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Prophecy has a bad habit of disappearing. Sufficiently vitiated by the end of the Second 
Temple period, some scholars argue, it could persist only under pseudepigraphic guise or, 
at least among the rabbis, through a bat qol, an attenuated divine voice with no 
substantial halakhic import.1 Along a slightly staggered timeline, this narrative of decline 
repeats itself among early “Christians,” despite the emergence of late antique “prophets” 
like Mani, the self-proclaimed Apostle of Jesus Christ whose teachings held none other 
than Augustine captive for a decade, and Montanus, whose followers included 
Tertullian.2 As if following Paul – “where there are prophecies, they will cease”3 – 
                                                          
1 For an exhaustive survey of past literature, see L. Stephen Cook, On the Question of the “Cessation of 
Prophecy” in Ancient Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). While Cook argues that “Second Temple 
Jews did, on the whole, tend to believe that prophecy had ceased in the Persian period,” (Cook, On the 
Question, 192), he notes that the question of whether prophecy continued or ceased often depends on one’s 
methodology and definition of prophecy. This is perhaps telling of the impasse regarding the question as a 
whole in so far as its highlights deeply embedded assumptions regarding “prophecy” as an ontologically 
static category that undergoes periods of “transformations” from the “classical Biblical” era to its supposed 
“decline” rather than as disjointed and discursive formations that must be interrogated according to 
particular times, places, and communities. I keep historical change at the forefront of the study and bracket 
all questions of universal “definitions” of prophecy.  
2 Cook, On the Question, 119-21. Following Weberian metanarratives of charismatic decline and 
institutionalization, Aune writes, “After the process of institutionalization was largely completed, a process 
which did not occur at the same rate in all parts of the Greco-Roman world, the prophet became an 
endangered species, primarily because of the social changes which had taken place,” in D.E. Aune, 
Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1983), 204. It is curious that the Weberian model of institutionalization – one which emerges 
from a peculiarly Protestant rereading of capital and history – should provide the interpretative model for a 
pre-modern “Greco-Roman” world. For a strong critique on the scholarly practice of employing peculiarly 
“European” models of analysis as “universal” models to interpret non-“European” phenomena, see: D. 
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 47-71. Nevertheless, Aune sees the Odes of Solomon (2nd / 3rd Century 
(?); Syriac) as evidence for the continuation of prophecy as a representative of a “special form of 
Christianity.” See D.E. Aune, “The Odes of Solomon and Early Christian Prophecy,” in Apocalypticism, 
Prophecy and Magic in Early Christianity: Collected Essays (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 320-46, 
322. For a lengthy critique of Weberian narratives of decline especially as it relates to prophecy, see L. 
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scholars of Judaism and Christianity have read what I will explore in this dissertation as 
the persistence of “prophecy,” ironically enough, almost wholly through a narrative of 
decline, a way station on the road to “classical” Judaism and “orthodox” Christianity.  
As I will elaborate in the following section, scholars have critiqued this narrative 
of decline on two parallel fronts. Scholars of Second Temple Judaism, for example, have 
demonstrated that those literary practices long held to be evidence of prophetic decline, 
especially “pseudepigraphic” attribution, demonstrate instead the continued vitality of 
prophecy and revelation as a “legitimate” expression of Jewish literary imagination and 
production.4 They flip the narrative of decline on its head, arguing that the continued 
production of revelatory literature like Jubilees and 4 Ezra bears witness to the continued 
relevance of prophecy among Second Temple Jews. In the same vein, scholars of ancient 
Christianity have highlighted the continued interest among Christians in prophetic and 
revelatory literature. As Paul Alexander demonstrates, Christians continued to recycle, 
expand, and produce revelatory texts throughout late antiquity.5 Furthermore, as Laura 
Nasrallah has insightfully argued, the narrative of prophetic decline falls in line with the 
“rhetoric of ancient texts” and Weberian notions of progress.6 When scholars read these 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nasrallah, An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity (Harvard Theological Studies 
52; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 11-20. 
3 1 Cor. 13.8.  
4 E. Mroczek, The Literary Imagination in Jewish Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); A. 
Jassen, Mediating the Divine: Prophecy and Revelation in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Second Temple 
Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2007); H. Najman, Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation 
and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2010); ibid., Losing the Temple and 
Recovering the Future: An Analysis of 4 Ezra (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
5 P.J. Alexander, The Byzantine Apocalyptic Trajectory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); D. 
Frankfurter, “The Legacy of Jewish Apocalypses in Early Christianity: Regional Trajectories,” in The 
Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity (eds. J.C. VanderKam and W. Adler; Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1996), 129-200. 
6 Nasrallah, Ecstasy, 13.  
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texts that supposedly bear witness to a universal “disenchantment” with prophecy as 
rhetoric rather than as transparent windows into the past, we open up space for more 
plausible representations of the past. At the same time, Nasrallah’s arguments goad us to 
be ever mindful of the contingent events that led to the naturalization of such narratives 
of decline within particular academic disciplines in the first place.7 
Nevertheless, one might admit that the narrative of decline is surprisingly durable 
in part because its tropes are found in a wide range of texts, including those written by 
Second Temple Jews, rabbis, “Christians,”8 and “second sophistic” Greeks like Plutarch.9 
Is this, then, evidence for universal disenchantment with prophecy? Of course not. In 
fact, the Weberian metanarrative of prophetic decline does a shockingly poor job of 
accounting for our late antique evidence preserved in Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and 
Coptic. Even if one accepts the “narrative of prophetic decline” among late antique Jews, 
for example, one is hard-pressed to account for the resurgence of post-Talmudic Jewish 
apocalypses like Sefer Zerubbabel or Sefer Eliyahu or the earliest Jewish “mystical” 
literature known as Hekhalot literature.10 This is not to deny that “things changed” 
between the latest extant “Jewish” apocalypse in the first century (4 Ezra; 2 Baruch) and 
                                                          
7 See now C.A. Barton and D. Boyarin, Imagine No Religion: How Modern Abstractions Hide Ancient 
Realities (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016). For more on rhetoric in the Christian context, see: 
A. Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991). 
8 Cook, On the Question, 149-73.   
9 Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles (LCL 306; trans. F.C. Babbitt; Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1936), 348-501.  
10 A.Y. Reed, Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic 
Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 233-72; M. Himmelfarb, Tours of Hell: An 
Apocalyptic Form in Jewish and Christian Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1983); J.C. Reeves, “Exploring the Afterlife of Jewish Pseudepigrapha in Medieval Near Eastern Religious 
Traditions: Some Initial Soundings,” JSJ 30 (1999): 148-77; ibid., Trajectories in Near Eastern 
Apocalyptic: A Postrabbinic Jewish Apocalypse Reader (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005). 
Curiously, the same might be said for later Syriac apocalypses as well. See M. Henze, The Syriac 
Apocalypse of Daniel: Introduction, Text, and Commentary (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 17-22.  
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the emergence of Sefer Zerubbabel in the seventh century, but to insist that such changes 
must be explained through a range of particular parameters rather than glossed over as the 
dying gasps of the prophetic spirit.    
The same might be asked about the Christians. Indeed, it is only by uncritically 
following the precedence set by late antique heresiographers, who argued that 
Manichaeans and those “Jewish Christians” responsible for texts like the Pseudo-
Clementine complex are not “Christian,” can scholars assume that prophecy “died out” 
among “Christians.”11 As I demonstrate in this dissertation, conceptions of prophecy and 
prophethood continued to be debated among such groups. Indeed, going beyond the 
Jew/Christian binary, we also trace lines of continuity from the Second Temple Jewish 
apocalypses into communities now typically labelled as “Jewish Christian” or 
“Gnostic.”12 Finally, despite Plutarch’s arguments that divinatory power had diminished 
in his day and age, we would be ill-advised to take such statements as emblematic of their 
“true beliefs” or as evidence of universal disenchantment, especially when viewed vis-à-
vis Iamblichus’ developing notions of theurgy, divination, and divinization two hundred 
years after Plutarch. 
Representing Prophethood and Prophecy 
 
                                                          
11 It is important to recognize that even the epistemological structure by which scholars array “religions” – 
especially Christianity, Judaism, and other heresies – is not a natural designation of “Christianity” or 
“Judaism.” See T. Berzon, Classifying Christians: Ethnography, Heresiology, and the Limits of Knowledge 
in Late Antiquity (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016). 
12 J.C. Reeves, Heralds of that Good Realm: Syro-Mesopotamian Gnosis and Jewish Traditions (Leiden: 
Brill, 1996).   
 5   
 
Yet what is prophecy? Cook’s warning that one’s methodological approach and 
definition of prophecy determines one’s conclusion should be taken seriously.13 In this 
sense, any definition of prophecy opens a set of possibilities and closes another. As a way 
of rendering this quandary useful for scholars, I lean on Frank Ankersmit’s distinction 
between historical description and representation:14 whereas historical description 
operates within an economy of value, essence, and truth that links “words” to “things,” 
e.g., the description “the cat (thing) is black (word)” can be verified or falsified on the 
basis of whether the cat is in fact black or not, historical representation is a metaphorical 
operation that connects “things to things,” e.g. a painting (thing) of a cat represents a cat 
(thing). Just as it would be senseless to say that the painting is “true or false,” so it is 
senseless to state that any representation of the past is “true or false” without first 
circumscribing the parameters of the discussion. The plausibility of historical 
representation, however, remains entirely within the realm of scholarly analysis. 
Therefore, as Ankersmit tells us, “truth” is not the criteria through which a scholar 
produces historical knowledge, but what is at stake.15 
With Ankersmit’s sage words in mind, I frame “prophethood” and “prophecy” in 
particular ways in order to present a plausible representation of the past. It may therefore 
be helpful to begin with how I position (not define) prophecy and prophethood within this 
dissertation.16 First, this dissertation moves away from absolute definitions of prophecy, 
                                                          
13 Cook, On the Question, 192.  
14 F.R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).  
15 Ibid., Historical Representation, 35. 
16 For a recent application of contextual analyses, see L. Salaymeh, The Beginnings of Islamic Law: Late 
Antique Islamicate Legal Traditions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1-15; E.A. Clark, 
History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 
130-55; A.Y. Reed, “Rethinking (Jewish-)Christian Evidence for Jewish Mysticism” in Hekhalot Literature 
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which are interwoven with values of truth and worth against which one might measure 
“prophecy’s” amplification or degradation, e.g., the movement from “classical” prophetic 
“biblical” texts to non-“biblical” “pseudepigraphic” apocalypses, or the movement from 
“charisma” to “institution.” For the purposes of this dissertation, I position “prophecy” as 
a way about talking about knowledge above and beyond the normal processes of human 
ratiocination, a discourse about “knowledge” beyond human ken and epistemological 
capability.17 This can only ever be a provisional “definition” of “prophecy” as it is one 
toggled to my particular position as a Korean-American within twenty-first century 
academic culture. It does not pretend to be a pure artifact retrieved from the past, but a 
lens for producing scholarly knowledge and a way of marking some texts as relevant 
comparanda in the hopes of approximating an ancient discourse.  
Second, while recognizing the value of sociological and anthropological 
approaches to “prophecy” in the wider ancient Roman Empire, especially the study of 
divination, this dissertation primarily attends to the textual surface and literature about 
prophecy coming from a specific time and place. Consequently, it does not ask what 
“prophecy” and “prophethood” might tell us about “society” or the Greco-Roman 
mentalité, but attends to the poetics of the text and its discernible anxieties, modes of 
persuasion, and the rhetorical goals that animate the text, that is, its discourse. As 
discourse, “prophecy” in the ancient world is at the same time a conversation interwoven 
by threads of power and pockmarked with sites of contestation. It sprawls into adjacent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in Context: Between Byzantium and Babylonia (eds. R. Boustan, M. Himmelfarb, and P. Schäfer; TSAJ 
153; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,  2013), 349-77, 364-76. 
17 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (Trans. A.M. Sheridan 
Smith; New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 21-39. 
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territories, e.g., the nature of “revelatory knowledge,” means of acquisition, non-
discursive modes of thinking, and the nature of divinity itself, which are also discussed in 
this dissertation.   
Furthermore, this dissertation distinguishes between “prophethood,”18 namely, 
discursive statements that explicitly discuss the qualifications and characteristics of a 
“prophet,” from prophecy. There are two primary reasons for this distinction. The first is 
historical: As I argue in the first half of the dissertation, prophethood itself emerges as an 
object of explicit theoretical discourse among local Syrian communities, partly due to the 
intrusion of Manichaeans. The second is methodological and oriented towards expanding 
the discussion to include affiliated yet understudied sub-fields. By positing prophethood 
as a discursive category that emerges in late antique Mesopotamia, I articulate a concept 
that will perhaps be of use for scholars of Mandaeism, a “religion” that emerged from the 
same “Jewish Christian” roots as the Manichaeans in the fifth century,19 and early 
“Islamic” theorizations of the “prophethood” of Muhammad and his household, which 
emerged in the first few centuries following the Arab conquests.20 I offer an 
understanding of “prophethood” rooted in the “Jewish Christian” reception of Second 
Temple Jewish apocalypses.21 Obviously, both prophecy and prophethood are rather 
                                                          
18 Michael Pregill proposes incorporating “comparative prophetology” into the study of the late antiquity. 
See M. Pregill, “Ahab, Bar Kokhba, Muḥammad, and the Lying Spirit: Prophetic Discourse before and 
after the Rise of Islam,” in Revelation, Literature, and Community in Late Antiquity (eds. P. Townsend and 
M. Vidas; TSAJ 146; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). 
19 See now K.T. van Bladel, From Sasanian Mandaeans to Ṣābians of the Marshes (Leiden: Brill, 2017). 
Van Bladel argues that Mandaeaism emerged in the fifth century in the Sasanian milieu from the same (or 
similar) community of “Jewish Christians” from which Mani emerged.  
20 P. Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012); ibid., “Jewish-Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part One),” JNES 74.2 
(2015): 225-53; ibid., “Jewish-Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part Two),” JNES 75.1 (2016): 1-32. 
21 Reeves, Heralds, 209-11. 
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chunky categories and overlap to some degree. Nevertheless, in light of both the 
emergence of “prophethood” as an object of discourse in late antiquity and in preparation 
for the future horizons of this dissertation, theories of prophethood must be disentangled 
from prophecy in general.  
One might critique this methodological deferral of “real” prophecy as merely a 
license to compare a range of texts based on a set of loose-resemblances, claiming, for 
example, that the theorizations of revelatory knowledge among late antique Neoplatonists 
have nothing to do with early Jewish mystical literature.22 Yet, to the degree that all 
frameworks of comparison are already conditioned by disciplinary histories and 
practices, this critique falls flat on its face;23 there is no inherent reason, to choose one 
particularly salient example, that scholars must read early Jewish “mystical” literature 
known as Hekhalot literature solely with Jewish texts as relevant comparanda.24 In fact, 
the historian’s indexing of time and place as the primary constraints on “discourse” might 
provide a more robust method for comparing “unlike” materials than “internalist” 
parameters erected by religious “tradition,” e.g. “Jewish literature” or “Christian 
literature.” In other words, contemporary “Christian,” “Jewish Christian,” and “Pagan” 
                                                          
22 In this sense, it is important to remember J.Z. Smith’s point that “difference” or “uniqueness” only make 
sense against a backdrop that presumes similarities. The goal is to make difference “interesting” for 
scholarly analysis. Or, in his words, “It reminds us that comparison is, at base, never identity. Comparison 
requires the postulation of difference as the grounds of its being interesting (rather than tautological) and a 
methodical manipulation of difference, a playing across the ‘gap’ in the service of some useful end.” See: 
J.Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982), 
35. 
23 For an example for the emergence and naturalization of a “World religions” model, see: T. Masuzawa, 
The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of 
Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).  
24 Again, following Smith, “For the self-conscious student of religion, no datum possesses intrinsic interest. 
It is of value only insofar as it can serve as exempli gratia of some fundamental issue in the imagination of 
religion. The student of religion must be able to articulate clearly why ‘this’ rather than ‘that’ was chosen 
as an exemplum” (Smith, Imagining Religion, xi).  
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discourses on prophecy and prophethood may end up better illuminating particular 
developments in Jewish literature, society, and culture than studies that forefront the 
study of “Jewish” literature.  
Finally, this dissertation begins where the critiques of the cessation of prophecy 
ends. It recognizes that despite critiques of the “cessation of prophecy” narrative in both 
ancient Judaism and Christianity, the parameters of scholarly discussion are largely taken 
from the narrative itself, namely, Second Temple literature written in Hebrew and 
Aramaic or the New Testament.25 As a result, the narrative beyond the “cessation of 
prophecy” remains relatively unexplored. What about late antique notions of prophecy 
becomes visible if we discard the Weberian narrative of cessation that inevitably colors 
later prophecy as vitiated prophecy? How might we best contextualize late antique 
literature centered on prophecy and prophethood?  
To answer these questions, I look at the interlocking discourses on prophecy and 
prophethood among late antique Syrians roughly between the destruction of the Second 
Temple and the rise of the Islam. My dissertation focuses on one moment and place 
within this history – late antique Syria – and draws on texts coming from this particular 
milieu. These texts include the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies (4th century; Greek), the 
Cologne Mani Codex (4th century; originally Aramaic and written in Mesopotamia, 
preserved in Greek and transmitted throughout Syria and probably Egypt), the Kephalaia 
of the Teacher (4th-5th century; originally Aramaic [?], preserved in Coptic), the Hekhalot 
                                                          
25 The “New Testament” often bookends the academic discussion of prophecy in “Christianity.” The 
implication is that prophecy does not belong within the history of early “Christianity,” which in turn is 
narrowly circumscribed as the New Testament and “patristics” literature. For a recent example, see J. 
Verheyden, K. Zamfir, and T. Nicklas (eds.), Prophet and Prophecy in Jewish and Early Christian 
Literature (WUNT 286; Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2010); Cook, On the Question, 119-21.  
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corpus (5th century[?] onwards; Hebrew and Aramaic), and Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis 
Aegyptorum (4th century; Greek). I contextualize these sources with one another and 
through sources preserved in Syriac – including the Didascalia Apostolorum (3rd to 4th 
century; originally Greek), the Syriac Acts literature, e.g., the Acts of Thomas, the 
Teaching of Addai, the Acts of Mar Mari (3rd-5th century), and the writings of Mar 
Ephrem (5th century), among others. In what follows, I frame my individual contributions 
to separate fields and conclude with a reflection on the application of time and place as a 
mode of navigating texts from a particular place methodological parameters to the study 
of a particular historical phenomenon. 
 
Pseudepigrapha, the Cessation of Prophecy, and its Reemergence 
 
“Pseudepigraphic” apocalypses occupy one major area of debate in the broader 
discussion on the cessation of prophecy. Though the practice of appending texts to earlier 
collections is already well-attested within the Tanakh, perhaps most famously in the three 
books of the prophet Isaiah, the Second Temple period bore witness to the birth of a 
relatively stable literary genre of “apocalypse” in which heavenly secrets, whether 
astronomical, eschatological, or broadly historical, were revealed to a set of “biblical” 
heroes.26 These apocalypses were often written under a “pseudepigraphic” guise, which 
some scholars argue furnishes evidence for the Jewish disenchantment with prophecy. As 
Shaye Cohen writes, “This pseudepigraphy is not the result of the accidental and 
                                                          
26 J.J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature, 2nd Ed. 
(Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1998), 1-42. 
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incorrect attribution of an anonymous work but is the result of deliberate misattribution 
by the author. Rather than admit their own identities, the authors of these works hid 
behind the masks of figures who lived at the very beginning of the world.”27 Cohen 
therefore reasons that scribes “forged” their documents in the name of earlier heroes 
precisely because “prophecy” ceased to be a compelling mode of authorizing texts in the 
scribes’ own time.  
This broad characterization of a range of “pseudepigraphic” texts as somehow 
degenerate prophecy has given rise in recent years to a chorus of objections. Echoing 
earlier voices, Alex Jassen demonstrated that the Qumran community transformed the 
broader Near Eastern phenomenon of “prophecy” to fit the needs of the Qumran 
community.28 Other scholars, most notably Hindy Najman and Eva Mroczek, have taken 
aim at the concept of the pseudepigrapha itself. In her recent study of 4 Ezra, Najman 
reimagines the “pseudepigraphic” attribution of the apocalypse as way of “rebooting” 
historical time in the face of world-ending, and time-ending, trauma.29 Though one 
cannot posit this singular explanation as applicable to all “pseudepigraphic” works, much 
less those that do not recount a particularly traumatic moment in Jewish history, 
Najman’s work highlights both the dangers of foisting modern conceptions of 
“authorship” unto the past and the demonstrates the value of positing a broad range of 
                                                          
27 S.J.D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (2nd Ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2006), 189. Nevertheless, even Cohen agrees that “it is unlikely that the authors were attempting to deceive 
their readers, or, in fact, that their readers were deceived.” (From the Maccabees, 190). 
28 Jassen, Mediating the Divine. Jassen defines prophecy according to Martti Nissinen’s definition, namely, 
as “transmission of allegedly divine messages by a human intermediary to a third party.” Though Jassen 
concludes that this ancient understanding of prophecy continued through the Qumran community, he 
admits that “it” underwent transformation, thereby raising questions of how one defines “transformation” at 
all. See: M. Nissinen, Prophecy in its Ancient Near Eastern Context: Mesopotamian, Biblical, and Arabian 
Perspectives (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 4.  
29 Najman, Losing the Temple, 1-25.  
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experiences behind “pseudepigraphic” works, even despite the perceived literary stability 
of the “apocalypses.” Likewise, Eva Mroczek argues that scholars have foisted 
anachronistic categories of “canon” and “author” to the study of our ancient texts and 
instead draws out “native” conceptualizations of the ancient Jewish literary 
imagination.30 For my purposes, her book highlights the sheer anachronism of the 
category of pseudepigraphy, and where it falls, so too must narratives of prophetic 
decline. Instead, as Mroczek reminds us, we must consider the ways that the Jews 
themselves imagined the boundaries and contours of their texts.31   
Yet, as important as Jassen, Najman, and Mroczek have been for pushing back 
against the “tyranny of canonical assumptions,” and, by extension, narratives of decline, 
they have tended to cleave closely to the texts set by the narrative itself, that is, texts 
written in Judea written in Hebrew and Aramaic among Second Temple Jews. As a result, 
their studies intervene most directly in the way that Second Temple Jews living in Judea 
specifically narrativized the connections between revelatory knowledge and literary 
imagination. Their interventions, moreover, do not apply a priori to apocalypses in 
general, and certainly cannot be taken as blanket statements for the literary modes of 
imagining apocalypses in the centuries that follow. Furthermore, their very choice of 
texts tends to be rather selective, clustering around texts written by or transmitted by the 
notoriously sectarian Qumran community or among Palestinian Jews following the 
destruction of the Second Temple. As I think Najman and Mroczek would agree, we 
should not take the literature of the Qumran community, for example, as representative of 
                                                          
30 Mroczek, Literary Imagination.  
31 Also see, S. L. Sanders, From Adapa to Enoch: Scribal Culture and Religious Vision in Judea and 
Babylon (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017). 
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Jewish literary production in general, especially if considered vis-à-vis the Egyptian 
Jewish literature of the same period.  
Having discarded the cessation of prophecy narrative and moving past the Second 
Temple period into late antique Syria, two potential trajectories emerges. One trajectory 
continues through those communities often labeled as “Jewish Christian.” Of course, the 
category of “Jewish Christian” is itself a subject of debate, though it is not necessary for 
the purposes of this dissertation to hash out whether these communities are or are not 
“Jewish Christian.”32 Nevertheless, I follow Visotzsky, Fonrobert, and Reed in 
understanding “Jewish Christianity” as both Jewish and Christian, instead of neither 
Jewish nor Christian, and therefore important for tracing historiographical narratives in 
the development of both “religions.”33 Returning to the topic, as John Reeves has made 
clear, Second Temple Jewish apocalypses had long afterlives among “Jewish Christian” 
communities that populated the Syro-Mesopotamian milieu. The most important of these 
communities were the “Elchasaite” Baptists, from whom Mani, the self-proclaimed 
Apostle of Jesus Christ, would emerge in the third century CE. The first section of this 
                                                          
32 For a helpful collection of “Patristic” references to Jewish-Christianity, see A.F.J. Klijn and G.J. Reinink, 
Patristic Evidence for Jewish-Christian Sects (Leiden: Brill, 1974); D. Bernard, Les disciples juifs de 
Jésus du Ier siècle à Mahomet: Recherches sur le mouvement ébionite (Paris: Cerf, 2017); F. 
Stanley Jones (ed.), Rediscovery of Jewish Christianity: From Toland to Baur  (History of Biblical 
Studies 5; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012); A.Y. Reed, “The Modern Jewish Rediscovery 
of ‘Jewish-Christianity’” in Jewish-Christianity and the History of Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
Forthcoming). For a trenchant critique of the category of Jewish-Christianity, see D. Boyarin, “Rethinking 
Jewish Christianity: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (To Which is Appended a 
Correction of My Border Lines),” JQR 99 (2009): 7–36. 
33 C. Fonrobert, “The Didascalia Apostolorum: A Mishnah for the Disciples of Jesus,” JECS 9 (2001): 
483–509; B. Visotzky, “Prolegomenon to the Study of Jewish-Christianities in Rabbinic Literature,” in 
Fathers of the World: Essays in Rabbinic and Patristic Literatures (WUNT 80; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1995), 129–49; A.Y. Reed, Jewish-Christianity and the History of Judaism. 
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dissertation contextualizes this discourse of prophethood among the early Mesopotamian 
followers of Mani.  
The second trajectory continues through more familiar channels, from Second 
Temple Judaism to Rabbinic Judaism and beyond. We hear little about rabbinic 
speculation of revelatory matters throughout late antiquity, at least not in ways that align 
with Second Temple era apocalypses. There is probably no single reason for the rabbinic 
rejection of apocalypses, though I find Schwartz’s general argument persuasive: The two 
failed Jewish revolts destroyed the institutional and ideological foundations that 
legitimized the production and circulation of apocalypses.34 Attachment to the Jerusalem 
Temple may help explain why Hebrew and Aramaic “revelatory” texts written in Judea 
abruptly stopped while those outside the land of Judea, like the originally Egyptian 
Sibylline Oracles, continued to be produced.35 Whatever the reason, as a result of the 
rabbis’ characteristic downplaying of revelation, scholars are hard-pressed to account for 
the resurgence of Hebrew and Aramaic revelatory texts in the early medieval era, most 
notably the Hekhalot corpus, Sefer Zerubbabel, Sefer Eliyyahu, and the R. Shimon bar 
Yohai “complex.” These texts have a complicated relationship with “classical” rabbinic 
literature and are perhaps better characterized as “para-rabbinic” texts rather than 
“rabbinic.”36  
                                                          
34 S. Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E. To 640 C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 62-99.  
35 J.J. Collins, “Sibylline Oracles: A New Translation and Introduction,” in The Old Testament 
Pseudepigrapha Volume One (ed. J.H. Charlesworth; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 2009), 317-
472. 
36 M. Himmelfarb, “Revelation and Rabbinization in Sefer Zerubbabel and Sefer Eliyyahu,” in Revelation, 
Literature, and Community in Late Antiquity (eds. P. Townsend and M. Vidas; TSAJ 146; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2011), 217-36; ibid., Jewish Messiahs in a Christian Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2017); J.C. Reeves, “Sefer Zerubbabel: The Prophetic Vision of Zerubbabel ben Shealtiel,” in Old 
 15   
 
I exploit this gap between these para-rabbinic texts and “rabbinic” Judaism to 
explore para-rabbinic late antique Jewish theorizations of divine knowledge.37 In this 
dissertation, I focus specifically on the Hekhalot literature. Yet how does one approach a 
corpus whose closest precedents are found centuries earlier in the Second Temple era? 
There is simply no magic wormhole that will connect the Hekhalot corpus to the Second 
Temple Jews.38 Recognizing this fact, scholars like Ra‘anan Bouston, Michael Swartz, 
and Moulie Vidas have demonstrated the importance of contextualizing the Hekhalot 
corpus through a range of corpora, especially alongside Jewish materials that overlap 
with, but were not identical to, rabbinic literature.39 As Ra‘anan Boustan writes,  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Testament Pseudepigrapha More Noncanonical Scriptures Volume One (eds. R. Bauckham, J.R. Davila, 
and A. Panaytov; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 448-66; ibid., 
Trajectories in Near Eastern Apocalyptic: A Postrabbinic Jewish Apocalypse Reader (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2005). For a handy Hebrew collection of such texts, see A. Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrasch: 
Sammlung kleiner Midraschim und vermischter Abhandlungen aus der jüdischen Literatur (6 vols; Leipzig, 
1853-77; Repr., Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1938). Also, see H. Spurling, “Hebrew Visions of 
Hell and Paradise: A New Translation and Introduction,” in Old Testament Pseudepigrapha More 
Noncanonical Scriptures Volume One (eds. R. Bauckham, J.R. Davila and A. Panayotov; Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 699-753.  
37 R. Boustan, “Rabbinization and the Making of Early Jewish Mysticism,” JQR 101.4 (2011): 482-501; 
For broader shifts, see S. Schwartz, “Rabbinization in the Sixth Century” in The Talmud Yerushalmi and 
Graeco-Roman Culture Volume 3 (ed. Peter Schäfer; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 55-69. 
38 Nevertheless, for attempts to connect early mystical literature with priestly castes, see R. Elior, The Three 
Temples: On the Emergence of Early Jewish Mysticism (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish 
Civilization, 2004). In response, see M. Himmelfarb, “Merkavah Mysticism since Scholem: Rachel Elior’s 
The Three Temples,” in Wege mystischer Gotteserfahrung: Mystical Approaches to God: Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam (ed. P. Schäfer; Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006), 19–36; R. 
Boustan, “Rabbinization,” 487-93.  
39  R. Boustan, “Rabbinization,” 493-501; ibid., From Martyr to Mystic: Rabbinic Martyrology and the 
Making of Merkavah Mysticism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 281-88; M.D. Swartz, Scholastic Magic: 
Ritual and Revelation in early Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 220-21; M. 
Vidas, Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). In her 
recent monograph on the seventh century “apocalypse” Sefer Zerubbabel, Martha Himmelfarb 
demonstrates that post-talmudic apocalypses drew from traditions that the rabbis rejected or otherwise 
sought to domesticate, pointing again to the value of contextualizing early medieval Jewish literature within 
the Christian culture of the Byzantine Empire. (Himmelfarb, Jewish Messiahs). 
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Rather than seek the ‘‘roots’’ of Jewish mystical and magical discourses within a hermetically 
sealed Jewish culture and documenting their linear, even teleological development through 
successive stages of Judaism, many scholars are increasingly taking up the challenge of tracing the 
crisscrossing ‘‘routes’’ of conceptual and material exchange at and across the boundaries of 
religious community and tradition.40  
 
I take up Boustan’s challenge, though I frame the parameters slightly differently. Instead 
of looking down from an aerial perspective to trace possible routes of intersection 
between “communities and traditions,” I suggest that communities themselves navigated 
shared conceptual spaces tethered to particular times and places. Their literature would 
therefore come to express this movement through this culturally-inflected, local “time 
and space.”41 This is not to discount possible points of intersection along communal 
borders, but to suggest a complementary model that respects both the particular aspects of 
late antique Jewish society, its continued “embeddedness” in a specific time and place, 
and its passage through that local context. Speaking spatially and temporally about the 
Hekhalot literature therefore allows me to frame it alongside the literature produced by 
other communities within a shared environment and the visible similarities among these 
regional and contemporary communities can then be attributed to analogous 
developments produced under a common environment. As I argue in the second part of 
this dissertation, this environment was characterized by multiple late antique 
                                                          
40 Boustan, “Rabbinization,” 486. For methodological considerations regarding the deployment of Syriac 
sources for the study of Judaism broadly, and Hekhalot literature specifically, see A.H. Becker, “Polishing 
the Mirror: Some Thoughts on Syriac Sources and Early Judaism” in Envisioning Judaism: Studies in 
Honor of Peter Schäfer on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday (vol. 2; eds. R. Boustan, K. Hermann, R. 
Leicht, A.Y. Reed, and G. Vetri; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 897-915. 
41 I draw on Soja’s critique and exploration of “space.” See E.W. Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los 
Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996). 
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communities theorizing the limits of human knowledge and the possibility of attaining 
revelatory knowledge.  
 
Localizing Christianity: Beyond “Religious” Representation and Towards “Context” 
 
This dissertation builds on critical insights voiced by scholars of religion to move away 
from the category of “religion” as an object of study in the ancient world.42 I translate this 
call practically to mean that scholars should move away from “religious tradition” as the 
operative principle for organizing our ancient texts and instead to experiment with other 
parameters of analysis. This dissertation employs a regional and synchronic approach to 
its chosen sources and therefore forefronts the “local” context in which “religious texts” 
were “embedded.” After all, if “religion” as a category was exported “from the local,” to 
use Dubuisson’s turn of phrase, by which he means the shift from “religion” as a 
historically-contingent Western category to an ostensibly neutral “universal” category, 
then this dissertation aims to return “religion” to the “local.”43 Even if, as Nongbri 
reminds us, there is no such thing as “embedded religion” since there is no such thing as 
“religion” in the ancient world, scholars still have the fact of embeddedness itself – that 
                                                          
42 To quote Judith Lieu in her critique of the “Parting of the Ways” model, she writes, “The problem of the 
model ‘parting of the ways’ is that… it operates essentially with the abstract or universal conception of 
each religion, when what we know about is specific and local” in “‘The Parting of the Ways?’: Theological 
Construct or Historical Reality?,” JSNT 56 (1994): 101-19, 108. This insight applies even beyond the 
narrow question of the “Parting of the Ways.” Indeed, if all our “Christian” or “Jewish” texts are “specific 
and local,” then it makes sense to read these corpora laterally according to their specific and local contexts. 
A.Y. Reed and L. Vuong, “Christianity in Antioch: Partings in Roman Syria” in Partings: How Judaism 
and Christianity became Two (ed. H. Shanks; Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeological Society, 2013), 
105-32. 
43 D. Dubuisson, “Exporting the Local: Recent Perspectives on ‘Religion’ as a Cultural Category,” Religion 
Compass 1 (2007): 787-800. 
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is, a text’s particular regional and temporal “context” – as an arena of analysis.44 This 
approach, while obvious in one sense, has radical consequences for how scholars 
represent Christianity. In fact, when scholars approach “Christianity” from the grounded 
perspective of a particular region and specific moment, much of what scholars assume, 
explicitly or implicitly, as representative of “Christianity” becomes radically relativized.  
The late antique Syrian milieu furnishes an excellent case study. For example, 
there is little reason why one should a priori accept John Chrysostom or Mar Ephrem, 
two of the more famous fourth century Syrian “Christians,” as more (or less) 
“representative” of Syrian Christianity than the creators of understudied texts like the 
Didascalia Apostolorum. Nor should we forget that Bardaisanites, Manichaeans, and 
Marcionites, among others, still populated the Syrian borderlands. We might push this 
logic further to incorporate “Jewish Christian” texts like the Book of Elchasai (2nd 
century), the Pseudo-Clementine complex (3rd-4th century), or the Kephalaia of the 
Teacher (3-5th century); these are all “representative” of Syrian Christianity and our 
privileging of one over the other often depends on disciplinary boundaries and hidden 
canons. Indeed, our vision of Syrian “Christianity” would look very different if we 
privileged these understudied texts as somehow emblematic of “Syrian Christianity.”  
An awareness of the limits of “Christianity” as a descriptive term for the various 
“Christianities” populating the Syrian plateau invites scholars to reassess the place of 
Syriac literature in particular, especially given its resurgence of interest precisely due to 
                                                          
44 B. Nongbri, “Dislodging ‘Embedded’ Religion: A Brief Note on a Scholarly Trope,” Numen 55 (2008): 
440-60.  
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its apparent ability to act as “contextual” material for other fields.45 In the face of such 
evidence for the varieties of “Christianities” in late antique Syria, it would be odd to 
sequester Mar Ephrem, to choose one outstanding example, solely within historiographic 
narratives of the Church of the East.46 Would he not also be participating in the broader 
patterns and discourses of his time and place? Part of the problem stems from the fact that 
this Syriac-speaking poet is often pegged as a historiographic point of origin for a 
recognizable “Church of the East” that is at once aligned with “Greek-speaking forms of 
Christianity” and discontinuous with a presumed “Jewish Christian” past.47 Ephrem 
therefore comes to “represent” Syriac Christianity in the fourth century because he aligns 
with our sensibilities of what Christianity ought to be. Yet Aaron Butts has recently 
argued that our picture of Ephrem is heavily mediated by the medieval scribes who 
“sanitized” Ephrem’s writings to align with their later Christological sensibilities.48 If 
Ephrem looks like an exemplary member of the Church of the East, it is because he was 
deliberately packaged by later scribes to be so. If Butts is correct, then Ephrem cannot 
                                                          
45 In response to this trend, see A. Becker, “Polishing the Mirror.”  
46 For example, see C. Shepardson, Anti-Judaism, 157-61. Following scholars like Sidney Griffith, 
Shepardson demonstrates the ways that Ephrem used anti-Jewish rhetoric in order to bring the Syriac-
speaking Church in line with Nicene forms of Christianity. My argument, however, is that Syriac sources 
do not have to be used for the purposes of reconstructing a historiographic narrative of the Church of the 
East, but can also be used as unwitting witnesses to broader local and regional shifts, dynamics, and 
parallel developments. There is no reason why the institutions responsible for the transmission of 
manuscripts needs to determine how they are used. For an example that compares Ephrem’s writings with 
rabbinic legal terminology, see: Y. Monnickendam, “Articulating Marriage: Ephrem’s Legal Terminology 
and its Origins,” Journal of Semitic Studies 58.2 (2013): 257-96.  
47 L.W. Barnard, “The Origins and Emergence of the Church of Edessa during the First Two Centuries 
A.D.,” VG 22 (1968): 161-75; S.B. Brock, “Jewish Sources in Syriac Sources,” JJS 30 (1979): 212-32; C. 
Sheperdson, Anti-Judaism and Christian Orthodoxy: Ephrem’s Hymns in Fourth Century Syria 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008). In response, see A. Becker, “Beyond the 
Spatial and Temporal Limes: Questioning the ‘Parting of the Ways’ Outside the Roman Empire” in The 
Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (eds. A.H. 
Becker and A.Y. Reed; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2007; repr. of Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 
373–92. 
48 A. Butts, “Manuscript Transmission as Reception History: The Case of Ephrem the Syrian (d. 373),” 
JECS 25.2 (2017): 281-306. 
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only be deployed as a point of origin for the Church of the East, but must also be 
configured horizontally as one type of “Christian” within the broader late antique Syrian 
environment. 
Second, scholars of early Syriac literature have focused intensely on 
demonstrating the “Greek” impact on “Syriac” Christianity. The sum of such scholarship 
is to demonstrate that Syriac Christianity was not an untrammeled oasis of a Semitic form 
of Christianity, but already deeply attuned to the Greek speaking Roman Near East.49 As 
Drijvers had already recognized in the case of the early second century Syriac-speaking 
“Christian” named Bardaisan, this “Aramean philosopher” was an active participant, 
however unique, in the intellectual and religious currents of his day.50 Ute Possekel too 
has exhaustively demonstrated that Ephrem was conversant in Greek philosophy.51 
Examples of “Hellenic” features might be multiplied with regard to other early Syriac 
texts like the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion.52 As Adam Becker has also argued, 
                                                          
49 S. Griffith, “Setting Right the Church of Syria: Saint Ephraem’s Hymns against Heresies” in The Limits 
of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R.A. Markus (eds. W.E. 
Klingshirn and M. Vessey; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 97-114; ibid., “Ephraem the 
Deacon of Edessa, and the Church of the Empire,” in Diakonia: Studies in Honor of Robert T. Meyer (eds. 
T. Halton and J.P. Williman; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 22-52.  
50 H.J.W. Drijvers, Bardaiṣan of Edessa (trans. Mrs. G.E. van Baaren-Pape; Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. 
N.V., 1966), 218-27; I. Ramelli, Bardaisan of Edessa: A Reassessment of the Evidence and a New 
Interpretation (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2009). In response, see A. Camplani, “Bardaisan’s Psychology: 
Known and Unknown Testimonies and Current Scholarly Perspectives” in Syriac Encounters: Papers from 
the Sixth North American Syriac Symposium Duke University, 26-29 June 2011 (eds. M. Doerfler, E. Fiano, 
and K. Smith; Leuven: Peeters, 2015), 259-76; U. Possekel, “Bardaisan of Edessa: Philosopher of 
Theologian?,” ZAC 10 (2006): 442-61; ibid., “Bardaisan of Edessa on the Resurrection: Early Syriac 
Eschatology in its Religious-Historical Context,” OC 88 (2004): 1-28. For new directions for 
contextualizing Bardaisan, see W. Adler, “The Kingdom of Edessa and the Creation of a Christian 
Aristocracy” in Jews, Christians, and the Roman Empire: The Poetics of Power in Late Antiquity (eds. 
A.Y. Reed and N. Dohrmann; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 43-62. 
51 U. Possekel, Evidence of Greek Philosophical Concepts in the Writings of Ephrem the Syrian (Leuven: 
Peeters, 1999).  
52 K. McVey, “The Letter of Mara Bar Serapion to his Son and the Second Sophistic: Palamedes and the 
‘Wise King of the Jews’” in Syriac Encounters, 305-25. 
 21   
 
Neoplatonic pedagogy also crept into Syriac education as part of this broader 
rapprochement with Greek education.53  
Having established that Syriac-speaking “Christians” were deeply conversant with 
intellectual currents in the Roman Near East, scholars must now attend to the more 
difficult task of navigating this enlarged “archive.” It is imperative, however, that 
scholars do not end up reinscribing the binary of Greek/Syriac Christianity that they 
sought to undermine lest we get cornered (or hoodwinked) into thinking that measuring 
the degree of “Greekness” on Syriac Christianity is a worthwhile endeavor. At the same 
time, the text/context framework that relegates Syriac literature as mere “context” to the 
foregrounded “text” must also be rejected in so far as it predetermines the range of 
possible conclusions to a question of how the expanded “context” informed the “text.” In 
the text/context model there remains only a single possible axis of analysis, one that 
extends from “accommodation” to “resistance.” What is lost in the process is a broader 
vision of Syriac-speaking Christians among other Syrian communities. How might 
expanding the range of comparanda for early Syriac literature inform scholarly analyses 
of these texts? How did early Syriac-speaking Christian communities respond to and 
participate in broader epistemic shifts?  
Syriac sources play an active role within my representation of the development of 
prophethood and prophecy. As such, they are not meant to compose the “background” or 
“context” for my foregrounded object of study but occupy a shared evidentiary plane. In 
this sense, I depend on the post-structuralist collapsing of text/context binary, which 
                                                          
53 A.H. Becker, Fear of God and the Beginning of Wisdom: The School of Nisibis and the Development of 
Scholastic Culture in Late Antique Mesopotamia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).  
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ultimately liberates scholars to experiment with models of comparative work.54 Such 
theoretical interventions may help scholars resituate Syriac sources beyond their current 
use as emblems of “Christian” identity, within trajectories of the “Church of the East,” or 
as “contextual” materials for other fields. Even more broadly, by arraying figures like 
Bardaisan and Ephrem as particular nodes within a wider interconnected net of Syrian 
literati, I hope to demonstrate the value of situating those sources preserved in Syriac as 
already participating in broader discourses of the Late Antique Near East.  
 
Late Antique Greek Philosophy 
 
This dissertation incorporates the writings of late antique Syrian philosopher Iamblichus 
with the aim of emplotting them within broader Syrian epistemic shifts centering on the 
revelatory knowledge. As such, I am less interested in approaching these figures 
“philosophically” – that is, discovering what they “truly” thought regarding a certain 
philosophical position – than in situating them among other local communities in a late 
antique Syrian milieu. As was the case with Syriac literature, I respond to calls from 
within the field of philosophy for a broader “contextualizations” of the “history of 
philosophy.”55  
Late antique Syria was marked by a peculiar density of philosophers allied with 
the Neoplatonic “movement.” We know very little about the life of Plotinus, the 
ostensible “founder” of “Neoplatonism,” yet we do know that he was accused of 
                                                          
54 Clark, History, 130-55. 
55 P. Adamson, “Neoplatonism: The Last Ten Years,” The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 9 
(2015): 205-220.  
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plagiarizing the works of Numenius, a Platonist philosopher from the Syrian city of 
Apamea.56 In fact, Numenius’ works were read in Plotinus’ seminars in Rome. Plotinus’ 
most important student Porphyry was of Syrian descent, as was Porphyry’s student and 
rival, Iamblichus.57 Both were probably conversant in a form of Aramaic. Indeed, their 
names in the original Aramaic – Porphyry from Malkhus and Iamblichus from Yamlikhu 
– preserve the m-l-k triconsonantal root (to rule; act as king), signifying their high station 
among the Syrian elite. All three early Neoplatonists had read the writings of the 
“Gnostics,” and reacted violently against them.58 Porphyry also read the writings of 
Bardaisan, whom he calls the Babylonian, and cited him approvingly, despite Porphyry’s 
distaste for Christians in general.59 Furthermore, given Apamea’s history with innovative 
thinkers, it is no surprise that Iamblichus chose to retire there and establish relationships 
with powerful socialites and politicians.60 We should remember that the Chaldean 
Oracles, which both Porphyry and Iamblichus studied intensively, was written by Syrian 
Platonic “theurgists” of some sort sometime in the second century.61 Later Neoplatonists 
like the “Christian” philosopher Pseudo-Dionysius also emerged from Syria, 
demonstrating the deep channels of “Neoplatonic” thought that persisted among Christian 
                                                          
56 Life of Plotinus 17-18.  
57 Millar’s remarks about the cultural “identity” of these two philosopher need not deter us here. 
Nevertheless, see F. Millar, “Porphyry: Ethnicity, Language, and Alien Wisdom,” in Rome, the Greek 
World, and the East: Volume 3 (eds. H.M. Cotton and G.M. Rogers; Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), 331-50. 
58 Enneads II.9. Iamblichus cites the Gnostics without any explicit sign of distaste in his commentary on De 
Anima, 4.23. See J. Dillon and J. Finamore, Iamblichus De Anima: Text, Translation, and Commentary 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 49, 136. 
59 Adler, “Kingdom of Edessa.” 
60 As apparent from the surviving collection of Iamblichus’ letters. See J.M. Dillon and W. Polleichtner 
(trans.), Iamblichus of Chalcis: The Letters (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009). 
61 R. Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989).  
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Syrians deep into late antiquity.62 At the same time, we should not underestimate the 
spread of Neoplatonism – specifically, an Iamblichean form of theurgic Neoplatonism – 
among the elite in the years shortly following Iamblichus’ death.63 None other than the 
Emperor Julian would adopt Iamblichus’ program of theurgy and his reputation as 
adherent of Iamblichean “divination” seems to have preceded him. In fact, Mar Ephrem 
blasted Julian by calling him a “Chaldean” and mocking his particular penchant for 
divinatory practices, which may signal that Mar Ephrem was aware of Julian’s adoption 
of Iamblichean theurgy, which is strongly associated with the Chaldean arts.64 Finally, by 
the time of the “School of Nisibis,” a curated form of Neoplatonic thought would enter 
into the Syriac speaking academy, which would ultimately prove instrumental for the 
spread and naturalization of “Neoplatonic” thought into the Islamic age.65 Ultimately, all 
this demonstrates that late antique Syria was a particularly fertile bed for both the 
precursors to Neoplatonism and for the Neoplatonists themselves. Moreover, their ideas 
crisscrossed in ways with both “Gnostics” and Syriac-speaking Christians in ways that 
opens us up to the possibility of an integrated bilingual world of Syrian intellectual 
thought.  
                                                          
62 C. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: No Longer I (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). For a robust overview of Dionysian theurgy, see S.K. Wear and J. Dillon, 
Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2007). 
63 I. Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity: The Invention of a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 2013). 
64 Ephrem calls Julian the “Chaldean.” Hymns against Julian 1.16; 4.7-8, 10-11, 26; S.N.C. Lieu (ed.), The 
Emperor Julian: Panegyric and Polemic: Claudius Mamertinus, John Chrysostom, Ephrem the Syrian 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press); S. Griffith, “Ephraem the Syrian’s Hymns ‘Against Julian’: 
Meditations on History and Imperial Power,” VC 41 (1987): 238-66. 
65 A. Becker, Fear of God. 
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Recent monographs have demonstrated a bit of the range to which Neoplatonic 
literature might be put to historical work. Jeremy Schott, for example, analyzes Porphyry 
within a post-colonial framework to articulate how “Christianity” presented itself as a 
hybridized threat to the Roman Empire.66 Aaron Johnson also situates Porphyry’s 
interplay between the particular and the universal as a “product of Empire.”67 More 
recently, Heidi Marx-Wolf read Iamblichus as participating in what she identifies as a 
late antique trend of “taxonomizing” spiritual beings.68 Dylan Burns has also recently 
argued that the final separation between the “Jewish Christian” Gnostics and Plotinus’ 
school can be pinpointed to the moment when Plotinus “kicked” the Gnostics out of his 
seminar.69 Though we are not beholden to follow Marx-Wolf or Burns to their ultimate 
conclusions, they nevertheless highlight how scholars might continue to employ 
“Neoplatonic” sources beyond their usual place within the “history of philosophy.” In 
keeping with this methodological momentum, I also attempt to make sense of these 
Syrian “Neoplatonists” within a late antique Syrian milieu.  
 
Late Antique Syria: Between Method and Data 
 
Syria has long been a crucible for studying the “limits” of imperial power.  Not 
surprisingly, the bulk of this scholarship contextualizes Syria as a peripheral province 
                                                          
66 J. Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008). See also A. Johnson, Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: the Limits of 
Hellenism in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
67 Johnson, Religion and Identity, 286. 
68 H. Marx-Wolf, Spiritual Taxonomies and Ritual Authority: Platonists, Priests, and Gnostics in the Third 
Century C.E. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). 
69 D.M. Burns, Apocalypse of the Alien God: Platonism and the Exile of Sethian Gnosticism (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 
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operating in relation to a Greek or Roman center.70 In his recent book, for example, 
Nathaniel Andrade argues that Syrians – broadly defined as those living in the Roman 
Near East – ultimately wove together Greek, Roman, and “local” cultural idioms as a 
mode of accommodating, appropriating, and/or resisting Roman-ness in a myriad of 
individual ways.71 Though one might nitpick Andrade’s interpretations of particular texts, 
his argument pushes scholars to rethink the “essentialist” identities and refocuses 
attention on the Syrians’ role in the process of “Hellenization” or “Romanization” from 
the bottom up as a strategy of resistance and accommodation. At the same time, while 
such attention to the subaltern is certainly welcome, the limitations of such studies mirror 
the problem alluded to above in the section on Syrian Christianity: when one understands 
“Syrian”-ness or “Roman”-ness as meaningful descriptions of one’s identity, the 
parameters of scholarly production are set to fixing “identity” along an axis of 
accommodation and resistance. The irony lies in the fact that Andrade argues for the non-
essential nature of “Syrian” identities while still understanding “Roman,” “Greek,” 
“Local” as descriptive categories. Andrade’s recent monograph, then, while significantly 
pushing forward the conversation by adopting concepts from post-colonial theory and 
attempting to go beyond “essential” identities, ends up reinscribing the utility of these 
                                                          
70 The literature is vast. For a comprehensive bibliography, see N. Andrade, Syrian Identity in the Greco-
Roman World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); P. Kosmin, “Seeing Double in Seleucid 
Babylonia: Rereading the Borsippa Cylinder of Antiochus I,” in Patterns of the Past: Epitēdeumata in the 
Greek Tradition (eds. A. Moreno & R. Thomas; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 173-98; T. 
Kaizer, “Religion in the Roman East,” in A Companion to Roman Religion (ed. J. Rüpke; Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011), 446-56; J. Elsner, “Cultural Resistance and the Visual Image: The Case of Dura 
Europos,” Classical Philology 96 (2001): 269-304; W. Ball, Rome in the East: the Transformation of an 
Empire (London: Routledge, 2000); M. Sommer, “Modeling Rome’s Eastern Frontier: the case of 
Osrhoene,” in Kingdoms and Principalities in the Roman Near East (eds. T. Kaizer and M. Facella; 
Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), 217-26; F. Millar, The Roman Near East 31 BC-AD 337 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
71 Andrade, Syrian Identity, 288-313. 
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categories through his denial of their fixity; whether “both/and,” “neither/nor,” or 
“already/always,” the categories of analysis – Greek, Roman, and Near Eastern – remain 
the same.  
Scholars of religious studies have approached Syria and “Syrian” identity in more 
oblique ways, working through the writings of Syrian “religious” communities in order to 
look at Syria from the inside-out. From this perspective, “Roman” power operates less as 
a thing a Syrian might “talk back to” but as part and parcel of his or her participation in 
“Roman-ness.” For example, Laura Nasrallah’s work complicates the processes of center 
and periphery that dominates much of the scholarship alluded to above.72 Her argument 
that Justin, Tatian, and Lucian might be profitably read together through the lens of the 
Second Sophistic cuts across entrenched disciplinary divides, especially between Classics 
and Religious Studies, and nuances questions of cultural transformation. Another 
example might be found in Hayim Lapin’s book on rabbinic literature as “the product of 
Roman, provincial, city-dwelling men.”73 In Lapin’s categorization, the rabbis are not 
“Roman-ized” Jews – as if these two were separate domains – but simply Roman Jews in 
so far as they inhabited the material and ideological habitus of the Roman Near East. In 
like manner, Annette Yoshiko Reed and Natalie Dohrmann have interrogated regnant 
                                                          
72 L. Nasrallah, “Mapping the World: Justin, Tatian, Lucian, and the Second Sophistic,” Harvard 
Theological Review 98 (2005): 283-315; J. Elsner, “Describing Self in the Language of Other: Pseudo(?)-
Lucian at the Temple of Hierapolis,” in Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic 
and the Development of Empire (ed. S. Goldhill; New Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
123-53; Andrade, Syrian Identity, 261-313. 
73 H. Lapin, Rabbis as Romans: The Rabbinic Movement in Palestine, 100-400 CE (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 65.  
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practices of “contextualizing” Judaism and Christianity against a “Roman Empire,” and 
instead seek to reorient these communities as inescapably Roman.74  
Such experimentations in “contextualizing” Jews, Christians, and Pagans 
alongside and together with the Roman Empire, rather than models that situates these 
groups “in front of” or “behind” the Empire, might be profitably brought to bear on the 
Syrian context itself. Though this dissertation does not explicitly address the poetics of 
Roman imperial rule, following the studies raised above, it embeds the communities 
studied here – Jewish Christians, Christians, Jews, Manichaeans, and Platonists – as 
inevitably “Romans,” as if they could be anything but Romans. The common regional 
and temporal prism is certainly not a license to collapse the often radical differences 
among these communities – and to be clear, I am not arguing that various identities 
dissolve into a homogeneous Syrian humanity – but an opportunity to descry parallel 
developments, points of intersection, or to put it more poetically, “differences predicated 
on similarities, and similarities predicated on differences.”75 In other words, though such 
communities certainly acted, at times, in polemical exchange with one another in ways 
that had significant ramifications for the ways they articulated their “identity” vis-à-vis 
other “identities,” one cannot forget that they were interlocked along chains of power, 
discourse, and affect that ordered the Roman Near East. As such, one can study these 
communities together as Syrians to tell a single multifaceted narrative. Of course, one 
must attend to how each community drew from a well of locally-available and 
communally-delimited materials and strategies. Yet, in my view, that is only half the 
                                                          
74 Dohrmann and Reed, Jews, Christians.  
75 Dohrmann and Reed, Jews, Christians, 3.  
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story; the other half is trying to understand how these communities deployed such 
particular strategies and ordered materials in ways that “make sense” vis-à-vis their 
neighbors.  
Chapter Outline and Argument of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on prophethood as an 
emergent object of discourse and as a strategy of articulating difference. This first part 
focuses on the Cologne Mani Codex, the Kephalaia of the Teacher, and the Pseudo-
Clementine Homilies as examples of how a particular cross-section of Syrian 
communities began to theorize and articulate difference through concepts of 
prophethood. The second part pivots to an exploration of prophecy as revelatory 
knowledge. It argues that despite their differences, concepts of revelatory knowledge – 
especially as they cluster around the word prognosis – began to converge among a broad 
range of local Syrian communities.  
 In chapter one, I focus on the Cologne Mani Codex, a third century document 
written by early followers of Mani. In contrast to scholars who look at the Codex as a 
window into the origins of a distinct religion we now know as “Manichaeism,” I argue 
that the “origin of religion” model does little to explain its complexities. I focus in 
particular on Baraies the Teacher’s homily to his “brothers.” As opposed to most scholars 
who interpret Baraies’ homily as an expression for an already well-established 
Manichaean “prophetology,” I argue instead that we must read it as crafted text that was 
delivered for a specific occasion. I argue that Baraies’ homily preserves evidence for a 
fissure that developed among the followers of Mani, not between “Manichaeans” and 
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“others.” Accoridng to Baraies, at least, this fissure split the community between those 
who understood Mani as a prophet in the line of other prophets, and those who did not. 
The Codex thus bears witness to the emerging importance of “prophethood” as a mode of 
articulating between “true” and “false” forms of Mesopotamian “Christianity.”  
 Chapter two examines the discursive transformations of “prophethood” as it 
entered the Roman Near East. It focuses on the prophetological systems found in the 
Coptic Manichaean text known as the Kephalaia of the Teacher. I argue that despite 
sharing a tendency towards systematization, the Kephalaia has no master 
“prophetological” system, but multiple systems that bear witness to their different origins. 
I argue that these diverse prophetological systems respond to Manichaean anxieties 
regarding the relationship between “Manichaeism” and other local Syrian forms of 
Christianity, as evidenced by the Didascalia Apostolorum and the Syriac texts narrating 
the spread of “Christianity” into Syria and Mesopotamia. Syrian Manichaean 
prophetology emerges as a way for Manichaeans to identify themselves as Christians and 
to claim superiority over Christians. In so doing, the Syrian Manichaeans responsible for 
the creation of the Kephalaia engage in a type of oblique competition with non-
Manichaean forms of Christianity.  
 Chapter three turns to examine the unique system of prophethood found in the 
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, an early fourth century text. I follow other scholars in 
agreeing that its unique privileging of the oral-aural transmission of prophetic knowledge 
evinces awareness of the developing rabbinic ideology of the Oral Torah. At the same 
time, I demonstrate that contemporary medical and embryological discourses provide the 
raw conceptual materials for this system of prophethood and prophecy. Ultimately, I 
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situate the Homilies as a counter-Manichaean prophetological system, one that adopts the 
position as Jews in order to critique what it conceives to be false prophetic teachings, 
which from its own peculiar “Jewish Christian” position, included not only the doctrines 
of the “Catholic” Church, as demonstrated by the Didascalia, but also those espoused by 
the Manichaeans.  
Part Two turns to explore the concept of revelatory knowledge by attending to the 
shifting semantic field of the Greek/Coptic word prognosis. Chapter four argues that a 
range of late antique Syrian communities expressed deep skepticism towards humanity’s 
ability to apprehend the divine. As might be expected, there is no single reason for this 
trend but a stream of converging discursive statements. Their explanations range from 
faulty bodily composition (Ps.-Cl. Hom.), the futility of human reasoning processes, 
especially Greek modes of logic-splitting (Iamblichus, Ps.-Cl. Hom., Ephrem), the threat 
of destruction (rabbis), or simply because God is too transcendent (Iamblichus, Ephrem). 
Nevertheless, while some communities were perfectly content with “horizontal” forms of 
knowledge-production, e.g., the analysis of “mysteries” embedded in Scripture and nature 
(Ephrem) or by approaching “Torah” – broadly conceived – as an expansive endeavor 
tied to creation (rabbis), others sought to establish a “vertical” link with the divine by 
rhetorically fashioning an alternative domain of “revelatory knowledge,” that is, “divine 
prognosis.” This conception of prognosis was absolutely distinct from human modes of 
knowledge production and acquisition (Iamblichus, Ps.-Cl. Homilies, Manichaeans). As I 
argue in this chapter, “divine knowledge” belongs solely to the divine and therefore 
cannot be “transmitted” or even “experienced” through the channels of normal human 
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physiognomy. In this sense, divine knowledge as prognosis is not “knowledge,” at least if 
conceived as a discrete “byte” of information, but its divine cause, source, or essence. 
The final chapter extends the argument of chapter four to the Sar Torah 
macroform in the Hekhalot corpus. I examine the Sar Torah as a privileged example for 
how Syrian theorizations of divine knowledge generated the broader environment for the 
development of the Sar Torah traditions. I argue that the Sar Torah’s flirtation with 
“angelic contemplation” as well as its articulation of an “instantaneously knowable” 
Torah that stands apart from rabbinic models of transmitting Torah aligns well with the 
argument explored in chapter four. I conclude by arguing that the Sar Torah traditions 
and the late antique Syrian discourse on divine prognosis might be viewed profitably as 






CHAPTER ONE: THE EMERGENCE OF A DISCOURSE OF PROPHETHOOD 
AMONG EARLY FOLLOWERS OF MANI 
 
The study of prophecy and prophethood in the Syrian borderlands cannot be told without 
first going across the Roman limes into Sasanian Persia, where the third century 
Mesopotamian prophet named Mani was rapidly finding adherents across the entire 
spectrum of Sasanian communities, ranging from “Jewish-Christian” Baptists to 
Zoroastrian nobles. Proclaiming himself the Paraclete and an Apostle of Jesus Christ, 
Mani sent his missionaries westward deep into the Roman Empire and eastward towards 
China. His aggressive missionizing efforts can be understood, in part, alongside his 
unique understanding of regional prophethood. Just as Buddha was sent as a prophet to 
India and Kushan, Zoroaster to Persia, Jesus to the West, Plato to the Greeks, and Hermes 
to Egypt,76 Mani was sent to the middle of the world, Mesopotamia. Unlike his 
predecessors whose churches were narrowly circumscribed to particular regions, Mani 
was a universal prophet who came to restore the entire world to the original and true 
teachings of Jesus the Savior.77  
 It was only with the discovery and decipherment of the Cologne Mani Codex, 
henceforth CMC,78 that scholars gained access into some of the problems that beset the 
                                                          
76 For the Syriac text, I rely on: C.W. Mitchell, St. Ephraim’s Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion, and 
Bardaisan: Transcribed from the Palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623 (2 vols; repr. Gorgias Press, 2008; Oxford: 
Williams and Norgate, 1912). For the English translation, see: vol. 2, xcviii. For the Syriac: vol. 2, p. 208, 
ln. 21-29. 
77 Stroumsa writes, “Each was sent only to one area of the world, while Mani, the only prophet to offer a 
total revelation, valid for all peoples in the entire oikoumene, seals prophecy.” See: G. Stroumsa, The 
Making of Abrahamic Religions in Late Antiquity (Oxford University Press, 2015), 68. 
78 Editio princeps: A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, ‘Der Kölner Mani-Kodex (P.Colon.inv.nr.4780) Περὶ τῆς 
γέννης τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ’, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 19 (1975): 1-85; 32 (1978) 87-199; 
44 (1981): 201-318; 48 (1982): 1-59. I also consulted the following: L. Koenen und C. Römer, Der Kölner 
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early followers of Mani in the years shortly following his execution in the late third 
century. The CMC demonstrated that Mani’s earliest followers were still debating what it 
meant for Mani to be a “prophet.” In fact, “prophethood” is the main topic of debate in 
Baraies the Teacher’s homily (CMC 45.1-72.7). Indeed, the entirety of this lengthy 
homily amounts to a sophisticated argument proving that Mani was a prophet like the 
prophets who had come before him. Baraies cites passages from texts ostensibly written 
by their ancestral “biblical” prophets – Adam, Sethel, Enosh, Shem, Enoch, and Paul 79 – 
and patches these passages together to construct a “typology” of prophethood.80 This 
typology defined a prophet as someone 1) who was “raptured” and acquired revelatory 
knowledge, 2) who inscribed that revelation as a “memoir” for posterity, and 3) who 
chose an elect community to safeguard and propagate his teachings. Just as the ancestral 
prophets had met all three criteria for prophethood, so too had Mani. Therefore, Baraies 
argues, Mani should be considered a prophet in the same order as the earlier prophets.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
Mani-Kodex: Über das Werden seine Leibes Kritische Edition, Papyrologica Coloniensia Vol. XIV 
(Westdeutscher Verlag, 1988); ibid., Der Kölner Mani-Kodex: Abbildungen und Diplomatischer Text 
(Bonn; Habelt, 1985). Most translation are my own, and differences in translation between mine and others 
have been marked. For English translations, I consulted: R. Cameron and A.J. Dewey (trans.), The Cologne 
Mani Codex: “Concerning the Origin of His Body” (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979); I. Gardner 
and S.N.C. Lieu, Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 47-73.  
79 John Reeves has already conducted an exhaustive study on these apocalypses. See: J.C. Reeves, Heralds 
of that Good Realm: Syro-Mesopotamian Gnosis and Jewish Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 1996).  
80 Reeves also says, “There are therefore several key credentials for candidacy as a representative of the 
heavenly Light-Nous. At their bare minimum they include an ascent-experience, the formation and 
supervision of a select community of adherents who cherish the teachings of the adept, and the preparation 
of a written ‘memoir’ that faithfully records the circumstances of the ascent and some indication of the 
contents of the revelation. From Mani’s perspective, traditional figures who met these conditions merited 
consideration for apostolic status.” (Reeves, Heralds, 16). Though I agree with his assessment of the 
credentials for apostolic consideration, I disagree that we have evidence that this was “from Mani’s 
perspective.” Baraies is not merely “adopting” Mani’s understanding of prophethood, but he is constructing 
his own for his particular circumstances.   
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In stark contrast to triumphalist narratives of the rise of Manichaeism from its 
Elchasaite roots,81 Baraies’ homily bears witness to a community beset by uncertainty, 
riven by deep feuds, and characterized by intense struggles for the authority to speak on 
behalf of the recently deceased Mani. By interrogating the rhetoric, audience, and goals 
of Baraies homily, I argue that Baraies’ homily points to the emergence of a late third 
century Syro-Mesopotamian discourse of “prophethood” that played an increasingly 
important role in defining communal identity, as the following chapters will demonstrate. 
This discourse on “prophethood” was not a “natural” evolution from earlier 
prophetological doctrines stemming either from Elchasai or from Mani, as has been 
commonly assumed, but can be better understood as a local and occasional strategy of 
curating and presentating an ancient prophetic past for the purposes of negotiating intra-
communal politics. How one understood prophethood determined one’s “identity” either 
as a “true” follower of Mani or as a “false brother.”  
To argue this point, I first explore the identity of “the brothers” as followers of 
Mani. In contrast to other scholars who see Baraies’ homily as written after the hardening 
of boundaries between the “Manichaeans” and the “false brothers,” I argue that the “false 
brothers” are still “brothers,” in a sense, and that the homily can be more profitably read 
as a work that addresses both camps. The “brothers” are still “followers of Mani,” just 
not Baraies’ faction of brothers.  
I then turn to investigate the dispute between Baraies and his opponents. I first 
argue that the authority to interpret Mani’s writings and therefore to “represent” Mani 
following his death is what at stake in the larger debate between Baraies and his false 
                                                          
81 I speak more about this in the concluding section.  
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brothers. Baraies insists that he understands the signs embedded in Mani’s writings and 
that he and his faction were legitimate spokespersons for how the community should 
think about Mani’s prophethood. In order for Baraies’ to convince anyone, however, he 
must also demonstrate that he understands the deeper meaning of Mani’s writing. I argue 
that Baraies does this by showcasing his excellent command of the community’s literary 
heritage. Baraies’ ability to weave together multiple texts into a coherent argument and 
presentation demonstrates that he truly understands the meaning of the ancient prophetic 
texts, the “sense of their voice.”82 My goal in this section is to bring out the “occasional” 
nature of Baraies’ homily, rather than looking it as a transparent expression of “Syro-
Mesopotamian” gnosis or as an articulation of some inner “systematic” theology.  
In the concluding section, I contextualize Baraies’ homily against the broader 
narrative of Mani’s “biography” as depicted in the CMC. I demonstrate that the CMC as 
a whole shows Mani to be deeply involved with his “Elchasaite” community.83 Therefore, 
we cannot assume that Mani “broke” away from the Elchasaite community, but that he 
represents a fissure within that community. This directly parallels Baraies’ own vision for 
where Mani fits within Elchasaite history since he argues that Mani occupied the latest 
rung in a continuous Elchasaite past. Against this background, then, the fissure that 
developed among the early followers of Mani over “prophethood” may have ultimately 
fractured the community irrevocably in two.   
 
                                                          
82 CMC 62.24-63.1. 
83 This is an abbreviated form of a larger discussion. See, J. Han, “The Baptist Followers of Mani,” 
currently under review with Numen.  
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Who were the “Brothers?” 
 
The comprehensiveness and length of Baraies’ homily suggests that Baraies is not just 
constructing a rhetorical “other,” but that his opponents’ arguments were sophisticated 
and perhaps even effective. But who were these brothers who had, according to Baraies, 
“changed allegiances,”84  “put on unbelief,”85 and who “think they know something about 
this revelation and vision of our father?”86 There is surprisingly little work done on this 
question, as scholarly interest is diverted either to Mani’s earlier life or to the various 
apocalypses embedded in Baraies’ homily. Tigchelaar suggests that these are “opponents 
of the early Manichaeans, who may have been originally believers themselves.”87 Based 
on a “text-pragmatic” reading of the homily, he argues that Baraies’ homily is “not 
directed against opponents, but aims to boost the disciples’ relation to Mani, and hence to 
the Manichaean community.”88 He also hypothesizes a “Christian background” for both 
the “brothers” and the opponents.89 Tigchelaar therefore distinguishes between the early 
“Manichaean community” and their “original” identity as Christians. He further 
postulates that Baraies’ opponents were “non-Manichaeans” or possibly “former 
Manichaeans,” who once may have had or continue to have Christian predilections. In 
my view, the existence of a distinct “Manichaean” community must first be proven and 
not asserted a priori, especially in light of methodological questions regarding the 
                                                          
84 CMC 46.3. 
85 CMC 71.13-14. 
86 CMC 71.14-17.  
87 Eibert Tigchelaar, “Baraies on Mani’s Rapture, Paul, and the Antediluvian Apostles,” in The Wisdom of 
Egypt: Jewish, Early Christian, and Gnostic Essays in Honour of Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, ed. Anthony 
Hilhorst and George H. van Kooten (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 440.  
88 Tigchelaar, 435.  
89 Tigchelaar, 441.  
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category of religion and the subsequent reverberations of that question into the field of 
late antique religions, as I have already discussed in the introduction. When we consider 
the evidence altogether, I argue that Baraies’ “opponents” were also “brothers,” but 
brothers who did not understand the prophethood of Mani in the specific manner that 
Baraies argued. 
 
The Brothers as Followers of Mani 
 
In the introduction to his homily, Baraies urges his brothers to “know and understand”90 
the “sending of the Spirit of the Paraclete,”91 so that they would not provoke those who 
had “changed allegiances” (μεταβληθεὶς) into saying “They alone (οὗτοι μόνοι) wrote a 
rapture of their teacher in order to boast.” 92 Whereas some might argue that this passage 
already presupposes an absolute separation between Baraies’ community and his 
opponents, it can be interpreted in another way. After all, why would Baraies even care 
about what these “false brothers” were thinking if they were already two distinct 
communities? Moreover, how is he able to preempt their response, unless he had spent 
significant time with those naysayers? Such questions suggest that the lines of 
communication between the two parties are still open and that boundaries between the 
two had not yet hardened to the point of no return. Baraies also calls his opponents “those 
who think they know something regarding the revelation of Mani.”93 He does not say that 
these brothers altogether dismissed the revelation of Mani, as one might expect, but that 
                                                          
90 CMC 45.1. 
91 CMC 46.1-3.  
92 CMC 46.3-7. For more on the word μεταβληθεὶς, see: ZPE 19 (1975) 47 n. 84.  
93 CMC 71.13-14. 
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they understood it incorrectly, or better, not in the specific manner that Baraies argues. 
Again, this presupposes that Baraies knows what they think about the revelation of Mani, 
which again requires that the lines of communication remain open. Even false brothers 
are still brothers.  
These observations compel us to revisit Tigchelaar’s identification of Baraies’ 
opponents with “non-Manichaean Christians.” First, we have to take seriously Baraies’ 
explicit claim in the introduction and the conclusion that he wrote the homily so that the 
ones who changed allegiances might acknowledge that Mani received the same prophetic 
ordinance as earlier prophets. Baraies says that the brothers should learn the apostleship 
of the Spirit so that the one who changed allegiances might not say, “They alone wrote a 
rapture about their teacher in order to boast.” Why is it the case that the brothers learning 
the Apostleship of the Spirit would prevent the one who changed allegiances from 
saying, “They alone wrote a rapture about their teacher?” The simplest answer is that 
“brothers” encompasses both Baraies’ faction and the “one who changed allegiances.” 
This interpretation is bolstered by Baraies’ initial address to the brothers, namely, “Let he 
who is willing, hear and heed how each one of the forefathers showed his own revelation 
to his elect, which he chose and brought together in the generation in which he appeared, 
and how he wrote it down and bequeathed it for posterity.” Tigchelaar argues that this 
phrase distinguishes between “one who changed allegiances” and the one who is 
“willing.”94 I would instead argue it is an attempt to adopt an open if not ostentatiously 
welcoming tone for both parties, which in turn suggests that those “who changed 
allegiances” were part of Baraies’ intended audience. 
                                                          
94 Tigchelaar, 435. 
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We can make a similar argument when we turn to the conclusion of the homily. 
There, Baraies states,  
 
Now many superior [ὑπερβολαὶ] things like these [παραπλήσιαι] are found in the books of our 
father, books that demonstrate both his revelation and the rapture of his apostleship. For the 
superiority [ὑπερβολή] of this coming is great, which, through the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth, is 
coming to us. Concerning these things, why do we sift them thoroughly, we who are once and for 
all convinced that this apostleship is superior [ὑπερβάλλειν] in its revelations? We have repeated 
from our forefathers each of their raptures and their revelations for the sake of those who have put 
on unbelief and who think they know something about this revelation and vision of our father 
(Mani), so that they might say/know [εἴπωσιν or εἰδῶσιν] that this same ordinance [ἡ διαταγή] was 
given to the ancestral apostles.”95  
 
There are two points worth dwelling on in this passage. First, Baraies makes it clear that 
he believes that Mani’s revelation was superior to the revelations of the ancestral 
apostles, as demonstrated by the forms of the verb ὑπερβάλλω used in reference to 
Mani’s apostleship.96 This in turn helps us make better sense of Baraies’ rhetorical 
question. Baraies is saying that even though he knows that Mani’s apostleship is superior 
to that of the forefathers, nevertheless, for the sake of those “who have put on unbelief,” 
he thought it necessary to demonstrate that Mani received the same “ordinance” of 
prophethood that they had received. The difference between Mani and the earlier 
prophets was a matter of degree, not of kind. Furthermore, Baraies frames his “sifting” as 
an act of good-will for those who have “put on unbelief,” so that they would reach the 
                                                          
95 CMC 71.6-20. 
96 Also, CMC 63.17-18. 
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same conclusions that he had presented. This suggests, again, that Baraies and his 
opponents were still part of a shared community. Second, as in the introduction, the very 
fact that Baraies believes that those who hear his homily might agree with him suggests 
that we are dealing with factions within the same community, rather than two entirely 
different communities separated on the basis of “religion.”  
 We can bolster and sharpen the profile of the brothers further. Since Baraies’ 
homiletical argument works on the basis of comparison between Mani and a common set 
of forefathers shared by both Baraies and his opponents, the so-called “ancestral 
apostles” (τῶν προγόνων ἀποστόλων), for Baraies’ homily to have had any rhetorical 
effect whatsoever, the opponents must have also understood their lineage to be the same 
as Baraies’ faction. Baraies and his “opponents” must have still understood themselves as 
descendants of a common ancestral lineage. This lineage of ancestral apostles, that is – 
Adam, Sethel, Enosh, Shem, Enoch, Paul – can also be interrogated. After all, Baraies 
says, “In conclusion, all the most blessed apostles, saviors, evangelists, and prophets of 
truth – each of them beheld in so far as the living hope was revealed to him for 
proclamation.”97 It this list representative of all the apostles? Why these apostles and not 
others? Does this list comprise the full roster of “all the most blessed apostles?” We 
cannot know whether these were the “core” apostles or merely a representative sampling. 
It may even be the case that Baraies had access only to their writings. Nevertheless, it 
seems more likely to me that Baraies selected this particular list of “apostles” to 
maximize his rhetorical impact on his false “brothers.” I will speak more about Baraies’ 
rhetorical agenda in the following sections. 
                                                          
97 CMC 62.9-18. 
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 We now have a relatively robust profile of Baraies’ audience. They are followers 
of Mani who are divided on the issue of how one should understand his status as a 
prophet. Their ancestral apostles include and are possibly limited to Adam, Sethel, Enosh, 
Shem, Enoch, and Paul. Who fits this profile? Were these followers those who had 
“Christian backgrounds” as Tigchelaar suggests? It certainly does not have to be 
restricted specifically to any one group. After all, many communities in the late Parthian / 
early Sasanian Persia era could have called Adam, Enoch, Enosh, and the other “biblical” 
figures as among their forebears. Indeed, the Syro-Mesopotamian milieu was dotted with 
groups that resist modern categorizations of “Jewish” or “Christian.” In this regard, Kartir 
the Zoroastrian priest’s inscription in Naqsh-i-Rustam (~late 3rd CE) is instrumental for 
highlighting this regional diversity.98 In it, he mentions that he struck down “Jews, 
Buddhists, Brahmins, Nazarenes, Christians, Baptizers, and Manichaeans99…” Though 
we cannot take this list as representative of the “religious” communities within the 
Sasanian Empire, since Kartir was trying to demonstrate the magnitude of his own 
contribution in promulgating “state Zoroastrianism,” it nevertheless suggests that there 
were many “biblically”-affiliated communities dotting the Sasanian era. It is precisely 
among such communities that Mani and his missionaries found their first followers, as 
demonstrated by numerous passages in the CMC.100    
 
                                                          
98 For a fuller discussion on the reception of this inscription into modern scholarship, see: R.E. Payne, A 
State of Mixture: Christians, Zoroastrians, and Iranian Political Culture in Late Antiquity (Oakland, CA: 
University of California Press, 2015), 23-58. 
99 For a recent discussion on the etymology of the word Zindiq as referring to “Manichaean,” see: F. de 
Blois, Zindīḳ, in Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition.  
100 For a debate with a “Christian” monk, see: CMC 127-129. With Jews or Zoroastrians, see: CMC. 137-
139. With other Baptists in a “Church of the Baptists,” see: CMC 140-143. 
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What was at stake?  
 
I have argued above that Baraies’ community of brothers were followers of Mani who 
were divided over how they should understand Mani’s prophethood. In this section, I 
explore more fully the point of dispute between these brothers. As in the case above, 
there is a surprising lack of scholarship on the polemical context of Baraies’ homily. 
Instead, scholars have tended to read through Baraies to better understand Mani’s genius 
or as a window into the wider Syro-Mesopotamian world. This is perhaps most explicit in 
Frankfurter’s approach to Baraies’ homily. Ignoring Baraies, the local context, and the 
particular occasion for the homily altogether, he ultimately concludes that Mani invoked 
these antediluvian prophets in “sheer interest of self-promotion.”101 Mani thus gravitated 
towards these ancestral “pre-Jewish” figures in order to gain more followers.   
Reeves represents another approach to the texts. Like Frankfurter, he is 
uninterested in the local polemical context but instead focuses on exploring the wider 
Syro-Mesopotamian context in which the passages from apocalypses embedded in 
Baraies’ homily were transmitted, read, and inculcated. Reeves concludes by saying, 
“Not only do they (Baraies’ passages from various apocalypses) collectively bear witness 
to the apostolic credibility of Mani as a ‘teacher of truth,’ to his cultural authority, but 
they also firmly ensconce the Babylonian sage within the common conceptual universe of 
his environment.”102 Like Frankfurter, then, Reeves reads through the homily to 
                                                          
101 D. Frankfurter, “Apocalypses Real and Alleged in the Cologne Mani Codex,” Numen 44.1 (1997), 68.  
102 J.C. Reeves, Heralds of that Good Realm: Syro-Mesopotamian Gnosis and Jewish Traditions (Leiden: 
Brill, 1996), 211.  
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reimagine the ways that the various apocalypses “cited” in the homily “fit” their cultural 
and religious milieu.  
In contrast to Reeves and Frankfurter, Tigchelaar emphasizes Baraies’ role in the 
construction of the homily. He argues that Baraies’ homily emerged from a “context of 
disputes and accusations,”103 and, consistent with his claim that these “outsiders” were 
ex-Manichaean Christians, he envisions Baraies’ homily as a defense against “Christians” 
who “valued ‘apocalyptic’ visionary experiences and journeys as a source of revelation or 
as a token of having been sent.”104 Therefore, Tigchelaar argues that the means of 
acquiring revelatory knowledge lay at the heart of this Christian-Manichaean dispute. 
Tigchelaar is certainly correct to draw out the polemical context in which Baraies forged 
his homily. He also correctly highlights the “rapture” as a key point of dispute. Yet, as I 
argued above, the dispute was not between “Christians” and “Manichaeans” but between 
brothers who both followed Mani. I further depart from Tigchelaar in arguing that the 
conflict between Baraies and his opponents was, in fact, a symptom of a deeper intra-
fraternal struggle for the authority to interpret Mani’s writings in the post-Mani era.  
Let us first recap the key point of contention between the two camps. In brief, this 
particular dispute between Baraies and his opponents centered on the question of whether 
Mani did or did not receive the same apostolic ordinance given to the ancestral prophets. 
To argue his point that Mani did receive the same ordinance, Baraies constructed what I 
called a “typology of prophethood.”105 He argued that all prophets were “raptured,” wrote 
their revelation in books as a memoir for future generations, and chose an elect 
                                                          
103 Tigchelaar, 440.  
104 Tigchelaar, 440.  
105 I will discuss this idea more in the following section.  
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community. Even though his revelations were superior to the earlier ancestral prophets, 
Mani did all three things that prophets are wont to do, and therefore, he received the same 
prophetic ordinance that they had. This is the “dispute” in a nutshell.  It is important, 
however, not to confuse the topic of the dispute with the question of what is at stake. 
Indeed, Baraies’ focus on articulating a lineage of ancestral prophets may have less to do 
with the “facts” – that is, the “fact” that Mani was a prophet who fit into a certain ancient 
lineage – as much as it was about Baraies’ ability to speak from a position of authority on 
Mani’s writings, and therefore, to shape the future of the community.  
To explore this point, let us turn to the passage where Baraies first introduces 
Mani. Having just summarized his argument on the apostleship of the ancestral prophets, 
Baraies writes,   
 
Also in this way, it is fitting for the all-praiseworthy Mani, through whom and from whom the 
hope and inheritance of life has come to us, to write to us and to signify [σημᾶναι]106 for all 
posterity and householders of faith and spiritual offspring, who are increasing through his most 
limpid waters, so that his rapture and revelation would be made known to them. For we know, oh 
                                                          
106 Curiously, all translations understand this verb to indicate “clarification” or “interpretation” rather than 
“signification.” See: L. Koenen und C. Römer, Der Kölner Mani-Kodex: Über das Werden seine Leibes 
Kritische Edition, Papyrologica Coloniensia Vol. XIV (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1988), 43. A. Henrichs, H. 
Henrichs, and L. Koenen, “Der Kölner Mani-Kodex (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4780) Περὶ τῆς γέννης τοῦ σώματος 
αὐτοῦ: Edition der seiten 1-72,” ZPE 19 (1975): 63. R. Cameron and A.J. Dewey, trans. The Cologne Mani 
Codex: “Concerning the Origin of His Body” (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979), 51. I. Gardner 
and S.N.C. Lieu, Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 57. Gardner and Lieu’s translation departs from both earlier German and English translations by 
switching the subject of the passage from Mani to the “Brothers.” Dewey is aware of this option but calls it 
“unlikely,” and he does not provide further reasoning. I dispute Gardner’s and Lieu’s switch of the subject 
for two reasons. First, the previous passage depicted the ancestral apostles as “writing their revelations.” It 
therefore does not make sense that the Greek would use words that signal similarity (τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι) 
and (ἀκόλουθόν) between the earlier apostles and Mani, only to suddenly switch the intended subject. 
Second, there is a very close parallel to this sentence in CMC 47.12. There, it makes it clear that the 
forefathers were the ones who “wrote” and bequeathed the books to posterity. It uses the same word to 
indicate posterity (τοῖς μεταγενστέροις). 
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brothers, how great is his superiority of wisdom in relation to us with the coming of the Paraclete 
of Truth.107  
 
According to Baraies, Mani wrote his books in order to ensure that his revelations would 
be safeguarded for all posterity. This is a well-known trope throughout the Manichaean 
corpus.108 Peculiar to this context, however, is Baraies’ implication that Mani’s writings 
are also “signs,” which in turn draws attention to the act of interpretation.109 To the best 
of my knowledge, this intertwining of writing and signifying is unparalleled in other 
Manichaean texts, which generally strive to present itself as the clear and self-evident 
words of Mani. Here, Baraies goes the opposite direction by suggesting that Mani’s texts 
need to be interpreted. This subtle assertion can be understood as a tactical move on 
Baraies’ part to arrogate for himself the authority to interpret Mani’s writings.  
 Baraies’ suggestion that texts written by prophets are “signs” that need to be 
interpreted reappears in his gloss on the apostle Paul. Baraies writes, “Now while he 
[Paul] was outside himself and raptured to the third heaven and paradise, he saw and 
heard, and that which he saw and heard he inscribed enigmatically [αἰνιγματωδῶς] in his 
writings concerning his rapture and apostleship for the fellow initiates of the mysteries 
                                                          
107 CMC 63.1-23. 
108 1 Ke 5.22-33.   
109 CMC 3.9, 40.7, 40.17, 41.3. Peter Struck reminded me that the Greek σημᾶναι may simply mean 
something like knowing that a red light means stop. Within this particular context, however, in which 
Baraies demonstrates that he “understands the sense of the voice” of these ancient prophets, it seems that 
the verb σημᾶναι means something akin to decoding secrets. Furthermore, if we keep in mind that the CMC 
was translated from the original Aramaic, it seems likely that underlying Aramaic would have used words 
like “sign, symbol” [ܢܝܫܐ], “mystery” [ܪܙܐ], or possibly “demonstration” [ܬܚܘܝܬܐ, from ܚܘܝ]. It seems that 
the word “mystery” [ܪܙܐ] would be the most likely candidate since the cognate Greek noun of σημᾶναι, that 
is, “signs” [σημεῖον], shows up throughout the CMC only in contexts that emphasize the secretive and 
mysterious aspects of “signs,” e.g., the revelations that Mani receives through “visions and signs” [δι' 
ὀπτασιῶν καὶ σημείων; CMC 3.9]. For more, see L. Cirillo, Concordanze del <<Codex Manichaicus 
Coloniensis>>, (Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna, 2001), 204-5. 
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[τοῖς συμμύσταις τῶν ἀποκρύφων]” (CMC 62.8). As is well-known, Mani modeled his 
apostleship off of Paul’s, even calling himself the “Apostle of Jesus Christ.” Baraies 
implies that just as Paul had written his revelations in an enigmatic manner, so had Mani. 
Both required Baraies’ interpretative expertise to uncover their meanings. The following 
passage bolsters this reading of Baraies’ gloss. There, Baraies says, 
 
In conclusion, all the most blessed apostles, saviors, evangelists, and prophets of the truth – each 
of them beheld in so far as the living hope was revealed to him for proclamation. And they wrote 
down, bequeathed [καταλελοίπασιν] and stored up as a memoir [εἰς ὑπόμνησιν] for the future sons 
of the divine Spirit, who will understand the sense of his voice [γνωσομένων τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ τὴν 
αἴσθησιν].110 
 
Baraies invokes the language of textual inheritance, memory, and expertise. Just as the 
ancestral apostles wrote their revelation for “those who will understand the sense of his 
voice” – that is, those who have the expertise to truly understand their writings – so too 
did Mani write down his revelation for those who had the expertise and knowledge to 
understand the importance of his words. Indeed, the ancestral apostles had written for 
these “future sons of the divine Spirit” as a “memoir,” a claim repeated throughout the 
homilies.111 Who were these rightful inheritors of the writings of these ancestral authors? 
Who would be so bold as to claim that they had a “sense of the voice” of the prophets? 
There is no doubt that Baraies is referring to himself. The counter-claim is apparent as 
well: the ancestral apostles did not write to Baraies’ opponents, as evidenced by the fact 
                                                          
110 CMC 62.9-63.1. 
111 CMC 47.11-13, 48.9-15, 55.6-9, 58.5-6, 62.20. 
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that they do not have a “sense of his voice” and by the fact that they “think they know 
something about this revelation and vision of our father,” when in reality, they do not.  
 The importance of interpretation for Baraies helps us better understand an 
enigmatic phrase in the concluding line of Baraies’ homily. There, Baraies writes that 
although the apostles were themselves the “witnesses” to their own revelations, their 
disciples were the “seals of his apostleship.”112 Tigchelaar connected the term “seals of 
apostleship” with 1 Corinthians 9.2, where Paul calls the Corinthian community his 
“seals of apostleship” who verify that his apostleship was truly from the Lord.113 Baraies 
too seems to understand the “seal” as primarily a mode of authenticating or verifying, 
rather than signifying “finality.” Baraies is a true “disciple” of Mani because he verifies 
the “truth” of Mani’s prophethood, not in the general sense of verifying whether Mani 
was a prophet or not, but in the specific sense of verifying the manner in which Mani was 
a prophet. Because Baraies verifies Mani’s prophethood by measuring it against the 
things that the earlier prophets had done, Baraies and his faction are Mani’s “Seal of 
Apostleship.”   
 
Prophethood and the Demonstration of Textual Expertise 
 
In the section above, I argued that the dispute among brothers was in fact a symptom of a 
deeper contestation for the authority to interpret Mani’s writings. In this section, I argue 
that Baraies pressed his claim as heir to the ancient prophetic writings through a 
                                                          
112 CMC 72.4-8. For an extended discussion on the language of seals in Manichaeism, see: G. Stroumsa, 
“‘Seal of the Prophets:’ The Nature of a Manichaean Metaphor,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 7 
(1986): 61-74.  
113 Tigchelaar, 435.  
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homiletical demonstration of his hermeneutical cunning and textual mastery. That is, the 
manner in which Baraies constructed his homily is itself an argument against his 
opponents. Baraies had argued that he understood the “sense of the voice” of the 
prophets; now he has to prove it. When seen in this light, Baraies’ argument for Mani’s 
inclusion into a lineage of ancestral prophets is not a mere resurfacing of an earlier 
“Elchasaite” Christology.” Without getting into the methodological problems involved 
with such an assumption, the tendency to read “Elchasaite” Christology into Baraies’ 
homily should not be done at the expense of rendering Baraies a mere precipitate of 
earlier christological discourses. Indeed, to do so would be to ignore the very processes of 
selection and compilation that undergirds his typology of prophethood and that Baraies 
himself highlights. In this section, I approach Baraies’ homily as an example of literary 
bricolage and the “work” of the homily as an inscribed performance of an expert 
bricoleur. To do so, I first review the Baraies’ construction of prophethood as a mode of 
argumentation. I then go further into the discursive framework of the homily itself, 
highlighting the various terms Baraies’ uses to imply, forge, and “discover” continuity 
among the prophets and thereby amplify his own claim to textual expertise.   
As already stated in the introduction, Baraies’ typology of prophethood is defined 
by 1) the acquisition of revelatory knowledge framed as a rapture114 2) the textualization 
of that revelatory knowledge for future generations, and 3) the selection of an elect 
community.115 I use the language of typology in order to highlight its status as a “second-
order” category, that is, a literary statement that presents itself as emerging from a 
                                                          
114 For an assessment on Baraies’ idiosyncratic language of “rapture”, see: Tigchelaar, 436-440.  
115 CMC 47.1. 
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process of reflection on the extensive similarities and dissimilarities of multiple sources, 
in this case, from ancient apocalypses. I do not claim to know what Baraies’ “thinks” or 
“intends,” therefore I make no claim on Baraies’ inner life. Nevertheless, Baraies’ homily 
literarily constructs and argues the typology of “ancestral prophethood” through the 
extensive citation and arrangement of passages from apocalypses attributed to figures like 
Adam, Seth, Enoch, Paul, and, of course, Mani.  
To get a better sense of how Baraies argued his point, we first turn to the 
conclusion of Baraies’ homily. There, he asks, “Concerning these things, why do we sift 
them thoroughly, we who are once and for all convinced that this apostleship is superior 
in its revelations?” The verb “to sift” – διακεκίνηται – evokes a sense of the textual labor 
involved in constructing his homily, the evidence of which is visible in the discursive 
seams that undergird each of the passages, as I will show below. More importantly, the 
verb frames Baraies’ construction of a “typology of prophethood” as a discovery into the 
deep patterns of prophethood, revelation, and prophetic community. Baraies and his 
faction had “sifted” through the books in order to uncover what was there all along. Yet 
even this may be part of a rhetorical strategy, in so far as Baraies may have edited or even 
fabricated passages of some of the apocalypses to make them “fit” into his typology.116 In 
any case, Baraies’ concluding statement highlights his inscribed role as bricoleur – as one 
who “sifts” of the ancient prophetic texts and “builds” an argument with what emerges.  
Baraies’ role as bricoleur is more evident when we look closely into the 
interaction between the various passages he cites and the terminology he uses to 
“discover” continuity among the ancestral apostles and Mani. The range of terms he uses 
                                                          
116 Frankfurter, Apocalypses Real and Alleged. Reeves, Heralds, 210.  
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to express continuity between each passage are rather limited. He uses the words “again” 
[πάλιν, used 10 times], “similarly” [ὁμοίως, used 2 times], “in this manner” [ὃν τρόπον, 
used 1 time] and [τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι, used 1 time]. Baraies also concludes each section 
with a phrase like “Now many such things are found in his [the prophets’] writings” 
[πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις παραπλήσια ὑπάρχει ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς αὐτοῦ, used 5 times]. 
To get a better sense of how Baraies uses these terms, I have schematized the discursive 
framework of the homily based on this set of words.   
Passages from the Apocalypse of Adam  
“Now many other things like these are in his [Adam’s] writings”  
 “Similarly” – Introduces Passages from the Apocalypse of Sethel  
  “Now many things like this were said in his [Sethel’s] writings  
 “Again” – Introduces section on Apocalypse of Enosh  
  “Again” – introduces another passage from Apocalypse of Enosh 
“Now many other things like these are in his [Enosh’s] writings, which talk about his 
rapture and revelation.”  
“Similarly” – Introduces the Apocalypse of Shem 
 “And again he said” – introduces another passage from the Apocalypse of Shem 
“Now many other things like these are in his writings, including what the angels revealed 
to him and said to write down for a memoir.”  
“Again” – Introduces Apocalypse of Enoch 
 “And again he said thus” – introduces another passage from the Apocalypse of Enoch 
 “Again he said” – introduces another passage from the Apocalypse of Enoch 
“He beheld everything and questioned the angels. Whatever they said to him, he 
inscribed in his writings…” 
“In this manner…” – Introduces passages from the Pauline corpus 
 “And in the second Letter to the Corinthians…” 
 “Again in the Letter to the Galatians…” 
Summary conclusion of the ancestral prophets  
“In this manner” – Introduces passages from Mani’s corpus 
 “For he said thus (in the Letter to Edessa)” 
 “He wrote again…” – introduces passage from Mani’s Gospel 
 “Again he said” – introduces another passage, probably from Mani’s Gospel 
 “Again he said” – introduces another passage, probably from Mani’s Gospel 
“Now very many superior things like these are in the books of our father, which 
demonstrate both his revelation and the rapture of his apostleship.” – Concludes passages 
from Mani’s corpus 
 
The regularity, dense placement, and rapid flow of these terms are in themselves an 
argument for Baraies. They do not merely “organize” the homily nor are they simply 
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placeholders that introduce a section or conclude it, but these words “do work” for 
Baraies by effecting literal continuity among the apostles, which in turn proves Baraies’ 
point that Mani stands in essential continuity with the ancestral apostles. Phrases like 
“again” and “in like manner” and “similarly” string the various passages together into a 
coherent and formidable whole. The phrase “There are many more such things in the 
writings” is an underhanded threat that implies that Baraies has more examples he could 
deploy for each set of his apocalypses. It signals that Baraies’ textual mastery extended to 
other relevant comparanda and implies that Baraies could have cited many other passages 
from these various apocalypses to confirm his argument. When set against its intra-
fraternal polemical context, it is not difficult to see Baraies’ construction of his typology 
as itself a literary argument, one that relies on and showcases the performance of his 
textual mastery and expertise. 
Another example might help drive home the point I am trying to make in this 
section. The rhetorical ability of terms like “again” and “similarly” to effect continuity 
among diverse passages, emerges when we interrogate the slippage between what Baraies 
wants his excerpts to say and what the passages themselves actually say. By doing so, we 
question Baraies’ claim that he had “discovered” the typology of prophethood within the 
sources themselves. Indeed, when we actually examine Baraies’ excerpted passages 
without the larger rhetorical framework, we find that they lack key parts of Baraies’ 
tripartite typology of prophethood. For the sake of space, I will restrict my argument to 
only those passages taken from Mani’s corpus.  
Let us first turn to Baraies’ excerpt from Mani’s Letter to Edessa. Baraies 
introduces this excerpt on the pretext of arguing that Mani did not receive his revelation 
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from men or from other scriptures117 and concludes this section by stating that this is 
proof of his rapture and revelation.118 The larger purpose is clear: to demonstrate his 
textual mastery by inserting Mani into the typology of prophethood of revelation, 
textualization of that revelation, and the choosing of an elect community. Let us now 
focus on the passage itself. Mani wrote,  
 
“The truth and the secrets which I speak about – and the laying on of hands which is in my 
possession – not from men have I received it nor from fleshly creatures, not even from studies in 
the Scriptures. But when my most blessed Father, who called me into his grace, beheld me, since 
he did not wish me and the rest who are in the world to perish, he felt compassion, so that he 
might extend his well-being to those prepared to be chosen by him from the sects. Then, by his 
grace, he pulled me from the council of the many who do not recognize the truth and revealed to 
me his secrets and those of his undefiled Father and of all the cosmos. He disclosed to me how I 
was before the foundation of the world, and how the groundwork of all the works, both good and 
evil, was laid, and how everything of this aggregation was engendered according to its present 
boundaries and times.”119 
 
In this passage, Mani is expressly interested in demonstrating that his teachings did not 
come from human sources, but from divine ones, and that this all happened according to 
the Father’s compassion. He goes on to describe briefly his separation from the “council 
of the many who do not recognize the truth” and his acquisition of cosmological wisdom. 
This passage highlights the first aspect of Baraies’ typology, that of the importance of 
                                                          
117 CMC 64.1-3. 
118 CMC 70.11-14. 
119 CMC 64.8-65.20. 
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revelation, but not the other two aspects, namely, the textualization of that revelation and 
the choosing of an Elect community.  
Baraies’ second excerpt from The Gospel of Mani anticipates to a greater degree 
Baraies’ tripartite typology. Mani writes,  
 
I, Mani, an apostle of Jesus Christ through the will of God, the Father of Truth, from whom I also 
was born, who lives and abides forever, existing before all and also abiding after all. All things 
which are and will be subsist through his power. For from this very one I was begotten, and I am 
from his will. The truth of ages which he revealed I have seen, and that truth I have disclosed to 
my fellow travelers; peace I have announced to the children of peace, hope I have proclaimed to 
the immortal race. The Elect I have chosen and a path to the height I have shown to those who 
ascend according to the truth. Hope I have proclaimed and this revelation I have revealed. This 
immortal Gospel I have written, including in it these eminent mysteries, and disclosing in it the 
greatest works, the most eminently powerful works. These things which he revealed, I have shown 
to those who live from the truest vision, which I have beheld, and the most glorious revelation 
revealed to me.120  
 
All three parts of Baraies’ typology are present here: Mani received a true revelation 
(though it is not framed as a rapture), he wrote down that revelation, and he chose an 
Elect. Nevertheless, Mani does not attempt to consolidate those elements into a second-
order typology of prophethood. There is no suggestion that the textualization of 
revelation and the choosing of an Elect are necessary components to his call as prophet 
nor is there evidence that “prophethood” is an isolatable or disembedded discourse, as it 
                                                          
120 CMC 66.4-68.5. 
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is in the case with Baraies’ homily. We turn finally to the last two sources, which are also 
possibly from the Gospel of Mani.  
 
And again he said: All the secrets which my Father has given to me, while I have hidden and 
covered them from the sects and the nations, and still more from the world, to you I have revealed 
according to the pleasure of my most blessed Father. And if again he would be pleased, once more 
I shall reveal them to you. For indeed, the gift which was given to me from the Father is very great 
and rich. For if the whole world and all people obey it, I would be able from very possession and 
advantage, which my father has given to me, to enrich them and establish wisdom as sufficient for 
the entire world.121  
 
And finally,  
 
And again he said: When my Father was pleased and had shown compassion and care for me, he 
sent out from there my most unfailing Twin, the entire fruit of immortality, so that he might 
redeem and ransom me from the error of those followers of that Law. In coming to me, he has 
provided me with the best hope, redemption that is based on immortality, true instructions, and the 
laying on of hands from my Father. Now when that one came, he preferred and chose me, severed 
and pulled me out of the midst of those followers of that Law in which I was reared.122 
 
Again, both passages dwell on the greatness and richness of Mani’s revelation. Yet they 
are curiously silent regarding the other core elements of Baraies’ typology. Because these 
passages were probably both from the Gospel of Mani, Baraies could point to its written-
ness as proof of the textualization of revelation. Nevertheless, Mani himself does not 
                                                          
121 CMC 68.6-69.8. 
122 CMC 69.9-70.10.  
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emphasize the “written-ness” of revelation. There is also no mention of Mani’s rapture 
nor is there an emphasis in the choosing of an Elect. There is certainly no impulse to 
compile all of these elements into a coherent typology either. In other words, when we 
examine these passages without Baraies’ framework to undergird and effect “continuity,” 
there is no evidence that Mani actually constructed a “typology of prophethood” in the 
manner that Baraies did. Ultimately, then, the continuity that Baraies draws among all the 
ancestral prophets and Mani is a product of his own argumentation. This alone should be 
sufficient proof for the necessity of locating Baraies’ homily to its time and place, rather 
than reading it as a mere resurfacing of “Elchasaite” doctrine. Indeed, in my view, it is 
precisely this mismatch between Mani’s words and Baraies’ usage of Mani’s words that 
demonstrates Baraies to be a bricoleur. If my argument above is sound, we can 
understand Baraies’ typology through a sharper contemporary lens, calibrated for his 
particular time and place.  
  
Prophethood and the Birth of Manichaeism  
 
In the sections above, I argued that “prophethood” emerged as a point of contention 
among the early followers of Mani and that this was part of a larger dispute regarding the 
authority to speak “for” Mani following his death. In this section, I would like to pick up 
the thread in the first section of this section, where I drew attention to the identity of these 
early followers of Mani as “originally” from “biblically”-affiliated communities in 
Sasanian Mesopotamia. I argue in this section that Baraies’ emphasis on “Prophethood” 
anticipated the birth of a “Manichaean” community distinct from other “biblically”-
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affiliated communities. While Baraies’ conception of prophethood sought to include as 
many followers of Mani as possible through his expansive definition of prophethood, 
which as we saw extended from Adam all the way to Mani, he also unwittingly 
contributed to “prophethood” as a defining marker of one’s identity as Manichaean, a 
claim that I will explore in the next chapter. To argue this point, however, it is necessary 
to critique the dominant scholarly narrative regarding the Manichaean “triumph” over its 
Elchasaite roots.  
The question of the Manichaean “parting of ways” from its Elchasaite Baptist 
roots has not been given sustained scholarly attention. This question is nevertheless 
timely, especially in the wake of the intense debates on the so-called “parting of ways” 
between Jews and Christians in the Roman Empire,123 as well as parallel discussions in 
the field of early Islam.”124 It is ironic, therefore, that while scholars of Late Antique 
“religions” and early Islam have become hyper-sensitive to the theoretical underpinnings 
of “religion” itself, especially regarding its genealogy from the Roman West125 to its 
crystallization during Europe’s colonial exploitation of indigenous populations,126 
scholars of Manichaeism – ostensibly a non-“Western” “religion” – have all but 
embraced the category. In their introduction to “Manichaean Texts from the Roman 
                                                          
123 The literature is vast. One should perhaps begin with:  A.Y. Reed, “‘Jewish Christianity’ after the 
‘Parting of the Ways’: Approaches to Historiography and Self-Definition in the Pseudo-Clementine 
Literature,” in The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle 
Ages (eds. A.H. Becker, A.Y. Reed; Tübingen: Mohr, 2003). 
124 P. Crone, “Jewish-Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part One),” JNES 74.2 (2015): 225-53. ibid., “Jewish-
Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part Two),” JNES 75.1 (2016): 1-32. F.M. Donner, Muhammad and the 
Believers (Harvard University Press, 2012). H. Zellentin, The Qurʼān’s Legal Culture: the Didascalia 
Apostolorum as a Point of Departure (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2013). 
125 W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 15-50.  
126 T. Assad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciple and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). D. Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and 
Comparative Religion in Southern Africa (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1996). ibid., Empire of 
Religion: Imperialism and Comparative Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
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Empire,” Gardner and Lieu go so far as to say that “Manichaeism is the first real 
‘religion’ in the modern sense, because Mani established it directly and deliberately, with 
its scripture and its rituals and its organization all in place.”127 Of course, Manichaeism 
cannot be a ‘real religion in the modern sense’ because it not modern, and therefore not a 
“religion.” What is meant by “real religion” is also frustratingly opaque. Indeed, in so far 
as “Manichaeism” emerged from a “Jewish-Christian” sect in Sasanian Mesopotamia, it 
is twice removed from the familiar categories of “Judaism” and “Christianity” incubated 
as they were within a “Greco-Roman” context, categories that ultimately undergird our 
notion of religion itself. Therefore, “Manichaeism” could, or perhaps even should, 
potentially provide a way to break open our categories of “religion” rather than to 
confirm it. 
Henrichs, one of the primary editors of the CMC, identifies the “actual birth hour 
of Manichaeism,”128 to use his memorable words, with Mani’s violent expulsion from his 
Elchasaite Baptist sect. He continues the motif of birth by stating that the Baptists’ 
violent reaction to Mani’s teachings was the “very cutting of the umbilical cord,”129 and 
from then on, Mani emerged as an “independent personality, ready to lead his own 
life.”130 Yet to claim that Manichaeism “began” at a certain moment is not a descriptive 
claim. It is already deeply interpretative. Henrichs does note in passing that Mani’s 
expulsion led to a process of defection from the Elchasaite-Baptist ranks into Mani’s 
camp and though this process may have been much more troubling than expected, it was 
                                                          
127 Gardner and Lieu, Manichaean Texts, 1-3. My criticism should be tempered in part because this book is 
meant to be an accessible introduction to the Manichaean sources, which it does admirably.  
128 A. Henrichs, “Mani and the Babylonian Baptists: A Historical Confrontation,” HSCP 77 (1973): 43. 
129 Ibid., 43.  
130 Ibid., 43. 
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relatively short.131 Yet Henrichs’ innocuous description from one “religious” identity to 
another is deeply teleological. Indeed, one might ask, at what point do “Elchasaite 
Baptists” cease to be “Elchasaite Baptists” and become “Manichaeans?” What is the 
calculus of sufficient difference that demonstrates that “Manichaeism” is categorically 
different than “Elchasaite Baptists,” and who decides such a thorny question? What 
epistemological basis do scholars have to declare something “new” rather than a 
continuation of the “old,” and by which criteria is this assessed?132 Such questions, in my 
view, demonstrate the limits of the category of “religion” so heavily assumed by scholars 
of early Manichaeism. “Religion” exchanges the uneven and often inaccessible processes 
of “history” for a seductively easy story of “progress,” that is, from “Elchasaite Baptists” 
to “Manichaeans.”  
In the following section, I extend this argument by highlighting the continuity 
between Elchasaite Baptists and “Manichaeans.” I will use Elchasaite and Baptists 
interchangeably. In doing so, I extend Henrichs’ and Koenen’s argument on the deep 
influence that Elchasaite teachings had on Mani.133 I am also inspired by F. Stanley 
                                                          
131 Ibid., 43. 
132 In this regard, I have been heavily influenced by Bhabha’s understanding of “newness.” See, H.K. 
Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2008), 303-37.  
133 A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, “Ein griechischer Mani-Codex (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4780),” ZPE 5 (1970): 
97-216. See in particular pp. 141-158. There is an ongoing discussion on whether the CMC preserves 
authentic “Elchasaite” doctrines. See: G.P. Luttikhuizen, The Revelation of Elchasai: Investigations into 
the Evidence for a Mesopotamian Jewish Apocalypse of the Second Century and Its Reception by Judeo-
Christian Propagandists, TSAJ 8 (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1985). Also read F. Stanley Jones’ critical 
review of this book. F. Stanley Jones, “Review of The Revelation of Elchasai, by Gerard P. Luttikhuizen,” 
Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 30 (1987): 200-209. While Luttikhuizen is most skeptical about the 
scholar’s ability to find “genuinely” Elchasaite materials in the CMC, Jones is more willing. For another 
perspective, see: A. F. J. Klijn and G. J. Reinink, “Elchasai and Mani,” Vigiliae Christianae 28.4 (1974): 
277-89. The editors of the CMC, Koenen and Henrichs, are on the more optimistic end of the spectrum. 
See: ZPE 32/1978, 178-81. Koenen is most optimistic, see: “From Baptism to the Gnosis of Manichaeism,” 
in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism II, 1981, 747f. Henrichs is less optimistic, and claims that these stories 
“echo Elchasaite doctrine if only distantly.” (HSCP 83, 366). Luttikhuizen concludes, “The narratives about 
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Jones’ critical rethinking of the “origins” of Manichaean church order to its Elchasaite 
roots.134 I differ from these two scholars, however, by asserting that this “influence” is 
not only evidence of Mani’s past as an “Elchasaite Baptist” – as if those parts of Mani’s 
thoughts most influenced by Elchasaite Baptists are suddenly no less so once they are 
incorporated into “Manichaeism” – but as evidence that he remained a “Baptist,” albeit a 
“reformed” one or, depending on who is asking, an “aberrant” one. That is, instead of 
only understanding “Manichaeism” as a moment of “rupture” with the Elchasaite Baptist 
community, I highlight those moments when the narrative demonstrate continuity with 
that community. For example, if Mani developed his church order based on an earlier 
Elchasaite background, as Jones argues, this would speak more towards continuity with 
Baptists, not rupture. The same argument can be made regarding Mani’s “Elchasaite-
Baptist” schooling. This is not to say that there is no “difference;” Mani makes it 
absolutely clear that he will not follow “their law.”135 Nevertheless, as we will see, even 
this is not a sufficient grounds for assuming an absolute “break” between the “Elchasaite 
Baptists” and “Manichaeans.”  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Alchasaios may be of some value to the investigation of Baptists ideas and practices but it is doubtful 
whether they permit any conclusions relating to the teaching of a baptist Alchasaios.” Luttikhuizen, 161. 
Luttikhuizen expresses deeper doubts elsewhere in the same book, “I doubt whether the reverence for 
water, earth, and bread (in fact for the light particles of divine light in the material world) expressed in the 
Manichean stories about Alchasaios and other Baptist authorities (CMC 94-99) must be traced back to the 
Baptists…” (Luttikhuizen, 221, 25f.) Pedersen is perhaps most pessimistic, stating that these stories “only 
contain Manichaean ideas.” N.A. Pedersen, “Early Manichaean Christology,”182-83. 
134 F.S. Jones, “The Book of Elchasai in its Relevance for Manichaean Institutions with a Supplement: The 
Book of Elchasai Reconstructed and Translated,” ARAM 16 (2004), 179-215. Also see, C. Römer, “Die 
Manichäische Kirchenorganisation nach Dem Kölner Mani-Kodex,” in Studia Manichaica: II. 
Internationaler Kongress zum Manichimus, 181-88.  
135 Larry Wills reminded me that the usage of their does not necessarily imply absolute separation between 
two communities, but may simply be used to refer to an “other” faction within the same community.  
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Mani’s Expulsion as both Rupture and Continuity  
 
After being flogged and beaten by his fellow Baptists on charges that he was leading the 
community into error, Mani complains to his divine Twin, saying,  
 
When in that Learning [ἐν τούτωι τῶι δόγματι], [there were those] who knew about the Purity 
[περὶ ἁγνειας] and the Chastisement of the Flesh [σαρκοδερίας] and the taking of the Rest of the 
Hands [κατοχῆς ἀναπαύσεως τῶν χειρῶν], who know me by name and the value of my body [τὴν 
τοῦ σώματος .. ἀξίαν] more than all other sectarians, since I received bodily nourishment, nursing, 
and care in that Learning, and I often met with its leaders and elders according to the rearing of the 
body. If, then, they did not provide me space for the reception of the truth, how would the cosmos 
with its masters and teachers hear these unutterable secrets and accept these difficult 
commandments?136 
 
As discussed above, Henrichs and others have taken this moment as the “hour” in which 
Manichaeism was born and Mani’s Elchasaite heritage abandoned. This explanation, 
however, does not do justice to the full passage. After all, there were “those in that 
Learning” – that is, Elchasaite Baptists – who knew about the “Purity,”137 the 
“Chastisement of the Flesh,”138 and the “Resting of the Hands,”139 and who understood 
                                                          
136 CMC 102.11-103.19.  
137 Earlier in the CMC, Mani claimed that the Baptists are mistaken in thinking that “purity” comes from 
washing themselves and their vegetables. True purity, he says, “comes through knowledge, a separation of 
light from darkness, of death from life, of living water from turbid…” (CMC 83.20-85.12) For a longer 
discussion on the possible “influences” to this understanding of purity, see: A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, 
“Der Kölner Mani-Kodex (P. Colon. Inv. Nr. 4780): Περὶ τῆϲ γέννχϲ τοῦ ϲώματοϲ αὐτοῦ Edition der Seiten 
99, 10-120,” ZPE 44 (1981): 238, f. 325.  
138 Henrichs and Koenen note that the term here “σαρκοδερίας” is a hapax in the Manichaean corpus and 
connects it to strong forms of Encratism. Given that the other two passages are related to points in 
disagreement with the Baptists, it is unlikely that this word would be something that agrees with them, like 
encratistic practices. Rather, the idea may refer to the suffering of the divine light particles when it is 
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the “value” of his body140 more than all the other “sects” of the world. These are not 
insignificant aspects of Manichaean doctrine. In fact, in so far as the Manichaean 
“system” constitutes an integrated whole, they are not easily extricated from or 
disentangled from Mani’s system, which suggests additional points of intersection 
between “Elchasaites” and “Manichaeans.” Not only that, Mani states that he had had 
extensive contact with the leaders of that community since he had been with them since 
his youth. This allows Mani to make his rhetorical point, namely, if those who share 
many aspects of my teachings nevertheless reject me, then how much more would the 
world reject me!  
 The importance of this passage should not be lost among scholars. On the one 
hand, it does demonstrate a break between Mani and his natal community. On the other 
hand, it also demonstrates that early followers of Mani saw specific doctrinal similarities 
between Mani’s teachings and the system of the Baptists at the very moment when 
“Manichaeism” was supposedly born. One might object by saying that these Baptists 
“learned” these points from Mani, yet even if they had, it would still be the case that they 
remained “Baptists.” This is not to say that these Baptists “truly” believed in the “Purity,” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
encased in matter and in the human body. See: A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, “Der Kölner Mani-Kodex (P. 
Colon. Inv. Nr. 4780): Περὶ τῆϲ γέννχϲ τοῦ ϲώματοϲ αὐτοῦ Edition der Seiten 99, 10-120,” ZPE 44 (1981): 
240, f. 326. 
139 Though the connection between this word and the “Sabbath Rest” mentioned in the Book of Elchasai 
(Hippolytus Refutation, 9.16.3) is strained, Henrichs and Koenen are certainly correct in interpreting this 
word as meaning the prohibition for the Elect to do any sort of “work” – particularly agriculture. See: A. 
Henrichs and L. Koenen, “Der Kölner Mani-Kodex (P. Colon. Inv. Nr. 4780): Περὶ τῆϲ γέννχϲ τοῦ 
ϲώματοϲ αὐτοῦ Edition der Seiten 99, 10-120,” ZPE 44 (1981): 240, f. 327. 
140 The idea of the “value” of Mani’s body may refer to Mani’s understanding of his own body as a 
necessary but evil instrument [τὸ ὄργανον, CMC 22.10] to spread his word throughout the world. (CMC 
21.2-22.15) In this vein, it assumes knowledge of Mani’s pre-existent being as the Apostle of Light, who is 
himself an emanation of the Great Nous. In short, to “value” the body of Mani assumes that one knows the 
complex series of emanations. Surprisingly, Mani says that there were people “in that learning” who knew 
the value of his body!  
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the “Chastisement of the Flesh,” and the “Rest of Hands;” that question will likely never 
be satisfactorily answered. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for my argument that the early 
followers of Mani would admit to such a high degree of continuity with the Baptists. At 
the very least, it poses a challenge to the regnant scholarly framing of Mani’s expulsion 
as a “rupture” with the Baptist community, and instead allows us to interpret it as a 
rupture within the Baptist community.  
 
After the Expulsion: Complicating the Supposed Rupture 
 
The assumption that Mani’s break with his particular Elchasaite community represented a 
moment of rupture from Elchasaites in general is complicated by the fact that even after 
his expulsion, Mani traveled with members of his natal community and continued to 
frequent Elchasaite gathering-places and churches. This much is presaged in the Divine 
Twin’s response to Mani’s expulsion from his community, where he tells Mani,  
 
 You are not only sent out into this sect (εἰς τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δόγμα), but to every People (ἔθνος) 
and Teaching (διδασκαλίαν) and into every city (πᾶσαν πόλιν) and place (τόπον), the Hope will be 
made clear and declared through you in every region (πάντα κλίματα) and section of the cosmos 
(περιοχὰς τοῦ κόσμου).141 
  
The Twin does not envision Mani’s expulsion as an absolute break with the Baptists as 
much as it was an opportunity for Mani to teach every community, including other 
                                                          
141 CMC 104.12-22. 
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Baptist communities. Thus, when Pattikios searches for his son Mani following his 
expulsion, he enters other “synods”142 – presumably meeting places for other Baptists – 
because these are places that Mani would have been expected to frequent, even after 
having been expelled from his “Baptist” community just moments before. Mani 
continued to visit other communities, including a “Church of the Holy Ones [ἐν τῆι 
ἐκκλησίαι τῶν ἁγίων],”143 possibly a “Jewish” Synagogue [εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν...],144 
and even another “Church of the Baptists [ἐν τῆι ἐκκλησίαι τῶν βαπτιστῶν].”145 Nor 
should we forget that Mani’s earliest followers came from his own Baptist sect, including 
his biological father Pattikios and his two neighbors [πλησιόχωροί], Simeon and 
Abizachias. These points suggest, again, the early followers of Mani might not have 
thought of themselves as entirely distinct from Mani’s Baptist community, but still 
related to them in some attenuated fashion. This is perhaps most clear when Mani enters 
the “Church of the Baptists” mentioned above. 
 
When my Lord [Mani] and Pattikios the overseer of the house had come to Pharat, he preached in 
the church of the Baptists… He revealed his kingdom to us. We, however, were astonished at him 
and were shaken by his words. When the hour of prayer came, we said to Pattikios, “Let us pray! 
For the commandment of God calls my Lord [Mani] and us to prayer…” “… Why do you pray 
differently from us?” Furthermore, when at the time when fasting was... he went out and asked for 
alms before the houses. He did not put… I said to him: Why did you not partake the daily food? 
… “is with your son as it is with the elders and teachers. (Earlier, I) saw already in him, that he 
                                                          
142 CMC 110.7. 
143 CMC 111.16. 
144 CMC 137.6-8. 
145 CMC 140.15. 
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with all his wisdom, intelligence) and exposition of the scriptures bore witness to us… in contrast 
to the words of our teachers…  
 
Though fragmentary, the gist is clear. Mani and Pattikios enter a “Church of the Baptists” 
and begin to preach. The Baptists of that church are disturbed by what they hear, yet they 
invite Mani and Pattikios to pray and fast. They are surprised, however, that both Mani 
and Pattikios pray differently than they do and that they do not partake of the food. A 
member of that Baptist community is convinced by Mani’s words regarding the 
“Scriptures” over and against the interpretation of his teachers, and becomes a follower of 
Mani. 
But why is the Church of the Baptists surprised by Mani’s and Pattikios’ 
behavior? The best explanation is that they expected Mani and Pattikios to be one of 
them, even after Mani had uttered statements that the community found disturbing, and 
even after Mani’s supposedly decisive break with the Elchasaites. Indeed, the speaker 
here even invites Mani and Pattikios to pray with them, since he believes that the 
“Commandment of God” still applies to them as Baptists. The Church is again surprised 
that Mani and Pattikios pray differently and do not partake of the daily meal, evidently 
because they still assume Mani and Pattikios to be “Baptists.” At the same time, the fact 
that Mani prays and fasts at all already demonstrates both ritual similarity and difference 
between the Baptists and Mani. As a result, it is difficult to make a claim that Mani 
emerges as the founder of a “new religion,” when both contemporary Baptists and early 
followers of Mani saw such similarities between “Manichaeism” and the “Baptists.”  
 
 66   
 
Elchasaite Debates on Purity 
 
We can also turn to the uproar surrounding Mani’s teachings to find additional strands of 
continuity between the Baptists and Mani.146 This uproar was not between a monolithic 
“Baptist” community and Mani, but a dispute among Baptists regarding whether Mani 
was in continuity or in rupture with their laws. There were three parties involved. The 
first party regarded Mani as a “prophet” and a “teacher,” and voted to make Mani a 
teacher of their doctrine.147 Clearly, even according to early followers of Mani, there was 
a faction of Baptists who could regard Mani as an authority figure of their community. 
The last group, predictably, accused Mani of leading the community astray.148 Most 
interesting, however, is the middle group of Baptists who were cautiously optimistic 
regarding Mani’s prophethood. This group seemed to understand Mani to be in continuity 
with the teachings of their forefathers, not in spite of his disturbing teachings but because 
of them! They said,    
 
 Is this really the one whom our teachers [prophesied] saying, ‘A certain young man will [rise up] 
from our midst and a new [teacher] will come forth to disturb all our teaching in the manner that 
our forefathers spoke concerning the Rest of the Garment?149  
 
μή[τι οὗτ]ός ἐστιν περὶ οὗ [ἐπροφ]ήτευσαν οἱ διδά[σκαλο]ι ἡμῶν λέγοντες [ἀναστή]σεταί τις 
ἠίθε[ος ἐκ μέσ]ου ἡμῶν καὶ [διδάσκα]λος νέος π[ρο]σελεύσεται ὡς καὶ κινῆσαι ἡμῶν τὸ πᾶν 
δόγμα ὅν τρόπον οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν πατέρες ἐφθέγξαντο περὶ τῆς ἀναπαύσεως τοῦ ἐνδύματος; 
                                                          
146 CMC 85.13-88.15. 
147 CMC 85.13-86.4. 
148 CMC 87.12-88.15. 
149 CMC 86.17-87.6. 
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Scholars have generally understood the passage above to mean that the forefathers had 
prophesied about Mani’s coming through their prophecy on the “Rest of the Garment.” 
Therefore, they reason that the “Rest of the Garment” must refer to Mani, and interpret 
the “Rest of the Garment” as the “final stage of reincarnation of the Spirit of Christ.”150 
Yet Baraies never uses the preposition ὅν τρόπον in this sense. Instead, he always uses it 
to mean “in the manner that” or “similarly” or “similar to.”151 Therefore, I translate this 
passage to mean that the Baptists’ forefathers had previously disturbed the entire law 
through their interpretation of the “Rest of the Garment,” whatever that means. They also 
prophesied that a “young man would rise up and a new teacher will come forth to disturb 
our entire teaching,” as they themselves had. Therefore, the “Rest of the Garment” does 
                                                          
150 There are many competing interpretations on what this enigmatic phrase means. Merkelbach suggests 
that it refers to reincarnation. (R. Merkelbach, “Die Täufer, Bei Denen Mani Aufwuchs,” in P. Bryder (ed.), 
Manichaean Studies (Lund: 1988), 114). Gardner and Lieu suggest that the “Rest of the Garment” might be 
“a precedent for the Manichaean ‘Rest of the Hands.’” (Gardner and Lieu, Manichaean Texts, 61 f. 41). 
Henrichs and Koenen suggests the last incarnation of the “True Prophet.” (ZPE 1978: 160 f. 225); cf. L. 
Koenen, “Manichaean Apocalypticism at the Crossroads of Iranian, Egyptian, Jewish, and Christian 
Thought,” in Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis: Atti del Simposio Internazionale (Rende – Amantea 3-7 
settembre 1984), eds. L. Cirillo and A. Roselli (Marra Editore Cosenza: 1986), 287. This opinion is echoed 
by P. Crone: Patricia Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local 
Zoroastrianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 295. It is also echoed by L. Cirillo: L. 
Cirillo, “From Elchasaite Christology to the Manichaean Apostle of Light: Some Remarks about the 
Manichaean Doctrine of the Revelation,” in A. van Tongerloo and L. Cirillo (eds.), in Il Manicheismo: 
Nuove Prospettive della Ricerca (2005), 50-51. Elsewhere, Henrichs also suggests that it may refer to the 
“Resurrection of the Body.” (Henrichs, “Mani and Babylonian Baptists,” 55). To add to the list of possible 
interpretations, I would shift away from interpreting this phrase through the Pseudo-Clementines and 
propose to understand the word “Garment” in the way Mani usually understands it to be, namely, the “Five 
Sons of the First Man,” which was his armor when he descended to fight the forces of evil, and which is 
variously called “Great Garments,” “Rags,” “Images and Tattered Clothes,” “Light element,” “The Cross of 
Light,” “Counsel of Life,” “Soul that is slain.” Kephalaia 72 is particularly important for understanding this 
phrase. In it, a disciple asks Mani why there are so many different names for the same object, to which 
Mani replies that these all refer to the concept of the “Garment of the First Man” but at various stages in the 
process of their salvation. Likewise, the “rest of garment” probably refers to the final stage of the 
“garment,” when all the Light Elements are restored to its rightful place. Or, as Mani says, “They will 
gather together and make a single form, and a single name, unaltered and unchangeable forever in the land 
of their first essence, from which they were sent forth against the enemy.” This return to its original 
primeval essence and form is probably the “Rest of the Garment” mentioned in the CMC.  
151 CMC 14.5, 60.13, 63.1 (τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι is used), 73.13, 89.22, 91.17.  
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not refer to Mani, but to a prior moment when the Baptist forefathers disagreed with an 
earlier legal status quo and thus “disturbed the entire law.”  
This reading of the passage above would ultimately mean that the disturbance that 
Mani brought to the Baptist community was itself a reiteration of an earlier disturbance 
that arose due to the forefather’s interpretation of the “Rest of the Garment.” 
Paradoxically, this means that Mani was in continuity with the Baptists in so far as 
“disturbance of the law” already constituted a foundational moment in the etiology of the 
Baptists. It also opens up different avenues for understanding Mani’s “disturbing the 
law,” not merely as an act of “superseding” Baptist laws and starting an entirely new 
“religion,” but as a necessary clarification, purification, or even purging of the false 
elements in the laws of the Baptists. After all, this is exactly the way that Mani himself 
frames his teachings vis-à-vis the members of “that Law.” Finally, it also strongly implies 
that the early followers of Mani who wrote, compiled, and read the CMC would have 
understood the “Rest of the Garment” as originally a Baptist doctrine, thus strengthening 
the lines of continuity between Baptists and the early followers of Mani.  
 In concluding this section, it must be said that I am not arguing that 
“Manichaeism” as a distinct “religion” did not emerge at some point in time in 
Mesopotamia. This section only aimed to disrupt a triumphalist narrative of Manichaeism 
that located its “cause” to the genius of single person or from a single incident of 
expulsion. It demonstrated that the early followers of Mani were not shy in admitting to 
similarities between them and the Baptists. Perhaps, I suggest, it was because they 
thought of themselves as Baptists, though as “true,” “reformed,” “better,” or even 
“universal” Baptists and different from those Baptists who still clung to “that Law.” And 
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while the CMC does not, in my opinion, bear evidence that there were “Manichaeans” or 
“Manichaeism” qua religion, it does capture a “snapshot” of that process, a “snapshot” 
that may nevertheless tell us something about the immediate trajectory of the early 
followers of Mani.  
It is within this larger world that the intra-fraternal argument regarding the 
“prophethood” of Mani might have proven to be pivotal in the formation of 
“Manichaeism.” Indeed, it seems likely to me that Baraies’ brothers saw themselves as 
Baptist followers of Mani, who brought them back to the true interpretation of their 
ancestral laws. Yet, while the lines of communication between the two factions remained 
open for Baraies, it is not difficult to see how this intra-fraternal dispute centered on the 
prophethood of Mani might have led into hardened boundaries. Perhaps it was this 
dispute that proved pivotal for the “parting” of “Manichaeism” from its Baptist-
Elchasaite roots. Of course, we must not overestimate “prophethood” as the sole 
determinative factor for the “parting of the ways,” as if supposing that such complicated 
processes can be reduced to single causes. Rather, we can only venture to say that 
discourses of “prophethood” served as one contributing crack in the fissure that 




In this chapter I attempted to provide a broader and richer context through which we 
might understand the emergence of “prophethood” in late antique Syro-Mesopotamia. I 
argued that “prophethood” was not a natural or inevitable development of earlier 
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Elchasaite doctrine, nor was it simply a resurgence of Mani’s words in a different setting. 
It emerged within a context of intra-fraternal struggle for defining how one should 
understand Mani’s role as a prophet, and by extension, the right to speak on his behalf 
following his execution. Baraies’ construction of “prophethood,” in turn, contributed to 
the emergence of the “Manichaeans” as a distinct community apart from other 
“biblically”-affiliated communities. Baraies and his faction clearly emerged victors from 
these intra-fraternal skirmishes; his is the only homily preserved in the CMC and clearly 
occupies an important place in that text.  Yet as we will see in the next chapter, Baraies’ 
typology of prophetology soon became divorced from its original context and entered a 
broader discursive stream of “prophetologies” as the Manichaeans took their message 
into the Roman Near East, where they would formulate new “prophetologies” to meet 













 71   
 
CHAPTER 2: TRANSFORMATIONS OF MANICHAEAN PROPHETHOOD IN 
THEIR SYRIAN CONTEXT 
 
Baraies’ homily would not be the last time that Manichaeans discussed the prophethood 
of Mani. As the movement spread throughout the known world, this prophetological 
discourse continued to morph in regionally specific ways. In the Manichaean texts 
preserved in Chinese, for example, we see Mani portrayed as a Buddha or as a 
Bodhisattva. Lao Tzu, too, was added to the roster of ancient prophets.152 This chapter 
seeks to trace this discourse as Manichaeans went westward towards Syria and down the 
Mediterranean coastline to Egypt, where many of the extant Manichaean texts were 
unearthed. It focuses in particular on the introduction and the first chapter of the 
Kephalaia of the Teacher [ⲛⲕⲉⲫⲁⲗⲁⲓⲟⲛ ⲙⲡⲥⲁϩ; henceforth, 1 Ke] and chapter 342 of the 
Kephalaia of the Wisdom of the Lord Mani [ⲛⲕⲉⲫⲁⲗⲁⲓⲟⲛ ⲛⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲙⲡϫⲁⲓⲥ ⲡⲙⲛⲭⲥ; 
henceforth, 2 Ke]. Though these sections contain elaborate treatments of Manichaean 
prophetology, even tending towards systematization of these traditions, as I argue in this 
chapter, these passages articulate prophethood independently of one another and with 
different aims. We cannot speak about a single “prophetological” Manichaean system nor 
should we assume a wholly unified prophetological discourse in the Kephalaia or among 
Manichaeans as a whole. Therefore, I attend to each “chapter” as literary representations 
of a particular prophetological discourse, without assuming a unified system behind the 
                                                          
152 S.N.C. Lieu, Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China: A Historical Survey 
(Manchester University Press, 1985), 202-19. For a recent state of the field of Chinese Manichaean studies, 
see: G. Mikkelsen, “Recent Research on Chinese Manichaean Texts,” in Mani in Dublin: Selected Paper 
from the Seventh International Conference of the International Association of Manichaean Studies in the 
Chester Beatty Library, 8-12 September 2009  (eds. S.G. Richter, C. Horton, and K. Ohlhafer; Leiden: 
Brill, 2009), 259-72.   
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text. By doing so, I argue that theorizations of “prophethood” emerged as a conceptual 
tool for Manichaeans to map out their relationship with communities deeply “affiliated” 
with the early followers of Mani, most notably Syro-Mesopotamian “Christians,” and as a 
way of asserting their own orientation as followers of Christ through Mani. The 
Kephalaias thus turn Baraies’ understanding of prophethood inside out. Instead of 
operating as a discourse for constructing a shared prophetic history within the early 
“Manichaean” community, prophethood emerges as a way of engaging in a sort of 
oblique competition with those “inside” an ideal Manichaean community – a community, 
which from the perspective of the Manichaeans, included the “Christians” and 
“Zoroastrians” – yet who for some reason remained “beyond” the immediate confines of 
existing Manichaean circles. In other words, prophetology emerges as a way of positing 
identity as Christians and Zoroastrians and as a way of asserting a truer and purer 
“Christianity” or “Zoroastrianism.” Since I will focus specifically on “Christians” and not 
Manichaeans in this chapter, I argue that we can see prophetology as a diagnostic for 
assessing how early Manichaeans negotiated their own position as Christians alongside 
other local Christian communities. 
 
Situating the Kephalaias 
 
One can do no better at situating the two sets of the Kephalaia than to quote Timothy 
Pettipiece’s summary statement. He writes,  
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While the Kephalaia (literally the ‘Chapter-book) may present itself as a record of Manichaean 
oral tradition based on Mani’s discourses to his inner circle, it is essentially the product of later 
theological developments and elaborations that seek to respond to a wide array of specific 
questions, many of which appear to be rooted in ambiguities found in the canon.153  
 
In contrast to earlier scholars who had assumed that the Kephalaia was “a record of 
Mani’s actual discourses and teachings, or a systematic (albeit secondary) presentation of 
the ‘main points’ of Manichaean theology,”154 Pettipiece argues that it can be better seen 
as “representing the emergence or evolution of a scholastic, interpretive tradition…”155 In 
this view, then, we can see the Kephalaia’s self-presentation as the ipsissima verba of 
Mani in the same way that Foucault discusses the “author-function.” Mani serves as the 
ideological center – the “author” – that unites and legitimizes a diverse range of texts, 
traditions, and discourses within a specific community. More intriguingly, Pettipiece 
demonstrates that Kephalaia alters even the “canonical traditions” to suit its own 
needs.156 His insights help us understand the text as a “living” document that emerges 
from multiple contexts and occasions, prone to change even key doctrinal matters if 
doing so facilitated the Manichaean advancement into the Roman Near East.   
We must also take care not to reduce the Kephalaia as part of a monolithic 
“Western” Manichaeism. As Paul van Lindt ably demonstrates, the differences between 
the Manichaean Psalm-book and the Kephalaia challenge the assumption that we can talk 
                                                          
153 T. Pettipiece, Pentadic Redaction in the Manichaean Kephalaia (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 9. 
154 Ibid., 8. For example, consider Henrichs’ words. He writes, “We may conclude, then, that, once 
conceived admitted little, if any, substantial change, and that the several books he produced are a 
monument of systematization rather than landmarks of continuous intellectual evolution” (Henrichs, Mani 
and the Babylonian Baptists, 33). 
155 Ibid., 8.  
156 Pettipiece, Pentadic, 82.  
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about the Coptic Manichaica as a single “coherent library.”157 Van Lindt traces the 
similarities and the differences between these two texts as indicative of two different 
waves of Manichaean missionaries, traversing through Syria, possibly Palmyra, and 
located the “final” redaction of the Psalm-book and Kephalaia in Alexandria and 
Lycopolis, respectively.158 Ultimately, he argues that “the Kephalaia are probably a 
Coptic composition, based on Syriac fragments on the Manichaean religion.”159 His 
argument refocuses scholarly habit to attend to textual and literary differences over and 
against assuming an idealized Manichaean system.  
In attributing the roots of the Kephalaia to Syrian missionary efforts, Van Lindt 
follows the basic outline of Michel Tardieu’s suggestive claim that Mar Adda, an early 
Manichaean missionary to Syria, was the “author” of our Kephalaia.160 Pettipiece does 
not accept Tardieu’s attribution of the Kephalaia to Mar Adda, but he too echoes that 
someone like Mar Adda may very well have been responsible for the heavy-handed 
“pentadic redaction” so apparent in many of the chapters.161 Perhaps the most responsible 
way to contextualize the Kephalaia is to see it as an expansive anthology rooted in the 
Aramaic-speaking Levantine belt of the late third-century, yet sprouting westwards 
towards Palmyra and down the Syrian coastland into Egypt, where it was either translated 
into Coptic from Greek or Syriac by the early fifth century. It is thus neither wholly 
                                                          
157 P. van Lindt, The Names of Manichaean Mythological Figures: A Comparative Study on Terminology in 
the Coptic Sources (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), 221.  
158 Ibid., 225-31. For sources regarding the spread of Mani’s teachings into Syria, see: Gardner and Lieu, 
Manichaean Texts, 111-14. 
159 van Lindt, Names, xxvii.  
160 M. Tardieu, “Principes de l’exégése manichéenne,” in Les règles de l’interprétation (ed. M. Tardieu; 
Paris: Cerf, 1987), 134, n. 73.  
161 Pettipiece, Pentadic, 90-91.  
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“Syro-Mesopotamian” nor is it reducible to an “Egyptian” context, but must be 
understood according to the local contexts as far as possible. 
This cautious yet persistent attribution of the formative stages of the Kephalaia to 
a Syrian provenance deserves continued attention. Indeed, the curious density of texts 
from late third / early fourth century Syria that bear the marks of prophetological 
discourse, as we will see in the next two chapters, makes Syria a promising place to 
contextualize the passages of the Kephalaia under discussion here. To do so, I draw from 
the Laws of Various Countries, the Didascalia Apostolorum, and the Syro-Mesopotamian 
expansion of the “Acts” genre, that is, the Acts of Thomas, the Teachings of Addai, and 
the Acts of Mar Mari, to contextualize these chapters of the Kephalaia.  
 
1 Ke: Manichaeans and Christians: A Case of Oblique Competition 
 
The Kephalaia opens with a concise, though poorly preserved, treatment of Mani’s core 
teachings, which it calls the “Three Great Lessons [ⲥⲉϫⲉ].”162 These three lessons 
comprise the “Measure of all Wisdom [ⲡϣⲓ ⲛⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲧⲏⲣⲥ]”163 and whoever writes or 
teaches these three lessons are “true” teachers and scribes. Mani boasts that he wrote 
these three lessons in his books, yet laments that “the world did not permit him to write 
down all my wisdom.”164 As a result, he urges his disciples to “remember them [his 
lessons] and write them, gather them in different places, because much is the wisdom that 
                                                          
162 1 Ke 5.30. Coptic from: H.J. Polotsky and A. Böhlig, eds., Kephalaia (I): 1 Hälfte [Lieferung 1-10] 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1940).  
163 1 Ke 5.27.  
164 1 Ke 6.17-18. 
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I have uttered to you.”165 The “wisdom” that Mani had written did not contain the entirety 
of the “wisdom” that had been revealed to him. Rather, this “unrecorded” wisdom 
became manifest in Mani’s face-to-face encounters with his disciples, teachers, leaders, 
the Elect, the Catechumens,166 and even with members of the sects [ⲛⲕⲉⲇⲟⲅⲙⲁ] and 
heresies [ⲛⲕⲉϩⲁⲓⲣⲉⲥⲓⲥ].167 These are, not surprisingly, Mani’s main interlocutors in our 
Kephalaia. While it is doubtful that the Kephalaia emerged whole-cloth from “actual” 
encounters between Mani and others, the calculated pretense of Mani’s face-to-face 
encounters also legitimizes the form and structure of the Kephalaia, that is, as an 
anthology of dialogues between Mani and another person. Mani demarcates such “oral” 
discussions as “interpretations [ⲛϩⲉⲣⲙⲏⲛⲓⲁ],” “homilies [ⲛϩⲟⲙⲓⲗⲓⲁ],” and “lessons 
[ⲛⲥⲉϫⲉ].”168   
This patently transparent mode of self-legitimization quickly takes a 
prophetological turn. Mani evokes the “Fathers of Righteousness,” Jesus, Zoroaster, and 
Buddha, who are, like Mani, incarnations of the “Apostle of Light.” He states that 
because they failed to personally publish books of wisdom, their “righteousness” and 
their “churches” will pass away.  
 
And this, in that the fathers of righteousness did not write their wisdom in books… know that their 
righteousness and their church will pass away [ⲛⲁⲟⲩⲓⲛⲉ(?)] from the world; because they did not 
write… Since… write it in books… will lead astray [ⲛⲁⲣⲡⲗⲁⲛⲏ]… fall … and they … lead  
                                                          
165 1 Ke 6.25-27. 
166 1 Ke 6.23-24.  
167 1 Ke 7.3.  
168 1 Ke 6.21-22.  
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astray… adulterate, and they … mix… all of it, of the knowledge… will reveal [ⲛⲁϭⲱⲗⲡ]… in the 
world…169  
 
Despite the gaps in the text, the gist is clear. The “righteousness” and the churches of 
Buddha, Jesus, and Zoroaster will pass away from the world because their prophets failed 
to write down their teachings in books. Their disciples will be led astray, their teachings 
adulterated, and their church will perish. In contrast, Mani’s church will persevere 
precisely because of the books he had published. It should be noted that the text does not 
assume that the churches of Buddha, Jesus, or Zoroaster have already passed away but 
that they will at some future moment.  
Why frame the superiority of Mani’s church in these terms? The anxiety about the 
persistence of Mani’s church reflects, in part, the experiences of persecution in both the 
Roman and Sasanian Empires. The churches of Jesus and of Zoroaster, both of which 
should have aided Mani in promulgating the truth since Mani inhabited the same “Spirit” 
as these two prophets, instead aligned themselves with imperial powers and persecuted 
Mani and his followers. Mani himself witnessed the forging of a Zoroastrian alliance with 
the Sasanian shahs,170 an alliance that ultimately led to his own execution, and his 
disciples would have seen the gradual but no less powerful “Christianization” of the 
Roman Empire and its violent discourse against the Manichaeans. Nevertheless, Mani 
assures us, their churches will pass away, if only because for their “founders” had 
neglected to record their wisdom in books.  
                                                          
169 1 Ke 8.7-19. Unfortunately, the verb for “will pass away” is lost. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
missing verb was in the future tense since the verb “to lead astray” [ⲛⲁⲣⲡⲗⲁⲛⲏ] and “to reveal” [ⲛⲁϭⲱⲗⲡ] 
are both securely in the future tense.  
170 T. Daryaee, Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 69-77. 
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 At the same time, this introductory chapter exposes the tenuous nature of Mani’s 
superiority over the other prophets. In fact, it is not quite sure what to do with the fact 
that the churches established by Jesus and Zoroaster continued to persist side-by-side 
Mani’s church. Mani assures his disciples that his church is superior to the “affiliated” 
churches of Jesus and Zoroaster, yet he thrusts the demonstration of that superiority into 
the future – their churches will perish and their disciples will be led astray. I characterize 
this positioning as reflecting Mani’s own ambiguous relationship to the churches of his 
predecessors and operating as a form of oblique competition. After all, Mani’s claim to 
be an “Apostle of Jesus Christ” and the Paraclete asserts both filiation with and 
differentiation from the “Church of Jesus.” This mode of oblique competition can be 
detected on both the “Manichaean” and “Christian” sides. Kephalaia 105, for example, 
presents a concise example of this dynamic: there, Mani says that just as the “Christian 
people” [ⲛⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲛⲭⲣⲓⲥⲧⲓⲁⲛⲟⲥ] use the name of Christ in their invocations, name their 
children after Jesus, and take oaths in his name, so too do Manichaeans with the name of 
Mani.171 “Mani” adopts a curious position here; though he asserts parity with Jesus, the 
very act of asserting parity suggests distance and difference from Jesus and his church. 
Mani argues that his followers do everything that Jesus had done, though this boast only 
makes sense within a context that took Jesus’ deeds as the “gold standard.” Mar Ephrem, 
the fifth century Syriac poet, attacked the Manichaeans on similar grounds, writing, “For 
their works are like our works, their fasts are like our fasts, but their faith is not like our 
faith. And therefore, rather than being known by the fruit of their works, they are 
                                                          
171 1 Ke 258.26-259.23.  
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distinguished by the fruit of their words.”172 Ephrem adapts Jesus’ words in Matthew 
7:15-16 regarding false prophets, “that you shall know them by their fruits,” to mean by 
the “fruit of their words” not of their deeds. He therefore acknowledges that the 
Manichaeans are very similar to the “Christians,” yet he replaces the Manichaean 
prophetological model, which can tolerate the existence of “affiliated” churches, with a 
model that distinguishes sharply between “Christians” and the Manichaean “heretics.” 
Finally, this introductory chapter highlights the active role that disciples have in 
demonstrating the superiority of Mani’s church vis-à-vis the other churches. After all, the 
disciples are responsible for the preservation of their prophet’s wisdom and the 
continuation of their churches. Thus, Mani urges them to “Remember, and write a little 
something of from the great wisdom you heard from me [ⲁⲣⲓⲡⲙⲉⲩⲉ ⲛⲧⲉⲧⲛⲥϩⲉⲓ ⲟⲩⲕⲟⲩⲓ 
ⲛⲗⲁⲩⲉ ϩⲛ ⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲉⲧⲛⲁϣⲱⲥ ⲉⲧⲁⲧⲉⲧⲛⲥⲁⲧⲙⲉⲥ]!”173 This utterance legitimizes the 
compilation and publication of the Kephalaia itself by elevating scribal activity as a key 
marker of the superiority of Mani’s church. Mani depicts the disciples as vanguards of 
the faith, safeguarding his “authentic” teachings from pollution through the very act of 
scripturalization. In the long war of attrition that marks this present age until the second 
coming of Jesus, Mani intends that his church will be the last one standing.  
 
1 Ke 1 – Cycles of Revelation and the Superiority of Mani’s Church   
 
                                                          
172 Prose Refutations, I, 184,28-39. 
173 1 Ke 9.6-7. 
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The first full chapter of the Kephalaia also engages in oblique competition with the 
Christians and highlights the role of scripturalization, though it does so in different ways. 
In fact, an awareness of the Kephalaia’s own “sub-canonical” status permeates 
throughout this chapter. In its conclusion, for example, after having explained to his 
disciples various questions regarding his apostolate, Mani says,  
 
I have written for you about it in full in my books [ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ ϩⲛ ⲛⲁϫⲙⲉ] already. Today you 
have again questioned me. Behold, now I have repeated the lesson to you in brief [ϩⲛ 
ⲟⲩⲥⲩⲛⲧⲟⲙⲓⲁ]! When his disciples heard all these things from him, they rejoiced greatly. Their 
mind [ⲡⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩⲥ] was enlightened. They said to him in their joy, we thank you master! For while 
you have written about your advent in the scriptures [ⲁⲕⲥϩⲉⲓ ⲙⲉⲛ ϩⲁ ⲧⲕϭⲓⲛⲉⲓ ϩⲛ ⲛ [ⲅⲣⲁ]ⲫⲁⲩⲉ], how 
it came to be, and we have received it and believed in it, still you have repeated it to us in this 
place in a “gathered” form [ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲥⲱⲩϩ]. And we, for our parts, have received it in full [ϩⲛ 
ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ]. We have also believed that you are the Paraclete, this one from the Father, the revealer 
of all these hidden things!174 
 
This chapter is extremely conscious of its “sub-canonical” status. It does not overtly 
“compete” with the canonical “seven” written by Mani himself, but instead presents itself 
as a distillation of the teachings found therein. There is, of course, some latent tension: 
the disciples had already read about the apostleship “in the books,” yet it is only after 
they hear Mani utter the lesson in person that they receive it “in full.” The parallels 
                                                          
174 1 Ke 16. 21-31. It is worthwhile noting that Mani’s first response begins with, “I… but I will recount to 
you… [ϯ... ⲁⲗⲗⲁ ϯⲛⲁⲧⲉⲟⲩⲁϥ ⲁⲣⲱⲧⲛⲉ]” Given the fragmentary nature of the text, we cannot be absolutely 
certain what the lines in between contained, yet it seems likely to me that it said something like, “I [have 
written about it in my books already] but I will recount to you…” If this is accepted, it lends further 
credence to what I call the “anxiety” of this chapter with its status as a “sub”-canonical text.  
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underlined above capture this nicely: though Mani had written about his prophethood “in 
full” [ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ], it is only after the disciples receive it “in a gathered form” [ϩⲛ 
ⲟⲩⲥⲱⲩϩ] that they actually receive it “in full” (ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ). The Kephalaia thus exploits 
the gap between the canonical “Scriptures” and the practical-didactic needs of a growing 
community by presenting itself as a condensation of the former albeit in a more 
comprehensible and perhaps even superior form. This dual orientation of the Kephalaia 
endows its redactors/authors with the freedom to articulate conceptions of prophethood in 
ways that interact with their present circumstances while at the same time legitimizing 
itself as Mani’s own words. It is, I suggest, also a nod that acknowledges the chapter – 
and perhaps the Kephalaia as a whole – as a living document. To demonstrate this 
requires a thorough and somewhat lengthy look into the structure of this unusually long 
chapter, which I will attempt below. To be clear, I am not arguing that the Kephalaia is, 
in fact, a “distillation” of Mani’s scriptures. That question cannot, and most likely, will 
never be answered satisfactorily. Rather, I am interested in contextualizing what I argue 
are the two primary strata of this chapter within their Syro-Mesopotamian contexts. 
The larger intent of the first chapter of the Kephalaia is to frame Mani’s 
apostleship as the culmination of a cosmic cycle of prophets and prophetic communities, 
their “churches.” Like Baraies, the authors/redactors of this chapter articulated Mani’s 
superiority not as one of kind, but of degree. Interestingly, instead of constructing a 
typology of prophethood as Baraies had done, they articulated a notion of “prophethood” 
as a cyclical process of descent of the apostle, his choosing of an Elect community, and 
their staggered ascent back to the realm of light. Scholars have tended to understand this 
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cycle of prophetic descent and ascent as part of a larger concept of a “chain of prophets,” 
tying it to both Elchasaite and other “Jewish-Christian” understandings of 
prophethood.175 Though this is true at some level, it does not capture the complex 
nuances of the cycle of prophecy, nor does it attend to the inner contradictions and 
problems within the chapter itself. In this section, I focus on such problems, first to argue 
a source-critical point that the first half of the chapter is an intrusion into an “original” 
text that extended directly from the introductory questions to the latter half of the chapter, 
and second, that this textual insertion helps us better understand the contested nature of 
prophetological discourse in the late third / early fourth century Syria. Before proceeding 
further, however, it is necessary to summarize the two halves of this chapter.  
 
Summary of the First Half: The Parable of the Farmer and the Months of Parmuthi and 
Paophi 
 
The first half of the chapter176 is essentially an extended parable about the descent of the 
“Apostle of Light,” his duties as prophet in this world, his return back to the Heights, and 
the gradual ascent of his church. The apostle is compared to a farmer, and the cycle of 
descent and ascent of his church is compared to the Egyptian months of Parmuthi and 
Paophi. The parable illustrates that before each apostle is sent into the world, he “frees” 
                                                          
175 N.A. Pedersen, “Early Manichaean Christology, Primarily in Western Sources,” in Manichaean Studies: 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Manichaeism (ed. P. Bryder; Lund, 1988), 166-72; L. 
Cirillo, “From Elchasaite Christology to the Manichaean Apostle of Light: Some Remarks about the 
Manichaean Doctrine of the Revelation,” in Il Manicheismo: nuove prospettive della ricerca (eds. A. van 
Tongerloo and L. Cirillo; Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2005), 51-54; Reeves, Heralds, 7-17. More recently, 
see: P. Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 279-301.  
176 Roughly 1 Ke 9.21-12.9. 
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[ⲣ-ⲣⲙϩⲉ] the “forms” [ⲛⲟⲩⲙⲟⲣⲫⲁⲩⲉ] of his church in the heights – that is, he chooses his 
Elect community prior to his entering the cosmos.177 When the “forms of the church” are 
to be “born in the flesh [ϫⲡⲁⲥ ϩⲛ ⲧⲥⲁⲣⲝ],”178 the apostle descends immediately to tend to 
his church. When the “season” of harvest approaches, the apostle returns to the Land of 
Light, leaving his church behind (ⲛϥⲕⲁ ⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ ⲙⲛϫⲱⲥ).179 Though he goes up 
before them (ⲛϥⲥⲱⲕ ϩⲏⲧⲟⲩ),180 the ascended apostle remains a “helper” and a “guardian” 
for his still-enfleshed church. This ascent of the prophet prior to the ascent of his church 
is crucial in so far as it allows the apostle – who has now returned to his previous state as 
the pre-incarnate ‘Apostle of Light’ – to begin the process of “freeing the forms” of his 
church for the next cycle of descent. When the “first-fruits” of his church – presumably 
referring to those he himself had chosen prior to entering the cosmos – become ripe for 
harvest, they in turn propagate other fruits on the tree. These newly-propagated fruits 
probably refer to Manichaean converts, who were not chosen directly by the Apostle, yet 
nevertheless constitute his church. Given this continuous cycle of choosing an elect 
community propagating further converts, “there is not any time that the tree is bare of 
fruit!”181 The work of the Apostle is endless.  
                                                          
177 1 Ke 10.25, 12.5. The Apostle “frees” the forms of his church in the Heights. According to 1 Ke 36.9-
11, when the Church whom he chooses on earth decide to follow Mani, they receive their “Light Form” 
[ⲡⲙⲟⲣⲫⲏ ⲛⲟⲩⲁⲓⲛⲉ]. This may be the idea in 1 Ke 9.9 as well, though the text is too fragmentary to tell 
[ⲛⲥⲉⲣⲣⲙϩⲉ…]. See: Pedersen, “Early Manichaean Christology,” 166-67. It should be noted that in 1 Ke 
36.9-11, there is no indication that it is the apostle’s responsibility to “free” the forms of the church.  
178 1 Ke 11.1. Presumably the “forms of the church” will be “born in the flesh.” In contrast, the statement in 
1 Ke 36.9-11 states that the members of Mani’s church receive [ϫⲓⲧⲥ] the “light forms” only if they 
“renounce the world [ⲉⲩϣⲁⲛⲁⲡⲟⲧⲁⲥⲥⲉ].” Is the Manichaean church “predestined” or is it a matter of one’s 
choice? 
179 1 Ke 11.6. 
180 1 Ke 11.9. 
181 1 Ke 11.26-27.  
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As a whole, the parable in the first half of the chapter is interested in two 
intertwined aspects of Manichaean theology: the manifestation of the Apostle of Light 
and the ultimate origin and destination of his Church. It is not interested in the historical 
narratives of individual prophets, which occupies the bulk of the second half, as we will 
see.  
 
Summary of the Second Half: The Chain of Apostles, Jesus, his Church, and Mani 
 
Given the state of the text, it is difficult to state with certainty when the second half 
actually begins.182 Nevertheless, a good place is with the “chain of apostles.” This 
supposed “chain” includes Adam, Enosh, Enoch, Sem, Buddha, Aurentes, and 
Zarathustra. In reality, this “chain” is merely a prelude to the two most important figures 
in Manichaean history, Jesus and Mani. The text continues by outlining Jesus’ 
incarnation into the sect of the Jews, his obedient life, death, and resurrection.183 Before 
Jesus ascends to the heights, however, he chooses his seventy-two disciples and his 
twelve apostles, and breathes into them his holy spirit. 184 After he ascends, Paul the 
apostle and another “righteous man” [ⲁⲩⲇⲓⲕⲁⲓⲟⲥ]185 strengthens Jesus’ church. Despite 
their best efforts, the church of Jesus withers away. When the last of Jesus’ church 
ascends, Mani’s apostleship begins.186 Mani discusses his apostolate starting with the 
sending of the Paraclete, from whom he received the revelatory knowledge that he would 
                                                          
182 Roughly from 1 Ke 12.9-16.31. 
183 1 Ke 12.19-13.12. 
184 1 Ke 13.8-25. 
185 1 Ke 13.30.  
186 1 Ke 14.3-4.  
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later inscribe in his books. He then recounts his travels in the Sasanian Empire as well as 
in India.187 He boasts that he is superior to the other apostles because his church had 
spread to every corner of the earth, and as a result of its wide propagation, it will remain 
until Jesus returns as a judge to separate between his church, who will sit at Jesus’ right 
side, and those who belong on his left, presumably the various sects whom Mani aligns 
with the forces of darkness.188  
Perhaps more importantly, this half of the chapter demonstrates the superiority of 
Mani’s “church” over and against earlier apostles, especially Jesus’. Whereas Jesus’ 
church ultimately perished, or to speak charitably, “ascended,” Mani’s church was so 
widespread that it continued to conceive and bear new “fruit.” Its global reach guarantees 
the superiority of Mani’s church since it continues to expand and gain new adherents. It 
also guaranteed that there would no longer be any need for another prophet, thus ensuring 
Mani as the final prophet. Though one might be tempted to assume that this 
understanding of Mani’s superiority is in continuation with how it was portrayed in the 
introduction, in reality, it flatly contradicts it. There, as we saw, the dissolution of Jesus’ 
church will occur in the future because Jesus failed to author books of wisdom. Here, 
Mani’s apostleship occurs as a result of the dissolution of Jesus’ church, without any 
mention of scripturalization as the key cause for that dissolution.  
As is evident from even this brief summary, the focus of this second half differs 
from the first. It is wholly concerned with the narrative of Jesus’ life and how it relates to 
                                                          
187 1 Ke 15.25-16.9. 
188 1 Ke 16.14-17. 
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the coming of Paraclete in Mani. It is, in fact, very difficult to detect the cosmic cycle of 
prophethood outlined in the parable in the first half.  
 
Deconstructing the Chapter: The Parable and the Narrative  
 
This chapter can thus be roughly divided into two halves. Of course, there is no a priori 
reason why we should assume this chapter was written by a single “author” or in a single 
moment. In fact, in the following sections, I ultimately argue that this chapter is the 
product of at least two moments of redaction. I suggest that 1) the second half of the 
chapter is in fact the original response to the disciples’ questions as framed in the 
introduction, and thus, the first half is a later intrusion, and that 2) the parable is, in fact, 
an expansive “parabolization” of the cycle of Jesus’ descent and ascent in the second 
half. It should be noted, however, that the following must remain tentative until scholars 
launch a more dedicated effort at unraveling the inner composition of the Kephalaia. 
Nevertheless, even if my redaction-critical analysis is ultimately overturned, the 
differences between the two halves are worth pointing out, if only to get a sense of the 
architectonics of this chapter.  
There are good reasons for reading the second half of this chapter as “original” to 
the text and the first half as an “intrusion.” These reasons are 1) Mani only responds to 
his disciples’ questions in the second half of the chapter. Therefore, the second half is 
necessary and sufficient for the entire chapter. 2) The parable in the first half comprise a 
self-enclosed unit, only loosely affiliated with the second half, and is therefore 
superfluous to the chapter. Lest one think that the parable is supposed to introduce the 
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second half, I argue 3) that the parable actually introduces obscurities into the chapter. 4) 
Nevertheless, there are a few parallels between the two halves that must be explained. As 
stated above, I suggest that the parable is, in fact, a “parabolization” of the second half. 
This explains both why the parable is so loosely connected to the introduction and why 
there are parallels to the second half. These points altogether suggest at least two 
moments of redaction. Let us begin with the first point.   
 
1) Mani only responds to the disciples’ questions in the second half of the chapter. The 
opening chapter of the Kephalaia begins with Mani’s disciples requesting Mani to 
explain his coming into this world. They ask concerning,  
 
… his apostleship and his coming to the cosmos / for how did it happen [… his] / journeying in 
each city, in each la[nd] ; / in what [manner] was he sent […] first, before he had yet chosen his 
church.”189  
 
ⲧϥⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲏ ⲙⲛ ⲧϥϭⲓⲛⲉⲓ ⲁⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ϫⲉ ⲛⲧⲁⲥϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲛⲉϣ ⲛϩⲉ ... ⲧⲉϥϭⲓⲙⲙⲁϩⲉ ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ 
ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲭⲱⲣⲁ ⲭⲱⲣⲁ ⲛⲧⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩϥ ⲛⲉϣ ⲛϩⲉ ... ⲛϣⲁⲣⲡ ϩⲁⲧⲉϩⲏ ⲉⲙⲡⲁⲧⲉϥⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲛⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ 
 
It is imperative to note that the disciples are only interested in the coming of “the” 
apostle, Mani, and the narratival arc of his sojourn in this cosmos. This is clear not only 
from the third person singular masculine marker – ⲧϥϭⲓⲛⲉⲓ – but also assumed from the 
references to Mani’s journeys in various cities and lands - ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲭⲱⲣⲁ 
                                                          
189 1 Ke 9.15-20. 
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ⲭⲱⲣⲁ. There is thus a noticeable gap between the disciples’ questions and Mani’s 
immediate response, that is, the parable that dominates the first half of the chapter, which 
does not focus on Mani’s apostleship at all, but on the relationship of the Apostle of Light 
and his multiple churches. This wide gap suggests that the parable in the first half is not, 
in fact, responding to the disciples at all.  
Let us now examine each of the disciples’ questions. The disciples ask regarding 
“his apostleship and his coming to the cosmos, for how it happened.” Mani responds to 
this question multiple times in the latter half. For example, by way of introducing the 
“historical” section on Jesus, Mani says, “… the advent of the Apostle happened at the 
occasion… as I have told you…”190 In this passage, the “Apostle” refers to the “Apostle 
of Light,” Mani’s Divine Twin, also known as the Paraclete, whose union with Mani 
initiates Mani’s tenure as Apostle. Mani also responds to these questions on the specific 
circumstances of his apostleship when he says, “When the church of the savior was raised 
to the heights, my apostleship began, which you asked me about (ⲉⲧⲁⲧⲉⲧⲛϣⲛⲧ 
ⲉⲧⲃⲏⲧⲥ).”191 This phrase is strong evidence that Mani is responding directly to the 
questions posed in the introduction, and though it only occurs three times, 192 they are all 
in the latter half of the chapter. Finally, Mani responds to his disciples when he says, 
“This is how [ⲧϩⲉ ⲧⲉ ⲧⲉⲓ] everything that has happened and that will happen was 
unveiled to me by the Paraclete…”193 He thus answers the questions in the introduction 
regarding the manner in which the Apostle of Light, the Paraclete, entered into the world. 
                                                          
190  1 Ke 12.9. 
191  1 Ke 14.3-4. 
192  1 Ke 14.4, 16.18, 16.22 
193 1 Ke 15.19-20.  
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The disciples also ask about the cities and regions Mani visited in his travels. 
Again, Mani discusses this only in the latter half of the chapter, where he discusses his 
travels in India and Persia, Babylon, Mesene, Susiana, the land of the Parthians, 
Adiabene, and the borders of the provinces of kingdom of the Romans.194  
They also ask “in what manner he was sent (ⲛⲧⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩϥ)… The “he” in this 
situation probably refers to the Paraclete, Mani’s divine twin. This is, after all, a major 
theme in the second half of the chapter. There, Mani says, “From that time on was sent 
(ⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩ) the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth…”195  again, “Since the Spirit is of the 
Paraclete, the one who was sent to me (ⲡⲉⲧⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩϥ ϣⲁⲣⲁⲓ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ) from the 
Greatness.”196 Mani also dates the coming of the Paraclete by referring to the ascension 
of Ardashir. He writes, “In that same year, when Ardashir the King was crowned, the 
living Paraclete came down (ⲉⲓ ⲁⲡⲓⲧⲛ ϣⲁⲣⲁⲓ) to me. He spoke with me. He unveiled to 
me the hidden mystery…”197 He then describes everything that the Paraclete proceeded to 
teach him. These three examples demonstrate that Mani is responding to his disciples’ 
questions in the second half.   
Finally, the disciples ask about the things Mani did “… before he had yet chosen 
his church [ⲛϣⲁⲣⲡ ϩⲁⲧⲉϩⲏ ⲉⲙⲡⲁⲧⲉϥⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲛⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ].” In order to understand this 
question, it is necessary for us to nuance what it means to “choose a church.” The apostle 
is responsible for two acts of “choosing,” one when he is in the “Heights” and another 
when he is in the “Cosmos.” While in the “heights,” the Apostle chooses an Election 
                                                          
194 1 Ke 15.25-16.3. 
195 1 Ke 14.4-5 
196 1 Ke 16.19. 
197 1 Ke 14.32-15.1. 
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[ⲙⲛⲧⲥⲱⲧⲡ],198 which is the same as “freeing the forms of his Church.” But when he is in 
the “cosmos,” the incarnate apostle “chooses” his church [ⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ] whose “forms” 
he had freed in his pre-incarnate stage. The term “Church,” then, is only an earthly 
phenomena. This is why the Apostle goes to “another” Church [ⲛⲧⲕⲉⲉⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ] when he 
descends into the cosmos199 and leaves behind his “Church” when he ascends.200 The 
Church itself refers specifically to the earthly manifestation of the “Forms” which the 
Apostle freed while he is in the heights. Again, the Paraclete reveals to Mani the 
“mystery of the apostles who were sent to the world to enable them to choose the 
churches [ⲁⲧⲣⲟⲩⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲛⲛⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ]…”201 A “church” can only be chosen while in the 
world. Again, later on, Mani says, “I have chosen you, the good election, the holy church 
[ⲁⲓⲥⲱⲧⲡⲧⲏⲛⲉ ⲛⲧⲱⲧⲛ ⲧⲙⲛⲧⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲉⲧⲁⲛⲓⲧ ⲧⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ ⲉⲧⲟⲩⲁⲃⲉ] that I was sent to from the 
Father.”202 In this last example, the essential congruity of the heavenly “Election” and its 
earthly form, the Church, is emphasized.  
All these points demonstrate that the disciples are asking about Mani’s deeds 
while he was incarnate and thus within the cosmos, and not about his duties in his pre-
incarnate form as the Apostle of Light. They are curious about Mani’s deeds before he 
chose them as members of his church, a question that Mani answered by describing how 
he received his revelations from the Paraclete and subsequently wandered throughout the 
Sasanian Empire, at times in the retinue of the emperor Shapur. Again, Mani only 
answers these questions in the latter half of the chapter.  
                                                          
198 1 Ke 10.13-14. 
199 1 Ke 12.3-4. 
200 1 Ke 11.6. 
201 1 Ke 15.14-15. 
202 1 Ke 16.3-4.  
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Of course, one might simply argue that the parable is a prelude to the latter half. 
For evidence, one might argue that the reference to the “coming to the cosmos,” the 
“manner in which he was sent,” and his “pre-existence” prior to his “choosing his 
church” are all elements present in the first half. Yet, as I argued, all these points are 
already sufficiently explained in the second half of the chapter with direct reference to 
Mani. Furthermore, if the parable was in fact an “original” prelude to the second half, it 
should clarify the narrative in the second half. In fact, as I will show below, the parable 
actually obscures it.  
 
2) I argued above that the second half of the chapter responds directly to the disciples’ 
questions. It is thus both necessary and sufficient for the integrity of the chapter. Here, I 
advance an argument that the first half – that is, the parable of the farmer and the seasons 
– can be considered its own self-contained unit, and as a result, is superfluous to the 
chapter.  
As already summarized above, the first half is an extended parable of the farmer 
and the seasons of sowing and harvest. The boundaries of the parable can be assessed by 
marking both its content and patterns in terminology. I have already summarized the 
content of the parable above and will discuss here the terminology that binds this first 
half together as a discrete unit. Given that the first half is essentially an extended parable, 
it is riddled with phrases and terms that marks it as part of a continuous parabolic 
discourse. They are: 
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1. “All the apostles who are on occasion sent to the world resemble farmer, while their church, 
which they choose, are like Parmuthi and Paophi…203 
2. “This is the way of the apostles who are come to the world… They are like a… of the 
greatness”204  
3. “Also the way…”205  
4. “Like the farmer…”206  
5. “Again, this too is how the apostles…”207 
6. “Like the farmer who shall be glad of heart…”208 
7. “Or like the merchant who shall come up from a country…”209 
8. “The apostles are like this also…”210  
 
Such terms mark the first half of the chapter as a discrete and internally-coherent unit. 
Naturally, both the parable and their explanations are part of this unit as well. The end of 
the unit, then, must be when the parabolic discourse ends, which is roughly in 1 Ke 12.9, 
where the “chain of prophets” discussed above begins. Apparently, Mani had already 
forgotten that he had just discussed this very topic in his parable. From there, the chapter 
leaves behind the parabolic discourse and enters into the more “narratival” second half.  
Related to the argument above, one might also identify the boundaries of this 
parabolic unit by paying attention to the “cycle” of prophet and churches itself. A single 
cycle begins with the Apostle freeing the “forms” of his church, the descent of the 
                                                          
203 1 Ke 9.24-27. 
204 1 Ke 10.8. 
205 1 Ke 10.21. 
206 1 Ke 10.26. 
207 1 Ke 10.30. 
208 1 Ke 11.17. 
209 1 Ke 11.18. 
210 1 Ke 11.35. 
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church, the descent of the Apostle, the ascent of the Apostle, and concludes with the 
ascent of the church. We can trace this single cycle through the chapter in the following 
manner.   
 
 Freeing the Forms of the Church 
 1. All the apostles who are on occasion sent to the world…211 
2. This is the way of the apostles who are come to the world… they choose a selection of the… the 
elect and the catechumens… their forms, and they make them free… in the flesh…212  
3. Also, the way… many years before… the world… makes the forms of his church free… of the 
flesh, whose forms he had made free.213  
 4. Again this too is how the apostles… before everything he shall… free above, first.214  
 
 Descent of the Apostle 
5. Yet, when it [the church] will be born in the flesh, he shall come down to it and at once… He 
shall continue in the world at this time…215  
 
Ascent of the Apostle 
6. When the season will mature he is raised up from the world… / and he leaves his church behind 
and goes forth…216 
 
Ascent of the Church 
 7. When the apostle will be raised up from the world, he and his church… for every apostle…217  
                                                          
211 1 Ke 9.24-25. 
212 1 Ke 10.8-16. 
213 1 Ke 10.21-24. 
214 1 Ke 10.30-34. 
215 1 Ke 10.34-11.1. 
216 1 Ke 11.5-6.  
217 1 Ke 11.20-21.  
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8. The apostles are like this also. Now, when the apostle will be raised up to the heights, he/ and 
his church, and they depart from that world; at that instant another apostle shall be sent to it, to 
another church … Yet first he shall make the forms of his church free in the Heights…218 
 
The “chain of apostles” mentioned above immediately follows this cycle. With a few 
exceptions that will be discussed below, the second half is devoid of any sustained 
“parabolic” aspects that so heavily marked the first half. Furthermore, this parable is 
concerned with the relationship between the apostle and the origins, duration, and telos of 
his churches, whereas the second half centers strongly on answering the disciples’ 
questions, as demonstrated above. Therefore, the parable itself can be understood as a 
discrete unit, only loosely affiliated with the rest of the chapter. Granted, superfluity does 
not determine whether it was “original” to the chapter or not. To assess that point, I will 
argue in the following section that the parable, in fact, obscures the meaning of the 
“original” second-half of the chapter.  
 
3) Despite the arguments made above, one might argue that the first half was also 
“original” to the chapter and that it served to elucidate the second half. There is no doubt 
that the first half affects the way that the entire chapter is read in its final form. 
Nevertheless, this alone does not make it original to it. In fact, the first half does not 
clarify the second half, but introduces obfuscations and tensions.  
Let us first turn to the conclusion of what I argue is the first half of the chapter. 
We have already seen this passage above. Mani says, 
                                                          
218 1 Ke 11.35-12.5. 
 95   
 
 
The apostles are like this also. Now, when the apostle will be raised up to the heights, he and his 
church, and they depart from the world; at that instant another apostle shall be sent to it, to another 
church… it… Yet, first, he shall make the forms of his church free in the heights, as I have told 
you. When … again, he too shall come down and appear… and he releases his church and saves it 
from the flesh of sin …219 
 
Though the passage is full of holes, the gist is clear. When an apostle’s church ascends, 
another apostle descends from the heights to begin the process all over again. 
Presumably, another prophet will not descend until the previous church had been entirely 
redeemed. Therefore, there can only be one prophet and one church in the world at a 
time. The parable, then, understands prophethood within a single “register” that is, as 
incarnations of the “Apostles of Light.”  
Let us now turn to the passage that immediately follows, which I argued above, 
was the beginning of the second half and the original response to the disciples’ questions. 
It says,  
 
The coming of the Apostle has occurred… as I have told you: From Sethel, the firstborn son of 
Adam up to Enosh, together with Enoch, from Enoch up to Sem, the son of Noah … church after 
it… Buddha to the east, and Aurentes, and the other who were sent to the orient, from the advent 
of Buddha and Aurentes up to the advent of Zarathustra to Persia, the occasion that he came to 
                                                          
219 1 Ke 11.35-12.5. 
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Hystaspes, the king; from the advent of Zarathustra up to the advent of Jesus the Christ, the son of 
greatness.220  
 
With this passage, there is a shift from the parabolic discussion on apostles as 
incarnations of the Apostle of Light to the more “historical” discussion of the Apostle par 
excellence, Mani. If, for the moment, we understand this passage as a continuation of the 
“parable” that came prior to this passage, then we are meant to understand this “chain of 
prophets” as incarnations of the Apostle of Light. Or, if we read it in light of what 
follows, then it is merely a prelude to the coming of the apostle par excellence, Mani. 
Can it be read as both? I argue here, no. It is easier and more consistent to read this 
passage as an introduction to the second half rather than a continuation of the first.  
 Let us first read the passage above with what follows it. This half allows for 
multiple apostles to exist simultaneously and at the same time. It thus has a rather flexible 
understanding of who is an apostle.  For example, though Jesus is an incarnation of the 
“Apostle of Light” in one sense, he himself has “apostles” whom he chooses. These 
“apostles” are not “incarnations” of the Apostle of Light, though they share in some of 
his power. Paul too is one of these apostles who strengthens Jesus’ church. There is also a 
mysterious “righteous man” who may also be an “apostle” of some sort. In light of this 
relatively unproblematic understanding of “prophethood,” I would suggest that the “chain 
                                                          
220 1 Ke 12.9-21. The traces of earlier traditions of prophethood are also visible in this passage. For 
example, Sethel, Enosh, Enoch, Sem, and Noah are clearly one set of prophets and Buddha, Aurentes, the 
“others,” Zarathustra, and Jesus another. Sethel and Sem are marked by their patrilineal descent, while the 
latter set of prophets are marked by their regional distribution. Finally, only the latter set of apostles are 
described entering the world as “Advents.” The set of “Buddha, Zarathustra, and Jesus” most likely derives 
from the Shabuhragan. It is possible that the list of “biblical” forefathers is from the same text, though it is 
difficult to know for certain. It seems that there was never a “canonical” list of the prophets, and the 
boundaries of who was a prophet and not were quite porous!   
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of apostles” discussed above is allied more closely with this half of this chapter because it 
too has overlapping eras of apostleship, e.g., Enosh and Enoch, and Buddha and Aurentes 
and the “others.” Clearly, for the author/redactors of this second half, “multiple” apostles 
in the same span of time and place was not a major issue.   
Though the “chain of apostles” is relatively straightforward if one connects it to 
the following passages, it becomes obfuscated if one reads it as part of the earlier 
parabolic discourse. For example, as already stated, Enosh and Enoch both occupy the 
same “prophetic” time, as does Buddha and Aurentes. By itself, it would not be a 
problem were it not for the fact that it contradicts the plain sense of the prior passage, 
which stated that a prophet descends only when the previous church had been raised. 
There cannot be two prophets at the same time. Or perhaps, one might think that there 
can be two prophets, as long as they occupy different regions. Yet the passage also states 
clearly that Buddha and Aurentes were both sent to the “East.” Presumably, Enoch and 
Enosh were also present in the same region, though the text does not state this explicitly 
nor does it care to do so. It would also mean that there were two incarnations of the 
Apostle of Light at the same time, which would completely obviate the need for the 
Apostle to return to the Heights prior to the ascent of his church. Or, perhaps the parable 
explicates only a “higher register” of prophethood, that of incarnations of the “Apostle of 
Light” like Jesus and Buddha, as opposed to the “lower tier” of prophets, like Seth and 
Enoch. This too falls flat because the Coptic does not distinguish between upper-case 
“Apostles” and lower-case “apostles.” Moreover, if this were the case, why juxtapose the 
parable with a “chain of apostles” that contains both “major” and “minor” apostles at the 
same time, thus leading to more confusion?   
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Even more fundamental to the problem, the text does not explain what exactly 
was “from Sethel firstborn of Adam up to Enosh, together with Enoch.” Sethel, Enosh, 
and Enoch are clearly some sort of temporal markers, but what are they marking?221 If we 
read this passage in light of what follows, these temporal aspects do not necessarily have 
to mark anything at all. In fact, as is readily apparent, this “chain of apostles” is nothing 
more than a prelude to the main figures of history, Jesus and Mani. Indeed, the passage 
almost stumbles in its rush to discuss these two figures, as evidenced by the awkward 
insertions of “Enosh” and “Aurentes.” In other words, the point of the chain of apostles is 
not to explicate any doctrine of the descent of the prophet, but merely to link Mani’s 
apostleship to a prophetic and historical past.   
If read as a continuation of the parabolic discourse, however, these prophets must 
be seen as “incarnations of the Apostle of Light,” which leads to further complications. 
Predictably, these problems come from the implicit rule from the parable that the world 
cannot tolerate more than one prophet and church at a time. We are therefore forced to 
come up with increasingly unlikely interpretations for figuring out what precisely is being 
demarcated “From Sethel son of Adam up to Enosh.” Is it the lifetime of the prophets? 
                                                          
221 I suspect that these terms actually mark the possession of revelatory knowledge, not one’s incarnation as 
an Apostle of Light, as the parable would lead its readers to think. This is best attested in sources that relate 
to the Šābuhragān. For instance, the Šābuhragān begins with the following passage: “Then Xradešahr (the 
god of the world of wisdom) – he who first gave that male creation, the original First Man, wisdom and 
knowledge, and who afterwards from time to time and age to age, close to the renovation…” (Mackenzie, 
“Mani’s Šābuhragān,” 505). This is corroborated in later Islamicate sources. For example, ‘Abd al-Jabbar 
writes, “The first whom God most exalted sent with knowledge (‘ilm) was Adam, then Seth, then Noah. 
Then he sent Zarādusht to Persia, Buddha to India, Jesus Christ to the countries of the West, and the, Mani, 
‘seal of the prophets.’ Also Shahrastānī writes, “… the first whom God Most Exalted commissioned with 
knowledge and wisdom was Adam…, then Seth after him, then Noah after him, then Abraham after him…” 
See: Reeves, Islamicate Manichaeism, 102-104. The “biblical forefathers” do not align exactly with the 
chain espoused in our chapter, but these passage suggest that it was knowledge (‘ilm) that was being 
transmitted from one source to another. Presumably, after the flood, the knowledge was lost which 
necessitated the need to transmit incarnations of the Apostle of Light himself.  
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Perhaps, but the parables makes clear that the prophet needs to ascend prior to the ascent 
of his church. This would mean that there is a significant gap of time between the ascent 
of the prophet and his re-descent as a prophet to another church. This seems unlikely. 
Perhaps it is marking the duration of his churches? This is more likely, yet even here 
there is a major difficulty. After all, the churches of Enoch and Enosh, as well as of 
Buddha, Aurentes, and the “others,” would have to exist simultaneously and in the same 
region. This is impossible, at least according to the parable, since there can only be one 
prophet at a time. Such complications only emerged if we understand the “chain of 
prophets” through the lens of the parable. When we read the “chain” with what follows it, 
rather than what comes before, there is no problem. This leads me to conclude that the 
author/redactors of the “chain of apostles” does not belong originally to what precedes it, 
but to what follows it.   
 
4. Before discussing the implications of an understanding of this chapter as a redacted 
whole, it is necessary to explain the parallels present in the two halves. I argue that these 
parallels are best explained if we assume that the parable in the first half is an abstraction, 
or perhaps better, a “parabolization” of the second half. As we will see, these parallels are 
too similar to be mere chance. Barring the discovery of another source that demonstrates 
that these two halves composed a single unit, one can cautiously assert some sort of 
genetic relationship between the two halves. To be more provocative, I argue that a later 
author/redactor responsible for the parable on the cycle of descent and ascent in the first 
half based his parable on the cycle of Jesus’ descent, the ascent of his church, and the 
descent of Mani in the second half. Therefore, the cycle of descent and ascent in the 
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second half of the chapter, which in fact only explains the advent of Mani’s apostolate, 
becomes the standard for all cycles of prophetic and ecclesiastical descent and ascent; the 
second half was the conceptual germ for the first half.  
To argue this point, let us turn to the first parallel. This parallel is in fact a short 
passage appended a larger passage on a mysterious “righteous person” who, like Paul, 
strengthened the church. It reads,  
 
After those one again, little by little, the church perished. The world remained behind without a 
church, like a tree that will be plucked, and its fruits on it taken away. And it remains behind 
without fruit.”222 
 
The imagery of a tree, its fruit, and the demise of a “church” finds its closest parallel in 
the parable, where it is used to explain the opposite point, namely, that the fruit of the tree 
propagates other fruits, therefore, the tree is never barren of fruit.223 For our purposes, we 
must determine if the passage above is an intertextual invocation to the parable in the first 
half. The brevity of the statement makes it difficult to ascertain a definite answer. At the 
same time, its very brevity also signals that it is not meant to invoke the parable. Its 
casual mention of the tree is far too incidental to bear the weight as an intentional 
intertextual reference to the grand cycle of prophetic descent and ascent discussed in the 
first half of the chapter. The imagery of the tree is only instrumental to this particular 
passage, and is not essential to it. This is in contrast to the parable, in which the tree and 
the harvest take center stage. My interpretation that this is more of a “local” illustration 
                                                          
222 1 Ke 13.35-14.2. 
223 1 Ke 11.26-27.  
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than a strong intertextual link is further bolstered by its placement at the end of a major 
passage on the demise of Jesus’ church.  
 I posit essentially the same argument with the second parallel. This parallel is 
embedded in a larger passage regarding the beginning of the apostleship of Mani as the 
prophesied Paraclete. The passage is a bit patchy, yet it seems to describe the actions of 
the Paraclete as “freeing” the forms of the “Manichaean” church.  
 
“… And he makes them free. Yet, when the church assumed the flesh, the season arrived to 
redeem the souls, like the month of Parmuthi in which cereal shall ripen to be harvested.”224 
 
The idea of the “freeing the forms” as well as the reference to Parmuthi, cereal, and the 
harvest are all familiar from the parable. Yet, are these intertextual referents to the 
parable? Again, I would argue no. They are instead narrowly circumscribed illustrations 
of the advent of Mani’s apostleship and does not suggest any awareness of a larger cycle 
of prophethood. Also like the previous parallel, the reference to Parmuthi is appended 
towards the end and is illustrative only of Mani’s apostleship. Taken within its immediate 
context, then, the reference cannot be used to indicate a wider horizons of “prophethood” 
that the parable presents.   
 Nevertheless, the two parallels adduced so far are conceptually identical to the 
parable. Another parallel makes this clear. 
 
                                                          
224 1 Ke 14.24-26.  
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“When the church of the savior was raised to the heights, my apostolate began, which you asked 
me about! From that time on was sent the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth: the one who has come to 
you in this last generation. Just like the savior said, “When I go, I will send to you the Paraclete. 
When the Paraclete comes, he can upbraid the world concerning sin, and he can speak with you on 
behalf of righteousness and about judgement…”225  
 
Compare this with the following parallel in the first half.  
 
The apostles are like this also. Now when the apostle will be raised to the heights, he and his 
church, and they depart from the world; at that instant, another apostle shall be sent to it, to 
another church… Yet first, he shall make the forms of his church free in the heights, as I have told 
you. When… again, he too shall come down and appear … and he released his church and saved it 
from the flesh of sin.226 
 
It is clear that the passages from both halves envisage an identical process of ascent and 
descent. A prophet descends when the previous prophet and his church ascends. Yet 
whereas the passage from the latter half is limited in scope to the case of Jesus and Mani, 
the passage in the first half expands and systematizes this particular example to apply to 
all cycles of prophetic descent and ascent. Jesus no longer needs to proclaim the coming 
of a “Paraclete,” as he does so in the second half, because the cycle of descent and ascent 
is already built into the broader understanding of prophethood and church.  
We might also draw attention to the fact that in the parable the “Apostle of Light” 
ascends to heaven prior to the ascent of his church, which is directly paralleled by Jesus 
                                                          
225 1 Ke 14.3-10. 
226 1 Ke 11.35-12.5. 
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ascending to the heights in the latter half of the chapter, leaving behind his “apostles” and 
his church. Again, there is no indication that this passage is aware of a cosmic cycle of 
descent and ascent. After all, its primary goal is to set the scene for the beginning of 
Mani’s apostolate. The parable, then, predictably weaves the “premature” timing of 
Jesus’ ascent as an integral part of its cycle.  
In retrospect, this argument is not at all surprising. Jesus and Mani are, after all, 
the two principal figures of the cosmic soteriological drama of “Manichaeism.” My 
reading of this chapter would necessarily mean that the author/redactors of the second 
half (that is, the “original” creators) did not envision Mani’s prophethood within the 
cosmic cycle of descent and ascent as explicated in the first half. In fact, it was quite the 
opposite. The disciples, after all, were asking only about the particularities of Mani’s 
apostleship. One might even interpret the inclusion of Jesus’ prophecy of the coming 
Paraclete as marking the uniqueness and particularity of the Paraclete that united itself 
with Mani. If my argument so far is sound, the parable in the first half does something 
else altogether, denuding the “historical” particularities of Mani’s apostleship and 
integrating it instead into a cosmic “cycle” of prophethood, of which Mani’s apostleship 
is only one albeit final instantiation.  
 
Putting it back together: Prophethood of Mani and Oblique Competition 
  
What might an understanding of this chapter as a redacted composition tell us about the 
corpus in general and the wider pressures facing the early Manichaean movement? It 
must first be stressed that the inclusion of a parable into this chapter aligns with the 
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didactic goals of the Kephalaia itself. As is abundantly evident from both its content and 
in form, the Kephalaia strives to frame Mani’s teachings in ways that facilitated 
comprehension and memorization, and frequently employed parables to that end. The 
parable of the farmer and the seasons of Parmuthi and Paophi are no exception to this 
rule. At the same time, this does not answer pressing questions on why a later 
author/redactor thought it necessary, useful, or apt to expand this opening chapter in this 
way. To begin to broach this question, this chapter – both in its constituent parts and as a 
redacted whole – must be understood within its late antique Near Eastern contexts. 
Ultimately, I argue that both halves of the parable are engaging in the same mode of 
oblique competition that I have discussed in relation to the introduction of the Kephalaia.  
It is especially illuminating to compare this chapter’s understandings of 
prophethood alongside the writings of other Syrian “Christians.” After all, these would 
have been the first “Christians” that Mani and his disciples met and interacted with on a 
regular basis. Indeed, as the CMC illustrates, Mani had regular contact with his followers 
in Edessa, a city brimming with Christians of various stripes.227 Even our chapter in the 
Kephalaia boasted about Mani’s venture up to “Adiabene, and the borders of the 
provinces of the kingdom of the Romans.”228 The anti-Manichaean polemic Acts of 
Archelaus also imagines Syria as the first bulwark against the spread of this “Persian 
heresy.”229  
                                                          
227 S.H. Griffith, “Christianity in Edessa and the Syriac-Speaking World: Mani, Bar Daysan, and Ephraem; 
The Struggle for Allegiance on the Aramean Frontier,” Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies 
2 (2002): 5-20. 
228 1 Ke 16.1-2. 
229 M. Vermes (trans.), Acta Archelai: The Acts of Archelaus (ed. S.N.C. Lieu; Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), 
16-23.  
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The density of such evidence invites us to reconsider Mani’s prophethood within 
the wider world of early Syro-Mesopotamian ‘Christian’ literature. Though both 
redactional moments within the literary history of this chapter requires a different set of 
comparanda, both captures a snapshot in the shifting ways that “prophethood” helped 
Manichaeans demonstrate both superiority over and filiation with the “Christian” church.   
I argue that Mani’s claim in the second half of the chapter that his church is superior to 
the other apostles, and hence his own superiority as a prophet, competes with 
contemporaneous and regional discourses of the “universal” presence of Christians, as 
witnessed by Bardaisan and the emerging Syrian-Mesopotamian “Acts” genre. The 
parable, in contrast, responds to discourses of “Apostleship” among Syrian Christians and 
the construction of a golden “Apostolic Age,” as demonstrated by the Didascalia 
Apostolorum. 
 
Bardaisan, the Syriac Acts, and the Universality of the Church of Christ 
 
Towards the conclusion of his account of his apostleship in the second half, Mani 
declares that he was superior to all the other apostles who came before him. Mani boasts,  
 
I have sown the seed of life. I have… them  … from east to west. As you yourselves are seeing, 
my hope has gone toward the east of the world and every inhabited part; to the clime of the north, 
and the… Not one among the apostles did ever do these things… because all the apostles who 
were sent… they preached... the world… [my hope] will remain in the world until…  
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ⲁⲓϫⲟ ⲡⲃⲣⲉ ⲛⲧⲉ ⲡⲱⲛϩ ⲁⲓⲡⲱϩⲣⲉ ⲛϯ... ⲃⲉ ⲙⲙⲁⲩ... ϫⲛ ⲙⲡⲉⲓⲃⲧ ⲁⲡⲉⲙⲛⲧ ⲧϩⲉ ϩⲱⲧⲧⲏⲛⲉ ⲉⲧⲉⲧⲛⲛⲉⲩⲁ 
ⲧⲁϩⲉⲗⲡⲓⲥ ⲃⲱⲕ ϣⲁ ⲧⲁⲛⲁⲧⲟⲗⲏ ⲙⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ⲙⲛⲛⲥⲁ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ ⲛⲧⲟⲓⲕⲟⲩⲙⲉⲛⲏ ⲁⲡⲕⲗⲓⲙⲁ ⲙⲡⲙϩⲓⲧ... ⲙⲡⲉ ⲟⲩⲉ 
ϩⲛ ⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ ⲣ ⲛⲉⲓ ⲁⲛⲏϩⲉ... ⲉⲡⲉⲓⲇⲏ ⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ ⲉⲧⲁⲩϫⲁⲩⲥⲟⲩ... ⲁⲩⲧⲁϣⲉⲁⲓϣ... ⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ... 
ϫⲉ ⲥⲛⲁϭⲱ ϩⲙ ⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ϣⲁⲛⲧⲉ230 
 
Mani boasts that his church had spread into every region of the inhabited world, an 
accomplishment unparalleled by the earlier apostles. Yet this is not entirely true. After 
all, as our chapter makes clear, Jesus too had “sent them [apostles] out into the whole 
world [ϩⲙ ⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ⲧⲏⲣϥ]…” and thus, his church too could be considered as far-
reaching as Mani’s. Indeed, in another chapter of the Kephalaia, Mani reiterates and 
emphasizes the boast made above, saying that he is better than all apostles “except for 
Jesus… the father of all the apostles [ⲭⲱⲣⲓⲥ ⲓⲏⲥ... ⲉⲧⲉ ⲛⲧⲁϥ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲓⲱⲧ ⲛⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ 
ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ]!”231 This interjection is quite puzzling, and captures the sense of oblique 
competition that characterizes Mani’s relationship with the church established by Jesus. 
Unlike Mani’s church, which Mani boasts will continue until the second coming of Jesus, 
Jesus’ church was one in constant decline. Even after the efforts of the twelve apostles, 
whom Mani says were quite diligent [ⲁⲩⲣⲙⲛⲧⲁϣⲓⲣⲉ]232 in their task, the efforts of Paul 
the Apostle and of another mysterious “righteous man,” Jesus’ church eventually 
                                                          
230 1 Ke 16.4-14. 
231 1 Ke 101.28-29. Mani boasts about his superiority much more exuberantly in these passages. He says, “I 
have chosen with my power this entire great election… I have made my church strong, and appointed in it 
all good things that are beneficial to it in every matter. I have planted the good, I have sown the truth in 
every land, far and near. Apostles and ambassadors I have sent to all countries. Therefore, the former 
apostles who came before them did not do as I have done in this hard generation, except for Jesus, the son 
of Greatness, who is the father of all the apostles. So, all of the apostles have not done as I have done. Look 
again, and see now: How great is my power and my activity? For not one among the former apostles… in 
the flesh has reached my like in the… through me….”  
232 1 Ke 13.17.  
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perished [ⲧⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ ⲱϫⲛⲉ],233 or to speak more charitably, it “ascended” [ϫⲉⲥⲧⲥ 
ⲁⲡϫⲓⲥⲉ],234 triggering the advent of Mani’s Paraclete.  
 Mani thus argues that the superiority of one’s apostleship depends on the spread 
and persistence of his church. We have already seen this concern for duration of his 
church in the introduction to the Kephalaia, though as we will see, he discusses it in a 
different manner here. His preoccupation with the universality of Jesus’ church and his 
oblique criticism of it makes better sense when we compare it to two other early Syriac 
“Christian” texts and genres, that is, the Book of the Laws of the Countries and the 
Mesopotamian “Acts” genre. Let us first turn to the Book of the Laws of the Countries.  
The Book of the Laws of the Countries purports to be a dialogue between the 
second century Edessan Christian named Bardaisan and his disciples regarding free-will, 
“nature,” and “fate.” 235 It was, in fact, written probably shortly after his death in the mid-
third century by one of his disciples. In this book, Bardaisan argues that humans are all 
equally subject to “nature,” variably subject to fate, and that all possess free-will 
 to do what is good and what is evil. To demonstrate that peoples are not wholly [ܚܐܪܘܬܐ]
controlled by fate, Bardaisan compiles together a dossier of various peoples, ranging 
from Indians to the Brits, and shows that all peoples adhere to their particular laws 
                                                          
233 1 Ke 13.35.  
234 1 Ke 14.3. 
235 For a classic overview of the study of Bardaisan, his philosophy, and legacy, see: H.J.W. Drijvers, 
Bardaiṣan of Edessa (trans. G. E. van Baaren-Pape; Groningen, 1966); W. Cureton, “Bardaisan – The Book 
of the Laws of Countries,” in Spicilegium Syriacum, Containing Remains of Bardesan, Meliton, Ambrose, 
and Mara bar Serapion (London: Rivingtons, 1855). It is worth noting that Mani had extensive contact 
with Bardaisanites, who were probably centered in the city of Edessa. Evidence for this is found 
particularly in the Islamicate descriptions of Mani’s “Book of Mysteries.” See: Reeves, “Islamicate 
Manichaeism,” 105-108.  
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despite astral or heavenly influences. Bardaisan concludes by finally discussing the “new 
race” of Christians. He writes, 
 
What shall we say about our new race [ ܚܕܬܐ ܫܪܒܬܐ ], the Christians [ܕܟܪܣܛܝܢܐ], whom the 
Messiah established in every place and in every direction [ ܦܢܝܢ ܘܒܟܠ ܐܬܪ ܕܒܟܠ ] at his advent 
 For in every place that we are present, we are called by the one name of the Messiah ?[ܒܡܐܬܝܬܗ]
– Christians…236  
 
Baradaisan continues to argue that all Christians follow the same norms, even when they 
occupy different areas of the cosmos. Thus, the brothers in Gaul [ܓܠܝܐ] do not marry 
men, as one might expect from the Gauls, nor do those in Persia [ܦܪܣ] marry their 
daughters. In contrast to these local customs, all Christians everywhere follow the law of 
their Messiah. Bardaisan thus understands the bounded identity of various peoples and, 
by extension, the unity of Christians, as ultimately based on their adherence to certain 
norms. The book ends on an eschatological note, stating that though the current 
cosmological system is fine-tuned to keep creation in line, a time is coming when all 
commotion, evil desires, and deficiencies will cease. Important for our purposes, 
however, is Bardaisan’s statement that the Christians were a “new race” who were 
established only at the “advent” of Jesus the Messiah and that they are now found 
throughout the entire inhabited world. The Syriac here is suggestive in so far as it 
specifies Jesus as directly “establishing” Christians throughout the world [ ܕܟܪܣܛܝܢܐ... ܐܩܝܡ
ܒܡܐܬܝܬܗ ܫܝܚܐܡ ]. In other words, Bardaisan simply assumes that Christians occupied the 
                                                          
236 Cureton, “Bardaisan,” pg. 20/kaph 
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entire known world since the beginning of Christ’s time on earth; the universality of 
Christians is simply taken for granted.  
 At around the same time when the Laws of Countries was written, stories about 
the “conversion” [ܬܘܠܡܕܐ] of Syria, Mesopotamia, and India were beginning to circulate 
in the Roman Near East and Sasanian Mesopotamia.237 Such texts aspired to give an 
account of the history of these “regional” churches as part of the “universal” church 
initiated by Jesus and brought to fruition by his apostles. The Acts of Thomas, for 
example, written roughly in the beginning of the third century, recounts the journey of the 
Apostle Thomas to India and the subsequent conversion of that region.238 The Teachings 
of Addai, datable to the late fourth or early fifth century and hence around the time when 
our Kephalaia was being put into its extant form, recounts the story of the Apostle Addai 
and the spread of Christian “Religion” [lit. “Fear”, ܕܚܠܬܐ] among Syrians and 
Mesopotamians.239 The later Acts of Mar Mari the Apostle picks up where Addai left off 
and describes how Christianity spread down the two rivers into the rest of Sasanian 
                                                          
237 Mani’s earliest missionaries bore similar names to various early “orthodox” Christian missionaries. See: 
H.J.W. Drijvers, “Jews and Christians at Edessa,” JSJ 36 (1985): 91; Reeves, Prolegomena, 76-77.  
238 A.J. Klijn, The Acts of Thomas: Introduction, Text, and Commentary, Second Revised Edition (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003). Further research, read: P. Nagel, “Die apocryphen Apostelakten des 2. und 3. Jahrhunderts in 
der manichäischen Literatur,” in Gnosis und Neues Testament (ed. K.-W. Tröger; Gütersloh, 1973), 149-82. 
J.-D. Kaestli, “L’utilisation des Actes Apocryphes des Apôtres dans le manichéisme,” in Gnosis and 
Gnosticism, Nag Hammadi Studies VIII (Leiden, 1977), 107-16; P.-H. Poirier, “Les Actes de Thomas et le 
manichéisme,” Apocrypha 9 (1998): 263-87.  
239 Hans J.W. Drijvers argues that “Addai” was “invented” by Edessene Orthodox Christians to outdo the 
early Manichaean missionary “Adda.” I would only add methodological caution in so far as the “Teaching 
of Addai” may itself be an appropriation of local and circumscribed traditions about an apostle named 
Addai. My argument above does not dispute the main of Drijvers’ argument. See: H.J.W. Drijvers, “Early 
Syriac Christianity: Some Recent Publications,” Vigiliae Christianae 50 (1996): 164-65, 171-72; ibid., 
“Addai und Mani: Christentum und Manichäismus im dritten Jahrhundert in Syrien,” in IIIe Symposium 
Syriacum, 1980: Les contacts du monde syriaque avec les autres cultures, Goslar 7-11 septembre 1980 (ed. 
R. Lavenant; Rome: Pontificium Institutem Studiorium Orientalium, 1983), 171-85. For the Syriac, see: G. 
Howard (trans.), The Teaching of Addai (Ann Harbor: Scholars Press), 1981.  
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Mesopotamia.240 Intriguingly, the author/redactor of the Acts of Mar Mari notes that the 
tradition regarding the conversion of Mesopotamia that was “repeated” [ܡܬܬܢܝܐ] to him 
was unclear and that he was compelled to write down the “old tradition” [  ܡܫܠܡܢܘܬܐ
 as recorded in the books.241 This suggests that our Acts of Mar Mari the Apostle [ܥܬܝܩܬܐ
is a “newer” edition of earlier traditions and that the author/redactor of the Acts found it 
necessary to remedy what he saw as a problematic divergence between the oral and 
written traditions. This hints at a more widespread and much more variegated discourse 
on the origins of the Sasanian churches. Ultimately, this complex of texts seek to 
demonstrate that Sasanian forms of Christianity was a seamless extension of the Church 
of Christ begun in Palestine. 
I suggest that Mani responds to this Syro-Mesopotamian Christian discourse of 
the universality of the Christian church that Bardaisan’s followers took for granted and 
that the Acts insisted on demonstrating. We know that Mani engaged directly with the 
Bardaisanites in his Book of Mysteries,242 and the very fact that Bardaisanites in Edessa 
could assume the universality of the Church of Jesus demonstrates how deeply 
“universality” was associated with the church of Jesus by the end of the second century.  
As we have seen, Mani accepts the fact that Jesus sent his apostles to every corner 
of the world; in fact, he models his own success after precisely this precedent. 
Nevertheless, he defangs the broader argument in the Syriac Acts literature that connects 
                                                          
240 A. Harak (ed.), The Acts of Mār Mārī the Apostle (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005). C. 
Jullien and F. Jullien, “Les Actes de Mār Mārī: Une figure apocryphe au service de l’unité 
communautaire,” Apocrypha 10 (1999): 177-94. ibid., Apôtres des confins: Processus missionnaires 
chrétiens dans l’empire iranien. Res Orientales 15 (Bures-sur-Yvette: Groupe pour l’Étude de la 
Civilisation du Moyen-Orient, 2002), 77-78. 
241 Harak, Mār Mārī, 11. 
242 See Reeves, “Prolegomena,”105-8. Reeves notes that Ephrem the Syrian accused Bardaisan of writing 
his own “Book of Mysteries” and suggests that Mani appropriated the title in order to refute Bardaisan.  
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Mesopotamian “Christianity” with the “Church of Christ” by arguing that the church 
established by Jesus eventually perished and was replaced by a superior church, the 
Church of Mani. After all, Mani was the prophet sent to Mesopotamia, not Jesus; 
therefore, Jesus’ church must have perished if Mani’s church was to begin. In this view, it 
is no coincidence that Mani touts his foray into India, the same region where the Apostle 
Thomas was sent,243 or that he describes his travels throughout the entire Sasanian 
domain, as Mar Addai and Mar Mari had done, or that, like them, Mani boasted about the 
miracles he had wrought in those places through the power of God. Mesopotamia was, 
after all, Mani’s allotted turf as a prophet, and he boasts that his church spilled even 
beyond his allotted portion. To say that Jesus’ church persisted into the Mesopotamian 
milieu, as the Acts insist on demonstrating, would thus negate Mani’s claim that he was a 
prophet sent specifically to Mesopotamia. In this sense, then, we already see 
“prophethood” operating as a discursive space that allow Manichaeans to suit “Christian” 
claims to universality for their own purposes.  
 
Prophethood over Prophets: The Didascalia Apostolorum and the Parable 
 
Let us now turn to the parable of the farmer and the seasons. I argued above that the 
parable is a later inclusion into the text and that it speaks to a different moment in the 
redactional history of this chapter of the Kephalaia. There, I suggested that the redactors’ 
inclusion of the parable shifts the didactic focus of the chapter from a simple narrative on 
the prophets Jesus, Mani, and their individual churches to one that prioritized concepts of 
                                                          
243 Reeves, Prolegomena, 78 n. 360.  
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prophethood and the relationship between the prophet and his church.244 Indeed, with the 
inclusion of the parable, the descent of Jesus and his church, their eventual ascension, and 
the ensuing descent of Mani’s Paraclete and his church, no longer describe a unique 
moment in history, but is now only a single instantiation of a cosmic cycle of descent and 
ascent. More importantly, however, this cycle of descent and ascent constructs an 
understanding of prophethood as inextricably tied to a prophet’s role as a church-builder, 
a role that remains relatively submerged in the second half of the chapter.  
If this much is granted, what does it demonstrate? For one, it signals that some 
Manichaeans thought it necessary or apt to nuance Mani’s claim to superiority over the 
Church of Jesus. Indeed, as would have become quickly evident to Mani’s disciples as 
they fanned out towards the Roman Empire, the “Church of Jesus” was not, in fact, 
eroding. From the early fourth century onward, with the legalization of Christianity, the 
“conversion” of the emperor Constantine, and the influential works of Ephrem the Syrian 
in Edessa radiating outwards into Syria and Mesopotamia, Mani’s argument for the 
superiority of his church may not have had the same effect as it did a century earlier, 
when the “church of Jesus” in Mesopotamia may very well have been on the decline.245 
Moreover, contemporary Christians living in the Roman Near East were intensifying their 
                                                          
244 Curiously, the CMC does not preserve any indication that Mani understood his body of followers as a 
“church.” It therefore seems better to say that Manichaeans appropriated the Christian understanding of a 
“church” and are constructing it along their own trajectory.  
245 Of course, it is still important to remember Millar’s ominous words, “A social and economic history of 
the Near East in the Roman period cannot be written. None of the conditions for such a history are present.” 
F. Millar, The Roman Near East, 32 BC-AD 337 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 225. Also, see: 
H.J. Drijvers, “Early Syriac Christianity, Some Recent Publications,” Vigiliae Christianae 50 (1996): 151. 
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efforts at constructing Christian “orthodoxy” by evoking the idea of a golden “apostolic 
age.”246  
The Didascalia Apostolorum proves to be a provocative window into the ways 
that various discourses of church order and apostleship in Syria might have affected the 
ways that Manichaean missionaries thought about the relationship between apostleship 
and the church.247 Organized into twenty-six chapters, the Didascalia presents itself as a 
robust compendium of apostolic teachings on the proper practices of the Christian 
church. Scholars have tended to date this text to the early third century, a consensus 
recently, and in my view persuasively, challenged by Alistair Stewart-Sykes, who argues 
that we should see the Didascalia as a “living document”248 that reached its “final” form 
only in the early fourth century. If he is correct that the Didascalia’s strategy of apostolic 
legitimization emerges only later in its redactional history, then it is worth attempting to 
read the Didascalia alongside the Kephalaia, in so far as they coincide roughly in time 
and place.  
The Didascalia Apostolorum participates within the larger construction of an 
“Apostolic Age,” in which late third / early fourth century “Christians” were beginning to 
imagine a pristine ‘Apostolic’ past in which the boundaries of orthodoxy and heresy were 
clearly and finally demarcated under the unified authority of the early apostles. For 
example, in the twenty-fourth chapter of the Didascalia, the apostles gather in Jerusalem 
                                                          
246 T. Korteweg, “Origin and Early History of the Apostolic Office,” in The Apostolic Age in Patristic 
Thought (ed. A. Hilhorst; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1-10. 
247 For a recent translation of the Didascalia, along with detailed introduction, see: A. Stewart-Sykes, The 
Didascalia Apostolorum: An English Version with Introduction and Annotation (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009). 
For the Syriac, I rely on: A. Vööbus (ed.), The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac I: Chapters I-X (Louvain: 
CSCO, 1979); ibid., The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac II: Chapter XI-XXVI (Louvain: CSCO, 1979). 
248 Stewart-Sykes, Didascalia, 5-49.   
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“as one” and write down “this universal Didascalia to affirm [or correct] all of you 
 They all ultimately agree that those 249”.[ܠܡܟܬܒ ܗܕܐ ܕܝܕܣܩܠܝܐ ܩܬܘܠܝܩܐ ܠܫܘܪܪܐ ܕܟܠܟܘܢ]
Christians who were originally of the “peoples” [ܥܡܡܐ] should not be circumcised, be 
baptized only once, marry, not follow the “Second Law” [250,[ܬܢܝܢ ܢܡܘܣܐ and, perhaps 
most importantly, abstain from anything sacrificed, from blood, from any foods that are 
strangled, and from fornication.251 The apostles are depicted as completely unified in 
their opinions regarding these matters and their Didascalia in turn reflects their desire for 
unity in belief and practice in their churches.  
Having dealt with the problems of internal divisions, the apostles then turn to the 
problem of false prophets living in their midst. In the twenty-fifth chapter of the 
Didascalia, the apostles exhort Christians “to keep far from those who come falsely in 
the name of the apostles [ ܕܫܠܝܚܐ ܒܫܡܐ ] and to recognize them by the shiftiness of their 
words and the manner in which they act…”252 These are, as the writer goes on to say, 
those whom Jesus had forewarned as “false Christs and prophets of the lie” [  ܕܓܐܠ ܡܫܝܚܐ
 If we follow Stewart-Sykes in locating this strata of the text to the early 253.[ܢܒܝܐ ܕܟܕܒܘܬܐ
fourth century, this late “redactor” may be referring to Manichaeans, among others, 
whose master Mani fashioned himself as a prophet, an “Apostle” of Jesus Christ, as an 
embodiment of Christ, and whose missionaries presented a radically different conception 
for the functions of a “church.”  
                                                          
249 Vööbus, Didascalia II, 232. 
250 See: Charlotte Fonrobert, “The Didascalia Apostolorum: A Mishnah for the Disciples’ of Jesus,” JECS 
9.4 (2001): 483-509.  
251 Vööbus, Didascalia II, 237. 
252 Vööbus, Didascalia II, 238. 
253 Vööbus, Didascalia II, 238. 
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Finally, the apostles proclaim that they had rooted out the error from the church 
by accepting those who had repented from their sins, and by driving out those who were 
incurably lost. They conclude by stating, “We have done this in every place, in every 
city, and in every land in the world [ ܕܒܥܠܡܐ ܬܒܝܠ ܘܒܟܠܗ ܡܕܝܢܐ ܘܒܟܠ ܐܬܪ ܒܟܠ ], and we bear 
witness [ܘܐܣܗܕܢܢ] by leaving behind [ܘܫܒܩܢܢ] justly and righteously this universal 
Didascalia to the universal church as remembrance [ܠܕܘܟܪܢܐ] for the affirmation of the 
faithful.”254 They thus strongly assert the universality of the apostolic church – “in every 
place, in every city, and in every land in the world” – and its abiding relevance for the 
church that is to come in the post-apostolic age. Curiously, the density of terms like 
“leaving behind” [ ܢܘܫܒܩܢ ] a “remembrance” [ܠܕܘܟܪܢܐ] as an act of bearing witness 
 is strikingly reminiscent of the concept of apostleship in Baraies’ homily. As [ܘܐܣܗܕܢܢ]
we have already seen, Baraies had insisted that all the ancestral prophets and apostles had 
“left behind”255 [καταλελοίπασιν] as a “remembrance”256 [εἰς ὑπόμνησιν] their writings 
for their coming spiritual brethren. As a result, each of these ancestral apostles were 
themselves a witness [αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως μάρτυς ἐγένετο] to their own 
revelation.257 Whatever might be the cause of this uncanny coincidence, these chapters as 
a whole make it clear that some Syrian Christians were constructing a vision of a unified 
apostolic past in their aspiration to quell internal divisions and allay the influence of 
“false Christs and prophets of the lie.” 
                                                          
254 Vööbus, Didascalia II, 241. 
255 CMC 62.18-19.  
256 CMC 62.20.  
257 CMC 72.2-4.  
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The Didascalia’s intense efforts at “unearthing” an apostolic past may have posed 
a strong counter-narrative to Mani’s “original” argument for the superiority of his own 
prophethood. After all, according to the second half of the chapter, Mani’s tenure as an 
“apostle of Jesus Christ” depended on the ultimate failure of the twelve apostles and Paul 
to effectively propagate the church of Jesus. In contrast, the Didascalia proclaimed that 
the apostles were successful in propagating and cementing the marks of orthodox 
“Christian” beliefs and practice, which were accepted in “every place, in every city, in 
every land in the world.” The inclusion of the parable into the chapter may therefore be 
responding to the Didascalia’s challenge. Its insertion into the beginning of the chapter is 
surely intended to guide our reading of the narratival second half. It works by shifting the 
reader’s focus to the macrocosmic scale, insinuating that Jesus’ church ascended not due 
to the fault of any of Jesus’ apostles, but simply because this was the way that the cycle 
of descent and ascend had been ordained. These were the “seasons” of ascent and 
descent. The “parabolized” chapter thus sidesteps the main issue of contention – whether 
the Church of Jesus did or did not continue to persist beyond Jesus’ apostles – by 
rendering its failure a foregone conclusion. As a result, it relativized the Christian 
construction on an “apostolic past” by asserting that there have always been “apostolic 
pasts,” all of which have passed away, except, of course, Mani’s church, which will 
remain until Jesus returns.  
 
2 Ke 342: Extending Baraies’ Typology 
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We turn now to discuss “prophethood” in the “other” Kephalaia (2 Ke). Before 
discussing 2 Ke 342, it is necessary to state that there is currently no editio princeps of 2 
Ke. Therefore, I have not had access to the entirety of the Coptic text. Giversen’s 
facsimile of 2 Ke has been of some help, though I have used it only to check existing 
translations.258 I therefore rely on Gardner’s recent translation of a section of 2 Ke 342 as 
a starting point.259 I am aware that the publication of a scholarly edition of 2 Ke might 
shed a different light on my argument here. Nevertheless, even what little is accessible 
proves instrumental for thinking about the ways that early Manichaeans were negotiating 
their received traditions on prophethood. Indeed, as I argue below, 2 Ke 342 aims to 
articulate a coherent and comprehensive understanding of prophethood. Yet its definition 
of prophethood is itself the product of multiple traditions, particularly the “chain of 
prophets” found in Mani’s Shabuhragan260 and the model of prophethood in Baraies’ 
homily.261 Unlike the chapters discussed so far, there is no hint here of what I called 
“oblique competition,” at least, not in the sections published so far. This exploration is 
useful nevertheless as a “control” since it indicates that Manichaeans increasingly 
systematized notions of prophethood without merely “deploying” them against 
Christians; it was a “discourse” in its own right.  
                                                          
258 S. Giversen, The Manichaean Coptic Papyri in the Chester Beatty Library: Vol. I Kephalaia Facsimile 
Edition (Genève, 1986).  
259 I. Gardner, “The Final Ten Chapters,” in Mani at the Court of the Persian Kings: Studies on the Chester 
Beatty Kephalaia Codex (eds. I. Gardner, J. BeDuhn, and P. Dilley; Leiden: Brill, 2015), 92-95.  
260 For plates of extant Šābuhragān texts in Middle Persian and their translations, see: D.N. Mackenzie, 
“Mani’s ‘Šābuhragān,’” BSOAS 42.3 (1979): 500-34; idem., “Mani’s ‘Šābuhragān’—II,” BSOAS 43.2 
(1980): 288-310. For a collection of Islamicate sources on the Shabuhragan, see Reeves, Prolegomena, 98-
105.  
261 Gardner suggests that the similarities between 2 Ke 342 and Baraies’ homily are parallels. I argue for a 
much stronger genetic relationship. See Gardner, “Final Ten,” 94.   
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2 Ke 342 purports to be a conversation between Mani and a well-born man 
[ⲉⲩⲅⲉⲛⲏⲥ].262 The initial sections, as Gardner puts it, centers on “whether the apostle’s 
wisdom has been revealed to him by his eyes.”263 Mani argues that all the apostles had 
seen the Land of Light. The conversation then turns to the Land of Light itself and those 
apostles who had seen it, culminating in Mani discussing the “chain of prophets” who 
came prior to him. This extended passage has already received a fair amount scholarly 
attention, albeit somewhat narrowly centered on the possible influences of Buddhism on 
Mani’s thought.264 Those questions are not my focus here. Rather, I attempt to read this 
section as part of an ongoing Manichaean discourse of prophethood. Let us turn to the 
relevant section of the 2 Ke 342.265 
 
a. I will [tell] you each one of the apostles by name, they who came [ⲛⲉⲧⲁⲩⲉⲓ] and appeared in this 
world. Zarades was sent to Persia, to Hystaspes the king. He revealed the truly-founded law 
[ⲙⲡⲛⲟⲙⲟⲥ ⲁⲛ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ ⲉⲧⲥⲙⲁⲛⲧ ⲙⲙⲏⲉ] in all of Persia. Again, Bouddas the blessed, he came to the 
land of India and Kušān. He also revealed the truly-founded law in all of India and Kušān. And 
after him Aurentes came with Kebellos to the east. They also revealed the truly-founded law in the 
                                                          
262 This term may not mean “aristocrat” but simply a “Manichaean man,” one who was “well-born” as a 
Manichaean. See 201.7-8, where a “eugenes and the female “free ones” laugh at an old ugly man. This was 
referring to the entirety of “congregation,” which means that the eugenes is not an aristocrat.  
263 Gardner, “Final Ten,” 92-93.  
264 M. Tardieu, “La diffusion du bouddhisme dans l’Empire Kouchan, l’Iran et la Chine, d’après un 
Kephalaion manichéen inédit,” Studia Iranica 17 (1988): 153–82; I. Gardner, “Some Comments on Mani 
and Indian Religions: According to the Coptic Kephalaia,” in New Perspectives in Manichaean Research. 
Proceedings of the vth International Conference of Manichaean Studies, Napoli 2001(eds. A. Van 
Tongerloo and L. Cirillo; Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 123–35; G. Gnoli, “Remarks on a Manichaean 
Kephalaion of Dublin,” Bulletin of the Asia Institute 4 (1990): 37– 40. The important exception is Dilley’s 
recent article: P. Dilley, “‘Hell Exists, and We Have Seen the Place Where It Is’: Rapture and Religious 
Competition in Sasanian Iran,” in Mani at the Court of the Persian Kings: Studies on the Chester Beatty 
Kephalaia Codex (eds. I. Gardner, J. BeDuhn, and P. Dilley; Leiden: Brill, 2015), 211-46.  
265 Translation by Gardner and the editors of 2 Ke. Gardner, “Final Ten,” 93-94.  
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east. (N.N.) came to Parthia. He revealed the law of truth in all of Parthia. Jesus the Christ came to 
the west. He (revealed the law of) truth in all of the west.  
 
b. (All?) these apostles … and these busy merchants … as they came from that place in …-ness … 
among them: For they were seized [ⲁⲩⲧⲁⲣⲡⲟⲩ] from this place, they were [taken] up, they went, 
they saw, they came (back), they bore witness (that truly?) the land of light exists and that we have 
come from it. Also, hell exists, and we have seen the place where it is. They (came forth and) 
dwelt (?) in the world. They made disciples of the people. They (taught them what is good?), they 
… from them. They were taken to the land of light, this city of good fortune. Their witness exists 
till now in their writings, in all these countries …  
 
c. Also, Adam and Seth, Enosh and Sem and Enoch and Noah and Shem; all these men: The 
angels came from the land of light and seized them. They were taken up. They were taught about 
the land of light, how it is; and they were also taught about hell and the place where it exists. They 
came back (?), they came to this place again. And when they came they spoke. They bore witness 
about the land of light and hell, that they exist. They did that which was entrusted to them by God. 
Indeed, these who became disciples of them: They did good deeds, and they came forth from their 
body and they went to the land of light, the city of the well-favored. Their testimony exists till 
now in their writings.  
 
d. So, if, as I have told you, these people came from the land of light to this place, people have 
also gone from this place to the land of light.  
 
e. I, myself, whom you are looking at: I went to the land of light. Indeed, I have seen the land of 
light with my eyes, the way that it is. [Again], I have seen hell with my eyes, the way that it is. I 
have (been sent here) by God. I came; I have revealed this place (i.e. the land of light) [in this] 
world. I preached the word of God; and I … of God in the world from the north to [the south. A] 
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multitude of people have heard me. They have believed … How many among them have done 
good deeds! They came forth [from their] body and they went to the land of light, they … they are 
established, being there until today. Behold (?), I have told you about a multitude of witnesses 
who have come forth from the land of light. 
 
Parallels are consistently visible among sections b, c, and e, as evident by the certain 
terms that reoccur throughout, such as “coming from” a heavenly place, the language of 
“seizure” [ⲁⲩⲧⲁⲣⲡⲟⲩ] and being “taken up,” of knowing the existence and location of 
heaven and hell, of bearing witness, doing good deeds, making disciples, and writing a 
testimony. In fact, these three sections are virtually identical with one another. The point 
of these passages is to demonstrate that all prophets do similar things, and since Mani 
does these things, he too is a prophet.  
Yet differences abound as well. These differences betray their different origins. 
Section b tellingly calls its subjects “apostles,” whereas section c calls them “men.” 
Furthermore, Mani uses the first-common plural “we”266 in section b to mark himself as a 
prophet like Jesus and Zarathustra, whereas he only uses the third-common plural “they” 
to mark the “men” in section c. Section b states that its apostles came from “that place,” 
that is, from the “Greatness,” meaning they are incarnations of the “Apostle of Light,” yet 
section c does not assume that the “biblical” forefathers were “incarnations” at all. We 
are clearly dealing with two different sets of “apostles.” In fact, as section d 
demonstrates, the redactor already assumes that he is dealing with two different sets of 
apostles since it states that the some “people” descended from above whereas other 
                                                          
266 Admittedly, the perspective shifts immediately back to “they.” It is unclear whether this “we” is an 
accident, a scribal gloss, or, perhaps more provocatively, it reflects an earlier edition of this passage. 
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“people” ascended to it. The former are prophets like Buddha, Zoroaster, and presumably 
Mani himself, whereas the latter are the “biblical forefathers” like Adam, Seth, and 
Enosh. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the various terms that cluster around the 
different set of apostles betray differing origins. All the apostles mentioned in section b 
are discussed only in reference to one another as a complete set (that is, a “biblical” 
figure like Sethel never intrudes into this list) and in terms that draw attention to their 
regional distribution. Furthermore, the primary function of the apostles in section a is to 
reveal [ⲁϥⲟⲩⲱⲛϩ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ] the well-founded law. In contrast, the “men” mentioned in 
section c are likewise only mentioned together without any further qualifications, 
regional or otherwise. Unlike the “regionally-distributed” prophets associated with Mani, 
these apostles do not “establish” laws.  
 If it is accepted that we are dealing with two different prophetological traditions, 
then it is clear that the later redactors of this section are incorporating disparate traditions 
in order to present a unified image of all the prophets. Yet the question remains. Where 
did the redactors of this passage get their model of prophethood? Dilley argues that the 
similarities between Baraies’ homily and the passage above means that both texts were 
rooted in a chapter in the Shabuhragan called “On the Coming of the Prophet,” a title 
amply attested in later Islamicate sources.267 I am much less willing to accept a single 
source for what seems to be two radically different traditions on prophethood.268 Instead, 
                                                          
267 There are many issues with this claim. I use Reeves’ handy translation. The Shaburagan mentions 
specifically only Buddha, Zarathustra, and Jesus. Mani was sent to Babylonia. [Reeves, Prolegomena, 
103]. There is no evidence that the apostles included the list used by Baraies.  
268 Though his argument for rooting Mani’s list of apostles (section a) in the Shabuhragan is strong, his 
argument that the apostles mentioned in section c are also from the Shabuhragan is weak. This is because, 
in my view, he does not give due attention to 1) the differences between the two sets of “apostles” 
mentioned above and he 2) implicitly accepts Baraies’ homily as a window into Mani’s writings – in this 
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it should not escape notice how closely the model of prophethood outlined above aligns 
with the understanding of prophethood found in Baraies’ homily, as described in the 
previous chapter. The apostles are “raptured,” “seized,” “taken up,” they see visions of 
heaven and hell,269 they inscribe their texts in writings as “testimonies,” and they choose 
disciples. All these points, as we have already seen, are mentioned and discussed in 
Baraies’ homily and, to the best of my knowledge, nowhere else. This strongly suggests a 
genetic relationship between Baraies’ homily and this section of the Kephalaion. 
Furthermore, we should note that the language of seizure is already unusual in the 
Manichaean corpus, as Tigchelaar already demonstrated.270 For it to be replicated here 
suggests direct dependence on Baraies’ homily. Lastly, it should be noted that “wrote 
down” testimonies of their revelation is in direct contradiction to introduction of the 
Kephalaia, which explicitly stated that Jesus, Buddha, and Zoroaster did not write down 
their revelations.  
If my argument regarding the redaction history of this Kephalaia is correct, it 
would demonstrate that the redactors of 2 Ke 342 attempted to frame prophethood under 
a single comprehensive typology of prophethood, one that is ultimately derived from 
Baraies’ writings. Tellingly, this implies that Baraies’ homily had become “naturalized” 
into the larger Manichaean body of traditions, so much so that the typology that he 
                                                                                                                                                                             
case the Shaburhagan – rather than attempting to situate Baraies to a particular time and place. I argued the 
latter point extensively earlier, so I will dwell a bit on the first point here. Dilley is, of course, aware that 
the two sets of “prophets” differ. Nevertheless, he ties Baraies’ set of prophets into the Shaburhagan by 
citing the work of later Muslim historiographer ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who thought that Baraies’ prophets were 
earlier than the various incarnations of Apostles of Light – Buddha, Jesus, and Zoroaster. He also mentions 
a fragment preserved in Middle Persian which includes Shem, Sem, Enosh, Enoch, and, surprisingly, 
Nikotheos. Dilley thus assumes that the Shahbuhragan must have included Baraies’ set of the forefathers.  
269 A vision of hell is only described once, in the Apocalypse of Enoch section. This adds to my point that 
the redactors of this particular chapter were keen on emphasizing that which is latent in Baraies’ homily.  
270 Tigchelaar, “Baraies on Mani’s Rapture,” 440. 
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constructed could be attributed to Mani himself. Ultimately, then, our redactors are not 
merely channeling older “Manichaean” traditions, but actively shaping them to its own 
ends, whatever they were.271 One key that might help contextualize this particular section 
of the kephalaion emerges when we note how strongly it emphasizes the role of 
revelation as a marker of prophethood. Whereas in Baraies’ homily, the “rapture” of the 
prophet was only one part of what made him a prophet, 2 Ke 342 emphasizes it as the 
primary characteristic of a prophet. Dilley, for his part, contextualizes this chapter’s 
emphasis on revelatory knowledge within the politics of religious competition in the 
Sasanian court. He writes, “The description of the apostles and their visionary ascents in 
K342 closely reflects the dynamics of religious competition within early Sasanian 
courts…. The shared discourse on otherworldly realms allows for a way in which these 
differences could be framed, and presented as something of consequence not only to 
followers but also potential patrons.”272 Yet, as he himself makes clear, Dilley does not 
read 2 Ke 342 as a redacted work in its own right, but for what it might add to an 
understanding of Mani’s world in the mid/late third century.  
Furthermore, despite Dilley’s argument about the competitive “discourse” of 
otherworldly realms in the Sasanian courts, the literary mise-en-scène of 2 Ke 342 is not a 
court competition, but a dialogue between a “well-born” disciple and Mani. Though a full 
analysis of this chapter must await the publishing of an editio princeps of the Kephalaia 
of the Wisdom of my Lord Mani, for now, this kephalaion again demonstrates the ongoing 
                                                          
271 The discussion of the similarities between “Eastern” kephalaia-like materials and some chapter in the 2 
Ke has reopened the question of whether the Kephalaia as a genre developed within the Sasanian Empire, 
or in the Roman side. The new discoveries hint at the possibility that this chapter in particular was written 
within a Sasanian context, yet it remains nothing more than a hint.  
272 Dilley, “Hell Exists,” 246.  
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vitality and amorphous nature of the Manichaean discourse of “prophethood.” Whereas 
there was distinct sense of “oblique competition” with the Church of Jesus in the other 
two chapters discussed above, it is not the case here. Rather, this section aims more 
narrowly to be a comprehensive exposition of prophethood. It is less concerned with 
competition as more with presenting and molding different traditions of prophethood into 




I have argued in this chapter that in comparison to the “early” discourse of prophethood 
in Baraies’ homily, the Kephalaia expands prophethood in ways that defy any master 
prophetological system. There is no single discourse of prophethood, nor does the 
Kephalaia systematize a discourse of prophethood beyond the boundaries of its 
individual chapters. Therefore, we cannot posit a general “Manichaean” prophetology 
without reflecting on the sheer diversity of statements on prophethood in the Kephalaia 
and giving due attention to the processes of selection and redaction within the Kephalaia 
itself.  
Perhaps more importantly, I have argued that Syro-Mesopotamian Manichaean 
“prophetology” emerged as a discursive arena in which the uncomfortable tensions 
between “Manichaean” and “Christian” could be articulated. Prophethood emerged as a 
way of mapping the relative proximity of local Syro-Mesopotamian Christians unto a 
Manichaean framework. This allowed Manichaeans to acknowledge their 
“uncomfortable” similarities with these other local Syrian Christians – and to be clear, 
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Manichaeans understood themselves as following the same “rightly-guided Law” that 
Jesus had established – but also to assert the superiority of Mani’s understanding of true 
“Christianity.” For the Syro-Mesopotamian Manichaeans responsible for these particular 
chapters of the Kephalaia, “Christians” were not a “heresy” of “Manichaeism,” but its 
surprisingly-durable, vitiated precedent. Prophetology therefore complements other local 
strategies of “Christian” differentiation offered by texts like the Didascalia Apostolorum, 
which argued that “heresies” were later “innovations” of the true and original Apostolic 
Christianity, and the Syriac Acts literature, which as a whole depict Syro-Mesopotamian 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PSEUDO-CLEMENTINE HOMILIES AS COUNTER-
MANICHAEAN PROPHETOLOGY 
  
As we have seen, prophethood played a central role among Syro-Mesopotamian 
Manichaeans, first as a way of constructing social and doctrinal boundaries among and 
between followers of Mani (chapter one) and as way of engaging in oblique competition 
with Syriac-speaking Christians (chapter two). In this chapter, I look to the other side of 
the Manichaean presence in Syria and argue that the presence of Manichaean 
missionaries intensified the discourse of prophethood among local followers of Jesus. I 
look to the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, an early fourth-century text written by a 
“Jewish Christian” living in Syria, perhaps near Antioch or Edessa,273 and I argue that it 
challenges Manichaean claims that their Apostle was a prophet.274 More specifically, the 
Homilies undermines the prophethood of Mani by attacking all forms of worship that rely 
                                                          
273 See J.M. Bremmer, “Pseudo-Clementines: Text, Dates, Places, Authors and Magic,” in The Pseudo-
Clementines (ed. J.M. Bremmer; Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 6-9. This chapter follows both early twentieth-
century and recent scholarship on the Homilies, which has pointed to the importance of the Syrian context 
for the Pseudo-Clementines. See S. Pines, Points of Similarity between the Exposition of the Doctrine of the 
Sefirot in the Sefer Yeẕira and a Text of the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies: The Implications of this 
Resemblance (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1989), 108-14; J. Chapman, 
“On the Date of the Clementines,” Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 9 (1908): 21-34, 147-
59; N. Kelley, Knowledge and Religious Authority in the Pseudo-Clementines: Situating the Recognitions 
in Fourth Century Syria (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 179-212; R. Boustan and A.Y. Reed, “Blood and 
Atonement in the Pseudo-Clementines and the Story of the Ten Martyrs: The Problem of Selection in the 
Study of Ancient Judaism and Christianity,” Henoch 30 (2008): 333-64, 348-49; A.Y. Reed, “Rethinking 
‘Jewish Christian’ Evidence for Jewish Mysticism” in Hekhalot Literature in Context: From Byzantium to 
Babylonia (eds. R. Boustan, M. Himmelfarb, and P. Schäfer; TSAJ 13; Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 
349-77; C. Clivaz, “Madness, Philosophical or Mystical Experience? A Puzzling Text: Pseudo-Clementine 
Recognitiones II 61-69,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 13 (2009): 475-93; D. Côté, Le thème de 
l’opposition entre Pierre et Simon dans les Pseudo-Clémentines (Études Augustiniennes Série Antiquités 
167; Paris: Étude augustiniennes, 2001), 109-33; idem., “Le problème de l’identité religieuse dans la Syrie 
du IVe siècle. Le cas des Pseudo-Clémentines et de l’Adversus Judaeos de S. Jean Chrysostome,” in La 
croisée des chemins revisitée: quand l'“Eglise” et la “Synagogue” se sont-elles distinguées?: Actes du 
colloque de Tours 18-19 Juin 2010, 2012 (ed. S. Mimoni and B. Pouderon; Paris: Cerf, 2012), 339-70.  
274 For an overview of scholarship on the Pseudo-Clementines in general and the Homilies in particular, see 
F.S. Jones, “The Pseudo-Clementines: A History of Research (Parts 1 and 2),” in Pseudoclementina 
Elchasaiticaque inter Judaeochristiana: Collected Studies (Orientalia Loveniensia Analecta 203; Leuven: 
Peeters, 2012), 50-113, 86-92.  
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on visual means of gaining revelatory knowledge, which from the “Jewish Christian” 
vantage point of the fourth-century Syrians responsible for the Homilies, encompassed all 
Pauline forms of Christianity, including the emergent “Catholic” Church, and 
Manichaeans. Interestingly, the Homilies constructs its unique system of revelatory 
knowledge by wedding late antique Greek embryological discourse – especially on 
semen and blood – with a dualistic prophetological system.   
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I turn to the Homilies’ 
construction of prophethood and prophecy, demonstrating how it uses contemporary 
discourses of blood and semen to undergird a broader model for the acquisition of 
revelatory knowledge. This model ultimately privileges “vivid encounter” (ἐνάργεια), 
which is further nuanced here to mean the oral-aural encounter between truly existing 
persons, as the only legitimate means of securing revelatory knowledge. In fact, the 
Homilies contrasts ἐνάργεια over and against revelatory systems based on the faculty of 
vision, i.e., those that require the visualization of apparitions, whether awake or in 
dreams. As I show in second section, this contrast between the oral-aural and the visual 
buttresses a crucial debate between Peter the Apostle and the representative of the false 
prophetess, Simon Magus, who is here explicitly portrayed in the image of Paul, the 
Apostle of Jesus Christ (Hom. 17). I argue that the Homilies’ portrayal of the false 
prophet Simon Magus qua Paul participates in a broader Syrian discourse on 
prophethood, a discourse that had been become increasingly urgent due to the 
proclamations of Manichaean missionaries whose prophet had portrayed himself as Paul 
redivivus, an “Apostle of Jesus Christ.” In the third and final section, I turn to a key 
passage in the Homilies often employed by scholars of Manichaeism, Islam, and 
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Gnosticism to connect these various “religions” to a shared “Jewish Christian” 
prophetological core. This passage equates Adam with Jesus and posits that Adam-Jesus 
changed his form and names throughout history, appearing to select people along the 
way, before God granted him eternal rest. Again, I argue that this passage reflects the 
contested nature of the late antique Syrian discourse of prophethood, especially as it 
seeks to displace claims that anyone other than Adam-Jesus could possibly be the True 
Prophet.    
Seminal fluids and Blood: Embryology in the service of Epistemology 
 
Blood and semen play enormously important roles in the Homilies. The Homilies 
discusses blood in the context of sacrifices, wars, pre-diluvium cannibalism, sexual 
pleasure, demons, impurity, and the false prophetess, who, “as a female in her menses is 
stained with blood at the offering of sacrifices and pollutes those who touch her” (Hom. 
3.24).275 It is no accident that the Homilies describes her blood here as menstrual blood or 
that the Apostle Peter describes her as “giving birth” to temporary kings (Hom. 3.24). In 
keeping with the earlier works of Aristotle and Hippocrates, late antique physicians also 
saw menstrual blood as nutriment for the development of the fetus. This is no less the 
case in the Homilies. Yet, though the importance of blood and semen in the Homilies 
reflects, in part, regional discourses of the same among both Palestinian rabbinic 
communities and Syrian Christian communities, only the Homilies uses embryological 
                                                          
275 For a fuller discussion on the role of blood, see A.Y. Reed, “Parting Ways over Blood and Water? 
Beyond ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’ in the Roman Near East,” in La croisée des Chemins revisitée: Quand 
l’Église et la Synagogue se sont-elles distinguées? (eds. S.C. Mimouni and B. Pouderon; Paris: Cerf, 2012), 
227-5l; B. Leyerle, “Blood is Seed” JR 81 (2001): 26-48. 
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concepts and terms to articulate a distinctive “prophetic” epistemology.276 As we will see, 
the false prophetess’ menstrual blood links her to the corporeal composition of the human 
body, and this corporeal “root” subtly perverts human attempts at reasoning, seducing 
humans away from proper worship of God. As a result, humans cannot attain truth 
through their own means, thus necessitating the appearance of a True Prophet, the arbiter 
of truth. There is comparatively less overt discussion regarding seminal fluids, yet this 
does not detract from their importance in the Homilies. As we will see, the Homilies 
consistently describes “words” either as the masculine seminal fluids of the True Prophet 
or arising through the illicit commingling of masculine and feminine seminal fluids. The 
Homilies thus articulates a theory of prophetic knowledge, its source, mode of 
transmission, and nature, by leaning on embryological discussions regarding the nature of 
semen and blood.  
Peter’s first lengthy discussion with Clement centers on the two types of prophets 
that God had appointed over this world and the next. Whereas he describes the True 
Prophet Jesus in overwhelmingly masculine and paternal tones, he depicts the false 
prophetess in conspiratorial tones, a sinister queen directing this world behind the scenes 
to its destruction. Yet, despite her evil nature, according to Peter, God appointed her to 
rule over this present cosmos because she resembles the cosmos in her ability to produce 
and generate offspring. In other words, her body and the body of the cosmos are sites of 
generation and coming-into-being. Peter says, “She as a female ruling the present world 
                                                          
276 C.E. Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity: Rabbinic and Christian Reconstructions of Biblical Gender 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 160-209; idem., “The Didascalia Apostolorum: A Mishnah for 
the Disciples of Jesus,” JECS 9.4 (2001): 483-509; G. Kessler, Conceiving Israel: The Fetus in Rabbinic 
Narratives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).  
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as her like [ὡς θήλεια ὁμοίου], was entrusted to be the first prophetess, announcing 
prophecy with all amongst those born of woman [ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν]” (Hom. 3.22). 
Elsewhere, Peter says, “For since the present world is female, as a mother bringing forth 
souls of her children [ὁ παρὼν κόσμος θῆλύς ἐστιν, ὡς μήτηρ τέκνων τίκτων ψυχάς], but 
the world to come is male, as a father receiving his children from their mother” (Hom. 
2.15). Again, Peter says, “The cosmos is an instrument created artfully, the female 
eternally bears righteous eternal sons for the sake of the masculine [cosmos] to come” 
[ἵνα τῷ ἐσομένῳ ἄρρενι αἰωνίως ἡ θήλεια τίκτῃ δικαίους αἰωνίους υἱούς]” (Hom. 19.23). 
Such statements make it clear that the female prophetess and the present cosmos share a 
critical role: they bear “sons” for the masculine True Prophet and his eternal cosmos to 
come.277  
Given that the Homilies’ male gaze sees the prophetess and the cosmos primarily as 
sites of fetal generation, it is not surprising that Peter would mention her uterine fluids, 
that is, both blood and seminal fluids, in his initial discussion on the two prophets. He 
introduces these prophets by saying,  
Therefore, there are two classes of prophets for us. The male prophet, who is considered 
the first, even though the male is ranked below the female in the order of advent. But the 
second-ranked one, who is female has been appointed to come first in the advent of pairs. 
The second, who is among those born of woman, as the female appointed over this 
current world wishes to be thought as a male. By stealing the seminal fluids of the male 
and covering over them with her seminal fluids of the flesh, she bears forth generated 
things as wholly her own, that is, spoken words. And she promises that she will give the 
                                                          
277 Intriguingly, the early Neoplatonist Porphyry also compared cosmogony to a woman’s womb. The 
overlap in time and place may call for further attention. See J. Wilberding, Forms, Souls, and Embryos: 
Neoplatonists on Human Reproduction (New York: Routledge, 2017), 33-57.  
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present earthly riches as a dowry, thereby exchanging the slow for the swift, the small for 
the greater (Hom. 3.23). 
δύο οὖν ἡμῖν γενικαὶ ἔστωσαν προφητεῖαι· ἡ μὲν ἀρσενική (καὶ διωρίσθω ὅτι ἡ μὲν 
πρώτη ἄρσην οὖσα δευτέρα τοῦ λοιποῦ τέτακται κατὰ τὸν τῆς προόδου λόγον, ἡ δὲ 
δευτέρα θῆλυς οὖσα πρώτη ὡρίσθη ἔρχεσθαι ἐν τῇ τῶν συζυγιῶν προελεύσει) — ἡ μὲν 
οὖν ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν οὖσα, ὡς θήλεια τοῦ νῦν κόσμου ἐπαγγελλομένη, ἀρσενικὴ 
εἶναι πιστεύεσθαι θέλει. διὸ κλέπτουσα τὰ τοῦ ἄρσενος σπέρματα καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις τῆς 
σαρκὸς σπέρμασιν ἐπισκέπουσα ὡς ὅλα ἴδια συνεκφέρει τὰ γεννήματα, τουτέστιν τὰ 
ῥήματα. καὶ τὸν παρόντα ἐπίγειον πλοῦτον ὡς προῖκα δώσειν ἐπαγγέλλεται, τῷ ταχεῖ τὸ 
βραδύ, τὸ βραχὺ τῷ μείζονι. 
Though the true male prophet ranks above the female, the false female prophetess 
precedes his coming. The prophetess exploits this situation by masquerading as the male 
prophet. To do so, she steals and “covers over” the masculine seed of the True Prophet, 
which is presumably spiritual in nature, with her own “seeds of the flesh.” This 
commingling of male and female seminal fluids results in the birth of seductive 
utterances, which she passes off as her own. She seduces unsuspecting people through 
such utterances, and by accepting her dowry of temporary riches, they “marry” her and 
this present world, thereby losing their status as brides of the True Prophet and hope for 
eternal life in the next.  
 Strecker notes that the “impact” of Gnosticism on the passage above was 
“unübersehbar.”278 He finds in it the dim outline of the gnostic concept of a masculine, 
divine seed stuck in matter and in need of redemption. He does admit, however, that this 
“gnostic cosmology” does not match our passage exactly. A closer parallel might be 
                                                          
278 G. Strecker, Das Judenchristentum in den Pseudoklementinen (Berlin: Akademie, 1981), 158.  
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found in roughly contemporaneous discussions regarding the existence and function of 
male and female seminal fluids. For example, the passage above assumes that female 
seminal fluid exists when, in fact, late antique intellectuals were divided on this very 
issue. Aristotelians, for example, claimed that women do not secrete semen while 
physicians like Galen defended the existence of female semen.279 More intriguingly, the 
passage assumes that both the male and female seminal fluids contribute to the generation 
of offspring, in this case, “spoken words.” This interpretation is supported by the verb of 
“bearing forth together” – συνεκφέρει – which suggests that both male and female semen 
contribute to the act of generation. Furthermore, the false prophetess wants to portray her 
“children” – the “spoken words” – as “wholly her own,” which implies that in actuality, 
they were the product of both male and female seminal fluids. This resonates with 
roughly contemporaneous debates regarding the function of these seminal fluids, 
exemplified best by Galen’s controversial position that both male and female semen, as 
well as the female’s menstrual blood, contributed to the actual production of offspring.280 
This was again in opposition to contemporaneous Aristotelians, who claimed that only 
the male seed provided the necessary “movements” to the female blood to provoke the 
generation of a fetus, after which the material body of the male semen would dissipate. 
                                                          
279 Wilberding notes “Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Aristotle, and the Stoics” as among those who 
followed a one, masculine seed theory and “Alcmaeon, Hippon, and other Pythagoreans, Parmenides, 
Empedocles, Democritus, Epicurus – and especially among ancient physicians: the Hippocratics, Diocles, 
Herophilus, Soranus, and Galen” as following a two-seed theory in which the female also produced seminal 
fluids. See Wilberding, Forms, Souls, and Embryos, 14. For a recent challenge to this “well-worn 
narrative,” see S.M. Connell, Aristotle on Female Animals: A Study of the Generation of Animals 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 93-120. Connell argues that Aristotle believed that female 
also secreted seminal fluids. Whatever Aristotle “truly” believed, my argument takes its place from how 
Galen and others understood Aristotle – namely, as a “one-seed” theorist.  
280 For an overview of Galen’s thoughts on sperm, see P. de Lacy, Galen: On Semen: Edition, Translation 
and Commentary (Berlin: Akademie, 1992), 47-51.  
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Nevertheless, this is not an exact parallel, in so far as Galen argues that it is the female’s 
menstrual blood, and not her semen, that is responsible for the production of flesh itself 
(On Semen, I.16.33-35). 
 Unlike Galen, however, the Homilies contends that the intermingling of the male 
and female seminal fluids has deep epistemological and soteriological consequences. 
Their union produces bastard utterances that illicitly impregnate the souls of human 
beings, ultimately leading the person to damnation. This is why the Homilies is peculiarly 
concerned with making sure that others do not even hear blasphemous words.281 The 
person who hears the utterances of the false prophetess are thereby “sown by another 
word [ὁ παρ᾿ ἑτέρου σπαρεὶς λόγῳ], and therefore receives the charge of fornication, and 
is cast out by the Bridegroom from his kingdom” (Hom. 3.28). By daring to hear these 
bastard utterances, the spiritually adulterous person imitates the False Prophetess, who 
“dares both to say and hear that many gods exist [πολλοὺς μέντοι θεοὺς λέγειν καὶ 
ἀκούειν οὐ μόνον τολμῶσα]” (Hom. 3.24). As will become clear in the following section, 
one should only attend to the words of the True Prophet, or to put it in the Homilies’ 
terms, one should only become pregnant through the words (=pure spiritual masculine 
semen) of the True Prophet.  
Peter’s denunciation of the false prophetess’ seminally-commingled utterances 
doubles back on the epistemological deficiency of Greek oracular sites, which he attacks 
as woefully ambiguous and whose words ultimately lead to damnation. Indeed, it is not 
difficult to discern the figure of the famous Oracle at Delphi, celebrated both for her 
                                                          
281 See, e.g., Hom. 2.20, 2.38, 3.4, 3.9. These passages highlight the importance in guarding oneself from 
“hearing” blasphemous words.  
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divine wisdom and cryptic words, behind his description of the “utterances” of the false 
prophetess. He says, “As for those who desire to learn truth from her, she keeps them 
always seeking and finding nothing, even until death, by telling them all things contrary 
and by presenting many and various services… Prophesying deceit and ambiguities and 
obliquities, she deceives those who believe her” (Hom. 3.24). Elsewhere, Peter contrasts 
the prophetic utterances of the false prophetess, who “speaks the first things last, the last 
first, speaks of past events as future, and future as already past, and without sequence, or 
things borrowed from others and altered, some lessened, unformed, foolish, ambiguous, 
unseemly, obscure, proclaiming all unconscientiousness” (Hom. 3.14), with the words of 
the True Prophet, whose utterances “need nothing for its interpretation, not prophesying 
darkly or ambiguously, so that one would need another prophet to interpret the spoken 
words, but clearly and simply” (Hom. 3.12, 15).  
 We have so far discussed how the female prophetess produces “words” through 
the illicit commingling of seminal fluids. Let us now turn to examine the masculine seeds 
of the True Prophet. There is less explicit theorization of the masculine semen. 
Nevertheless, like the female seminal fluids, the masculine semen produces or is identical 
to the “words” spoken by the True Prophet. As Peter says,  
 
For every person is a bride, whenever they are sown with the white word of the True 
Prophet, their mind is enlightened (Hom. 3.27).  
νύμφη γάρ ἐστιν ὁ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὁπόταν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς προφήτου λευκῷ λόγῳ ἀληθείας 
σπειρόμενος φωτίζηται τὸν νοῦν.  
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It is no accident that Peter couples the “white” word of the Prophet with the participle 
“being sown.” He conceptualizes the True Prophet’s logos as “white” semen that 
impregnates the mind of a person. Peter invokes similar terminology in a later discussion 
on the characteristics of a “chaste woman.” He describes her one “adorned with the Son 
of God as with a bridegroom [ἡ σώφρων γυνὴ ὡς νυμφίῳ τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ κοσμεῖτα],”282 
and as a result, “She is white, whenever her mind is enlightened [λευκὴ δὲ τυγχάνει, ὅταν 
τὰς φρένας ᾖ λελαμπρυμένη].”283 These passages demonstrate the intermingling of 
prophethood and embryology: “words,” whether utterances or logoi, are produced by 
masculine and/or feminine seminal fluids.  
Whereas the Homilies aligns seminal fluids, both male and female, rather narrowly 
with the production of words, it has a wildly expansive view of blood. It connects blood 
with menstrual impurity, sacrifices, demons, and the present cosmos itself. What has 
gone unnoticed, however, is the role of blood as nutriment for the production of human 
bodies and its consequences on the human ability to discern truth. In short, the Homilies 
appropriates widespread conceptions of menstrual blood as fetal nutriment, as well as 
proximate discussions relating to sexual pleasure, to fashion a unique account of human 
composition. Whereas the menstrual blood from the false prophetess nourishes the fleshy 
aspects of the human body, the pneuma responsible for thought and reasoning derives 
from the seminal logos of the True Prophet. These two “roots” oppose one another within 
                                                          
282 For the Syriac text, see P.A. de Lagarde (ed.), The Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions and Homilies (10-
14) in Syriac (repr. ed.; Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2012 [1861]). For an English translation, see F.S. Jones 
(trans.), The Syriac Pseudo-Clementines: An Early Version of the First Christian Novel (Brepols: 2014). 
The Syriac agrees almost perfectly. The Syriac translates the Greek “honorable” [σεμνὸν] as “chastity” 
] :[ܢܟܦܘܬܐ] ܕܢܟܦܘܬܐ ܢܘܗܪܐ ܠܒܝܫܐ ܟܕ ܡܨܛܒܬܐ ܕܐܠܗܐ ܠܒܪܗ ܕܠܚܬܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܢܟܦܐ ܐܝܕܐ ] 
283 Hom. 13.16. The Syriac agrees perfectly [ܚܘܪܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܪܥܝܢܐ ܗܘܐ ܙܗܐ].  
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each human being, so that humans are not capable of sound reasoning and attaining truth. 
To explore this in full, let us turn first to the Homilies’ discourse regarding the interaction 
between menstrual blood and the True Prophet’s semen. In Hom. 3. 27, Peter concludes 
his private discourse with Clement by saying,  
What more needs to be said? The male is wholly truth, and the female wholly error. But 
he who is born from both male and female at times lies, and at other times, tells the truth. 
For by surrounding the white sperm of the male with her own blood, like a red fire, she 
braces the weakness of her bones through foreign supports, and taking pleasure in the 
temporary bloom of flesh and by secretly sapping the strength of reasoning through 
temporary pleasures, she leads many into adultery, and thus deprives them of the 
beautiful bridegroom to come.  
καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν; ὁ ἄρσην ὅλος ἀλήθεια. ἡ θήλεια ὅλη πλάνη, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἄρσενος καὶ θηλείας 
γεγονὼς ἃ μὲν ψεύδεται, ἃ δὲ ἀληθεύει. ἡ γὰρ θήλεια ἰδίῳ αἵματι ὥσπερ ἐρυθρῷ πυρὶ  
περιβάλλουσα τὸ τοῦ ἄρσενος λευκὸν σπέρμα, ἀλλοτρίοις ἐρείσμασιν ὀστέων τὸ ἀσθενὲς 
αὐτῆς συνίστησιν καὶ τῷ τῆς σαρκὸς προσκαίρῳ ἄνθει τέρπουσα καὶ βραχείαις ἡδοναῖς 
τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὴν ἰσχὺν ὑποσυλῶσα τοὺς πλείονας εἰς μοιχείαν ἄγει καὶ οὕτως τοῦ 
μέλλοντος καλοῦ στερίσκει νυμφίου. 
This passage converts the act of coitus into a prophetological idiom. Peter roots 
humankind’s propensity to both tell the truth and to lie in its dual heritage, a topic that he 
will fully describe in the last chapter of the Homilies. He states that the False Prophetess 
saps the “strength of reasoning” from humankind through the pleasure of conception and 
sexual pleasure. Humans are therefore hard-wired to be incapable of ascertaining truth on 
their own.  
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In keeping with the Homilies’ focus on embryology as a mode of articulating 
epistemology, this passage employs terms and concepts sources from ambient 
embryological discourses on the uterine fluids. First, the “white-ness” of the male sperm 
is contrasted with the “red fire” of the female blood. On the one hand, if interpreted 
minimally, the invocation of these colors need not signify anything.284 On the other hand, 
given the density of other embryological terms, we might be justified in reading these 
chromatic descriptions of reproductive fluids as evoking embryological tropes regarding 
the production of blood and semen. As we have already seen, the Homilies marks the 
True Prophet’s logos as seminal fluid by drawing attention to its whiteness. This may 
draw from parallel discussions where the whiteness of male sperm, at least according to 
Aristotle, results from a concentration of pneuma, an ether-like substance akin to the 
substance of the stars (De Generatione Animalium 737a1), which is compounded with 
water to form a frothy substance (De Generatione Animalium 736a1-3, 13). Galen, for his 
part, also seems to agree with Aristotle that the whiteness of masculine sperm is due to 
the concentration of “vital pneuma” [τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ζωτικοῦ] (On Semen I.5.18), and 
that its “whiteness” is crucial for its role as the substance from which arteries, veins, and 
nerves are created (On Semen I.5.4, 12-17). From Galen’s perspective, then, the 
“whiteness” of semen is not a mere cosmetic accident, but an essential characteristic of 
masculine semen. 
Second, after ejaculation, the blood of the female prophetess swallows up the white 
sperm of the true prophet, through which the prophetess supports [συνίστησιν] the 
                                                          
284 There are interesting rabbinic parallels on the “color” of semen and blood. See Kessler, Conceiving 
Israel, 106. 
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“weakness of her bones.”285 Apparently, the false prophet’s skeletal frame requires 
“foreign” contributions –presumably the male semen– in order to support her body. The 
mechanics of this are far from clear, though it strongly resonates with Aristotelian claims 
that the process of ossification requires the heat emitted by semen to cook, harden, and 
dry the corporeal materials needed for creating bones (De Generatione Animalium 
743a19-21). Galen, for his part, accepts Aristotle’s argument that bones are “cooked,” but 
develops it in his own way. First, he argues that Aristotle’s broader claim that women are 
constitutionally colder and wetter than men means that their seminal fluids are too cold 
and wet to activate their generative potential (On Semen 2.4.23-30). This necessitates 
contact with masculine semen, which, as it is hotter and drier than its feminine 
counterpart, imparts the heat necessary to activate the generative powers of the female 
seminal fluids (On Semen 2.4.31). Together, both the feminine and masculine semen turn 
into veins, nerves, and arteries of the fetus. Nature then sucks out the “thicker” and “more 
earthy” and “less ductile” parts of semen (On Semen 1.10.10), and cooks this seminal 
detritus with internal heat until it hardens, thus “setting” the bones (On Semen 1.10.14-
16). Therefore, both Aristotle and Galen seem to posit that masculine semen – more 
specifically, the heat emitted from the masculine semen, which is filled with hot pneuma 
– is required for bones to set. The Homilies seems to draw on such discussions in its 
claim that the masculine semen somehow “braces” the bones of the false prophetess, 
                                                          
285 Peck notes that the verb Συνιστάναι, Συνίστασθαι has an almost technical characteristic in Aristotle’s 
corpus. He writes that it refers to the “beginning of the process” of generation, and that it “denotes the first 
impact of Form upon Matter, the first step in the process of actualizing the potentiality of Matter.” See A.L. 
Peck (trans.), Aristotle: Generation of Animals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), lxi-lxii. The 
verb does not have the same technical sense here; nevertheless, its employment here suggests that the 
Homilies is gesturing towards this embryological background.  
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despite the fact that it would have been more appropriate to signal the “white fire” of the 
masculine semen rather than the “red fire” of the false prophetess’ menstrual blood. 
Nevertheless, we should not expect identical parallels, in so far as the Homilies does not 
demonstrate deep knowledge of Galenic embryology or physiognomy. Ultimately, the 
passage above resonates with Aristotelian ideas regarding the structural inferiority of the 
woman’s body and, in keeping with Galen, suggests that the female corporeal structure 
requires the energizing power of semen to fully actualize the material potential of her 
bones.  
Finally, the passage describes the false prophetess as taking pleasure in the 
“temporary bloom of flesh” and “secretly sapping the strength of reasoning” (Hom. 3.27). 
Physicians and philosophers too discussed sexual pleasure as part of their broader 
embryological conversations on the character and purpose of semen. Hippocrates argued 
that women have less intense and a more prolonged experience of pleasure since they 
discharge their semen slower than men.286 Aristotle too states that the extreme pleasure 
that arises through sexual intercourse is a result of its “strong movements,” referring to 
the act of coitus itself (De Generatione Animalium 723b34-35). According to Aristotle, 
however, men differ from women in the cause for their pleasure; for men, pleasure comes 
most powerfully from the expulsion of concentrated pneuma in their semen, which 
women cannot have because they do not secrete semen (De Generatione Animalium 
728a10-18).287 Furthermore, these thinkers agree that the act of coitus leaves the human 
body debilitated. Hippocrates writes, for example, that semen is in fact the most potent 
                                                          
286 See I.M. Lonie, The Hippocratic Treatises “On Generation,” “On the Nature of the Child,” “Diseases 
IV”: A Commentary (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 119-21. 
287 On women’s sexual pleasure, see De Generatione Animalium 727b7-12. 
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distillation of the fluids secreted by each member of the body, citing as proof that “The 
discharge of such a small quantity (of semen) in intercourse makes us weak” (On 
Generation 1.1). Galen also states “So it is not at all surprising that those who are less 
moderate sexually turn out to be weaker, since the whole body loses the purest part of 
both substances; and there is besides an accession of pleasure, which by itself is enough 
to dissolve the vital tone, so that before now some persons have died from excess of 
pleasure” (On Semen 1.16.31). He notes with displeasure that “they,” presumably 
Aristotelians, always ask why “sexual intercourse is especially debilitating” and states 
that they cannot know the real answer since they are ignorant of the first principles. In so 
doing, he hints that philosophers and physicians alike constructed serious accounts for the 
debilitating effects of over vigorous sexual appetite as an important topic of their craft.  
As we had already seen with the case of semen, the Homilies uses embryological 
concepts as a way of articulating concepts related to epistemological certainty. It is no 
less the case in the passage above, where Peter argues that the female prophetess dilutes 
and saps the epistemological potency of the masculine sperm by offering in its stead 
temporary carnal pleasures. As a result, “He who is born from both male and female at 
times lies, and at other times, tells the truth” (Hom. 3.27). It follows that humans, then, 
cannot discern truth on their own accord due to their mixed heritage. Peter later expands 
on the epistemological consequences of humankind’s unique composition. Peter says,  
Humans, therefore, He [God] created with free-will, and possessing the capability of 
inclining toward whatever deeds he wishes. And his body consists of three parts because 
it has its generation from the female, namely, lust, anger, and grief, and those things that 
follow from these three. But the spirit (which does not have three sources of origination, 
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but merely consists of three parts) has its generation from the male. And it is capable of 
reasoning, knowledge, and fear, and those things that follow these three. And each of 
these triads has one root, so that a human is a compound of two mixtures, the female and 
the male. Therefore, two paths have been laid before him – one lawful and the other 
unlawful, along with two kingdoms, one called the kingdom of heaven and the other the 
kingdom of those who currently rule over the earth (Hom. 20.2). 
τὸν οὖν ἄνθρωπον αὐτεξούσιον ἐποίησεν, ἐπιτηδειότητα ἔχοντα νεύειν πρὸς ἃς βούλεται 
πράξεις. καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἐστι τριμερές, ἐκ θηλείας ἔχον τὴν γένεσιν· ἔχει γὰρ 
ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, λύπην καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα—τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα (καὶ αὐτὸ οὐ τριτογενὲς 
ὄν, ἀλλὰ τριμερές) ἐκ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ δεκτικόν ἐστι λογισμοῦ, 
γνώσεως, φόβου καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων. ἑκατέρα δὲ τῶν τριάδων μίαν ἔχει τὴν ῥίζαν, 
ὡς εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ φυραμάτων δύο, θηλείας τε καὶ ἄρρενος. διὸ δὴ καὶ δύο αὐτῷ 
ὁδοὶ προετέθησαν, νόμου τε καὶ ἀνομίας—δύο τε βασιλεῖαι ὡρίσθησαν, <ἡ μὲν τῶν> 
οὐρανῶν λεγομένη, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς νῦν βασιλευόντων. 
According to Peter, humankind’s unique ability to exercise free-will results from their 
particular corporeal and pneumatic composition.288 From the female, they receive their 
corporeal frame, as well as those emotions associated with carnality, “lust [ἐπιθυμίαν], 
anger, and grief.” From the male, they receive their spirit, which furnishes humans with 
reasoning [λογισμοῦ], knowledge, and “fear.” Such an arrangement is necessary if 
humans are to have free-will, since one can only possess “free-will” if they have (at least) 
two options available to them. Not surprisingly, even here, the human body and spirit are 
characterized through embryological terminologies, e.g., “parts” [τριμερές]. In any case, 
Peter’s exposition on human composition in turn helps us understand what he meant 
                                                          
288 Strecker, Judenchristentum, 161-62.  
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when he said that “pleasure” saps the “strength of reasoning [τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὴν ἰσχὺν].” 
The female root, which ties the human body to the uterine fluids of the false prophetess, 
infects and saps the ability of the masculine spirit within each person to reason properly.  
Enargeia, Noetic Insemination, and anti-Paulinism 
 
I have argued above that the Homilies deploys embryological terminology and concepts 
to articulate an epistemological system that necessitates the need for a True Prophet as an 
arbiter of truth. Within this framework, “words” are the products or expressions of 
seminal discharge – either in its pure masculine form as logos or in its bastard form as 
utterances, which arise from the illicit commingling of masculine and feminine seminal 
fluids. Furthermore, these “words” qua seminal fluids “impregnate” the soul of the 
person. Building on these observations, in this section, I first demonstrate how this 
seminal understanding of words undergirds the Homilies’ privileging of “vivid 
perceptibility” (ἐνάργεια), which is further nuanced as the oral and aural encounter 
between two truly existent being, over visionary experiences of the divine. In short, 
ἐνάργεια stands in contrast to visual means of receiving revelatory information, 
something the Homilies characterizes as beset with epistemological uncertainty and 
related to the demonic. Strikingly, the Homilies’ critique of visionary apperception strikes 
at the very basis of Pauline Christianity, as other scholars have convincingly 
demonstrated.289 Unlike those scholars, who seek to situate the Homilies’ anti-Pauline 
                                                          
289 G. Luedemann, Opposition to Paul in Jewish Christianity (trans. M. Eugene Boring; Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1989), 189-94; Strecker, Judenchristentum, 191-94; A. Salles, “La diatribe anti-paulinienne dans 
le ‘roman pseudo-clémentin’ et l’origine des ‘kérygmes de Pierre,’” Revue Biblique 64.4 (1957): 516-51; 
H. Waitz, Die Pseudoklementinen Homilien und Rekognitionen: Eine Quellenkritische Untersuchung 
(Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1904), 133-40; Chapman, “On the Date of the Clementines,” 150-51; W.R. Cassels, 
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sentiments among “Jewish Christian” communities back to the “Basic Source” in the 
early third century, I argue that the Homilies, as a late fourth century text, participates in 
a broader Syrian discourse on prophethood, made recently urgent by the diffusion of 
Manichaeism, a neo-Pauline form of Christianity based on the prophetic status and 
visionary revelations of its putative “founder,” Mani.    
The Homilies first broaches the idea of orality and aurality as the privileged means of 
transmitting knowledge early in the text, right after Clement’s first meeting with Peter. 
Clement says,  
And at the same time, he put me to rest by expounding to me who he [the True Prophet 
Jesus] is, and how he is found, and holding him forth to me as truly discoverable, and 
demonstrated that the truth is more manifest to the ear by homilies concerning the 
prophet than things that are seen with the eye, so that I was astonished and wondered that 
no one sees those things which are sought after by all, though they lie before him (Hom. 
1.20). 
καὶ ὁμῶς ἀνέπαυσέν με, ἐκθέμενός μοι τίς ἐστιν καὶ πῶς εὑρίσκεται, καὶ ἀληθῶς εὑρετόν 
μοι παρασχὼν αὐτόν, τῶν παρὰ ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρωμένων ἐμφανεστέραν τῆς <περὶ> τοῦ 
προφήτου ὁμιλίας τοῖς ὠσὶν δείξας τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἐκπλαγέντα με θαυμάζειν πῶς τῶν 
πᾶσι ζητουμένων ἔμπροσθεν κειμένων οὐδεὶς ἐνορᾷ. 
Clement notes, perhaps not without a bit of irony, that no one “sees” [ἐνορᾷ] those things 
that are laid out before them, precisely because they believe that truth is “more manifest” 
by “things seen with the eyes” rather than through conversations regarding the prophet. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Supernatural Religion (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874), 33-37; J. Bourgel, “The 
Holders of the ‘Word of Truth’: The Pharisees in Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions 1.27-71,” JECS 25.2. 
(2017): 171-200, 185-88. Annette Yoshiko Reed pivots the discussion from a focus on Paul to broader 
questions of secrecy and transmission in, “Secrecy, Suppression, and the Jewishness of the Origins of 
Christianity,” in Jewish-Christianity and the History of Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming).  
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As such, this passage is not about the True Prophet himself or his teachings, but centers 
squarely on the superior manner in which Peter presented the true prophet Jesus, that is, 
through “homilies.” Within the narrow context of this chapter, this passage legitimizes 
the Homilies as the inscribed words uttered by Peter himself. Clement writes that he had 
been ordered by Peter to write Peter’s homilies and to dispatch the volume to an 
unknown “you” (Hom. 1.20). At the same time, the importance of the oral-aural 
encounter as the sole legitimate means of truth is soon transformed into a major point of 
contention between Peter and Simon Magus, who insists on the priority of visionary 
experience for furnishing sure knowledge. In fact, the passages above already hints in 
that direction, since it is not clear why Clement valorizes the “oral-aural” encounter at the 
expense of visual means of perceiving the truth. There had been no discussion regarding 
the visual means of perceiving truth up to that point, which makes its appearance here 
suspicious. In my view, the creator of this passage presages the debate between Paul and 
Peter in Hom. 17.13-19, where the debate between aural-orality and visions will be on 
full display.  
Before turning to that debate, however, we need to explore briefly one of its most 
important facets, namely, its explicit anti-Paulinism. As scholars have already noted, 
Hom. 17 casts Simon in Pauline form; he masquerades as an “Apostle of Jesus Christ,” he 
is characterized as Peter’s enemy, and he relies on visions of Jesus Christ as a mode of 
legitimizing his own station.290  Surprisingly, however, the most vociferous anti-Pauline 
statements are not found in the Homilies itself but in the Epistle of Peter to James, whose 
                                                          
290 Luedemann, Opposition to Paul, 188-90.  
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function is to “frame, authorize, and introduce” the Homilies.291 For our purposes, the 
differences between the two proves instrumental in thinking again about how the 
Homilies conceptualizes orality-aurality and visuality as mediums for revelatory 
knowledge. As in the Homilies, Peter in the Epistle hones in on the difficulties of 
attaining sure knowledge. This is best expressed in Peter’s characterization of “his 
enemy,” Paul, as perverting the message of the Gospel among the Gentiles. He says,  
For some among the peoples have rejected my preaching concern the law and instead 
attach themselves to the certain lawless and foolish teachings of the man who is my 
enemy. And they even attempt such things while I am present, transforming my words 
through various interpretations with the aim of dissolving the law, as if I myself thought 
as they did, only that I did not proclaim it frankly. God forbid! For such oppose the law 
of God uttered by Moses, and our Lord bore witness to its eternal applicability. Thus, he 
said, “The heavens and the earth shall pass away, but not one jot or tittle shall pass from 
the Law.” And this he said so “that all things might come to pass.” But these men profess 
to know my mind, though I do not know how, and attempt to interpret those words which 
they have heard from me, more intelligently than I who spoke them, telling their 
catechumens that that which I had never pondered was, in fact, the meaning in my mind. 
But if, while I am still present, they dare to spin lies concerning such things, how much 
more will those who come after me dare to do so (Epistle 2)! 
τινὲς γὰρ τῶν ἀπὸ ἐθνῶν τὸ δι’ ἐμοῦ νόμιμον ἀπεδοκίμασαν κήρυγμα, τοῦ ἐχθροῦ 
ἀνθρώπου ἄνομόν τινα καὶ φλυαρώδη προσηκάμενοι διδασκαλίαν. καὶ ταῦτα ἔτι μου 
περιόντος ἐπεχείρησάν τινες ποικίλαις τισὶν ἑρμηνείαις τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους 
μετασχηματίζειν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νόμου κατάλυσιν, ὡς καὶ ἐμοῦ αὐτοῦ οὕτω μὲν φρονοῦντος, 
μὴ ἐκ παρρησίας δὲ κηρύσσοντος. ὅπερ ἀπείη. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτο ἀντιπράσσειν ἐστὶ τῷ τοῦ 
                                                          
291 See Reed, “Secrecy.” I echo Reed’s skepticism to the claim that the Epistle was meant to introduce the 
third-century Basic Source. 
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θεοῦ νόμῳ τῷ διὰ Μωυσέως ῥηθέντι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν μαρτυρηθέντι περὶ τῆς 
ἀιδίου αὐτοῦ διαμονῆς. ἐπεὶ οὕτως εἶπεν· «Ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ παρελεύσονται, ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ 
μία κεραία οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου». τοῦτο δὲ εἴρηκεν, «ἵνα τὰ πάντα γίνηται». οἱ 
δὲ οὐκ οἶδα πῶς τὸν ἐμὸν νοῦν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, οὓς ἤκουσαν ἐξ ἐμοῦ λόγους, ἐμοῦ τοῦ 
εἰπόντος αὐτοὺς φρονιμώτερον ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἑρμηνεύειν, λέγοντες τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν 
κατηχουμένοις τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐμὸν φρόνημα, ὃ ἐγὼ οὐδὲ ἐνεθυμήθην. εἰ δὲ ἐμοῦ ἔτι 
περιόντος τοιαῦτα τολμῶσιν καταψεύδεσθαι, πόσῳ γε μᾶλλον μετ’ ἐμὲ ποιεῖν οἱ μετ’ ἐμὲ 
τολμήσουσιν; 
Peter calls Paul “his enemy” and his followers masters of the interpretative spin. In so 
doing, he highlights the dangers of interpretation, a theme he expands on in the 
Homilies.292 More specifically, Peter accuses Paul of feigning to know what Peter truly 
meant and of interpreting his words in an overly intellectual manner. In so doing, he 
draws attention to the ungrounded nature of “meaning” and the ease with which it is 
hijacked for ulterior purposes. As a way of preventing such outcomes, which Peter wisely 
foresees as only getting worse, Peter recommends rigorous screening before transmitting 
the Homilies to other parties.293  
 Paul stands guilty of interpreting that which needed no interpretation and of 
pretending to know the mind of Peter. Nevertheless, the Letter does not present a rigorous 
epistemological apology for how one might apprehend truth. What remains rather 
inchoate in the Letter, however, Peter expands in the Homilies. Here, the debate centers 
squarely on how one can better apprehend truth. Here, Peter argues against Paul-Simon, 
                                                          
292 Especially regarding allegories and the interpretation of scriptures; Hom. 4-6, 16.6-24. 
293 See further Reed, “Secrecy.”  
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who claims that visionary experience of the divine present a stronger basis for the 
acquisition of truth than through oral-aural exchange. Simon says,  
Someone who listens “in a vivid manner” is not fully convinced by that which is said, for 
his mind has to consider whether the speaker is lying since the speaker appears as a 
human being. But a vision not merely presents an object to view, but furnishes faith in the 
one who sees that that which is seen is divine (Hom. 17.13). 
ὁ ἐναργῶς ἀκούων τινὸς οὐ πάνυ πληροφορεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις. ἔχει γὰρ ὁ νοῦς 
αὐτοῦ λογίσασθαι μὴ ἄρα ψεύδεται ἄνθρωπος ὢν τὸ φαινόμενον. ἡ δὲ ὀπτασία ἅμα τῷ 
ὀφθῆναι πίστιν παρέχει τῷ ὁρῶντι ὅτι θειότης ἐστίν. 
Simon argues that one can trust apparitions and visions because they do not appear as 
mere humans, but as divine. He thus shows his hand and the source of his false teachings: 
visionary experiences of the divine. Not surprisingly, Peter calls Simon’s gospel as the 
work of a deceiver and a false prophet. He says, “And thus, as the true Prophet told us, a 
false prophet must first come from some deceiver; and then, in like manner, after the 
removal of the holy place, the true Gospel must be secretly sent abroad for the 
rectification of the heresies that shall be” (Hom. 2.17). Despite the initial spread of the 
false gospel, spread here by Paul-Simon, the true gospel, as propagated by Peter in a 
“secret” manner, will come to extinguish the “heresies” that inevitably spring from Paul’s 
gospel.  
Peter’s riposte to Simon’s unexamined reliance on visionary phenomena strikes at 
the heart of Simon’s argument: if one merely relies on apparitions, visions, dreams, and 
the like, then one does not have the opportunity to cross-examine the spirit to verify its 
identity. These apparitions may be nothing more than demons and or deceptive spirits 
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masquerading as divine beings. Thus, Peter argues that apparitions do not stay around 
long enough to answer questions, but instead they “gleam forth like an evil one, and 
remaining as long as he likes, he is at length extinguished, not remaining with the 
questioner so long as he wished to do for the purpose of consulting him” (Hom. 17.14).294 
Dreams too are unreliable in so far as one is unable to think discursively when sleeping, 
and hence they could not cross-examine apparitions who appear in dreams. Such would 
be the case even with “God-sent” dreams since there would be no way of distinguishing 
between “normal” dreams and divine dreams. Furthermore, human eyes – as globs of 
flesh – cannot bear the sight of God or his son, the True Prophet, since the light that emits 
from them would dissolve human flesh. Therefore, the apparition that appeared to Simon-
Paul could only have been a demon.  
 Instead, Peter argues, true revelatory knowledge does not come through visions or 
dreams, but through the discourses of the True Prophet who reveals knowledge already 
implanted in the human soul. According to Peter, revelation emerged within a pious 
person “by gushing forth [ἀναβλύζει] to the innate and pure mind [τῷ νῷ], not worked up 
through dreams, but granted to good people through their intelligence” (Hom. 17.17). As 
an example, Peter recounts his own experience of revelatory knowledge. When Jesus asks 
his disciples what others say about him, Peter states, “It came into my heart to say, 
though I do not know how, ‘You are the Son of the Living God.’” From this, Peter 
concludes, 
                                                          
294 Curiously, Porphyry assumes that one could ask questions of the conjured gods. See: Life of Plotinus, 
34-35. 
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I learned that revelation is learning that is untaught, without vision nor dreams. For this is 
truly the case. For entirety of Truth is…. placed in us from God “spermatically,” but it is 
covered and revealed by the hand of God, according to the merit of the knowledge 
operating within each person (Hom. 17.18).  
ἐμὲ δὲ ἔκτοτε μαθεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἀδιδάκτως, ἄνευ ὀπτασίας καὶ ὀνείρων, μαθεῖν  ἀποκάλυψίς 
ἐστιν. καὶ ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχει. ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκ θεοῦ τεθείσῃ σπερματικῶς ... πᾶσα 
ἔνεστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, θεοῦ δὲ χειρὶ σκέπεται καὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται, τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τὸ κατ’ 
ἀξίαν ἑκάστου εἰδότος. 
Though the meaning of the term σπερματικῶς is not entirely clear, it clearly evokes the 
embryological-epistemological nexus discussed above. The passage depicts God 
implanting the “entire truth” within humans as an act of noetic insemination. This may 
refer to the idea discussed above in which “every person is a bride” when they are 
inseminated by the “white logos” of the True Prophet. One might even speculate that the 
verb “gushing forth” [ἀναβλύζει] to describe how Peter gained revelatory knowledge is 
meant to evoke the idea of seminal ejaculation. More importantly, the passage 
demonstrates that the Homilies’ broader embryological and prophetological apparatus 
undergirds Peter’s argument against Paul. Peter’s characterization of “words” as “seminal 
fluids” and his insistence here on the priority of discourse come to a head in his argument 
against Pauline forms of Christianity.  
The Homilies’ most stringently anti-Pauline statement follows the passage above. As 
Peter says, Jesus only appears to people as an apparition if he is angry with them.   
If our Jesus made himself known to you by appearing in a vision and discoursed with 
you, it was as one who enraged with an opponent. And this is the reason why he spoke 
through visions and dreams, or through revelations from without. But can anyone become 
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fit for teaching through visions? And if you say, it is possible, then why did our teacher 
abide and discourse a whole year to those who were awake (Hom. 17.19)?  
εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σοὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἡμῶν δι’ ὁράματος ὀφθεὶς ἐγνώσθη καὶ ὡμίλησεν ὡς 
ἀντικειμένῳ ὀργιζόμενος, διὸ δι’ ὁραμάτων καὶ ἐνυπνίων ἢ καὶ δι’ ἀποκαλύψεων ἔξωθεν 
οὐσῶν ἐλάλησεν. εἴ τις δὲ δι’ ὀπτασίαν πρὸς διδασκαλίαν σοφισθῆναι δύναται; καὶ εἰ μὲν 
ἐρεῖς· Δυνατόν ἐστιν, διὰ τί ὅλῳ ἐνιαυτῷ ἐγρηγορόσιν παραμένων ὡμίλησεν ὁ 
διδάσκαλος;  
This passage polemicizes against Paul’s claim to be an Apostle of Jesus Christ by 
arguing that visions do not make one an apostle. This refutes Paul’s statement in 1 Cor. 
15:8, where he wrote “And last among all [the rest of the apostles], He [Jesus] appeared 
to me, as to one untimely born.” Coupled with the Homilies’ claim that a false gospel 
must first be spread among the Gentiles before the true one is promulgated, and the fact 
that Simon Magus opposes Peter just as Paul confronted Peter in Antioch in Galatians 
2.11, as well as the stringent anti-Pauline sentiment in the Letter, there is little doubt that 
the Simon Magus of chapter 17 is none other than the Apostle Paul.  
 Do such vigorously anti-Pauline passages merely channel earlier anti-Pauline 
sentiment? Most scholars have attempted to assess the historicity of the Homilies’ anti-
Pauline statements and concluded that such statements reflect an ancient “Jewish 
Christian” theologoumenon, dating at least to the time of “Basic Source” in the early third 
century.295 However one understands the ancient roots of the Homilies’ anti-Paulinism, 
the fact remains that the Homilies is an early fourth-century text and reflect the concerns 
of a community from that time and place; the processes of redaction, expansion, and 
                                                          
295 See, e.g., Luedemann, Opposition to Paul, 193-94.  
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excision so visible to twentieth-century source scholars bear witness to the heavy-handed 
editorial practices and attendant processes of interpretation and meaning-making that 
went into the production of the Homilies. In other words, scholars must contextualize the 
Homilies’ anti-Paulinism not only in its (possible) earlier contexts, but also within an 
early fourth century, Syrian context. Seen from this vantage point, Simon Magus operates 
as a sort of baggy symbol for all “Christianities” aligned with the figure of Paul.296 After 
all, Peter attributes the emergence of future heresies to Paul’s false gospel. If so, the 
Homilies’ understanding of “Pauline” Christianity must be capacious enough to include 
not only the “Orthodox” or “Proto-orthodox” Church, which sought to forge a unified if 
not irenic apostolic past, but also its opponents who also championed Paul as their 
touchstone to Christianity, including Marcionites297 and, I argue here, Manichaeans.   
 Though I have already discussed the figure of Paul in Mani’s self-presentation in 
the previous chapters, it is worthwhile to expand on the more relevant sections here. Even 
prior to the discovery of the CMC, scholars of Manichaeism had known about the 
distinctly Pauline locutions that Mani adopted for himself, namely, an “Apostle of Jesus 
Christ.”298 Yet the CMC demonstrates that Mani’s appropriation of Paul went beyond 
mere locutions; it frames his journeys throughout the Sasanian Empire as missions to the 
                                                          
296 Dominique Côté argued that Simon Magus is a conflate character, not a representation of a single 
person. See D. Côté, “La function littéraire de Simon le Magicien dans les Pseudo-Clémentines,” Laval 
Theologique et Philosophique 37 (2001): 513-23; Kelley, Knowledge and Religious Authority, 206-7; 
Annette Yoshiko Reed, “Jewish-Christianity” as Counter-history? The Apostolic Past in Eusebius’ 
Ecclesiastical History and the Pseud-Clementine Homilies,” in Antiquity in Antiquity: Jewish and Christian 
Pasts in the Greco-Roman World (eds. G. Gardner and K. Osterloh; TSAJ 123; Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 
2008), 173-216. 
297 F. S. Jones, “Marcionism in the Pseudo-Clementines,” in Pseudoclementina, 152-71.  
298 H.D. Betz, “Paul in the Mani Biography (Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis),” in Codex Manichaicus 
Coloniensis: Atti del Simposio Internazionale (Rende – Amantea 3-7 settembre 1984) (eds. L. Cirillo and 
A. Roselli; Cosenza: Marra Editore, 1986), 215-34.  
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“Gentiles,” in conscious imitation of Paul’s self-proclaimed status as the “Apostle to the 
Gentiles.” For example, Mani’s Divine Twin declares to Mani,  
You are not only sent out into this sect (εἰς τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δόγμα), but to every People 
(ἔθνος) and Teaching (διδασκαλίαν) and into every city (πᾶσαν πόλιν) and place (τόπον), 
the Hope will be made clear and declared through you in every region (πάντα κλίματα) 
and section of the cosmos (περιοχὰς τοῦ κόσμου) (CMC 104.12-22). 
This echoes Paul’s announcement in the book of Acts that he will no longer preach to the 
Jews on account of their unworthiness but to the Gentiles [εἰς τὰ ἔθνη] (Acts 13:46) as 
well as the claims made by Mani’s opponents that “He (Mani) wants to go to the Gentiles 
and eat Greek bread” (CMC 87.18-24).  Nevertheless, the creators of the CMC may even 
be trying to present Mani as superior to Paul, in so far as Mani is called not only to a 
certain ethnos, but to spread his teaching in each city, place, region, and section of the 
cosmos! 
The CMC and the Clementine complex also share a somewhat similar understanding 
of Paul as a “nullifier of laws,” differing only in their evaluation of this image. As Betz 
says, “In general, the Baptists are classified under νόμος just like Paul does with his 
opponents in Galatians.”299 As we have seen, the Epistle of Peter to James called Paul his 
“enemy” who spouted nonsense that Peter had declared the Jewish law null and void. The 
Homilies expanded this idea by saying that Paul could not have possibly known Jesus’ 
minds because he had only encountered “Jesus” as an apparition, and not in a face-to-face 
conversation. Thus, for the Clementines, Paul is an anti-Law, false prophet. In contrast, 
the CMC’s positive depiction of Mani as “overturning” the Law of the Baptists 
                                                          
299 Betz, “Paul,” 228.  
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appropriates and valorizes the image of Paul as a destroyer of false laws. The Baptists 
accuse Mani of “disturbing” their “Law” on multiple occasions, and just as Peter in the 
Letter calls Paul his “enemy” for his lawless preaching, the Baptists call Mani the 
“enemy of our Law” (CMC 87.16-18). Mani, for his part, accepts that he is “destroying 
their arguments and mysteries” but denies that he is destroying the “commandments of 
the Savior,” which is the true law that the Baptists had once followed.  
Finally, in contrast to the Homilies’ vigorous argument against the role of “visions” 
as a means of securing apostolic legitimacy, the CMC consistently relies on visions to 
legitimize Mani as an “Apostle of Jesus Christ,” again, in imitation of Paul. Indeed, Mani 
describes his youth as one punctuated by a series of visions. He says, “… and they [the 
angels] nourished me with visions and signs [δι’ ὀπτασιαν καὶ σημείων] which they made 
known to me, slight and quite brief, as far as I was able to bear... Now very many are the 
visions [Πλεῖσται... ὀπτασίαι] and exceedingly great are the sights [τὰ θεάματα] he 
showed me during that time of my youth” (CMC 3.8-12, 4.7-12). These visions 
culminated in the appearance of Mani’s “Divine Twin,” who revealed to him the deep 
secrets of the cosmos, its purpose, origins, and the “secrets and visions [τὰ ἀπόρρητα καὶ 
τὰ θεάματα] and the perfections of my Father” (CMC 23.1-2). In his Gospel, Mani writes, 
“These things which he revealed, I have shown to those who live from the truest vision, 
which I have beheld, and the most glorious revelation revealed to me” (CMC 67.24-68.5). 
As we saw in the previous chapter with the examples of the Kephalaias, the importance 
of visions in legitimizing the prophethood of Mani continued unabated into the Roman 
territories. Baraies’ homily too demonstrated the important role that revelatory visions 
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played in legitimizing the prophethood of Mani. It is no coincidence that he links Mani 
into a “chain of prophets” that frames Paul as Mani’s immediate predecessor. 
To sum up, early Manichaean texts present Mani as a Pauline figure and relies 
heavily on his visions to legitimize his status as prophet. The presence of Manichaeans in 
Syria can be securely attested within Mani’s lifetime, as evidenced by his letter to Edessa, 
where the Homilies may have been written. In contrast, the Homilies attacks a Pauline 
figure as a false prophet by undermining the reliability of visions as a means of acquiring 
revelatory information. Given the regional and temporal overlap with the spread of 
Manichaeism and the publication of the Homilies, as well as the specificity with which 
the Homilies attacks Paul as a visionary false prophet, I argue that the Homilies responds 
to Mani’s self-identification as a prophet in the image of Paul. The Homilies construct a 
counter-prophetology that appropriates late antique embryological discourses to articulate 
a robust revelatory system based on the oral-aural encounter.  
The Homilies and Counter-Prophetologies 
 
In this section, I turn to another key passage that fits within the larger pattern of late 
antique Syrian “prophetologies” – Hom. 3.20. Scholars of Manichaeism, early Islam, and 
“Gnosticism” are drawn to this passage’s striking description of a Prophet “impregnated 
by God” who “changes his form together with his names.”300 Nevertheless, they have 
                                                          
300 See, e.g., L. Cirillo, “From Elchasaite Christology to the Apostle of Light: Some Remarks about the 
Manichaean Doctrine of the Revelation” in Il Manicheismo: Nuove Prospettive Della Richerca (eds. A. van 
Tongerloo and L. Cirillo; Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 47-54, 50-52; P. Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early 
Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 279-
301; Crone, “Jewish Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part One),” JNES 74.2 (2015): 225-53, 237-43; Crone, 
“Jewish Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part Two),” JNES 75.1 (2016): 1-21, 14-16; Dylan M. Burns, 
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tended to read it in isolation from the rest of the corpus. Indeed, scholars often read this 
passage as preserving an early third-century Jewish-Christian prophetological core, rather 
than reading it within its early fourth century context.301 Not surprisingly, a strong 
impulse towards harmonization dominates this line of research. This harmonized “Jewish 
Christian” prophetology is a scholarly construct and ultimately fails to adequately engage 
with its particularities. Partially as a result of this harmonizing trend, scholars have 
neglected to engage this passage within the broader Homilies corpus and its fourth 
century Syrian context. In contrast, I argue that this passage presents less evidence for the 
essential harmony of Jewish Christian concepts of prophethood, but more for the 
emergence of “prophethood” as a contested subject of discourse. Indeed, when one reads 
Hom. 3.20 alongside the rest of the Homilies, this passage surgically rejects the 
“incarnational” model of prophetology found among Manichaeans and Elchasaites. It 
does so first by denying the possibility that a person born by normal human means could 
be a True Prophet, and second, by stating that the Spirit of Christ could only ever subsist 
within a single person, rather than in multiple individuals pace Manichaeism. 
Let us first turn to the passage itself. Here, Peter says,   
Allow me to return to the initial discourse of truth. If someone does not allow the man 
who had been impregnated through the hands of God to have the holy spirit of Christ, 
how would he not be guilty of the greatest impiety if he allows another one born from a 
stinking drop to have it? But he would act most piously should he say that he [Adam] 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Apocalypse of the Alien God: Platonism and the Exile of Sethian Gnosticism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 154-59.  
301 This trend is perhaps most visible from scholars working in the field of Manichaeism or early Islam. 
Given the paucity of relevant comparanda, the desire to harmonize materials is understandable. Like the 
category of “gnosticism,” which is a scholarly invention that only loosely matches unto individual 
“gnostic” texts,” “Jewish Christian prophetology” similarly refuses to “fit.”  
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alone has the holy spirit of Christ, who from the beginning of this eon, changing his 
forms together with his names, traversed the [present] eon until he reached his own times, 
and having been anointed by God for his toils, God showed him mercy so that he might 
enjoy eternal rest. It is his honor to rule over everything in the air, earth, and water. He 
received the breath of that one who had created man, that is, the indescribable garment of 
the soul, so that he might be immortal (Hom. 3.20). 
Πλὴν ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπάνειμι λόγον. ἐὰν τῷ ὑπὸ χειρῶν θεοῦ 
κυοφορηθέντι ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἅγιον Χριστοῦ μὴ δῷ τις ἔχειν πνεῦμα, πῶς ἑτέρῳ τινὶ ἐκ 
μυσαρᾶς σταγόνος γεγενημένῳ διδοὺς ἔχειν οὐ τὰ μέγιστα ἀσεβεῖ; τὰ δὲ μέγιστα εὐσεβεῖ, 
ἐὰν ἑτέρῳ μὲν μὴ δῷ ἔχειν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ μόνον ἔχειν λέγῃ ὃς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς αἰῶνος ἅμα τοῖς 
ὀνόμασιν μορφὰς ἀλλάσσων τὸν αἰῶνα τρέχει μέχρις ὅτε ἰδίων χρόνων τυχών, διὰ τοὺς 
καμάτους θεοῦ ἐλέει χρισθείς, εἰς ἀεὶ ἕξει τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν. οὗτος ἄρχειν τε καὶ κυριεύειν 
πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ γῇ καὶ ὕδασιν τετίμηται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πεποιηκότος 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὴν πνοὴν ἔσχεν, ψυχῆς ἄρρηκτον περιβολήν, ὅπως ἀθάνατος εἶναι 
δυνηθῇ. 
What does it mean the true Prophet is one “impregnated by the hands of God,” in contrast 
to one who was born from a “stinking drop” and how does this relate to his “changing 
forms?” The Homilies is quite clear that the one “impregnated by the hands of God” is 
none other than Adam, the first man.302 Therefore, according to this passage, Jesus is 
Adam, just in a different form and with a different name. In fact, the Homilies uses the 
phrase “one impregnated by the hands of God” and contrasts it with “another born from a 
stinking drop” a few chapters earlier, where Peter says, “Since God made all things, how 
would one not err greatly if they do not a man who had been impregnated by his [God’s] 
                                                          
302 E.g., Hom. 2.52 says, “For I am persuaded that Adam – the one who impregnated by the hands of 
God – was not a transgressor…” 
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hands to possess his great and holy spirit of foreknowledge, and yet attribute it to another 
born from a stinking drop” (Hom. 3.17)? There, he uses this locution to argue that Adam-
Jesus always had the spirit of God coursing within him and that this must be the case, 
since the alternative – that Adam-Jesus only sometimes had the Spirit of God – would 
make it impossible to know for certain whether he was the True Prophet or not. Taken 
together, these passages articulate a rather simple prophetological concept: Adam-Jesus is 
the one true Prophet, who was begotten through divine means and not through normal 
modes of reproduction, and who always possess the divine spirit of foreknowledge, the 
spirit of Christ. As Adam, the True Prophet traversed this eon and appeared to his 
disciples under the name of Jesus, and following his crucifixion, he was granted eternal 
rest. 
 This does not answer, however, what “changing forms and names” has to do with 
his status as True Prophet. Without due methodological caution, scholars have generally 
understood this phrase to refer to the idea that the Spirit of Christ “incarnated” into many 
different bodies, as found in the Book of Elchasai and in Manichaean writings. In contrast 
to such decontextualized readings of this passage, I argue that Peter’s rather cryptic 
utterance that the True Prophet changes “forms” hints at an idea he will explain only fully 
in the conclusion of the Homilies, namely, that the True Prophet’s ability to change forms 
means that he is truly and uniquely “begotten of God,” and thus, the Son of God. This 
reading of the passage fits securely within the third homily as a whole, which, as we saw, 
is pregnant with embryological terminologies.   
The Pseudo-Clementine Homilies discusses and employs “form” in many different 
ways. At times, it serves a narratological purpose. In the conclusion of the Homilies, for 
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example, Simon Magus magically exchanges the form of Clement’s father Faustus for his 
own. Though his family recoils in disgust, the representative of the True Prophet, Peter, 
uses this to his own advantage and sends Faustus/Simon to Antioch, where he delivers a 
speech denouncing everything that the real Simon Magus had done. At other times, the 
Homilies discusses the mutability of form as an indication of one’s status as an immortal 
being. In one instance, Peter discusses how demons “exploit the shape [τῇ μορφῇ 
ἀπεχρήσατο]” of the idols (Hom. 9.15), and thereby deceive gullible worshippers into 
thinking that these idols are truly gods. Likewise, angels are able to transform into 
precious jewels, stones, and the like, on account of their “more-divine substance” (Hom. 
8.12). God too is said to have the most beautiful “form,” replete with eyes, heart, hands, 
and other limbs, which he stamped upon the human body and soul (Hom. 17.7). If 
someone should sin, that divine spirit leaves the body, which ultimately leads to death 
and the dissipation of the divine form on the human body through decomposition (Hom. 
16.19). This parallelization of divine substance and the mutability of form proves crucial 
for our understanding of the Hom. 3.20, in so far as it already hints that the True Prophet 
is of “divine substance” himself and thus capable of “changing forms.”  
 We gain further insight into the nature of the True Prophet when we turn to the 
final chapter of the Homilies. In a series of densely argued passages, Peter gratifies his 
disciples by clearly expounding on the origins of the false prophetess, who is also the 
devil. He stresses that the body of the devil emerged under God’s command through a 
combination of the four primary elements, and in that sense, God is the creator of the 
devil. The devil’s evil disposition, however, arose as result of its particular somatic 
composition and arrangement of these four elements. Indeed, Peter states that the devil 
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could potentially become good if his composite elements were rearranged! Therefore, 
though God is the source of all substances, and the creator of all things, he was not the 
“cause” of evil itself.  
 Peter’s emphasis on the “external” creation of the devil through the arrangement 
of the four elements sets the stage for his explanation on how God “begets.” This 
conversation begins with a question by a certain Sophonias, who argues that humans 
“beget” children who are different in disposition from them because the human body is 
subject to alteration. God, Sophonias says, is not subject to the same sort of alterations as 
humans, therefore God cannot beget something that is different from him in substance 
and disposition. Sophonias thus implies that God could not have produced the devil, who 
is of a different substance and disposition. Peter accepts Sophonias’ description of human 
changeability, yet disagrees with his assessment of God’s mutability. He states,  
Therefore, since men do not have bodies that are “turnable,” they are not turned. Instead, 
they have a nature that allows alteration through time through the seasons. But this is not 
the case with God, for through his innate pneuma he becomes whatever body he likes, 
through a power that admits no explanation (Hom. 20.6).   
αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔχοντες τὰ σώματα τρεπτὰ οὐ τρέπονται, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ 
τῶν τροπῶν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι φύσιν ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ οὕτως· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἐμφύτου 
πνεύματος αὐτοῦ ἀπορρήτῳ δυνάμει ὁποῖον ἂν βούληται, γίνεται τὸ σῶμα. 
Peter prefers to use the verb “to turn” [τρέπονται] both here and throughout, to mark the 
change from one substance and form to another. He differentiates it from the verb “being 
changed [ἀλλοιοῦσθαι],” which carries an idea of being subject to change. The question 
that animates the following passages centers on the former idea of “turning” rather than 
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“changing.” Thus, Peter cites a number of passages from Scripture that describe instances 
of such God-induced “turning”: God turned Moses’ rod into a snake, the Nile into blood, 
the dust-made human into flesh, Moses into light. Thus, Peter argues, if God could turn 
the substance and form of such things into something else, then he must have the power 
to also “turn” himself! Strikingly, he attributes this power to the “innate pneuma,” which 
is none other than the same “spirit of foreknowledge” that the True Prophet always 
possesses.  
 Peter then focuses specifically on the case of divine beings, whom Sophonias 
implied are not subject to somatic alteration. Here, Peter distinguishes between mortal 
human beings – who must grow old and eventually die according to their nature – and 
immortal beings. As in the previous case, Peter cites passages from scripture that 
demonstrate that immortal beings have the power to change the substance of their bodies. 
Therefore, Peter argues, their bodies are capable of transmuting their essence and 
changing their form into other things. Again, Peter argues, if these angels are capable of 
transforming their own bodies, then how much more would God himself who gave that 
power, have that power! It is in this context that Peter discusses the nature of the True 
Prophet. He says,   
Therefore, how much more is the power of God capable of turning the substance of the 
body into whatever he wishes, whenever he wishes! And he sends forth, through a 
present “turn,” something of the same substance, though it is not equal in power. The one 
who sent forth is capable of being “turned” again into a different substance, but the one 
who is sent forth as a result of this turn is not capable of becoming something else, since 
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he is a child, without the consent of the one who sent forth, unless he desires it (Hom. 
20.7).   
ὅθεν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις ὅτε θέλει τοῦ σώματος τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ὃ θέλει 
μετατρέπει, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τῇ παρούσῃ τροπῇ προβάλλει, ἰσοδύναμον δὲ οὔ. ὅτι ὁ μὲν 
προβάλλων καὶ εἰς ἑτέραν πάλιν οὐσίαν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τραπέντος δύναται, ὁ δὲ προβληθεὶς 
τῆς ἐξ ἐκείνου τροπῆς τε καὶ τέκνον ὑπάρχων ἄνευ τοῦ προβαλόντος βουλῆς ἄλλο τι 
γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται, εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνος θέλει. 
Though the passage is a bit corrupt, the meaning is clear. The one who sends forth and 
the one who is sent forth, the begetter and the begotten, are united in substance but 
differing in power. The child, an obvious reference to Jesus (=the True Prophet), is 
unable to change his form and essence without his father’s consent. To be clear, the 
substance of the True Prophet allows for “turning,” since it is of the same substance. It is 
only because he is weaker and a child that he is unable to metamorphize at will. Finally, 
as if we were not absolutely clear on the identity of the True Prophet, Peter says,  
But the Good One having been begotten from the most beautiful turn of God, and not as 
one emerging accidentally through an external mixture, is truly His Son. Yet such things 
are unwritten, and since we believe them only by conjecture, let it not be trusted as 
absolutely certain (Hom. 20.8). 
ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ καλλίστης τροπῆς γεννηθεὶς καὶ οὐκ ἔξω κράσει 
συμβεβηκὼς τῷ ὄντι υἱός ἐστι. πλὴν ἐπεὶ ταῦτα ἄγραφα τυγχάνει καὶ στοχασμοῖς 
πεπιστωμένα, μὴ πάντως ἡ <ἀλήθεια> οὕτως ἔχειν βεβαιούσθω. 
This series of passages illustrates the True Prophet’s unique relationship to God as 
the “child” of God by drawing attention to the mutability of his body. As we saw, God 
“turns” his body through the mysterious power of his “innate pneuma,” and through “this 
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most beautiful turn,” he “begets” the True Prophet. Nevertheless, the Prophet’s unique 
status as a “child” renders him less powerful than God and subservient to God’s will. 
After all, though his body allows for “turning,” since it sourced directly from the divine 
essence, he cannot manipulate his body without the consent of parent.  
What does this ultimately mean for our reading of Hom. 3.20? Above all, the 
passage’s description of the True Prophet as “changing forms” hints at his true identity as 
the Son of God. This jives well with the initial contrast between the one “impregnated by 
the hands of God” and the one from a “stinking drop,” in so far as the former implies a 
divine form of generation, and the latter a human mode of reproduction. The 
embryological terminology also fits well within Hom. 3 as a whole as well. Furthermore, 
Hom. 3.20 concludes by stating that the True Prophet received the “ineffable garment of 
the soul, so that he might be immortal,” as if to preemptively answer how a “human” 
could traverse the entire era without becoming subject to mortal decay. These points 
converge to demonstrate that the True Prophet Adam-Jesus has always ever been a single 
being, truly begotten by God the Father.   
How does this point compare with Manichaean concepts of prophethood? Are they 
in essential agreement, as scholars are wont to argue? I have already discussed at length 
through the example of the Kephalaias some of the ways that Manichaeans in the Roman 
Near East articulated concepts of prophethood. We noted that there was no single 
understanding of prophethood, despite the fact that they tended towards systematization 
and elaboration, at least in the Kephalaias. Nevertheless, one of the more persistent 
models of prophethood was the idea that Mani himself was a living embodiment of the 
Spirit of the Paraclete, who is at once his Divine Twin and an emanation of Christ. 
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Perhaps the most poignant expression of this crucial tenet is found in CMC 24.6-15, 
where Mani recites,   
I believed that he belongs to me and is mine and is a good and excellent counselor. I 
recognized him and understood that I am that one from whom I was separated. I bore 
witness that I myself am that one who is unshakable.  
καὶ ἐκτησάμην ὡς ἴδιον κτῆμα· ἐπίστευσα δ᾿ αὐτὸν ἐμὸν ὑπάρχοντά τε καὶ ὄντα καὶ 
σύμβουλον ἀγαθὸν καὶ χρηστὸν ὄντα· ἐπέγνων μὲν αὐτὸν καὶ συνῆκα ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ 
εἰμι ἐξ οὗ διεκρίθην· ἐπεμαρτύρησα δὲ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνος αὐτός εἰμι ἀκλόνητος ὑπάρχων. 
In this poem, Mani recognizes that he himself is the Apostle of Light in incarnate 
form. He also recognizes that his Divine Twin is in fact a reflection of his pre-incarnate 
self, from whom he had separated when he entered into this cosmos, thus positing the 
ultimate unity of the Apostle and the Divine Twin. However, as a result of his incarnation 
into a fleshly body, Mani forgot his true identity as the Apostle of Light. This 
necessitated the descent of the Divine Twin, who not only reminded Mani about his true 
identity. Mani thus learns,   
Who I am, what my body is, in what way I have come, how my arrival into this world 
took place… how I was begotten into this fleshly body, by what woman I was delivered 
and born according to the flesh, and by whose passion I was engendered… came into 
being… what sort of commission and counsel has given to me before I was led astray in 
this detestable flesh, and before I clothed myself with its drunkenness and habits (CMC 
21.2-22.15).  
τίς εἰμι καὶ τοὐμὸν σῶμα καὶ ποίωι τρόπωι ἐλήλυθα καὶ ὡς γέγονεν ἡ ἄφιξίς μου εἰς 
τόνδε τὸν κόσμον... καὶ ὡς ἐγεννήθην εἰς τὸ σαρκῶδες τοῦτο σῶμα ἢ διὰ ποίαν μαιευθεὶς 
ἐλοχεύθην κατὰ τὴν σάρκα ταύτην καὶ ἀπὸ τίνος ἔρωτι κατεσπάρην... γεγένηται... ἢ 
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ποίωι τρόπωι διαστὰς αὐτοῦ ἀπεστάλην κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην καὶ ποίαν ἐντολήν τε καὶ 
ὑποθήκην δεδώρηταί μοι πρὶν ἐνδύσωμαι τὸ ὄργανον τόδε καὶ πρὶν πλανηθῶ ἐν τῆι σαρκὶ 
ταύτηι τῆι βδελυρώδει καὶ πρὶν ἐνδῦναί με τήν τε μέθην αὐτῆς καὶ τὸν τρόπον... 
This passage demonstrates that Mani was, indeed, born into a fleshly human body. The 
importance of this passage is substantiated by the running title of the CMC itself:  
“Concerning the creation of his body” [περὶ τῆς γέννης τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ]!303 As this 
passage makes clear, Mani’s incarnation occurred through the “natural” means of human 
reproduction, a process that seemed to have lingering amnesic effects. Given Mani’s 
“Elchasaite background,” it is not too surprising that Mani’s understanding of 
“incarnational prophethood” resonates strongly with select passages from the Book of 
Elchasai.304 For example, Hippolytus writes regarding the Elchasaites,  
[Alcibiades] asserts that Christ was born (γεγονέναι) a man in the same way common to 
all, and that he was not at this time born for the first time of a virgin but having been 
previously born and being reborn, he both appeared and is born (πεφηνέναι καὶ φύεσθαι), 
                                                          
303 L. Koenen, “Das Datum der Offenbarung und Geburt Manis” ZPE 8 (1971): 247-50; idem., “Augustine 
and Manichaeism in Light of the Cologne Mani Codex,” Illinois Classical Studies 3 (1978): 154-95, 164-
66. Koenen holds that the “body” can be understood on multiple levels, including the generation of Mani’s 
physical body, extending all the way to the “Manichaean Church” as referring to “his” body.  
304 Nevertheless, it must be stated that one cannot simply overlay the christological concepts found in the 
Book of Elchasai upon Manichaean or Pseudo-Clementine materials. First, the Book of Elchasai does not 
conceptualize the incarnations of the “Spirit of Christ” as prophets. One might be tempted to state that 
Elchasai himself understood himself as an incarnation of the Spirit of Christ, but if he had, it is striking that 
neither Epiphanius nor Hippolytus mention this point. Second, the fragments of the Book of Elchasai do not 
attest to a broader mechanism dictating when the “Spirit of Christ” incarnates into this world, as found in 
the first chapter of the Kephalaia of the Teacher, for example. Indeed, Hippolytus and Epiphanius seems to 
suggest precisely the opposite, namely, that these “Christs” entered our cosmos willy-nilly, “in many times 
and in many ways.” Lastly, there is no evidence that the “bodies” in which Christ entered were human 
bodies. In fact, as Hippolytus and Epiphanius notes below, sometimes Christ came as one “born from God” 
or as a “Spirit,” as evidenced by the vision Elchasai had of the gigantic Christ and his sister, the Holy 
Spirit. In fact, if we incorporate the passages on Elchasai from the CMC, then Christ himself entered the 
cosmos as water, earth, and plants, as well as in Mani. In this light, the “transmigration” of the spirit of 
Christ resonates less with Manichaean “prophetology” as much as it does with Manichaean concepts of 
transmigration of souls, as found in 1 Ke 249.31-251.25, for example. See L. Cirillo, “From Elchasaite 
Christology,” 47-54; Reeves, Heralds, 5-30.  
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undergoing alterations at birth (ἀλλάσσοντα γενέσεις) and moving from body to body 
(μετενσωματούμενον) (Refutation 9.14.1).  
Again,  
[The Elchasaites] do not confess that there is one Christ, but that there is one above who 
transmigrates many times into many bodies (αὐτὸν δὲ μεταγγιζόμενον ἐν σώμασι πολλοῖς 
πολλάκις) and now is in Jesus. Similarly, at one time he was born of God (ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ 
γεγενῆσθαι), at another time he became a spirit, at one time from a virgin, and at another 
time not. And afterwards, he continually transmigrates in bodies and is made known in 
many at various points in time (ἐν σώμασι μεταγγίζεσθαι καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς κατὰ καιροὺς 
δείκνυσθαι) (Refutation 10.29.1-3).    
Epiphanius, too, largely agree with Hippolytus’ assessment. He writes,  
For some of them [the Ebionites] say that Christ is Adam and the first one formed and 
breathed by the inspiration of God. Others among them say that he is from above and was 
created before all things, being a spirit and is above angels, and ruling over all, that he is 
called Christ, and that he was appointed to rule the age. But he comes here when he 
wishes, as he came in Adam and appeared to the patriarchs clothed with a body. He is the 
same one who went to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and who came at the end of the days 
and clothed himself with the body of Adam, appeared to humans, was crucified, rose, and 
ascended. Next, as they wish, they say: this is not true but the Spirit who is Christ came 
upon him and took the boy called Jesus. For great is the darkness among them since they 
suppose him to be sometimes this way and then again that way (ἄλλοτε ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως 
αὔτον ὑποτιθεμένοις) (Panarion 30.3.3-6).  
That these heresiologists independently agree on key doctrinal elements in the Book of 
Elchasai furnishes strong evidence that the Elchasaites did, indeed, hold unto an 
“incarnational” understanding of Christology in which the Spirit of Christ incarnated 
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himself into the world at various times in the world and in many different ways.305 
Structurally-speaking, at least, it aligns with Mani’s self-proclamation as the final 
incarnation of the Apostle of Light in a chain of prophets that included Jesus, Zoroaster, 
and Buddha. Like Mani, these too were incarnations of the Apostle of Light.  
 At first blush, the similarities between Manichaeism, Elchasaite prophetology, 
and the Homilies are impressive. All seem to agree that a “prophet” appears in the world 
as an “incarnation” of the Spirit of Christ. Nevertheless, I argue that the Homilies rejects 
Elchasaite/Manichaean system of incarnation, and it does so with a precision that can 
hardly be coincidental. The Homilies’ rejection of Elchasaite/Manichaean prophetology 
results from its overwhelming interest in making truth particular to the somatic 
constitution of Adam-Jesus. As we had seen above in his comparison between “one 
impregnated by the hands of Christ” and one “born from a stinking drop,” Peter precludes 
the possibility that those born through sexual reproduction can be “True Prophets.” In 
order for a True Prophet to be the constant source of revelatory knowledge, his corporeal 
constitution cannot be tainted by the blood and seminal fluids of the false prophetess. 
Therefore, a True Prophet requires a divine mode of coming-into-being. Peter’s rhetoric 
works precisely by denying that the True Prophet can become a human “in a manner 
common to all,” to quote Hippolytus. This therefore refutes Mani’s claim to prophethood, 
since Mani incarnated into this world through sexual “passion” into a “fleshy body.” 
Likewise, Peter had also argued that the spirit of foreknowledge always flows within the 
body of the True Prophet. After all, if the “Spirit of Christ” ever abandoned the True 
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Alcibiades that we cannot possibly assume that he is dependent on the Refutation” (Book of Elchasai, 174).   
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Prophet, then one could never truly know the identity of the True Prophet. As before, the 
Homilies’ claim that the Spirit of Christ never leaves the True Prophet contests Elchasaite 
/ Manichaean claims that the Spirit of Christ leaves a particular person and become 
manifest in another. Indeed, Hom. 3.20 concludes by saying that Jesus received the 
“indescribable garment of the soul, so that he might be immortal,” as if to preemptively 
answer how a person could persist within a long span of time without becoming to mortal 
decay. Therefore, this passage refutes, or at the very least displaces, the idea of multiple 
incarnations of a preexistent Prophet figure as found in multiple Manichaean texts and 
the Book of Elchasai.  
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I argued that the conception of prophethood and prophecy found in the 
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies counters Manichaean systems of prophethood. The 
Homilies relied on contemporary embryological concepts to argue that auditory contact 
with the true Prophet are the only legitimate means of salvation. Yet the Homilies does 
not direct its attack against Mani or Elchasai alone, but all forms of worship dependent 
upon visions and apparitions of beings. This broad attack against theoretical forms of 
knowledge, intriguingly, also resonates with contemporary developments among Syrian 
Neoplatonists like Iamblichus, who was also theorizing anew the relationship between the 
human and the divine. Indeed, as I argue in the following chapter, despite their 
differences, Syrians like the creators of the Homilies, Iamblichus, and Manichaeans were 
all theorizing revelatory knowledge along similar lines.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PROGNOSTIC TURN: SYRIAN THEORIZATIONS OF 
PROPHECY 
At the same time that Syrian Manichaeans and “Jewish Christians” were theorizing 
concepts of prophethood (chapters 1-3), they also grappled with the concept of prophecy 
itself. This comes as little surprise, as Syria had long been marked by a peculiar density 
of peoples experimenting with conceptualizations of how the gods know what they know 
and how humans might access that divine knowledge. The second century creators of the 
Chaldean Oracles, for example, devised theurgic practices of ascent with the goal of 
uniting themselves with the gods.306 Others like Numenius of Apamea, who is most 
famous for his quip that Plato was nothing more than an “atticizing” Moses, dipped into 
the same set of literature and practices as the Chaldean Oracles,307 ultimately concluding 
that revelation and reason were identical paths to truth.308 At the same time, Hermetic 
literature traveled out of Egypt through Syria and into Persia, where interest in Hermes as 
a prophet would blossom.309 Still others like the creators of the Odes of Solomon wove 
narratives of “mystical” ascent into their communal liturgy.310 Yet perhaps no other 
                                                          
306 R. Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989); For 
background, see J.F. Finamore and S.I. Johnston, “The Chaldean Oracles” in The Cambridge History of 
Philosophy in Late Antiquity, vol. 1 (ed. L.P. Gerson; Cambridge University Press, 2000; Published online, 
2011), 161-73.  
307 Majercik, Chaldean Oracles, 3 f. 11. Majercik writes, “The parallels here, in certain instances, are so 
similar that some form of direct dependency is surely involved.” R. Petty,  Fragments of Numenius of 
Apamea: Translation and Commentary (Westbury, Wiltshire: Prometheus Trust, 2012). 
308 For background, see M. Edwards, “Numenius of Apamea” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy in 
Late Antiquity, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press), 115-25. 
309 K.T. van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes: From Pagan Sage to Prophet of Science (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 1-63; B.P. Copenhaver, Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin 
Asclepius in a new English translation, with notes and introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
310 For example, see Ode 38; M.A. Novak, “The Odes of Solomon as Apocalyptic Literature,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 66 (2012): 527-50; J.H. Charlesworth, The Odes of Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973).  
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group of Syrians thought about prophecy with the same intensity as those whom scholars 
now call “Neoplatonists.” Indeed, both Iamblichus (Aramaic: Yamlikhu) and Porphyry 
(Aramaic: Malkhos), the two most important students of Plotinus, hailed from the Syrian 
borderlands: Iamblichus from Chalcis and Porphyry from Tyre. Porphyry himself was 
known for his keen interest in oracular literature, which is evident not only in his reverent 
attitude towards the Chaldean Oracles and in his book Philosophy from the Oracles, but 
also his critical attitude to the “Biblical” book of Daniel.311 Yet it is the charged exchange 
between Porphyry and Iamblichus, preserved in a text now known as the Mysteries of the 
Egyptians (De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum),312 that best highlights the intensity with which 
Syrians debated the contours and content of divine knowledge and how humans might 
access it.  
At least from the Iamblichus’ perspective, his debate with Porphyry revolved 
around differing notions of prognosis (ἡ πρόγνωσις) and the proper mode of accessing 
this prognosis. In the course of his argument, Iamblichus ends up distinguishing true 
prognosis from both human modes of discursive reasoning and from earthly attempts at 
divination, calling it nothing more than educated guesswork.313 In so doing, he creates a 
separate category of knowledge: divine prognosis, which is completely set apart from 
                                                          
311 See A. Smith, Porphyrius: Fragmenta (Leipzig: Teubner, 1993), 351-407. For a somewhat problematic 
yet helpful understanding of Porphyry’s thoughts on ethnicity and its relationship to philosophy, see A. 
Johnson, Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: The Limits of Hellenism in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
312 See E.C. Clarke, J.M. Dillon, J.P. Hershbell (trans.), Iamblichus: De Mysteriis (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2003). They rely on the text prepared by Des Places. I have generally relied on their 
translation, though altered it where I see fit.  
313 See especially, P.T. Struck, Divination and Human Nature: A Cognitive History of Intuition in Classical 
Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 215-50. 
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human modes of knowing.314 Yet, as I argue in this chapter, Iamblichus’ recasting of 
prognosis as this revelatory form of divine prognosis coheres with broader theorizations 
of prognosis among his Syrian neighbors, especially the “Jewish Christians” responsible 
for the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies and the Manichaeans. Indeed, when these texts are 
viewed through the prism of Iamblichus’ innovative recasting of prognosis, we can 
situate the emergence of divine prognosis as a distinctly late antique Syrian phenomenon. 
At the same time, we gain an alternative vantage point to view those proximate 
communities – especially the Syriac-speaking Christians and the rabbis – who polemicize 
against human attempts at grasping the divine. My argument here focuses on the Greek 
word prognosis and its Coptic cognate (ⲛⲟⲩⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ), reading it as emblematic of 
deeper epistemic shifts centered on prophecy in the late antique Syrian world.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I trace the shifting 
contours of prognosis in Galen’s On Prognosis, Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius, and 
Origen’s Contra Celsum. I show how prognosis in these texts preempt the recasting of 
medical and divinatory prognosis as divine prognosis at the hands of Iamblichus, the 
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, and to a lesser extent, the Manichaeans. In the second 
section, I turn to focus on the literature of the early Syriac-speaking Christians and the 
rabbis. In contrast to Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans, all of who 
conceived of revelatory knowledge along a vertical axis linking humans to the God(s), 
these two groups studied the divine horizontally through God(s)’ creations – be they the 
two Torot, the two Testaments, or Nature. At the same time, they accused the Greek 
philosophers of attempting to go beyond the appropriate limits of human ken, and 
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dismissed it as either incapable of achieving accurate knowledge of God’s will or 
impugning on God’s honor by encroaching on his particular domain.  
In the final section, I turn to Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans. Like 
the rabbis and the Syriac-speaking Christians, they argued that Greek philosophy was 
incapable of grasping divine knowledge. In contrast to the rabbis and Christians, 
however, these Syrians entertained the possibility that direct revelatory knowledge was 
not only possible, but the only source of truth. They began to conceptualize prognosis 
along three converging points: 1) Prognosis as panoptic knowledge, total knowledge of 
all things at all times; 2) Prognosis as the particular domain of the divine and thus utterly 
distinct from human modes of discursive reasoning, especially philosophy, and human 
attempts at prognosis, especially medicine and divination; 3) Prognosis as a nexus point 
between divine ontology and divine epistemology. Putting these three points together, 
one can only possess divine prognosis if one is ontologically linked with the divine and 
such prognosis cannot be produced through human means, but only possessed through 
divine agency. Of course, Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans articulated 
prognosis in their own ways and through the constraints of their own set of texts, 
traditions, and practices. Nevertheless, I argue that these late antique Syrians began to 
understand prognosis along a converging horizon, away from earlier usages of the term in 
the medical and mantic realms and fashioning it instead as total revelatory knowledge – a 
divine mode of knowing.  
 
Medical and Mantic Prognosis: From Mere Prognosis to Divine Prognosis 
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In this section, I trace the broadening meaning of prognosis as it shifted from a word 
meaning “incremental insight” to include an expansive sense of “revelatory vision.315 
This broadening understanding of prognosis can be sharpened by comparing it to medical 
or divinatory conceptions of prognosis as “incremental knowledge.”316 That is, whereas 
the Greeks had hitherto understood prognosis as “incremental knowledge of a discrete 
event in the future,” e.g., a quickened pulse indicates the onset of an illness or erratic bird 
flight patterns signal bad luck in the future, it began to also mean panoptic knowledge – 
total knowledge of all things at all times – among some late antique Syrians. In this 
section, I look at three texts from the second and third century to help contextualize the 
shifting contours of prognosis: Galen’s On Prognosis, Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius, 
and Origen’s Contra Celsum. I do not pretend to provide an exhaustive account for this 
shift, but only to highlight examples representative of this shift.317  
Galen’s oeuvre furnishes evidence that the word prognosis was already tinged 
with divinatory overtones by the second century.318 At times, Galen fought against these 
associations, especially when they detracted from what he considered to be appropriate 
praise of his superior medical skills. Charges of divination and sorcery plagued Galen 
throughout his career.319 Indeed, upon curing Eudemus the Peripatetic philosopher, 
                                                          
315 Struck, Divination and Human Nature, 219. 
316 I am not claiming that this was evolutionary process in which all usages of prognosis adopted this 
broader revelatory definition; a quick search in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae will demonstrate that this 
was not the case. I am arguing, however, that the fact that those who defined prognosis as divine panopic 
knowledge came from late antique Syria tells us something important about Syria as a unique place for 
experimenting with concepts of prophecy. 
317 See especially Struck, Divination, 219-45. 
318 For Greek and English translation, see V. Nutton (ed. and trans.), Galen: On Prognosis (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1979). All references and page numbers to On Prognosis will follow this edition.  
319 There were many in Rome who called Galen a diviner. Galen writes, “As soon as I touched the boy’s 
artery at the wrist, I said that he was not feverish and that this was going to be a source of great amusement 
for those who called me a diviner [μάντιν]” (On Prognosis 7.6, pg. 107). Others called him “wizard and 
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Galen’s enemies accused him of speaking through the power of divination [ἐκ μαντικῆς] 
rather than from the medical arts (On Prognosis 3.7, p. 85). Though Galen expresses 
annoyance at being compared to a diviner when it detracts from his skill as a medical 
professional, he does not shy away from seizing upon such associations when they 
enhance his reputation among the Roman elite. Indeed, Eudemus, a grateful philosopher 
cured by Galen, compared him to the Pythian oracle who prophesies [θεσπίζειν] to those 
who are sick (On Prognosis, 3.17, p. 89). Elsewhere, in an incident featuring a certain 
young man named Cyrillus, Galen correctly deduces the problem through the “prophecies 
of a diviner” [τὸ τοῦ μάντεως θέσπισμα], for which he is explicitly called a diviner [ὁ 
μάντις] (On Prognosis 7.10, p.109). Galen himself ironically attributes this skill to the 
power of divination [τὴν μαντικὴν], and though he repeatedly demonstrates that 
philosophy, not divination, lay at the core of his medical method, he nonetheless states 
that these arts are worthy of Apollo and Asclepius, tying together the gods of both 
divination and medicine.320 In any case, it is clear that Galen’s particular conception of 
prognosis is limited to knowledge of a single event in the future. His training as a 
physician allows him to interpret through philosophy the irregularities of the human body 
in order to render an accurate diagnosis of the illness and furnish a fitting prognosis of its 
future effects.  
Evidence of a shift from mantic and medical conceptions of prognosis to panoptic 
knowledge can be found in Philostratus’ (3rd century) narratives of the wandering 
                                                                                                                                                                             
diviner and other such names [γόητά τε καὶ μάντιν ἕτερά τε κατ᾿ ἐμοῦ τοιαῦτα]” (On Prognosis 10.15, pg. 
125). 
320 On Prognosis 10.16, p. 125. 
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thaumaturge Apollonius of Tyana.321 Philostratus goes much further than Galen by 
claiming that the person who divines becomes divine himself, thereby associating the 
possession of prognosis with the divine. He writes,  
 
A discussion concerning prognosis (Περὶ δὲ προγνώσεως λόγου) once arose among them, because 
Apollonius was both dedicated to this wisdom (προσκειμένου τῇ σοφίᾳ ταύτῃ) and turned the 
majority of their discussions to this topic. Praising him [Apollonius], he [Iarchas] said, “Those 
delighting in divination (οἱ μαντικῇ… χαίροντες), my good Apollonius, both become divine by it 
and work towards the salvation of humankind (θεῖοί τε ὑπ᾿ αὐτῆς γίγνονται καὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν 
ἀνθρώπων πράττουσι). For there is that, which requires going to the [temple] of the God to make a 
discovery. On the other hand, my good man, these things – to foresee by oneself and to foretell to 
others those things which they do not yet know (ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ προιδέσθαι, προειπεῖν τε ἑτέροις ἃ 
μήπω ἴσασι) – I consider to belong to a thoroughly blessed person, equaling himself to the Delphic 
Apollo. Since the art commands those resorting to the temple of the God for an oracular response 
to enter walking in purified, or they will be told, “Leave the temple,” it thus seems to me that even 
the man who will prognosticate (τὸν προγνωσόμενον) be pure himself and neither have a single 
stain assault his soul nor the scars of sin be imprinted in his thought. And this man will interpret 
his own prophecies (προφητεύειν) purely, hearing himself and the tripod within his breast. He will 
thus pronounce his oracles more clearly and truthfully. Wherefore, it is unnecessary that you be 
amazed even if you comprehend this skill so well, as you have so much ether in your soul (VA 
3.42). 
 
As we will also see in the case of Iamblichus, prognosis not only renders someone divine 
but it also confers innumerable benefits to humankind. Curiously, Philostratus 
                                                          
321 For Greek and English translation, see C.P. Jones (trans.), The Life of Apollonius of Tyana (3 vol.; 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).  
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distinguishes between localized sources of prognosis – like the Delphic Oracle – and the 
man who possesses the unblemished interiority necessary for a superior form of 
prognosis. As Roshan Abraham notes, this passage assumes that the foreknower is 
superior to Greek oracles, which are fixed in certain locations.322 The foreknower, after 
all, needs no other person to interpret his prophecies, but interprets them “more clearly 
and truthfully,” presumably in comparison to fixed local oracles.   
As a conduit to the gods, Apollonius transmits various arts and skills that humans 
would never have discovered on their own. Not surprisingly, given the associations 
between prognosis and medicine, Apollonius singles out the art of medicine as a prime 
example of the benefits of prognosis. He writes, 
  
He said that it [divination] provides men many good things, but the greatest is the gift of medicine. 
The wise sons of Asclepius would never have attained their knowledge of this unless Asclepius 
had been born the son of Apollo, and by following his father’s sayings and prophecies had 
inferred [κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνου φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας ξυνθεὶς] the remedies appropriate to each 
disease… Without the wisdom of prognosis I do not think mankind would ever have ventured to 
compound the most deadly of drugs with the healing ones (VA 3.44). 
 
As we had seen with Galen, divination and medicine are strongly associated with one 
another. Here, however, medicine itself derives from the gods. This points to the 
expanding reach of prognosis – it is not simply the art of properly foreseeing the future 
state of an ill patient, but the source of the art itself. Even so, we are not quite at the 
                                                          
322 R. Abraham, “Magic and Religious Authority in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius of Tyana.” Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2009.  
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understanding of “panoptic knowledge” that we have with Iamblichus, the Homilies, and 
the Manichaeans. After all, there is still an element of human reasoning involved in 
Asclepius’ interpretation of Apollo’s utterances and prophecies; Asclepius does not 
“download” the medical arts directly from Apollo nor does he “upload” himself through a 
mode of ascent to Apollo, but he infers [ξυνθεὶς] these solutions, presumably through 
human forms of discursive reasoning, in order to devise the appropriate medicines.  
In fact, the closest we approach Iamblichus and company’s conceptions of 
prognosis comes from the Christian Origen’s work, Contra Celsus.323 This may be no 
accident, in so far as Origen was taught by Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus, 
and thus related to Iamblichus and Porphyry along a common intellectual pedigree.324 As 
Struck notes, “In the case of the Christians and Iamblichus, while the theos is different, 
the theological structure is similar.”325 Similar to the Homilies, Origen characterizes Jesus 
as possessing absolute prognosis and thus foreknowing all the events of his life. This line 
of thinking leads him to conclude that prognosis of an event cannot alter the event itself, 
since then it would no longer be prognosis (Contr. Cel. 2.20). More specifically, Origen 
argues that the cause of prognosis and the cause of the predicted event differ.326 Origen 
further contrasts this mode of grasping at future events with that of the diviners, a 
rhetorical strategy that we will see again in Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, the Homilies, and 
                                                          
323 R.J. Hauck, The More Divine Proof: Prophecy and Inspiration in Celsus and Origen (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1989), 103-35. 
324 For the most recent iteration of the claim that Ammonius taught both the “Christian” Origen and 
Porphyry, rather than a “pagan” Origen and Porphyry, see H. Marx-Wolf, Spiritual Taxonomies and Ritual 
Authority: Platonists, Priests, and Gnostics in the Third Century C.E. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 22-23. 
325 Struck, Divination, 244.  
326 This is in contrast to Iamblichus’ theory of prognosis, in so far as, for Iamblichus, prognosis cannot be 
dislodged from its perfect unity with its “cause” in the intelligible realm. In other words, Origen and 
Iamblichus seem to operate on different understandings of “causality” itself.  
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with the Manichaeans. These diviners, Origen says, sometimes gain a semblance of 
prognosis by interpreting the behaviors of daemonically-possessed animals (Contr. Cel. 
4.92). At the same time, Origen mocks Celsus’ belief in divination, arguing that if birds 
possess prognosis, then they knew more about divinity than even Plato (Contr. Cel. 4.90). 
Origen ultimately grants that God is the source of prognosis and that the Hebrew 
prophets possessed pure souls that drew them closer to God, rendering them superior 
conduits for prognosis (Contr. Cel. 5.42; 7.4). He contrasts this with the example of the 
Pythian Oracle (Contr. Cel. 7.3), who is possessed by evil demons that enter her body 
through her orifices.  
 These three examples demonstrate something of the shifting contours of 
prognosis in the first few centuries of the Common Era. They help us appreciate the 
radical shift in understanding of prognosis at the hands of some late antique Syrian 
intellectuals. Nevertheless, this diachronic outline needs to be supplemented by a 
synchronic analysis of other Syrian communities. As I demonstrate below, both rabbinic 
Jews and Syriac-speaking Christians in late antique Syria shared a deep skepticism in the 
human ability to penetrate the divine mind. Instead, they devoted their intellectual powers 
not to the study of God himself but God as mediated through his creation(s). Intriguingly, 
these two communities came to police the boundaries of proper inquiry into the divine by 
framing the study of God’s signs and mysteries as superior alternatives to Greek 
philosophy. As we will see, even “pagans” like Iamblichus and the “Jewish Christian” 
creators of the Homilies agreed in the futility of Greek philosophy to attain to divine 
truth; unlike the Christians and rabbis, however, they found a way forward.  
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Syrian Critiques of Greek Philosophy: Bardaisan, the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion, and 
Ephrem’s “Poison of the Greeks”  
 
In the section above, I traced the contours of prognosis as it shifted from a word 
signifying incremental knowledge of a future event to a word that approached divine 
panoptic knowledge. This shift will make a decisive turn among the Neoplatonists, the 
Homilies, and the Manichaeans. It is therefore striking that other proximate and 
contemporaneous communities – especially the Syriac Christians327 and the Amoraic-era 
rabbis – begin to resist claims that one could know God in some essential sense through 
Greek philosophy. Unlike Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans, all of who 
developed ways of conceptualizing and accessing divine prognosis, the Christians and 
rabbis eschewed such attempts, framing it instead as encroaching on God’s particular 
territory. On the one hand, these Christians and rabbis might simply gesture towards the 
paths-not-taken by Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans. On the other hand, 
the fact that they do so at this time and in this place may not be coincidental; indeed, with 
the spread of Iamblichean forms of “Neoplatonism” throughout late antique Syria, 
Syriac-speaking Christians and rabbis may have begun seeing “philosophy”328 as 
encroaching not only on God’s secrets, but more importantly, challenging their own 
pedagogical practices and modes of understanding God through their respective divinely-
sanctioned objects of study.   
                                                          
327 I do not assume that there was a monolithic “Syriac” Christian Church and merely use this term as a 
shorthand for those variegated communities that produced texts that were written in Syriac from the first to 
the fourth century.  
328 It is important to note here that what counts as “Greek philosophy” differed from the perspective of each 
community. For example, whereas Iamblichus explicitly eschews Greek philosophy in favor of 
Chaldean/Egyptian wisdom in his construction of theurgy, the rabbis would (probably) not have seen him 
as a “Chaldean” or an “Egyptian” but as a Greek “philosopher.”  
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In this section, I will focus on the Syriac Christians, specifically Bardaisan’s Laws 
of the Various Countries (3rd century),329 the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion (3rd 
century?),330 the Odes of Solomon (2nd century?),331  and Ephrem the Syrian (4th Century). 
I argue that while the Christians prior to the fourth century had a generally dismissive 
attitude towards Greek philosophy, it is only with Ephrem – a late contemporary of 
Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans – that we get our first explicit critique of 
Greek philosophy as encroaching on God’s secrets and territory. True, Ephrem 
specifically targets “Arian” claims that the Son was subordinate to the Father. Yet the 
fact that he frames their arguments as philosophical hubris and as utterly incapable of 
“grasping” God coheres well within the broader Syrian intellectual landscape.332 In this 
sense, we can begin to position Ephrem not only as part and parcel of the intellectual 
currents within the Church, but more broadly in Syria itself.  
We possess none of Bardaisan’s (2nd century, Edessa) actual writings. 
Nevertheless, the book Laws of the Various Countries, which features Bardaisan as a 
                                                          
329 For an outdated yet still insightful overview of Bardaisan’s philosophy, see: H.R.J. Drijvers, Bardaiṣan 
of Edessa (Groningen: Van Gorcum, 1966). An analysis of the Law of the Various Countries as a dialogue 
and as a work of literature still awaits study.  
330 For the Syriac text, see: W. Cureton (ed. and trans.), Spicilegium Syriacum: Containing Remains of 
Bardesanes, Meliton, Ambrose, and Mara bar Sarapion (London: Rivingtons, 1855). A new translation has 
apparently been published, but I have not been able to access this text. See: A. Merz and D. Rensberger (ed. 
and trans.), Mara bar Sarapion – Letter to his Son (SAPERE Series; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). For 
recent scholarship on this text, see: A. Merz and T. Tieleman (eds.), The Letter of Mara bar Sarapion in 
Context: Proceedings of the Symposium held at Utrecht University, 10-12 December 2009 (Leiden: Brill, 
2012). 
331 Much of scholarship on the Odes is devoted form-criticsm. For exceptions, see: J. Charlesworth, Critical 
reflections on the Odes of Solomon: Vol. 1: Literary Setting, Textual Studies, Gnosticism, the Dead Sea 
Scrolls and the Gospel of John (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 14-26; M. Lattke, 
Odes of Solomon: A Commentary (Fortress Press, 2009). 
332 S. Griffith, “Setting Right the Church of Syria: Saint Ephraem’s Hymns Against Heresies” in The Limits 
of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of RA Markus (eds. W.E. 
Klingshirn and M. Vessey; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 97-114; idem., “The Marks of 
the ‘True Church’ According to Ephraem’s Hymns Against Heresies,” in After Bardaisan: Studies on 
Continuity and Change in Syriac Christianity in Honour of Professor Han J.W. Drijvers (ed. G.J. Reinink 
and A.C. Klugkist; Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 125-40.  
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Socrates-like philosopher, probably reflects his philosophy. As a whole, this book argues 
that human beings possess free-will [ܚܐܪܘܬܐ] as a gift from God through which they are 
able to do either good or evil. The astral powers like the planets and stars might influence 
some factors of one’s life, whether one is born tall or short, for example, but they do not 
detract from humankind’s potential to act as a free moral agent. As proof, Bardaisan 
concludes by demonstrating that the varieties of human namose (Greek: nomos) furnish 
evidence that stars and planets do not totally overwhelm human agency. After all, if such 
powers did have complete control over humankind, then one would expect all human 
laws to be uniform in each section of the cosmos. 
More instrumental for our purposes, however, is the short introduction between 
Avida, presumably a “pagan,” and Bardaisan. Avida declares that he is not able to 
become a Christian unless he is first persuaded to become one [  ܐܢܐ ܡܫܟܚ ܐܠ ܘܐܢܐ
ܐܬܛܦܝܣܬ ܐܢ ܐܐܠ ܠܡܗܝܡܢܘ ]. Bardaisan responds by saying that because Avida and 
“many others” are not willing to believe, they are utterly destitute of “Knowledge of 
Truth” [ ܕܫܪܪܐ ܝܕܥܬܐ ]. As a result, they are “always tearing down and building up” their 
arguments [ ܘܒܢܝܢ ܣܬܪܝܢ ܒܟܠܙܒܢ ] and lack the firm foundation of faith upon which they 
might build the edifice of truth [ ܥܠܝܗ ܢܒܢܘܢ ܠܗܘܢ ܐܝܬ ܕܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܐܣܬܐ ܫܬ ܓܪ ܐܠ ]. 
Bardaisan’s language of “building and tearing down” echoes widespread critiques against 
Greek philosophy as particularly deficient as a path to knowledge of the divine. Tatian, 
for example a contemporary of Bardaisan and a fellow Syrian, caricaturizes Greek 
philosophers as those who “express views that contradict one another, and each says 
whatever comes into his head. And there are many causes of friction between them, for 
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each one hates his fellow and they hold different views, each taking up an exaggerated 
position out of self-importance.”333  
Of course, at the same time that Bardaisan and Tatian argue against the Greeks, 
they themselves perform “Greek-ness.” In fact, the Laws is written in the form of a 
Socratic dialogue and Bardaisan employs terminology lifted from Greek. Ephrem would 
later mock him as the “Aramean philosopher.”334 Adler too reminds us that Bardaisan 
makes better sense alongside other Greeks like Lucian, and we might add, Tatian, than 
alongside Christian martyrs and saints.335 Tatian, too, acknowledges the superiority of his 
“barbarian” philosophy by demonstrating his mastery of Greek knowledge. Yet, as Laura 
Nasrallah puts it, “We have also seen that Justin, Tatian, and Lucian teach us about one 
use of the sign ‘barbarian’ under this Roman Empire: the person who has mastered 
Greekness and yet is ambivalent about that mastery.”336 The same might be said 
regarding Bardaisan, even if he did not speak or write in Greek. In fact, as Nathanael 
Andrade has demonstrated, Syrians were continually reformulating native Greek and 
Syrian idioms in ways that aligned with and resisted Roman power.337 
In contrast to Bardaisan and Tatian, the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion is quite 
positive about Greek philosophy. To be sure, scholars are not quite sure what to make of 
                                                          
333 Translation based on M. Whittaker, Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982), 8-9. See especially, L. Nasrallah, “Mapping the World: Justin, Tatian, Lucian, and the Second 
Sophistic,” Harvard Theological Review 98.3 (2005): 315-34. 
334 C.W. Mitchell, St. Ephraim’s Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan: Transcribed from the 
Palmpsest B.M. Add 14623, vol. 2 (Reprint; Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2008; orig. Williams and Norgate: 
Oxford, 1912), 8-9. 
335 W. Adler, “The Kingdom of Edessa and the Creation of a Christian Aristocracy” in Jews, Christians, 
and the Roman Empire: The Poetics of Power in Late Antiquity (eds. N. Dohrmann and A.Y. Reed; 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 43-62.  
336 Nasrallah, “Mapping the World,” 314. 
337 N. Andrade, Syrian Identity in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 314-39. 
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this text and date it anywhere from the first to the third century.338 The Letter adopts the 
perspective of a Samosatene father urging his son to continue in his studies and to live a 
wise life. By wisdom, the father refers to the “teachings of Greekness (yewanayuta)” [  ܡܢ
ܐܢܝܢ ܐܫܟܚܬ ܕܝܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܝܘܠܦܢܐ ]. The –uta of yewanay-uta signifies an abstraction of 
“Greek-ness” in a way that encapsulates the transformative cultural cache of Greek 
paideia. In the father’s estimation, paideia transcends mere cultural capital and offers 
consolation for the toils of life. As he tells his son, “those who engage themselves with 
philosophy (filasafuta) [ ܡܬܥܢܝܢ ܕܒܦܝܠܣܦܘܬܐ ܐܝܠܝܢ ] seek to escape the troubles of the 
world.” He describes Philosophy positively as a pursuit of “wisdom” [ܚܟܝܡܘܬܐ] and 
“truth” [ܫܪܪܐ]. At the same time, by marking “Greekness” as a discrete cultural 
abstraction, the writer also marks his and his son’s “native” distance from “Greekness.” 
Greekness is a thing that one learns to be, not something they already are. One cannot 
help but be reminded of Lucian of Samosata. In any case, this letter’s characteristic mish-
mash of Greek philosophy highlights the complicated ways that “philosophy” persisted as 
a form of ethnically-coded Greek knowledge within the Syrian world. Furthermore, if the 
Letter was indeed written by a “Christian,” its praise of Greek knowledge prove to be a 
valuable counterpoint to Ephrem’s explicitly anti-Greek approach to God. 
Ephrem the Syrian (4th century) was the preeminent champion of Nicene 
Christianity in the Syrian borderlands. Long thought to be representative of a sort of 
“Semitic” Christianity uncontaminated by “Hellenism,” recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that he was integrated within the larger intellectual currents within the 
                                                          
338 A. Merz and T. Tieleman, Letter of Mara bar Sarapion, 1-9. I find Chin’s arguments for a later dating 
for the Letter more convincing in C.M. Chin, “Rhetorical Practice in the Chreia Elaboration of Mara bar 
Serapion,” Hugoye 9.2 (2006):145-71. 
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Church in the late antique Roman Empire.339 Yet it would be a bit odd to consider 
Ephrem only in the context of a Syriac Church, especially if, as Griffith notes, “more and 
more studies of his writings reveal his awareness of the intellectual developments in the 
Greek-speaking parts of the empire.”340 In fact, Ephrem’s distaste for Greek forms of 
logic-chopping resonates strongly with Iamblichus and the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies 
disavowal of “Greek” logic as a way of accessing divine knowledge. As Griffith states, 
Ephrem sought to “cultivate among the faithful a profound distaste for dialectics in 
religion, or indeed for any sort of philosophical inquiry governed by academic logic 
rather than by a fundamental faith in the Scriptures.”341 In his Hymns of Faith, Ephrem 
writes, “Blessed is the one who has not tasted the poison of the wisdom of the Greeks! 
 thus polemicizing against the “Arian” use of Greek 342”,(ܕܐܠ ܛܥܡܗ ܠܡܐܪܬܐ ܕܚܟܡܬ ܝܘܢܝܐ)
logic-chopping to argue their case that God the Son was somehow subservient to the 
Father. Ephrem writes, “If you ask, “Is there a son?” / You may learn that answer in an 
instant. / If you ask, “How?” / The question will remain until he comes again.”343 
Elsewhere, he praises the Apostle Paul, who went into the “the mother city of the 
Greeks,” that is, Athens, disarmed their “weapons” (ܠܙܝܢܗܘܢ) of Greek logic by using 
their own weapons against them, and then discarded their weapons as useless when he 
                                                          
339 See, for example, U. Possekel, Evidence of Greek Philosophical Concepts in the Writings of Ephrem the 
Syrian (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 1-32; S. Griffith, “Ephraem, the Deacon of Edessa, and the Church of the 
Empire,” in Diakonia: Studies in Honor of Robert T. Meyer (eds. T. Halton and J.P. Williman; Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1986), 22-52.  
340 Griffith, “Ephraem, the Deacon of Edessa,” 47. 
341 Griffith, “Ephraem, Deacon of Edessa,” 43. 
342 For Syriac, see: E. Beck, Des Heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Hymnen de Fide (CSCO 154; Scriptores 
Syri Tomus 73; Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1955), 7. 
343 E. Beck, Des Heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Sermones de Fide (CSCO 212; Scriptores Syri Tomus 88; 
Louvain, 1961), 48, sermon VI, line 297-98; Griffith, “Setting Right the Church,” 105.  
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left that city. In another poem, Ephrem praises the Magi for not subjecting the divine to 
“inquiry.” He writes,  
 
Come, let us marvel at the men / who saw the king here below / They did not conduct an 
investigation, nor did they engage in research ( ܒܥܘ ܐܘ ܥܩܒܘ ) / not one of them opened a debate 
 There shone there in silence, a pure act of faith / When he was here below, the Magi / did / (ܕܪܫ)
not venture to examine him ( ܒܨܐܘܗܝ ܐܡܪܚܘ ܐܠ ) / How can we then venture to examine him (  ܡܢ
   Now that he has gone up and taken his seat / at the right hand on high?344 / (ܢܡܪܚ ܢܒܨܝܘܗܝ
 
Unlike the Homilies, which finds epistemological certainty guaranteed in the 
constitutional makeup of the True Prophet, and Iamblichus, who accesses the divine 
causes of all events through theurgic modes of ascent, Ephrem simply states that God 
cannot be essentially known. The crucial point, however, is that he does not deny that 
God as knowable Essence exists; he merely argues that humans do not have the 
epistemological potential of ever attaining knowledge of that essence. Like the others, 
then, Ephrem recognizes that Greek philosophy cannot approach the divine, yet he is 
content to stay on the “this side of the world.” For him, humans can only understand God 
indirectly through the mysteries and symbols he implanted in scripture and nature.345 This 
idea is portrayed best, perhaps, in his madrasha called “He Wore the Names.” He writes, 
 
Let us give thanks to the One is clothed with the names [ܫܡܗܐ] of the bodily limbs / its name, 
“ears,” to teach that he hears us / its nickname, “eyes,” to inform that he sees us / it was only the 
                                                          
344 Beck, Hymnen de Fide, 33; Griffith, “Deacon of Edessa,” 43. 
345 S. Griffith, Faith Adoring the Mystery: Reading the Bible with St. Ephraem the Syrian (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1997), 19-21.  
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names of these things he wore / and though there is no wrath or regret within his Essence 
  he clothes himself with these names because of our weakness.346 / [ܒܐܝܬܘܬܗ]
 
As Ephrem goes on to say, God does not actually possess limbs, but he “wears” the name 
of the limbs for the sake of humankind – “His Essence remains hidden [  ܗܝ ܕܟܣܝܐ
 but he depicts through things that are visible.” Again, Ephrem says, “He is an ,[ܐܝܬܘܬܗ
Essence (ܐܝܬܝܐ) whose greatness we are not capable of grasping – no, not even in his 
smallness.”347 Just as God put on “names” for the sake of humanity, he also sowed 
mysteries in both Testaments and in Nature so as to point towards the crucifixion of 
Jesus, who reveals the true meaning of each mystery.348 This economy of salvation 
remains strictly within this world; there is no moment in which the human mind directly 
grasps divine mind or participates in his divinity. Rather, the mind, scripture, and nature 
are compared to mirrors that collectively point towards the truth of Jesus’ crucifixion.349 
These symbols are simultaneously “types” of Christ found in the Old Testament, Nature, 
and Christian liturgy, and their truth is demonstrated by the coming of Christ as found in 
the New Testament.350 Therefore, while Ephrem agrees with Iamblichus and the Homilies 
that humans are not able to grasp the divine through human means, he is content to 
remain in this realm, in so far as God himself had sown “mysteries” into the world that, 
through proper Christian training, one might uncover their “true” meaning in Christ.   
                                                          
346 My translation is based on S.P. Brock and G.A. Kiraz (trans.), Ephrem the Syrian: Select Poems (Provo: 
Brigham Young University Press, 2006), 16-27.   
347 Brock and Kiraz, Ephrem the Syrian, 27. 
348 Griffith, Faith Adoring the Mystery, 26-32. 
349S. Brock, The Luminous Eye: The Spiritual World Vision of Saint Ephrem (Kalamazoo: Cistercian 
Publications, 1992), 74-77; E. Beck, “Das Bild vom Spiegel bei Ephräm,” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 
19 (1953), 5-24, 5-10; In later literature, see A. Becker, “Polishing the Mirror,” 910-11. 
350 Griffith, Faith Adoring the Mystery, 26-32. 
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 We turn finally to a set of enigmatic texts known as the Odes of Solomon (2nd 
century?). This set of liturgical texts were clearly meant to be sung by a congregation. 
The Odes’ understanding of “Error” coheres well with what we have seen so far. In Ode 
38 (cf., Ode 31), for example, the Odist follows “Truth” across treacherous lands, 
chasms, gulfs, valleys, and cliffs. This topographical imagery maps unto the Odist’s 
conception of “Error” (ܛܥܝܘܬܐ). He depicts Error as the “Poisons of Error” (  ܣܡܡܢܐ
 ”.recalling Ephrem’s imagery of the “Poison of the Wisdom of the Greeks ,(ܕܛܥܝܘܬܐ
Error and Deceit imitate the pure relationship between the “Beloved and the Bride.” 
When Error and Deceit invite people to their unholy feast, they cause the attendees to 
“vomit up their wisdom and their knowledge ( ܘܡܕܥܝܗܘܢ ܚܟܡܬܗܘܢ ) and prepare for them 
instead ‘nonsense’ ( ܪܥܝܢܐ ܕܐܠ ).” In Ode 18, moreover, the Odist distinguishes those “vain 
people reasoned that Error ( ܣܪܝܩܐ ܥܠܝܗ ܣܒܪܘ ) was great, and became similar to it (  ܐܝܟ
) and became vain” from “those-who-know knew and reasoned (ܕܡܘܬܗ  ܕܝܕܥܝܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܘܝܕܥ
 ”.(ܒܡܚܫܒܬܗܘܢ) and were not polluted by their [the vain peoples’] thoughts / (ܘܐܬܚܫܒܘ
Of course, this is not proof that the Odist is explicitly or only targeting Greek philosophy, 
yet its characterization of error and deceit resonates strongly with Ephrem’s and 
Bardaiasan’s caricaturization of Greek philosophy. Furthermore, the Odist uses imagery 
that recalls broader Syriac tropes. In Ode 13, for example, he compares the Lord to a 
mirror (ܡܚܙܝܬܐ), through whom one can recognize their true nature, recalling Ephrem’s 
deployment of mirrors as a human mode of recognizing God. Ode 7 too notes that God 
“became like me ( ܐܟܘܬܝ ܗܘܐ ), that I might receive him… / Like my nature (  ܟܝܢܝ ܐܝܟ
) He became, that I might understand Him. / Like my form (ܗܘܐ ܨܘܪܬܝ ܐܝܟ ), that I might 
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not turn away from Him.” Examples of God’s utter transcendence and 
incomprehensibility are strewn throughout the Odes as well, again in striking similarity to 
Ephrem’s madrasha discussed above; though God is so utterly transcendent so as to be 
completely unknowable, he became human so that humans might understand him as a 
human.  
 Ultimately, Ephrem acknowledged the utter transcendence of the divine at a time 
when other Syrians were adopting Greek philosophy in their futile attempts to grasp the 
divine. He argued that one could only understand God in mediation through the God-
strewn symbols that remained firmly entrenched within scripture and nature. He 
foreclosed all direct modes of ascent and denied any ontological connections between 
these symbols and God. The only way that humans could approach the divine was 
through the infinitely-deep data set that God had allowed humans to understand. In the 
following section, I highlight a similar move made by the Palestinian rabbis. Like 
Ephrem, these Amoraic rabbis responded to what they saw as the philosophical 
encroachment into God’s divine territory. They did so by highlighting the superiority of 
Torah over and against philosopher’s claims to know God’s cosmogonic secrets.  
   
The Rabbis: The Torah as Mediated Knowledge of God 
 
The rabbis not only echo Syriac Christian attitudes towards “revelatory” knowledge but, 
like them, also fixed the boundaries of what was available for study, their “data set.”351 
                                                          
351 I do not mean to fault the rabbis for not employing Greek concepts such as “presence” or “prognosis.” I 
only want to make the claim that, like the Syriac-speaking Christians, the rabbis too were wary of 
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After all, for the rabbis, careful attention to the Torah explained everything that can or 
should be known. They decreed that other domains of inquiry, especially those that 
sought to delve into God’s exclusive domains of cosmology, cosmogony, and 
eschatology, were to be approached with extreme caution, if at all. Indeed, the earliest 
rabbis had already placed boundaries regarding which subjects must be approached with 
extreme caution.352 In m.Hagigah 2:1, for example, the rabbis declare,  
 
One may not expound the laws of forbidden sexual relations before three people, nor the account 
of creation [במעשה בראשית] before two,353 nor the divine chariot [במרכבה] before one, unless he is 
wise and understands through his own. It would be fitting for anyone who gazes into [המסתכל] 
these four things to not come into this world: what is above, what is below, what is before, and 
what is after. Anyone who has no consideration for the honor of his creator would be better off if 
he had not come into the world. 
 
I follow Schäfer and Halperin in their interpretation that this passage (and others) 
describe the extreme danger of expounding on the subject of creation and God’s Divine 
Chariot.354 This passage is not referring to a mystical practice of acquiring a vision of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
alternative approaches to the study of the divine. It should also be said that the rabbis did not only look into 
the Torah to “divine” God’s will, but also interpreted historical events and other signs as well. See 
especially, M.D. Swartz, The Signifying Creator: Nontextual Sources of Meaning in Ancient Judaism (New 
York: New York University Press, 2012). By looking into the “world” for God’s signs, they parallel 
Ephrem’s approach to the nature and the Testaments. For the role of midrash as a way of discursively 
instantiating the divine, see D. Stern, Midrash and Theory: Ancient Jewish Exegesis and Contemporary 
Literary Studies (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 73-93.  
352 Rabbis nevertheless found ways to work around this famous Mishnaic prohibition. See P.S. Alexander, 
“Pre-emptive exegesis: Genesis Rabba’s reading of the Story of Creation,” JJS 43 (1992): 230-45.  
353 P. Schäfer, “In Heaven as it is in Hell: The Cosmology of Seder Rabbah di-Bereshit” in Heavenly 
Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions (eds. R. Boustan and A.Y. Reed; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 233-74.  
354 P. Schäfer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 175-213; 
D.J. Halperin, The Merkabah in Rabbinic Literature (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1980), 60-
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Chariot or even ascending to God, as we will see in chapter five with the Hekhalot 
literature. Rather, as Schäfer writes, “the rabbis are solely, and quite consciously, 
occupied with textual exegeses, not with visionary experiences.”355 These subjects are 
dangerous, then, not because of some mystical ascent but because “… improper, 
unbridled exegesis of Gen. 1 and Ezek. 1 may infringe on God’s privacy, so to speak, 
God’s own sovereign realm, spatially and temporally, and that such an exegesis might 
being one too close to God, in any event, too close to accommodate the rabbis’ sense of 
decency.”356 In contrast to our Syriac texts, then, the rabbis in the mishnah above and its 
related passages in the Tosefta and Yerushalmi357 do not contrast their approach to divine 
topics against Greek modes of philosophical inquiry, but instead signal broader attempts 
at forming a distinctly rabbinic communal identity.358  
Nevertheless, philosophers begin to pop up in the later rabbinic sources stemming 
from the Amoraic era, clustering heavily in the fifth-century midrashic compilation 
Bereshit Rabbah and in the Yerushalmi.359 Let us briefly turn to the opening passages of 
Bereshit Rabbah.360 This midrashic anthology speaks from within a rapidly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
63; idem., The Faces of the Chariot: Early Jewish Responses to Ezekiel’s Vision (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1988), 25. 
355 Schäfer, Origins, 178. 
356 Schäfer, Origins, 185.  
357 Schäfer, Origins, 175-213.  
358 A.Y. Reed, Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 122-59. 
359 A study of the philosopher in these texts far exceeds the boundaries of this chapter, let alone 
dissertation. The image of the philosopher in the Yerushalmi also deserves further study, especially in light 
of the Iamblichean forms of Platonism circulating throughout late antique Syria. 
360 See now S.K. Gribetz and D.M. Grossberg (eds.), “Introduction: Genesis Rabbah, A Great Beginning” 
in Genesis Rabbah in Text and Context (ed. S.K. Gribetz, D.M. Grossberg, M. Himmelfarb, and P. Schäfer; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 1-11. 
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Christianizing Roman Empire. I will not engage in a full literary analysis of these famous 
petihtaot here,361 but highlight some of its more salient aspects.  
The ultimate goal of the opening parashah of Bereshit Rabbah is to claim that 
God is the sole creator of the cosmos; there were no other gods, angels, or beings that 
helped him in this endeavor. Nevertheless, God did consult something in his construction 
of the cosmos: the Torah.362 In the opening petihta, R. Oshaya compares God’s act of 
creation to an architect consulting his diagrams and charts to build a palace. In like 
manner, God looked into [מביט] the Torah to create the cosmos. On the one hand, this 
demonstrates that the Torah contains the very blueprint of the cosmos, and, as R. 
Yehudah b. Simon demonstrates (BerR 1.6), creative exegesis of the Torah has the 
potential to uncover how God created the cosmos. On the other hand, the comparison 
between the Torah and an architect’s diagrams demonstrates that the Torah is merely a 
tool for creation. It is not an emanation, spark, or ontologically divine.363 True, the Torah 
is the first and most important of God’s creations, yet it is still created and merely 
consulted; God does all the heavy work of actual creation.  
                                                          
361 For a full analysis of this parashah, see P. Schäfer, “Bereshit Bara Elohim: Bereshit Rabba, Parashah 1, 
Reconsidered,” in Empsychoi Logoi: Religious innovations in antiquity—Studies in honour of Pieter 
Willem van der Horst (eds. A. Houtman, A. de Jong, and M. Misset-van de Weg; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 267-
89. 
362 Also see E.E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs (Trans. I. Abrahams; Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 1975), 198-202. Urbach traces the idea of a pre-existent Torah within broader Near Eastern traditions 
and argues against scholars who would place it within a Platonic context, specifically with recourse to 
Philo. In contrast, Winston argues for the Philonic background to this conception of the pre-existent Torah 
as an instrument for creation. See D. Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria 
(Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985), 25; idem., “Philo and Rabbinic Literature,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 231-53, especially 232-
34. 
363 Daniel Boyarin’s arguments regarding the appropriation and rejection of the memra, or “logos 
theology,” by the Christians and non-/para-Rabbinic Jews, respectively, do not directly affect my argument 
here. See D. Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 112-48. 
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In keeping with the Mishnah, R. Yosi b. Haninah states that inquiry into the 
cosmological aspects of the world ultimately dishonors God as creator (BerR 1.5). After 
all, the cosmos was created through tohu ve-vohu, which are comparable to trash and 
dung. It is not polite to bring up such matters before God. Nevertheless, as R. Huna in the 
name of Bar Qappara correctly mentions, the Torah itself describes God creating the 
cosmos through the filth of unformed matter – tohu ve-vohu. As such, R. Huna claims 
that discussion of the preexistent filth is fair game for discussion. R. Yosi, R. Huna, and 
Bar Qappara thus seem to adhere to an understanding of creatio ex hylis. By the fifth 
century, however, this rather conservative position bordered on the scandalous. Indeed, 
the parashah goes on to depict a pitched argument between a philosopher [פילוסופוס] and 
Rabban Gamliel in what is undoubtedly the climax of this parashah. The philosopher 
opens by praising God as a great painter [ציר גדול] who used the “beautiful paints” [ סממנים
 at his disposal to create the world. He thus praises the God of the Jews not only as [טובים
an excellent “creator” God, but also goes so far as to transform the pre-existent filth tohu 
ve-vohu into “beautiful paints.” No rabbi can fault him, therefore, for impugning on 
God’s honor. His mistake, however, lies in his assumption that God used preexistent 
materials – “beautiful paints” – at all to create the world. In response, Rabban Gamliel 
tells the philosopher to drop dead and argues that God created the “paints” – tohu vevohu 
– he had used to create the world. He thus posits that God created everything ex nihilo.364  
                                                          
364 While I agree with Niehoff that the encounter between Gamaliel and the philosopher is 
“pseudepigraphic,” her argument that the philosopher was Christian is a bit of a stretch. See M.R. Niehoff, 
“Creatio ex Nihilo Theology in Genesis Rabbah in Light of Christian Exegesis,” Harvard Theological 
Review (2005): 37-64. That both Christians and rabbis were concerned with Creation ex Nihilo/Hylis seems 
to demonstrate a broader discourse, or perhaps simply a cultural / religious “anxiety,” one that may have 
included emerging philosophic concerns on the relationship between matter and the divine, as expressed by 
both Plotinus and Iamblichus. In response to Niehoff, see Schäfer, “Bereshit Bara Elohim,” 280-81.   
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How much Rabban Gamliel knew about Greek philosophical arguments is not 
clear from this passage, if at all. After all, he does not respond to the philosopher on the 
philosopher’s terms, but through his exegesis of the Torah. More significantly, the 
passage demonstrates that rabbis were aware of the converging rabbinic claims about 
creation with those made by Greek philosophers. Indeed, even when the preexistent 
materials tohu ve-vohu are interpreted positively as beautiful paints and even when Greek 
philosophers recognize the God of Israel as a creator God, they still completely fail to 
give God his due honor. As Rabban Gamliel demonstrates, this is because they 
understood the world through their own philosophical training, not through proper 
attention to the Torah. Significantly, from the perspective of the fifth century redactor of 
these passages, both Bar Qappara’s and the philosopher’s statements about creation 
converge, suggesting that the rejection of Bar Qappara’s position of creatio ex hylis – 
which was argued from the Torah no less! – became scandalous due to its similarity with 
what the rabbis associated with Greek philosophy.365  
The following passage presents further evidence for an increased concern with 
guarding against rabbinic inquiries into subjects dealing with eschatology, cosmology, 
                                                          
365 As David Stern mentioned to me, it is not clear whether we should see the problem as creatio ex nihilo 
at all, but as a sticky problem regarding the multiplicity of gods. According to this line of reasoning, R. 
Gamaliel interprets the philosopher’s words to mean that tohu ve-vohu were created by other gods, which 
implies that creation was the result of multiple gods, not just the God of Israel. This suggestion is certainly 
intriguing and demands more thought. At the very least, Stern’s suggestion is valuable in that it compels us 
to rethink whether the rabbis “took” the idea of creatio ex nihilo / hylis “from” the Christians or 
philosophers, which seems to be how Schäfer, and Niehoff understand the issue. In this sense, I suggest that 
we can still use the term creatio ex nihilo, since God does create the very materials for creation and 
therefore creates out of “nothing,” but only as a heuristic and not as a “rabbinic” version of a Christian idea. 
Furthermore, the role of the philosopher here needs to be explored a bit further. Though it is likely that he 
is simply a stock-character for the midrashic mill, it may still be worth asking why “philosophers” pop up 
most densely in the Amoraic materials, especially in Bereshit Rabbah. By doing so, we may begin to work 
out how “philosophers” figure into the Amoraic rabbinic imagination and literary creation, thereby 
bypassing the question of whether the rabbis truly “knew” this or that philosophic doctrine.  
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and cosmogony. Whereas the Mishnah prohibited the study of divine matters because it 
impugned on God’s honor, this passage goes beyond the prohibition by predicating the 
permitted domains of inquiry on the very structure of the world.366  
 
R. Yona [said] in the name of R. Levi, “Why was the world created with the letter bet? Just as the 
letter bet is closed off on its sides and opens up in the front [ב], so you have no permission to 
expound [לדרוש] on what is above, what is below, what is before and what is after.” Bar Qappara 
said, “Ask about the first days that were before you from the day that God created humans upon 
the earth, and from one end of heaven to the other” (Deut. 4:32)… “From the day” that they were 
created, you may expound [דורש], but you may not expound what came prior. “From one end of 
heaven to the other,” you may investigate [חוקר], but beyond that, you may not investigate.  
 
Riffing on the idea that the Torah was the blueprint for creation, R. Yona asks why the 
world was created with the letter bet, that is, the first letter of the first word of the Torah 
 He answers by incorporating the Mishnaic prohibition against studying what is .(בראשית)
above, below, before, and after. Bar Qappara deduces support for this prohibition from 
the Torah; one can only study that which is visible. Interestingly, he uses the verb “to 
investigate” [חוקר], suggesting that the ban is not so much on public exposition [דורש], but 
on research into these matters. Both R. Yona and Bar Qappara reinterprets the Mishnaic 
ban; it is no longer only about God’s honor, but the proper domains of inquiry are already 
woven into the structure of the cosmos and into the Torah. This is remarkably similar to 
                                                          
366 In true rabbinic fashion, however, the rabbis did not always follow their own injunctions. As Stern 
mentioned to me, in Bereshit Rabbah 8.2, despite R. Elazar’s transmitting a tradition in the name of Ben 
Sira (!) that one should not delve into mysteries that are too great for them, the entire chapter is replete with 
such speculations. Such caution against delving into the mysteries of creation, and the prompt dismissal of 
that caution, may be seen as part and parcel of rabbinic literature. Indeed, perhaps such prohibitions were 
meant to be broken, not followed! 
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Ephrem’s position discussed above; the only “data” for analysis are the secrets and 
mysteries that God had implanted into nature and the two testaments. This and the 
previous passage describing the debate between philosopher and Rabban Gamliel 
suggests that cosmological, eschatological, and cosmogonic issues were becoming a 
matter of increasing concern for rabbis in the fifth century, not only from rabbis within 
who favored a creatio ex hylis approach based on the Torah itself, but from philosophers 
without.  
I suggest that such an attitude towards God’s exclusive domain of inquiry mirrors 
Syriac Christian discomfort with the application of Greek philosophy to divine matters. 
Though they had differing scholastic habits and objects of inquiry, both rabbis and 
Christians held a healthy suspicion against Greek philosophy as a mode of approaching 
the divine. Indeed, as Hayes has demonstrated recently in her study of rabbinic law, the 
rabbis articulated an understanding of the “divinity” of the Torah in studied opposition to 
Greco-Roman conceptions of “divine” law.367 For the rabbis, then, the Torah contained 
all the knowledge that humans could and should know. God has provided humans with an 
infinitely deep “data set” that contains everything that the rabbis and Christians can and 
should know about him. Both the rabbis and the Syriac Christians were on earth “looking 
up” at the heavens and “looking down” at their books and nature; they both eschewed 
more direct methods for approaching God.  
 
                                                          
367 C. Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2015). 
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Beyond Knowledge: Prognosis as Divine and Revelatory Knowing 
 
As we had seen with Philostratus’ Apollonius of Tyana and Origen’s Contra Celsus, the 
Greek word prognosis expanded to include something like panoptic divine knowledge. At 
the same time, local Syrian communities like the Syriac-speaking Christians and the 
rabbis reacted negatively to the encroachment of “Greek philosophy” in the study of 
divine matters, choosing instead to study aspects of the divine through the things he had 
arrayed as available for study – be they the two Testaments, the two Torot, or the various 
signs and mysteries he had sown in Nature.  
 Yet not all Syrian communities were content on remaining on “this side” or in 
deciphering God’s signs. At the same time that rabbinic and Syriac Christian rejection of 
philosophical approaches to God were hardening, other Syrians began to entertain the 
possibility of direct unmediated knowledge of God, that is, to know like God. In this 
section, I examine the converging theorizations of prognosis among three Syrian 
communities: the Neoplatonists, “Jewish Christians,” and the Manichaeans. Though each 
did so in their own ways, these communities began to understand prognosis as 
unmediated divine knowledge along similar trajectories. More specifically, they 
understood prognosis in three interrelated ways: 1) as total panoptic knowledge; 2) as 
something possessed by the gods rather than produced by humans; 3) as an articulation of 
the unity of divine ontology and divine epistemology.  
 
Iamblichean Conceptions of Prognosis 
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Iamblichus’ conception of prognosis rehearses an age old problem regarding the 
relationship between reality and the perception of that reality. In short, humans need to 
transcend their perception of reality if they are to truly understand “reality.” In Rappe’s 
words, “conceptual activity, far from observing the nature of things as they are in 
themselves, actually obstructs our view. It prevents us from seeing things as they are in 
themselves.”368 Prognosis, for Iamblichus, short-circuits this problem by positing a 
divine mode of knowing, one that bypasses “conceptual activity” entirely. For him, 
prognosis does not mark prior knowledge in the temporal sense, but the divine priority of 
all things that “happen” in this world.369 Through various “theurgic” practices, the human 
soul links up with its divine priority, and thus gains “knowledge” of all things at all times 
prior to their actual “happening” in the temporal world; that is, the human soul “thinks” 
like and as a god.370 As I will argue in the following two sections, this particular 
understanding of prognosis coheres well with developing notions of prophecy among 
proximate communities, including the “Jewish-Christians” responsible for the Homilies 
and the Manichaeans.  
                                                          
368 S. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and 
Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 30. 
369 I largely agree with Gregory Shaw’s analysis, that “True divination, according to Iamblichus, was 
equivalent to divinization, making the soul divine, and knowledge of the future was merely a secondary 
consequence of ascending to the archē of temporal events.” See: G. Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The 
Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1995), 232. Nevertheless, his claim that Iamblichus “platonized” popular “religion” needs to be reassessed. 
Rather, as I argue here, it seems more likely that Iamblichus was already participating in broader 
theorizations of prognosis; in this sense, it would be the “prognosticization” of “Platonism.”  
370 For more on the theurgy in the Neoplatonic tradition, see: C. Addey, Divination and Theurgy in 
Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods (Dorchester: Ashgate, 2014), 215-82. Nevertheless, recent scholarship 
by Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler has historicized the category of “theurgy” and argued that it was not a stable 
set of rituals or even concepts. See I. Taneseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity. The Invention of a 
Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2013).  
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Iamblichus’ notion of prognosis builds upon Plotinus’ tripartite system of the 
One, the Intellect, and the Soul.371 The One is the cause and source of all existence, 
therefore, “it” is superior to “existence.” As such, “it” cannot “be” any “thing,” since it is 
superior and prior to “being” itself. The least egregious way to articulate this concept, 
according to Plotinus, is to call it the “One.” The One emanates forth “existence” as an 
expression of its perfection, thus issuing forth the realm of the Intellect. This is the realm 
in which Plato’s “ideas” exist and the realm of the intellectual gods. Yet there is no 
“division” in this realm; the knowledge of an object, the act of knowing, and the object 
itself are entirely united. Furthermore, there is no “time” as the sort of plodding 
movement that humans experience. Instead, “eternity” is the temporal context for the 
divine, in which all the intellectual gods are bound up all together at once. As an 
emanation of the One, the Intellect strives to return to the One and, in participation with 
the One, emanates forth the lower hypostatic realm of the Soul. This is the realm in which 
the divine meets the material, where time begins to tick, where unified intellectual 
knowledge fragment into multiple discursive elements. The human soul occupies the 
lowest rung in this ladder of existence, and at least according to Iamblichus, it is 
completely descended into matter and incapable of ascent without tapping into the 
presence and power of the intellectual gods.  
 Iamblichus’ understanding of prognosis builds on this Plotinian tripartite division. 
It is the “knowledge” that the intellectual gods possess. This form of knowledge is not 
“processable” in the way that humans might conclude 1 and 1 makes 2. Such processes 
                                                          
371 For an accessible approach to Neoplatonic philosophy, see: A. Smith, Philosophy in Late Antiquity 
(New York: Routledge, 2004). 
 198   
 
require the fracturing of a transcendental idea into component parts (input, function, and 
output) and their placement onto a temporal axis.372 In the intellectual realm, there is no 
fracturing of the idea; it is completely, fully, and instantaneously known, it is unitive in 
the sense that the knower, knowing, and known are completely unified. In Iamblichus’ 
words, “The former (the superior class of divine beings), in a single swift moment, 
comprehends the supreme ends of all activities and essences, while the latter (lower 
divine beings, including the human soul) passes from some things to others, and proceeds 
from the incomplete to the complete” (De. Myst. 1.7).373  
Prognosis, then, is precisely this instantaneous comprehension of all things; it is a 
divine mode of thinking. It is not the type of “knowledge” that humans possess, that is, 
discrete bytes of information, but a divine mode of “cognition.” At one level, prognosis is 
“knowledge” of the transcendental causes for all events that occur within our humanly 
experienced history.374 Iamblichus writes,  
 
If, however, it refers accounts of things happening to their causes, that is, to the gods, it receives 
from them a power and knowledge that reckons things that were and will be, and take a view of all 
time, and surveys events happening in time, and it participates in their order, care, and 
improvement. Further, it heals sick bodies, and re-arranges many things that were discordant and 
disorderly among human beings, and also it often transmits the discoveries of human skills, legal 
regulations, and the establishment of customs (De Myst. 3.3). 
                                                          
372 Plotinus himself was deeply suspicious of the power of discursive reasoning to approach the divine. See 
Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 25-44.  
373 Καὶ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μίαν ὀξεῖαν ἀκμὴν τὰ τέλη τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ὅλων καὶ οὐσιῶν συνείληφε, τὸ δ’ ἀπ’ ἄλλων 
εἰς ἄλλα μεταβαίνει, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς προχωρεῖ εἰς τὸ τέλειον. 
374 Iamblichus builds upon insights by Plotinus, though he seems to reject Plotinus’ views that “true 
divination” or “divination” itself is incumbent upon sympathetic bonds (Enn. III.3.6). For its relationship to 
Iamblichean theurgy, see: Addey, Divination, 173-89. 
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Ἐὰν δὲ τοὺς λόγους τῶν γιγνομένων ἀνάγῃ πρὸς τοὺς αἰτίους αὐτῶν θεούς, δύναμιν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν 
προσλαμβάνει καὶ γνῶσιν ἀναλογιζομένην ὅσα τε ἦν καὶ ὅσα ἔσται, θεωρίαν τε παντὸς χρόνου 
ποιεῖται καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ συμβαινόντων ἐπισκοπεῖ τὰ ἔργα, τάξιν τε αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ 
ἐπανόρθωσιν τὴν προσήκουσαν μεταλαγχάνει· καὶ τὰ μὲν κεκμηκότα σώματα θεραπεύει, τὰ δὲ 
πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα παρ’ ἀνθρώποις εὖ διατίθησι, τεχνῶν τε εὑρέσεις πολλάκις καὶ 
διανομὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων θέσεις παραδίδωσιν. 
 
Divine prognosis thus spans the entire breadth of time. The one who ascends acquires 
this perspective when they participate with the gods’ presence at the highest level, and 
thus they discern the transcendent causes for all events that play out in the course of 
history. It is the gods who possess prognosis, not human beings. Indeed, Iamblichus sums 
up the general rule of prognosis in this manner: “Never derive divination of the future 
from those things that have no prognosis as such, but derive it from the gods who in 
themselves possess the limits of all knowledge of existing things, from whom the mantic 
power is distributed throughout the whole cosmos, and among all the different natures 
found there” (De. Myst. 3.1).375 In other words, because the gods themselves are 
omnipresent and beyond “time,” so is the potential for true divination at every place and 
at any time. Nevertheless, some places, like various oracular sites, are suffused with a 
greater concentration of their divine presence than others and are particularly potent sites 
for contact with the divine (De Myst. 3.1, 12).  
                                                          
375 Ἀλλ’ εἷς ὅρος ὀρθὸς καὶ μία ἀρχὴ περὶ πάντων τοιούτων, μηδαμῶς ἀναιτίως παράγειν τὴν τοῦ 
μέλλοντος μαντείαν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδεμίαν ἐχόντων πρόγνωσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν θεῶν τῶν συνεχόντων ἐν 
αὑτοῖς τὰ πέρατα τῆς ὅλης εἰδήσεως τῶν ὄντων, ἀπὸ τούτων θεωρεῖν μεριζομένην τὴν μαντικὴν περὶ πάντα 
τὸν κόσμον καὶ περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ διῃρημένας φύσεις. 
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 Curiously, Iamblichus’ discussion of prognosis soon enters other domains; it not 
only confers absolute and total “knowledge,” it also heals broken bodies, rearranges 
disorderly phenomena, and transmits useful knowledge, among others. Prognosis, then, is 
not mere knowledge but an expansive form of divine blessing that elevates the conditions 
of humankind to a more divine level. How does this happen? At least to modern minds, 
which separates ontology and epistemology into two distinct fields, this might seem odd. 
Yet we must recall that, at least for Iamblichus, prognosis and divine being – 
epistemology and ontology – are one and the same in the realm of the intellect; the 
prognosis that the gods possess are united with their essence and their activity. Therefore, 
when one participates in the gods’ prognosis, they also participate in its perfect goodness, 
thus conferring the benefits mentions above. Iamblichus encapsulates this idea in his 
initial response to Porphyry, saying,  
 
Indeed, to tell the truth, the contact with the divinity is not to be taken as knowledge. Knowledge, 
after all, is separated (from its object) by some degree of otherness. But prior to that which knows 
another as an “other”, is the unified intertwining, which is suspended from the gods,376 that is self-
sufficient and of single form. We should not accept, then, that this is something that we can either 
accede or deny, nor admit to it as ambiguous (for it remains always in a single form in accordance 
with its activity), nor should we examine the question as though we were in a position either to 
judge its veracity or to reject it. For it is rather the case that we are enveloped by the divine 
presence, and we are filled with it, and we are ourselves by virtue of our knowledge of the gods 
(De Myst. 1.3).  
 
                                                          
376 P. Struck, Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of their Texts (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 218-24. 
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Εἰ δὲ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ γνῶσίς ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον συναφή. Διείργεται γὰρ αὕτη πως 
ἑτερότητι. Πρὸ δὲ τῆς ὡς ἑτέρας ἕτερον γιγνωσκούσης αὐτοφυής ἐστιν ... ἡ τῶν θεῶν ἐξηρτημένη 
μονοειδὴς συμπλοκή. Οὐκ ἄρα συγχωρεῖν χρὴ ὡς δυναμένους αὐτὴν καὶ διδόναι καὶ μὴ διδόναι, 
οὐδ’ ὡς ἀμφίβολον τίθεσθαι (ἕστηκε γὰρ ἀεὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἑνοειδῶς), οὐδ’ ὡς κυρίους ὄντας τοῦ 
κρίνειν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνειν οὕτως αὐτὴν δοκιμάζειν ἄξιον· περιεχόμεθα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς 
καὶ πληρούμεθα ὑπ’ αὐτῆς, καὶ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ τοὺς θεοὺς εἰδέναι ἔχομεν. 
 
According to Iamblichus, knowledge of the gods is not a matter of consent or dissent; it is 
the very grounding for human existence.377 Indeed, to deny that the gods are is to deny 
the very ground for one’s own existence. Iamblichus’ conception of knowledge thus goes 
far beyond the simple stringing together of prepositions. Rather, the knowledge of the 
gods presents the ontological preconditions necessary for the human soul to ascend to the 
gods, to reconnect the circuit that links the soul to the gods in the realm of the intellect. 
Once reconnected, then, prognosis smuggles the human soul back to its original 
epistemological and ontological “home.”  
 As a result of Iamblichus’ definition of prognosis as part and parcel of the divine 
realm, true divination – that is, the type of divination that furnishes true and sure 
knowledge – lies entirely within the domain of the gods. It is “something divine, 
supernatural, sent from heaven above; both unbegotten and eternal, it takes priority by its 
own nature” (De Myster. 3.1).378 Since it operates at a higher realm than the realm of the 
soul, nothing within the realm of the soul – including the visible cosmic world that 
                                                          
377 Indeed, as Iamblichus goes on to say, “The knowledge of the gods is of a quite different nature, and is 
far removed from all antithetical procedure (ἀντιθέσεώς τε πάσης κεχώρισται), and does not consist in the 
assent to some proposition now, nor yet at the moment of one’s birth, but from all eternity it coexisted in 
the soul in complete uniformity (ἀλλ’ ἦν ἐξ ἀιδίου μονοειδὴς ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ συνυπάρχουσα)” (De Myst. 1.3). 
378 … θεῖον δὲ καὶ ὑπερφυὲς ἄνωθέν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταπεμπόμενον, ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀίδιον 
αὐτοφυῶς προηγεῖται. 
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humans inhabit – can possess divine prognosis. As Iamblichus says, “There is no seed, 
implanted by nature in us, for divine divination” (De Myst. 3.27; 3.18).379 Indeed, any 
human contribution to the ascent of the soul towards the Intellect will only pervert the 
ascent itself, since by asserting itself, it disturbs the perfect control of the intellectual 
gods (De Myst. 2.11; 3.7; 3.22-25). Naturally, this means that human reasoning cannot 
attain prognosis (De Myst. 3.15; 6.4; 10.3). Iamblichus writes,  
 
So then, to the eternal companions of the gods, let there correspond also the innate cognition of 
them. Even as they themselves possess a being of eternal identity, so too let the human soul join 
itself to them in knowledge on the same terms, not employing conjecture or opinion or some form 
of syllogistic reasoning, all of which takes it start from plane of temporal reality, to purse that 
essence which is beyond all these things, but rather connecting itself to the gods with pure and 
blameless reasonings, which it has received from all eternity from those same gods (De Myst. 1.3). 
 
Ἐοικέτω δὴ οὖν τοῖς ἀιδίοις τῶν θεῶν συνοπαδοῖς καὶ ἡ σύμφυτος αὐτῶν κατανόησις· ὥσπερ οὖν 
αὐτοὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ γνώσει πρὸς 
αὐτοὺς συναπτέσθω, εἰκασίᾳ μὲν ἢ δόξῃ ἢ συλλογισμῷ τινι, ἀρχομένοις ποτὲ ἀπὸ χρόνου, 
μηδαμῶς τὴν ὑπὲρ ταῦτα πάντα οὐσίαν μεταδιώκουσα, ταῖς δὲ καθαραῖς καὶ ἀμέμπτοις νοήσεσιν 
αἷς εἴληφεν ἐξ ἀιδίου παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ταύταις αὐτοῖς συνηρτημένη.  
 
We should be careful to note, however, that Iamblichus does not think that “philosophy” 
or syllogistic logic-chopping is entirely useless. Rather, he delimits the boundaries of 
philosophy by framing it as a human endeavor, and thus incapable of causing ascent, but 
still viable as a practice of enhancing human intellectual capabilities. Thus, he says that 
                                                          
379 θείας ἄρα μαντικῆς οὐδέν ἐστι σπέρμα ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως… 
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the “speculations of the philosophers need to be answered on that basis” (De Myst. 
1.1),380 that is, they must be answered according to the practices attributed to philosophy. 
Indeed, he discusses dialectical inquiry in two of his letters. In his Letter to Dexippus, he 
calls the dialectical process a “gift of the gods” (Dexippus, 15), sent down by Hermes, 
whom Iamblichus calls the “God of rational discourse (ὁ λόγιος ῾Ερμῆς)” both in the 
letter and in the opening line of his response to Porphyry (Θεὸς ὁ τῶν λόγων ἡγεμών, 
Ἑρμῆς).381 In another letter address to Sopater, he calls dialectic the process through 
which one’s intellect becomes further refined, or, “these are the purifications of one’s 
discursive faculty through the practice of refutations” (Sopater, 39).382 Philosophy 
therefore has a time and place, but precisely because there is a “time” and “place,” it is 
useless for ascent to the gods, who are the transcendentally prior to both.  
 The same might be said for divination.383 Iamblichus admits that humans might be 
able to cultivate a sort of prognostic skill that resembles true prognosis. The cultivation 
of these skills may even make them better suited for ascent. Nevertheless, human modes 
of divination furnish only an inkling of the future. After all, they “calculate the future 
probabilities and estimates by certain signs, and are not trustworthy” (De Myst. 3.26).384 
As such, human divination is an interpretation of things that exist within the visible 
cosmos, which themselves are the effects of the transcendent causes, not the causes 
themselves. In contrast, “Divine foreknowledge of future events is directed by a firm 
                                                          
380 … ἔνια δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων θεωρίας ἐχόμενα τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ἑπομένως αὐτοῖς ποιεῖται. 
381 See now, J.M. Dillon (ed.) and W. Polleichtner (trans.), Iamblichus of Chalcis: The Letters (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2009). The number following the name of the address refers to the page 
numbers in this book. My translations are based on Dillon’s and Polleichtner’s.  
382 ἐπειδὴ αὗταί εἰσιν αἱ διὰ τῶν ἐλέγχων καθάρσεις τῆς διανοίας. 
383 See Addey, Divination, 171-213; Struck, Divination, 235-50.  
384 ἐξ εἰκότων γὰρ ἀναλογίζεται τὸ μέλλον καὶ σημείοις τισὶ τεκμηριοῦται καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἀεὶ πιστοῖς… 
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knowledge, and an unshakeable assurance deriving from the causes, an indissoluble 
comprehension connecting all things to all, and in the same manner, a power of an always 
abiding discernment of all things as present and determinate” (De Myster. 3.26).385 
Iamblichus thus reiterates his opening response to Porphyry: true prognosis proceeds 
from the source of the causes – the gods inhabiting the realm of the Intellect.    
 To conclude, Iamblichus argues that prognosis is an utterly transcendent form of 
“knowing.” As such, it is not even “knowledge” at all, at least not in the sense that 
moderns today understand knowledge as discrete pieces of data or as separable from 
divine beings. It is utterly different from human modes of knowing and encompasses all 
knowledge at all times. In the following two sections, I use Iamblichus’ conception of 
prognosis as a prism to assess theorizations of prognosis developing in two other 
proximate communities, the “Jewish Christians” responsible for the Pseudo-Clementine 
Homilies and the Manichaeans. I therefore seek to historicize and regionalize this aspect 
of Iamblichean with recourse to proximate and contemporary communities. 
 
The Pseudo-Clementine Homilies 
 
The Pseudo-Clementine Homilies shapes prognosis along similar lines, namely, as 
panoptic knowledge distinct from human intellection and belonging entirely to the 
divine.386 Like Iamblichus, the ideas regarding prognosis constellate around words like 
                                                          
385 Τῆς δὲ θείας προνοίας τῶν ἐσομένων βέβαιος ἡ εἴδησις προηγεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων ἀμετάπτωτος ἡ 
πίστωσις, συνηρτημένη τε πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀδιαλύτως κατάληψις, καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ μένουσα τῶν ὅλων 
ὥσπερ παρόντων καὶ ὡρισμένων διάγνωσις. 
386 Dominique Côté and Annette Yoshiko Reed have already drawn attention to the Iamblichean overtones 
in the Homilies and how it might fit within broader philosophical context in late antique Syria. See: D. 
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prophecy (ἡ προφητεία) and like the Manichaeans, around revelation (ἡ ἀποκάλυψις). 
Nevertheless, the purpose of prognosis differs; whereas in De Mysteriis, the gods furnish 
prognosis as part-and-parcel of one’s ascent and unification with the Intellect, in the 
Homilies, the prognosis of the True Prophet leads humans to recognize that True 
Prophet’s words are true. The ultimate goal of the True Prophet is to return humankind to 
the original worship of God, which was entirely rational and without any sacrifices.387 
Humans had wandered from this original worship due to their carnal nature, a nature 
rooted in the feminine principle. As a result, humans need someone from the “outside” 
and untouched by this female principle to guide them out of this morass; human gnosis 
requires divine prognosis to recognize truth. To make this distinction, the creators of the 
Homilies must both posit a difference between mere gnosis and divine prognosis. 
Curiously, as I argue here, the Homilies makes use of the same strategies that Iamblichus 
deploys in his construction of true and false divination.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Côté, “Sacrifice et théurgie dans les Pseudo-Clémentines,” forthcoming(?); idem, Le thème de l’opposition 
entre Pierre et Simon dans les Pseudo-Clémentines (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2001), 109-
33; idem, “Orphic Theogony and the Context of the Clementines,” Christian Apocryphal Texts for the New 
Millennium (forthcoming); R. Boustan and A.Y. Reed, “Blood and Atonement in the Pseudo-Clementines 
and the Story of the Ten Martyrs: The Problem of Selectivity in the study of ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity,” 
Henoch 30 (2008): 333-64, 348-49. For more on the Recognitions, the sister text of the Homilies, and true 
knowledge, see: N. Kelley, Knowledge and Religious Authority in the Pseudo-Clementines: Situating the 
Recognitions in Fourth Century Syria (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2006).  
387 In Hom. 9.19, Peter states that those who listen to the words of the Prophet will return to the “original 
saving worship that was committed to humanity” (τὴν πρώτην τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι παραδοθεῖσαν σωτήριον 
θρησκείαν), which did not involve sacrifices of any sort (Hom. 8.9-22). Certain passages within the 
Homilies hint at the possibility that this “original saving worship” was entirely rational. For example, the 
Homilies depicts the “Golden Rule” as eminently “rational” (Hom 2.6). The rite of baptism is depicted as 
somehow coded into the very nature and origin of things (Hom. 11.24-26). Abstaining from engaging in 
sexual contact with a menstruating woman is seen as even “divinely” reasonable, with Peter urging the 
crowd to “purify your hearts from evil through heavenly reasoning (τὴν μὲν καρδίαν τῶν κακῶν οὐρανίῳ 
καθάρατε λογισμῷ; Hom. 11.28-29)!” For further, see: A.Y. Reed, “Parting Ways over Blood and Water? 
Beyond ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’ in the Roman Near East,” in La croisée des chemins revisitée: Quand 
l’Église et la Synagoguese sont-elles distinguées? (eds. S.C. Mimouni and B. Pouderon; Paris: Cerf, 2012), 
227–59. 
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 First, like Iamblichus’ understanding of prognosis, the Syrian “Jewish Christians” 
responsible for the Homilies defined prognosis as complete knowledge of all matters at 
all times. It far exceeds the minimal definition of incremental knowledge of discrete 
events in the future. For example, Peter says,  
 
If he is a prophet, and is able to know how the world came into being, and the things that are in it, 
and the things that shall be to the end, if he has foretold us anything, and we have ascertained that 
it has been perfectly accomplished, we easily believe that the things shall be which He says are to 
be, from the things that have been already; we believe him, I say, as not only knowing, but 
foreknowing (Hom. 2.10).  
 
εἰ προφήτης ἐστὶν καὶ δύναται εἰδέναι ὡς ἐγένετο ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ εἰς 
τέλος ἐσόμενα, ἐὰν ἡμῖν ᾖ τι προειρηκὼς ὃ εἰς τέλος ἐγνώκαμεν γεγενημένον, καλῶς αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν 
ἤδη γεγενημένων καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἔσεσθαι πιστεύομεν, οὐ μόνον ὡς γινώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
προγινώσκοντι. 
 
Jesus does not merely “know,” he “foreknows.” The objects of his prognosis includes the 
mysteries of cosmogony, historical events, and the eschaton. Elsewhere, Peter is more 
explicit about the all-encompassing range of prognosis. He says, “The prognosis of the 
one true prophet comprehends not only the present, but stretches out prophecy without 
limits as far as the eon to come (Hom. 3.12)…”388 Furthermore, the True Prophet’s 
prognosis is not limited only to events in history, but penetrates into the secret things of 
the world. As a true prophet, “he always knows all things, and even the thoughts of all 
                                                          
388 ἡ δὲ τοῦ μόνου καὶ ἀληθοῦς πρόγνωσις οὐ μόνον τὰ παρόντα ἐπίσταται, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρις αὐτοῦ <τοῦ> 
μέλλοντος αἰῶνος ἀπέραντον ἐκτείνει τὴν προφητείαν...  
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(Hom. 3.11)…”389 As Peter goes on to say, “As an infallible prophet, he investigates 
everything through the boundless eye of the soul and knows those things escape notice 
(Hom. 3.13).”390 As such, the prognosis of the True Prophet is nothing short of the 
panoptic knowledge that Iamblichus describes in his construction of true prognosis.  
 Second, the Homilies shares Iamblichus’ doubts regarding the ability of the 
human intellect to attain knowledge of the divine; humans are simply too polluted by the 
carnal pleasures of the false prophetess to be able to understand “God.” Prognosis must 
therefore be an entirely divine mode of knowing, distinct from both human modes of 
knowledge production and attempts at prognosis. Intriguingly, in order to distinguish 
mere human gnosis from divine prognosis, the Homilies uses the same strategies for 
articulating difference that Iamblichus deploys, namely, contrasting it with philosophy 
and against medical and divinatory forms of knowledge acquisition. In the passage 
below, for example, Peter demonstrates how ill-suited philosophy is for the attainment of 
truth. He writes,  
 
Everyone, in so far as they sought the truth, they trusted themselves to be capable of finding it and 
thus fell into a snare. Both the philosophers of the Greeks and the more zealous among the 
barbarians have suffered such an end. For they declare their opinions concerning those things that 
are not apparent by engaging things that are visible through conjectures, considering those things 
to be true whenever they appear to them as such. As people who supposedly know the truth, they 
still seek the truth, rejecting some suppositions that are presented to them, and laying hold of 
others, as if they knew, though they do not know which things are true and which are false. And 
                                                          
389 … προφήτης δὲ ἀληθής ἐστιν ὁ πάντα πάντοτε εἰδώς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς πάντων ἐννοίας… 
390 προφήτης γὰρ ὢν ἄπταιστος, ἀπείρῳ ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμῷ πάντα κατοπτεύων ἐπίσταται λανθάνων.  
 208   
 
they lay down their opinions concerning truth, even though they seek the truth, not knowing that 
he who seeks truth cannot learn it from his own error. For not even, as I said, can he recognize her 
when she stand by him, since he is unacquainted with her… The lovers of words among the 
Greeks– rather than the philosophers – engage such matters through conjectures, have laid down 
their opinions regarding truth often and in many different ways, supposing that the apt sequence of 
hypotheses is truth, not knowing that when they have decreed for themselves false beginning-
principles, then their conclusion correspond with the beginning, namely, false (Hom. 2.7-8).  
 
πάντες μὲν οὖν ὅσοι ποτὲ ἐζήτησαν τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δύνασθαι εὑρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς πιστεύσαντες 
ἐνηδρεύθησαν. τοῦτο ὅπερ πεπόνθασιν καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φιλόσοφοι καὶ βαρβάρων οἱ 
σπουδαιότεροι· ἐκ στοχασμῶν γὰρ ἐπιβάλλοντες τοῖς ὁρατοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπεφήναντο, τὸ 
ὁπώσποτε παραστὰν αὐτοῖς, τοῦτο ἀληθὲς εἶναι νομίσαντες. ὡς γὰρ εἰδότες ἀλήθειαν οἱ ἀλήθειαν 
ἔτι ζητοῦντες τῶν παρισταμένων αὐτοῖς ὑπολήψεων ἃ μὲν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν, ἃ δὲ κρατύνουσιν 
ὥσπερ εἰδότες, μὴ εἰδότες ποῖα μέν ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, ποῖα δὲ ψευδῆ. καὶ δογματίζουσιν περὶ ἀληθείας 
οἱ ἀλήθειαν ἐπιζητοῦντες, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι ὁ ἀλήθειαν ζητῶν παρὰ τῆς αὑτοῦ πλάνης μαθεῖν αὐτὴν 
οὐ δύναται. οὔτε γάρ (ὡς ἔφην) παρεστηκυῖαν αὐτὴν ἐπιγνῶναι δύναται, ἣν ἀγνοεῖ… διὰ τοῦτο 
καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φιλόλογοι (οὐ φιλόσοφοι) διὰ στοχασμῶν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλοντες 
πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα ἐδογμάτισαν, τὴν οἰκείαν τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀκολουθίαν ἀλήθειαν εἶναι 
νομίσαντες, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι αὐτῶν ψευδεῖς ἀρχὰς ἑαυτοῖς ὁρισαμένων, τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ τέλος 
συμφωνίαν εἴληφεν. 
 
In this dense passage, we see Peter participating in a broad critique of Greek philosophy 
echoed by others like Ephrem, the rabbis, and Iamblichus himself. He recognizes that 
Greek philosophy is utterly incapable of attaining truth. Indeed, those who seek truth 
cannot possess truth, for how can one seek that which they possess? He points out the 
logical fallacies that the philosophers and philologers, and not a few of the more 
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intelligent barbarians commit, namely, thinking that a sequence of hypotheses is identical 
with “truth.” Rather, Peter points out that such sequences are merely equations, the 
conclusion of which would differ depending on its particular input and the function. This 
is structurally similar to Iamblichus’ argument that the “soul” can ever attain to “truths” 
borne of logical necessity, never to the intellectual “Truth” that undergirds such 
“truths.”391 Yet “truth” operates a level removed from these functions. Indeed, even if 
these philosophers attained the “truth,” they would have no objective basis for 
recognizing it as such, given that their epistemological limits remain hemmed in by the 
very parameters they set out. Furthermore, these philosophers can only begin with the 
things that are visible to men as their starting point, which means that they are trying to 
back-engineer their way to truth, a perilous task indeed.  
Furthermore, prognosis stands in stark contrast to philosophy, which is mocked as 
nothing more than the balancing act of “conjectures” (ὁ στοχασμός). As Peter elsewhere 
argues, philosophers are not driven by a desire for truth, but by pleasure; it is what is 
most pleasing to each philosopher that he holds up as truth.392 In a discussion between 
Clement and his father, for example, Clement says, “There is a great difference, father, 
between the words of true worship and those of philosophy (μεταξὺ τῶν θεοσεβείας 
λόγων καὶ τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας). For the demonstration of truth comes from prophecy (ἐκ 
προφητείας), while philosophy, though it furnishes beautiful words, seems to offer 
possibilities based on conjectures (καλλιλογίας παρέχων ἐκ στοχασμῶν)” (Hom. 15.5). It 
is no accident that Clement depicts philosophy as furnishing “beautiful” arguments in so 
                                                          
391 De Myst. 1.3. 
392 Homs. 2.8. 
 210   
 
far as this (false) beauty seduces philosophers into thinking that they know the truth. 
Clement signals a difference between pleasure and truth, philosophy and prophecy, the 
false prophetess and the True Prophet Jesus, recalling the broader epistemological system 
described in chapter three.  
 The Homilies presents another approach of prognosis by relating it with the 
concept of revelation. While it is true that the word prognosis does not explicitly show up 
in this chapter, its description of the revelation coheres well with the definition of 
prognosis mentioned above. In the following scene, Peter recounts how he knew that 
Jesus was the “Son of the Living God.”393 He struggles to come up with an answer and 
concedes that he did not know how he came to know Jesus’ identity. He writes,  
 
Thus the Son was revealed to me by the Father. For I know the power of revelation, having 
learned it on my own. For when the Lord said, ‘Who do they say that I am,’ and when I heard 
someone saying one thing about him and another something else, it rose up into my heart to say, 
and I know not how I said it, ‘You are the Son of the Living God.’ He (Jesus), having declared me 
blessed, disclosed to me that it was the Father who had revealed this to me. I learned that 
revelation is learning that is untaught, without vision nor dreams. For this is truly the case. For the 
entirety of Truth is…. placed in us from God spermatically, but it is covered and revealed by the 
hand of God, according to the merit of the knowledge operating within each person. (Hom. 17.18). 
 
οὕτως γὰρ κἀμοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπεκαλύφθη ὁ υἱός. διὸ οἶδα τίς δύναμις ἀποκαλύψεως, ἀφ’ 
ἑαυτοῦ μαθών. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τὸν κύριον εἰπεῖν τίνα αὐτὸν λέγουσιν, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλο τι λέγοντας 
αὐτὸν ἀκηκοότος ἐμοῦ, ἐπὶ τῆς καρδίας ἀνέβη· οὐκ οἶδα οὖν πῶς εἶπον· «Σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ζῶντος 
θεοῦ». τὸν δὲ μακαρίσαντά με μηνῦσαί μοι τὸν ἀποκαλύψαντα πατέρα εἶναι, ἐμὲ δὲ ἔκτοτε μαθεῖν 
                                                          
393 Matthew 12:12.  
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ὅτι τὸ ἀδιδάκτως, ἄνευ ὀπτασίας καὶ ὀνείρων, μαθεῖν ἀποκάλυψίς ἐστιν. καὶ ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχει. 
ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκ θεοῦ τεθείσῃ σπερματικῶς ... πᾶσα ἔνεστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, θεοῦ δὲ χειρὶ σκέπεται 
καὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται, τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστου εἰδότος. 
 
This passage is embedded within a larger argument that visions and apparitions do not 
furnish the proper means for instruction. Peter here, however, sweeps the rug underneath 
the argument; in fact, revelatory knowledge is fundamentally untransmittable, and as 
Peter’s difficulty in explaining how he knew Jesus’s identity suggests, completely beyond 
discursive formulation. It is “learning that is entirely untaught.” Instead, “truth” bubbles 
up from within one’s very being, where it already resides. This conception of revelatory 
knowledge makes sense within the ontological makeup of the human body, which is 
composed by the mixture of the female principle of carnality and male principle of reason 
and truth.394 This passage riffs on the idea particular to the Homilies that humans are 
ontologically capable of “knowing all things,” but due to the polluting effects of the false 
prophetess in their bodies, humans are unable to do so apart from the intervention of God 
the Father, the masculine “root” of human existence, who “reveals” the truth already 
within one’s soul. Ultimately, at least in my argument, the idea that “revelation” is 
unlearned knowledge again echoes Iamblichus own argument that divine prognosis 
cannot be taught, cultivated, or transmitted; it belongs entirely in the domain of the gods.   
The Homilies also distinguishes true prognosis from medical and divinatory 
prognosis. Peter says, 
 
                                                          
394 Hom. 20.2. 
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We should not simply accept his prognosis as such, but only if it can stand apart from some other 
pretext. For physicians predict certain things through underlying pulses, and some predict through 
birds, and some through sacrifices, and others through all sorts of different object. Yet they are not 
prophets. If anyone should say that such predictions are similar to truly innate prognosis, he 
would be much deceived. For even when a predictor is correct, he only declares things pertaining 
to the present. Nevertheless, even these things are useful to me, for they establish that there is such 
a thing as prognosis… (Hom. 3.11-12) 
 
διὸ ἡμεῖς ὀφείλομεν περὶ τῆς προγνώσεως αὐτοῦ μὴ ἁπλῶς διαλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ’ εἰ δύναται ἄνευ 
ἑτέρας προφάσεως συνεστάναι αὐτοῦ ἡ πρόγνωσις. ἃ γὰρ οἱ ἰατροὶ προλέγουσιν, ὑποβεβλημένην 
ὕλην ἔχοντες τοῦ νοσοῦντος τὸν σφυγμόν (καὶ οἱ μὲν πτηνά, οἱ δὲ θύματα, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλας ὕλας 
πολλὰς διαφόρους ὑποβεβλημένας ἔχοντες) προλέγουσιν, καὶ προφῆται οὐκ εἰσίν. εἰ δὲ βουληθείη 
τις λέγειν τὴν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων πρόρρησιν τῇ ὄντως ἐνφύτῳ προγνώσει ὁμοίαν εἶναι, πολὺ 
ἠπάτηται. τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα παρόντα μηνύει μόνον, καὶ ταῦτα εἰ ἀληθεύει (ἄλλως δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὰ 
εὐχρηστεῖ· πρόγνωσιν γὰρ εἶναι συνίστησιν) 
 
Though Peter acknowledges that physicians like Galen and various oracles might offer 
something that resembles prognosis, he states that such practices only grasp at 
incremental knowledge of immediate events. This is in contrast to true prognosis, which 
as we saw, “stretches out prophecy without limits as far as the eon to come (Hom. 
3.12)…” We are therefore dealing with two different kinds of prognosis: one that 
masquerades as truth yet is in fact an interpretation of a particular cause, be it a pulse or 
the flight pattern of birds, and another sort that is “truly innate.” In my opinion, this 
distinction mirrors a similar distinction that Iamblichus makes in his discussion of wildly 
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diverse divinatory practices.395 In short, Iamblichus argues that there are true divinatory 
practices – which lead to divine prognosis – and false ones, which amount to nothing 
more than human calculation or cultivation of human skill.396 Peter makes a similar 
move; whether they are measuring pulses, reading bird patterns, sacrifices, or “many 
other means,” they are ultimately nothing more than predictions, hence the repeated use 
of the verb προλέγω to mark predictions of immediate events. True prognosis, Peter tells 
us, is “truly innate”, and ultimately “needs nothing more for comprehension, not 
prophesying darkly and ambiguously, so that the spoken words would need another 
prophet for their comprehension, but clearly and simply, as our teacher and prophet, by 
the innate and ever-flowing Spirit, always knew all things (Hom. 3.12).”397 
What does it mean that prognosis is “innate” (ἔμφυτος)? Peter repeats the claim 
that true prognosis is innate to the True Prophet multiple times throughout the Homilies 
(Hom. 2.10; 3.11, 15, 22, 26). Prognosis does not come from causes external to the True 
Prophet, e.g., in nature or in the “present,” but channels into the True Prophet through his 
particular somatic composition. Indeed, as I had already discussed in the previous 
chapter, the True Prophet is uniquely capable of prognosis because he is ‘homoousias’ 
with God the father, in contrast to normal humans who are by nature incapable of 
prognosis without the direct intervention of God the father, as we saw in Peter’s case. 
                                                          
395 Iamblichus writes, “There are, therefore, many kinds of divine possession and divine inspiration is 
aroused in many ways. Hence, there are indeed many different signs for it…. As a result of these 
diversities, the characteristics of those inspired are also many kinds (Ἔστι δὴ οὖν πολλὰ τῆς θείας 
κατοκωχῆς εἴδη καὶ πολλαχῶς ἡ θεία ἐπίπνοια ἀνακινεῖται, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ 
διαφέροντα…. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν ἐπιπνεομένων γίγνονται πολυειδῆ; De Myst. 3.5, 9-16)...” 
396 De Myst. 3.15; 6.4; 10.3; Addey, Divination, 248-50; Struck, Divination, 235-43. 
397 … καὶ οὐδενὸς δεῖται πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν προφητεύων ἀμαυρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα, ἵνα ἄλλου προφήτου χρείαν 
ἔχῃ τὰ λεγόμενα πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν, ἀλλὰ ῥητὰ καὶ ἁπλᾶ, ὥσπερ ὁ διδάσκαλος ἡμῶν καὶ προφήτης ὢν ἐνφύτῳ 
καὶ ἀεννάῳ πνεύματι πάντα πάντοτε ἠπίστατο.  
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The same “ever-flowing Spirit” that rendered the True Prophet capable of “changing 
forms” as he traversed history also supplies him with prognosis. Like Iamblichus, then, 
prognosis is possessed, not produced. Seen from this angle, both Iamblichus and the 
Homilies can be seen as responding to the possibility that prognosis could exist 
somewhere beyond the divine. Just as Iamblichus argues that the gods alone are 
responsible for furnishing true prognosis, so too the Homilies argues that only he who is 
ontologically divine could possess it. For both, prognosis completely transcended mere 
gnosis; divination, medical arts, cultivation of skill, philosophy, and other modes of 
discursive reasoning had to be reinterpreted as merely human endeavors, unfit for true 
forms of divine prognosis. In this way, both the Homilies and Iamblichus arrive at a 
similar conception of divine prognosis: panoptic “knowledge” distinct from human 
modes of intellection and possessed only by the gods.  
 
The Light Mind and Prognosis in the Kephalaia of the Teacher 
 
Unlike Peter and Iamblichus, “Mani” – or at least the Mani available to us through the 
surviving literature – does not distinguish his understanding of revelation from discursive 
processes of knowledge acquisition nor from medical epistemologies. Like them, 
however, Mani distinguishes between prognosis and divination (ⲣⲉϥⲕⲁⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩ). 
Nevertheless, we can trace a distinctly Syrian trajectory on the concept of “prophecy” as 
it shifts from the Sasanian milieu to the Roman Near East. As I argue below, 
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Manichaeans living in the Roman Near East398 began to conceptualize their prophet’s 
understanding of “revelation” as prognosis (Coptic: ⲛⲟⲩⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ, from Greek 
prognosis). While we cannot discern direct lines of influence extending from Iamblichus 
or the Homilies to the Manichaeans, the very deployment of prognosis as a shorthand for 
revelatory knowledge intersects with ideas of the same articulated by Iamblichus and the 
Homilies. Like the others, these Manichaeans understood prognosis as total panoptic 
knowledge, not limited to knowledge of future events, and as uniquely characteristic of 
one’s divine ontology. Indeed, as we will see in this section, it is Mani’s prognosis that 
most characterizes him as a prophet, the “Apostle of Jesus Christ.” Ultimately, then, the 
resonance of revelatory concepts clustering around prognosis furnishes evidence that 
Manichaeans in the Roman Near East were theorizing prophecy in ways that resonated 
with their Syrian neighbors.  
In order to sharpen our reading of Manichaean conceptions of revelation as 
embodied in the Kephalaia of the Teacher, it is helpful to first to look at the passages 
from the Cologne Mani Codex, where we see a variety of different modes of acquiring 
revelation. We have already explored the idea of “rapture” as found in Baraies the 
                                                          
398 While scholarship on the Coptic Kephalaias have proceeded apace, there remains much that needs to be 
clarified. I depend primarily on Pettipiece’s and van Lindt’s suggestions that the Kephalaias emerged as a 
recognizable genre of Manichaean literature somewhere in late antique Syria, most likely, Palmyra. See 
Pettipiece, Pentadic Redaction, 90; van Lindt, Names, 225-30. As for the “vexed” problem of the possible 
“Syriac” originals of the Kephalaia, see Pettipiece, Pentadic Redaction, 12 f. 22. His wariness with fixing a 
Syriac original is laudable. One might question, however, whether there was even a “Greek” translation at 
all, which would mean that Kephalaia was written in Egypt and in Coptic. If so, this would dramatically 
undermine my argument here. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Kephalaia routinely mentions 
Mesopotamian communities like the Baptists and Nazoreans, little known Sasanian places like Mesene and 
Susiana, and figures like Shapur and Ardashir makes it likely that the Kephalaia was ultimately rooted in 
Sasanian Mesopotamia. At the same time, the very fact that its contents and literary structure presupposes 
missionizing activities, coupled with the dearth of any “Eastern” texts in Sogdian or Uyghur that resemble 
the Coptic Kephalaia, helps us fix the Kephalaia to the earliest missionary efforts to the Roman Near East, 
that is, to late antique Syria.  
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Teacher’s homily to his brothers in the second chapter of this dissertation. In this section, 
I look to Mani’s understanding of revelation as found in his Letter to Edessa (CMC 
63.13-65.22). In this letter, Mani writes,  
 
I did not receive the truth and the secrets of which I speak, nor the laying of hands that is in my 
possession, from men nor from fleshly creatures, nor even from my engagement with the 
scriptures. But when my most blessed father, who called me into his grace, since he did not wish 
that I and the rest of those in the world perish, saw me and pitied me, with the purposes of offering 
well-being to those prepared to be chosen by him from the various sects. Then, by his grace, he 
pulled me from the council of the many who do not recognize the truth. He revealed to me his 
secrets and those of his undefiled father and of the whole cosmos. He revealed to me how they 
existed before the creation of the world, and how the foundation for all works, both good and evil, 
was laid, and how they manufactured the things that came from this mixture in those times… 
 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὰ ἀπόρρητα ἅπερ διαλέγομαι καὶ ἡ χειροθεσία ἡ οὖσα παρ᾿ ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἐξ 
ἀν[θρώπ]ων αὐτὴν παρέλαβον ἢ σαρκικῶν πλασμάτων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν ὁμιλιῶν τῶν γραφῶν. 
ἀλλ᾿ ὁπηνίκα θεωρήσας με οἴκτιρέν [με] ὁ μακαριώτατος [πατὴρ] ὁ καλέσας με εἰς τὴν χάριν 
αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ [βουλ]ηθείς με ἀπολέσθαι [και] τοὺς λοιποὺς τοὺς [ἐν τῷ κ]όσμωι, ὅπως ὀρέ[ξηιτην] 
εὐζωσ[ίαν] ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἑτοίμοις ἐκλεγῆναι αὐτῶι ἐκ τῶν δομάτων, καὶ τότε τῆι αὐτοῦ χάριτι 
ἀπέσπασέ με ἀπὸ τοῦ συνεδρίου τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ γινώσκοντος καὶ ἀπεκάλυψε 
μοι τά τε αὐτοῦ ἀπόρρητα καὶ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀχράντου καὶ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου. ἐξέφηνε δέ μοι 
καθ᾿ ὅν ὑπῆρχον τρόπον πρὶν καταβολῆς κόσμου καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐτέθη ἡ κρηπὶς τῶν ἔργων πάντων 
ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ φαύλων καὶ ποίωι τρόπωι ἐτεκτονεύσαντο τὰ ἐκ τῆς συγκράσεως κατὰ τούτους 
τοὺς...  καιροὺς καὶ κ... 
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What is striking about this passage is that Mani contrasts revelatory knowledge – as well 
as his authority to “lay hands” – with knowledge one might gain from other humans, 
from “fleshly creatures,” or from the scriptures.399 Mani therefore assumes that 
“revelation” – here marked as “truth” and “secrets” – cannot be acquired through human 
means or even from “learning” from the scriptures.400 We are not told, unfortunately, how 
the Father “revealed” [ἀπεκάλυψε] such secrets to Mani. We can nevertheless flesh out 
different conceptions of revelation through the CMC, which, as a whole, presents 
multiple mediums for acquiring revelatory knowledge. For example, whereas Baraies the 
Teacher privileged “rapture” as the marker of a true prophet, the CMC also regularly 
presents other mediums for revelatory knowledge, such as visions, voices, and 
“assumption,” as seen most dramatically by Mani’s recognition of and unification with 
his divine Twin. We should be cautious of separating these different modes too sharply 
with one another since they all lead to the same “content” – revelatory knowledge. 
Before turning to the Kephalaia to understand how it conceives of prognosis, it is 
necessary first to explain the relationship between the Light Mind [ⲡⲛⲟⲩⲥ ⲛⲟⲩⲁⲓⲛⲉ] – who 
is the immediate source of revelatory knowledge – and the human body. For 
Manichaeans, one of the most potent sites for exploring the interface between the divine 
                                                          
399 One might speculate why Mani addressed the Edessans in this manner. We should of course be mindful 
that this is only an excerpt of the letter. Nevertheless, it is not implausible to think that the Edessans had a 
particularly difficult time accepting Mani’s claims, especially because his teachings seem to be derivative 
of other “Christian” and “Jewish” doctrines. If this much is accepted, Mani may be arguing that he did not, 
in fact, receive his teachings from these communities or from their books, but that he received it entirely 
through revelation.  
400 For an alternate translation, see, G. Fox and J, Sheldon (trans.), Greek and Latin Sources on 
Manichaean Cosmogony and Ethics (ed. S.N.C. Lieu; Corpus Fontium Manichaeorum Series Subsidia VI; 
Turnhout: Belgium, 2010), 7. They translate this passage as “I did not receive from men or being of flesh 
nor from written communications…” I think this downplays the importance of texts within the early 
Manichaean movement, though it is difficult to be sure how best to translate this phrase. In any case, it does 
not change the fact that Mani is arguing that he received revelations directly from a divine source.  
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and the material lay in thinking through the effects of the Light Mind [ⲡⲛⲟⲩⲥ ⲛⲟⲩⲁⲓⲛⲉ] 
inhabiting fleshly bodies. After all, according to Manichaean anthropogony, the human 
body was formed as a perpetual prison for the divine light particles. It teemed with 
demonic forces that polluted the very marrow of the bones with their evil influence. 
Consequently, demons directed human thinking, epistemology, and their various carnal 
appetites. The Manichaeans called this demonically-controlled human being the “Old 
Man” (ⲡⲣⲙ ⲛⲉⲥ). When one accepted the teachings of Mani, however, the Light Mind 
inhabited the fleshly body and subdued the sinful impulses ruling the body, turning the 
person into a “New Man” (ⲡⲣⲙ ⲛⲃⲣⲣⲉ).401 But surely, the presence of a god within one’s 
body must have had some visible, spiritual, or epistemological effects on one’s being! In 
one chapter of the Kephalaia, for example, a disciple asks how a perfect god like the 
Light Mind could occupy a small fleshly body in the first place, and why the person still 
continues to suffer despite the presence of the Light Mind in his body, and other such 
questions.402 In another incident, Mani chastises a congregation of Elect who dared to 
laugh at a deformed member of their own congregation. The Light Mind is not visible to 
the world, he proclaims, yet it had already perfected the ugly man’s body.403 Another 
disciple asks Mani why he is sometimes gloomy, irritable, and sometimes he is joyful 
despite the presence of the Light Mind in his body. 404 Here, Mani acknowledges that the 
work of the Light Mind is ongoing, yet blames the stars and the ill-effects of various 
foods for one’s ongoing troubles, thereby carefully avoiding the possibility that the Light 
                                                          
401 See, e.g., 1 Ke 56 (137.12-144.12). 
402 1 Ke 38 (89.21-90.3). 
403 1 Ke 83 (200.9-201.31). 
404 1 Ke 86 (213.21-216.30).  
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Mind could be at fault. Finally, one disciple asks, why an Elect member does not acquire 
foreknowledge [ⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ] in the same way that the Apostle, in this case, the Prophet 
Mani, does when the Light Mind inhabits their fleshly body.405  
We will spend some time on this question, but it is again necessary to take another 
detour into Manichaean system of emanation. This disciple’s question makes sense only 
within the context of the Manichaean system of emanation. Indeed, the Light Mind is 
sometimes referred to as the Father of all the Apostles [ⲡⲓⲱⲧ ⲛⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ],406 or 
sometimes just the Father.407 This is because the Light Mind is directly responsible for 
calling into existence the three powers responsible for the active salvation of humankind: 
the Apostle of Light, the Twin, and the Light Form. The Apostle of Light is the pre-
incarnate form of the historical prophets, that is, Buddha, Zoroaster, Jesus, and of course, 
Mani. The Twin is tasked with guiding and aiding the Apostle spread the gospel. When a 
person accepts Mani’s teachings, the Light Nous descends to inhabit the body of the 
proselyte and begins to transform the Old Man, whose body is occupied by the forces of 
sin, into the New Man, whose body is now ruled by the five counsels of the Light Mind: 
Love, Faith, Perfection, Patience, and Consideration.408 When the Manichaean dies, the 
Light Form comes to redeem the soul of the departed and guide it back to kingdom of 
light.  
Within this soteriological drama, then, the Light Mind “fathers” the Apostle, the 
Twin, and the Light Form. Therefore, these are all reflections of one another and 
                                                          
405 1 Ke 102 (255.22-257.7). 
406 1 Ke 7 (35.21-22). 
407 1 Ke 20 (64.8-9).  
408 For further descriptions of the Light Mind, see: 1 Ke 9, 56, 96, 99, 38, 114. For recent translations of the 
same theme in 2 Ke, see Gardner and Lieu, Manichaean Texts, 227-29.  
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involved in the process of redemption. Yet there is a problem here: the Light Mind, who 
“fathers” the Apostle also inhabits the fleshly body of the Elect. Therefore, why is the 
Elect not an Apostle? And more specifically, why does he not share in the same 
prognosis as the Apostle? After all, it is the Light Mind who is responsible for furnishing 
the Apostle with revelatory knowledge. In one Kephalaia, Mani says, “The Light Mind 
also, which came from the beloved Christ and was sent to the holy Church, is a letter 
[ⲟⲩⲉⲡⲓⲥⲧⲟⲗⲏ] of peace too, in which all the revelations and wisdom [ⲛⲁⲡⲟⲕⲁⲗⲩⲯⲓⲥ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ 
ⲙⲛ ⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ] are written down / all in the light and everything that had happened… it was 
prior to all mankind, and all that… to happen at the last in it, as the holy church shall 
understand all things [ⲙⲙⲉ ⲁϩⲱⲃ ⲛⲓⲙ].”409 The Light Mind therefore furnishes revelatory 
knowledge to the Apostle and these revelations encompass the entire scope of history, 
from the moments “prior to mankind” and the eschaton. It therefore stands to reason that 
an Elect should also possess the prognosis, since he too is inhabited by the Light Nous.  
Let us now return to where we left off, with the Elect asking Mani why the Elect 
do not receive the same prognosis that the Apostle Mani received.    
 
Once again, one of the Elect questioned the Apostle, saying to him: The Light Mind that shall 
come and be revealed of the Holy Church, and assumes the [body of the] faithful and the elect: 
Why shall it not deposit [ⲙⲁϥϭⲁⲓⲗⲉ] prognosis [ⲛⲟⲩⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ, from Greek prognosis] to them 
as for the apostle? In my opinion, it ought to be revealed to them in a revelation [ⲛϭⲱⲗⲡ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ ⲛⲉⲩ 
ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲡⲟⲕⲁⲗⲩⲯⲓⲥ, from Greek apocalypse]. Just as all things are unveiled for the apostle [ⲟⲩⲁⲛϩ 
ⲁϫⲛ ⲡⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ], so also should they be revealed for the elect and they become foreknowers 
                                                          
409 1 Ke 75 (182.20-30).  
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[ⲛϭⲱⲗⲡ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ ⲛⲛⲉⲕⲗⲉⲕⲧⲟⲥ ⲛⲥⲉⲣϣⲁⲣⲡ ⲛⲣⲉϥⲥⲁⲩⲛⲉ]. So that they will attain those matters, be they 
easy or difficult. You ought to find them, knowing each other’s heart, because the child of the 
Apostle is the Mind. For whoever understands it is able to unveil all things from it [ϩⲱⲃ ⲛⲓⲙ ϭⲱⲗⲡ 
ⲛⲉϥ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ], just as with the apostle! (1 Ke 102; 255.26-256.4) 
 
The Elect asks Mani why the rest of the Elect do not gain the same prognosis that the 
Apostle gains even though the Light Mind dwells within both the Apostle and the Elects. 
In fact, it would be beneficial for the Elect to have this prognosis since then they would 
succeed in all their endeavors; they would become “Foreknowers.”410 
In response, Mani assures the Elect that the Light Mind can indeed bestow 
prognosis through revelations to the Elect, yet it chooses not to do so. Mani provides five 
practical, totally uninspiring, reasons:411 1) If they received prognosis, then they would 
become apostles and not be humble; 2) They would come to know one another’s “hearts” 
and “counsel and considerations,” and they will come to despise on other; 3) Knowing 
one another’s evil “counsel”, they will become enemies and disrupt the unity of the 
Church; 4) They will know the length of their bodily existence and squander it;412 5) 
They would “reveal” (ⲛⲉⲩⲁϭⲁⲗⲡⲥ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ) their prognosis to “magicians and diviners” 
                                                          
410 Interestingly, Hippolytus states that the Elchasaites called themselves “foreknowers” (προγνωστικοὺς; 
Refutations 10.3). The word here in Coptic is ⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ. It is clearly a Greek loan word, made all the 
more striking by the fact its juxtaposition with the “native” Coptic word for “foreknowers” [ⲛⲥⲉⲣϣⲁⲣⲡ 
ⲛⲣⲉϥⲥⲁⲩⲛⲉ]. Greek words abound in Coptic, so it is difficult to assess exactly how much weight one should 
give to the use of the Greek loan-word here. 
411 Mani’s responses to the Elect’s questions are clearly constructed in order to fit the broader pentadic 
redaction of the entire Kephalaia. For example, his first response amounts to nothing more than a claim that 
the Elect and the Apostle are different. His second and third responses are nearly synonymous and the 
fourth and fifth responses demonstrates an astonishingly low level of confidence in the Elect. We are 
therefore probably not dealing with the ipsissima verba of Mani. If so, we are in a stronger position to 
assert that this particular chapter emerged from a period following Mani’s death, again somewhere in the 
Roman Near East, most likely Syria itself.  
412 This passage is too fragmented to get its exact meaning.  
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(ⲛⲛⲙⲁⲅⲓⲥ… ⲛⲓⲣⲉϥⲕⲁⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩ; Magician [ⲛⲛⲙⲁⲅⲓⲥ] is distinct from Zoroastrian Magi, who 
are ⲙⲙⲁⲅⲟⲩⲥⲁⲓⲟⲥ), who would go around the world making money. Mani concludes this 
chapter by saying that the Elect will indeed gain prognosis once they are released from 
their evil bodies, saying “Everything that has occurred and that will occur is unveiled to 
them [ⲧⲟⲧⲉ ⲛⲧⲉ ϩⲱⲃ ⲛⲓⲙ ⲉⲁϥϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲙⲛ ⲡⲉⲧⲛⲁϣⲱⲡⲉ ϭⲱⲗⲡ ⲛⲉⲩ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ]!”  
The concept of prognosis here coheres well with both Iamblichus’ and the 
Homilies’ understanding of prognosis. First, prognosis is clearly more than just 
knowledge of future events; like the definitions of prognosis as panoptic knowledge 
discussed earlier, prognosis here encompasses the entire scope of history, knowledge of 
one’s lifespan, and delves into the very minds of humans. It is relayed via “revelations” 
[ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲡⲟⲕⲁⲗⲩⲯⲓⲥ] straight from the Light Mind to the Apostle. Second, the Prophet’s 
prognosis differs from the attempts to grasp prognosis by the “magicians” and “diviners,” 
whom the Coptic word specifies and limits as “Diviners of a Moment (ⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩ).” 
Prognosis therefore not only distinguishes between the Prophet and the Elect, it is far 
superior to prognosis of magicians and diviners, echoing constructions of divine 
prognosis as distinct from the sorts of “traditional” divination discussed above. Finally, 
prognosis marks the prophet’s ontological unity with the divine – here configured as the 
recognition and the assumption of the Light Mind and the principle of the Apostle into 
the body of Mani413 and his church, respectively. While Mani’s responses to the Elect 
betray a lack of confidence in the elite of his own Church, this chapter of the Kephalaia 
demonstrates that Manichaeans were thinking intensively about the ontological and 
                                                          
413 CMC 21.2-22.16. 
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In this chapter I argued that the late antique Syrian Syrians participated in a broader 
discourse on the epistemological limits of prognosis. I traced these converging lines 
along three communities in particular, the “Neoplatonists,” the “Jewish Christians” 
responsible for the Ps.-Clementine Homilies, and the Manichaeans. At the same time, 
other proximate communities like the Syriac-speaking Christians and the rabbis rejected 
the possibilities of human beings “grasping” divine knowledge. When we study these 
communities side-by-side, therefore, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the late 
antique Syrian intellectual environment nurtured such discourse on divine knowledge 
which in turn shaped the environment itself. In the next chapter, I extend this argument to 
Jewish materials and argue that we can see how the broader discourse on prognosis might 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANGELIC CONTEMPLATION IN THE SAR TORAH MACROFORM 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that late antique Syrians were theorizing about prophecy 
along converging lines. I tracked this shift by attending to the ways that they fashioned 
prognosis as divine, panoptic knowledge. No longer anchored to horizontal models of 
information production, prognosis switched polarities, moving from the earthbound 
grasping after bits of data to intimate participation with the divine. Of course, individuals 
and communities theorized prognosis through the prism of their own traditions, histories, 
and resources. Whereas Iamblichus argued that one could only grasp prognosis by 
participating in the activity of the gods who possessed the transcendent causes for all 
encosmic events, the Ps.-Clementine Homilies characterized prognosis as panoptic 
knowledge that coursed through the prophet Jesus by virtue of his ontological connection 
with God the Father. Furthermore, given the fact that they emerge from a shared milieu, it 
is not surprising that they both fashioned this understanding of prognosis against both 
“false” forms of prophecy and Greek models of knowledge production, especially 
philosophy. Manichaeans too discussed prognosis along similar lines, claiming that it 
belonged only to the embodied principle of the Prophet, Mani, and distinguished this 
definition of panoptic divine prognosis from the type of prognostic knowledge gained 
from traditional divinatory practices. At the same time, rabbis and Syriac-speaking 
Christians began to delimit the proper boundaries of intellectual inquiry on divine 
matters, emphasizing the impropriety or the impossibility of attaining knowledge 
reserved for the divine. This shift, I argued, may have been spurred by circulating interest 
in and theorizations of divine knowledge among these other Syrian communities.  
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In this chapter, I extend my argument to the earliest body of Jewish “mystical” 
literature – the Hekhalot corpus. It must be stated from the outset that the origins and 
continued transmission of the Hekhalot corpus are still live topics of debate, as I 
elaborate below. Indeed, the very categories of “origin” – in so far as it supposes a single 
moment of emergence – and “transmission” – in so far as it supposes a discrete object 
passing through time and space – are ill-suited for the study of a corpus as radically fluid 
and varied as the Hekhalot literature. As such, this chapter makes no explicit attempt at 
placing the Hekhalot corpus within “Late Antique Syria.” Rather, it attempts to tease out 
overlapping concerns and shared developments in conceptualizations of “divine 
knowledge” found within the Hekhalot corpus. In other words, I experiment with 
contextualizing the Hekhalot corpus by placing it within the converging ideas of 
prognosis discussed in the previous chapters, thereby examining this corpus as a 
“privileged example” for how this broader “prognostic turn” might prove instructive for 
understanding late antique Jewish conceptions of divine knowledge.414 I do not seek to 
make a strong argument regarding the “originary” provenance of this corpus. I look more 
specifically at the Sar Torah macroform [§§281-294, 297-206], which is appended to the 
macroform known as Hekhalot Rabbati [§§81-121, 152-173, 189-277].415 I argue that the 
Sar Torah’s strategy for marketing its “magical” means of acquiring Torah rhetorically 
constructs a difference between human and angelic modes of comprehension, and 
                                                          
414 I adopt J.Z. Smith’s understanding of “privileged example.” See: J.Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the 
Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), vii-viii.  
415 In light of the often radical textual fluidity of Hekhalot texts, I adopt Schäfer’s distinction between 
“microforms” and “macroforms.” See: P. Schäfer, The Hidden and Manifest God: Some Major Themes in 
Early Jewish Mysticism (trans. A. Pomerance; Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 6 
n. 14. Microforms and macroforms are referenced through Schäfer’s Synopse. See: P. Schäfer (ed.), 
Synopse zur Hekhalot-Literatur (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1981).  
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between an “inert” Torah and the “divine aspects” of Torah. Whereas the Sar Torah 
macroform aligns its conception of an “inert” Torah alongside rabbinic models of 
handling Torah, which it portrays as a profoundly fleshly and corporeal mode of 
comprehension, it fashions the “divine aspects” of Torah as something both 
instantaneously knowable and as requiring a non-human angelic mode of instantaneous 
comprehension. Both are complementary strategies for marketing the Sar Torah, and 
both, I argue, reflect an analogous development alongside the notion of prognosis 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Contextualizing the Hekhalot Corpus 
 
Despite a lack of a consensus regarding the provenance, purpose, or even the “proper 
approach” to the Hekhalot corpus, scholars have begun to secure a clearer picture of its 
development.416 Crucial to this enterprise has been the growing awareness of the 
differences between those traditions that would make their way into the Hekhalot corpus 
and the Hekhalot corpus itself as a coherent body of literature. For example, following 
the pivotal work by earlier scholars, Boustan has recently argued that the Hekhalot corpus 
as a coherent body of literature emerged sometime in the seventh century and developed 
only afterwards.417 In so doing, he distinguishes between “Hekhalot”-like traditions, 
which are a motley jumble and compilations of theurgic names, songs, and prayers that 
                                                          
416 For a review of approaches to Hekhalot literature, see: R. Boustan, “The Study of Heikhalot Literature: 
Between Mystical Experience and Textual Artifact,” Currents in Biblical Research 6:1 (2007): 130-60. 
417 R. Boustan, “The Emergence of Pseudonymous Attribution in Heikhalot Literature: Empirical Evidence 
from the Jewish ‘Magical’ Corpora,” JSQ 14 (2007): 18-38; Michael Swartz, Mystical Prayer in Ancient 
Judaism: An Analysis of Ma‘aseh Merkavah (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 219. 
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emerged from a diverse range of contexts, and the Hekhalot corpus proper, which 
organizes and authorizes those traditions by drawing on various literary structures and 
figures from rabbinic literature. Boustan employs the stratigraphic method used by 
Michael Swartz, whose work also attends to the diverse literary strata within the Hekhalot 
corpus.418 Swartz, for his part, has demonstrated through both internal and external 
evidence that the earliest traditions (in this case, pre-classical piyyut) that would 
eventually make their way into the Hekhalot corpus emerged in diverse contexts and 
were later redacted together to become the Hekhalot literature as we know it. These 
traditions emerged sometime in 4th-7th century Palestine, putting them within the orbit of 
the texts studied thus far.419 Swartz corroborates this late antique Palestinian context by 
bringing in external evidence from an early “pre-classical” piyyut in the genre of seder 
beriyot to bear on the discussion.420 For the sake of demonstration, I reproduce the crucial 
section of the piyyut here:  
 
With whom did you take counsel / and who comprehended you / when you determined to perfect / 
the heavenly host? / In your heart you decided / in your thought you conceived / in which wise to 
create them / and with what seal. / In joy you created seven palaces for yourself / and for every 
palace its contents are known. / Their doors you beat down / and appointed guards / and one must 
show a seal / to every guard.  
 
                                                          
418 For example, Swartz, Mystical Prayer; M. Swartz, Scholastic Magic: Ritual and Revelation in Early 
Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 53-109.  
419 Swartz, Mystical Prayer, 218.  
420 See M. Rand, “The Seder Beriyot in Byzantine-Era Piyyut,” JQR 95 (2005): 667–83; M. Rand, “More 
on Seder Beriyot,” JQR 16 (2009): 183-209, 189-16; M. Swartz, “Hekhalot and Piyyut: From Byzantium to 
Babylonia and Back,” in Hekhalot Literature in Context: Between Byzantium and Babylonia (eds. R. 
Boustan, M. Himmelfarb, P. Schäfer; Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 41-64. 
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.בלבך נמלכתה במחשבותיך בנתה כאיזה צד  את מי נועצתה אז מי הבינך בשורך לשכלל צבא עליונים
לברותם ובאיזה חותם. גהצתה ובראתה לך היכלות שבעה וכל היכל והיכל ידוע מה בו. דלתותם דפקתה 
 ושומרים מיניתה וחותם להראות לכל שומר ושומר...
 
This passage contains many of the key ideas found in Hekhalot literature: the heavens are 
described as seven “palaces” [hekhalot], these palaces are populated by heavenly beings, 
angelic guardians are stationed at the entrances of each hekhal, and perhaps most 
importantly, someone could ascend through each hekhal by showing an appropriate seal 
to the guardian.421 While some sort of genetic connection between this passage in seder 
beriyot and sections of Hekhalot literature is undeniable, as Swartz put it, these few lines 
amount to only a drop in the veritable sea of piyyut. Therefore, we cannot take this 
passage as evidence that Hekhalot literature existed in the form we have them at this 
early point in time. Furthermore, it is important to note that there are no references to the 
rabbis nor to any rabbinic literary forms in this passage or in seder beriyot as a whole, in 
stark contrast to the Hekhalot corpus itself, which are steeped in rabbinic references, 
knowledge of rabbinic values, and rabbinic literary forms. It would not be an 
                                                          
421 Intriguingly, the idea of using “seals” and the general language of “seals” is used throughout antique 
“poetry.” For example, in the so-called “Psalm of the Naasenes,” it says, “For that reason, Father, send me / 
Bearing seals, I will descend and I will pass through the aeons; I will reveal all the mysteries and show the 
forms of the gods; I will transmit the secrets of the holy way, calling them Knowledge…” [τούτου με χάριν 
πέμψον πάτερ / σφραγῖδας ἔχων καταβήσομαι / Αἰῶνας ὅλους διοδεύσω / μυστήρια πάντα δ'ἀνοίξω / 
μορφάς τε θεῶν ἐπιδειξω / καὶ τὰ κεκρυμμένα τῆς ἁγίας ὁδοῦ / γνῶσιν καλέσας, παραδώσω]. See: M. 
Marcovich, “The Naasene Psalm in Hippolytus (Haer. 5.10.2),” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: 
Proceedings of the International Conference of Gnosticism at Yale; New Haven, Connecticut, March 28-
31, 1978 (vol. 2; ed. B. Layton; Leiden: Brill, 1981). Also, see the Odes of Solomon, esp. Odes 4, 8, 23, 24. 
For a broader comparison with “Gnostic” and “Magical” materials, especially the Ascension of Isaiah, see 
M. Himmelfarb, “Heavenly Ascent and the Relationship of the Apocalypses and the ‘Hekhalot’ Literature,” 
HUCA 59 (1988): 73-100.  
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understatement to say that Hekhalot literature “rabbinizes” diverse traditions to create a 
relatively coherent literary corpus.  
The lack of any references to the rabbis or to rabbinic values suggests that we 
cannot identify the creators of Hekhalot traditions as the rabbis from the “classical” 
rabbinic period. This is in line with David Halperin’s argument, which cuts the cord of 
continuity that Scholem wove between the early rabbis and the creators of the Hekhalot 
literature.422 That is, the “rabbinization” of “Hekhalot” traditions appear to have been a 
post-Talmudic phenomenon, datable from the seventh century onwards, though many of 
its traditions reach back into the fifth or possibly even fourth century. These points 
ultimately indicate that the “creators” of the Hekhalot corpus were most likely late 
antique Jews located within the sphere of rabbinic influence, though they themselves 
were not rabbis. 
 For my purposes, the differences in ideology, chronology, and the multiple 
contexts of their emergence among the early Hekhalot traditions, the classical rabbis, and 
the Hekhalot corpus furnishes a convenient trajectory for situating my argument.423 To be 
clear this trajectory operates primarily as a heuristic, not as a commitment to pegging the 
corpus to any particular location in time and space. This trajectory in turn helps expose 
the gaps of “internalist” narratives and assumptions that situate Hekhalot literature in a 
direct line from Second Temple Judaism through the rabbis to Hekhalot literature. If the 
                                                          
422 D. Halperin, The Merkavah in Rabbinic Literature (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1983). 
423 This is not to discount the literary parallels, and therefore possible overlaps between Hekhalot literature 
and Babylonian incantation bowls. Nevertheless, these parallels are less helpful for discussing those ideas 
that constellate specifically around the Sar Torah traditions. See: S. Shaked, “‘Peace be Upon You, Exalted 
Angels:’ on Hekhalot, Liturgy and Incantation Bowls,” JQR 2.3 (1995): 197-219. D. Levene, A Corpus of 
Magic Bowls: Incantation Text in Jewish Aramaic from Late Antiquity (New York: Kegan Paul, 2003), 14-
17; J. Naveh and S. Shaked, Magic Spells and Formulae: Aramaic Incantations of Late Antiquity 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1993), 17-22.  
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Hekhalot corpus cannot be fully “explained” by leaning on classical rabbinic literature or 
even on those early traditions that make their way into the corpus, then scholars must 
look broadly at non-“Jewish” comparanda that might furnish better contexts for analyzing 
the gaps between these domains. Put another way, the Sar Torah macroform under 
discussion in this chapter emerged in a thoroughly rabbinicized milieu, perhaps in the 
early medieval period. They are only partially contextualizable vis-à-vis classical 
rabbinic corpus and there is virtually no trace of similar traditions in the time of the 
Amoraim.424 In light of these gaps, I argue that the shift in thinking about prognosis 
among various late antique Syrian communities provides a prism through which to 
explore the Sar Torah’s articulation of “angelic” comprehension and the divine aspects of 
Torah. While the Sar Torah’s conceptions of such must be seen as an analogous 
development, and not a genealogical or homologous one, I sketch out possible points of 
intersection in the conclusion of this chapter.  
Approaches to the Hekhalot literature are equally varied and controversial. A 
number of scholars build on Gershom Scholem’s approach to Jewish mysticism in order 
to uncover late antique forms of Jewish “mysticism.”425 As a result, they tend to read 
through the text to uncover that mystical core. In contrast, the “Princeton” school of 
Hekhalot literature, following the “revisionist” work of Peter Schäfer and Martha 
Himmelfarb, begin their encounter with the Hekhalot corpus by first attending to its 
                                                          
424 Scholarship over the past two decades have demonstrated that the rabbis represented only a small 
portion of the late antique Jewish population. Therefore, we should not expect to find traces of the rabbis in 
these early piyyutim. For more, see: S. Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society: 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 104-28. 
425 For an overview of the arguments and methods of scholars who follow in Scholem’s steps, see Boustan, 
“Study of Heikhalot Literature.”  
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literary surface and textual strata.426 This is the approach that I take here. After all, as 
already noted, both Swartz and Boustan have demonstrated the value of form and 
redaction criticism for evaluating the dating of various strata in the Hekhalot macroforms 
relative to other strata. Their conclusions that various strata of the Hekhalot corpus 
emerged in different times and contexts amounts to a devastating critique against those 
who hunt after individual mystical experience behind the text; these texts are simply too 
compromised and refracted by contingency for scholars to reassemble a unitary 
“experience.” Scholars like Elliot Wolfson and Seth Sanders have challenged the very 
bifurcation of “experience” from “literature,” and in their own ways, have insightfully 
demonstrated that this difference lies among scholars, not in the text.427 Nevertheless, as 
Boustan has carefully argued, it is precisely those literary forms that structure the 
Hekhalot corpus that allows us to speak of it as a coherent corpus.428 Therefore, I do not 
make any claims to define “Merkavah mysticism.” Instead, I seek to operate within the 
poetics of the text and work outwards from there. 
Finally, scholars have tended to contextualize Hekhalot literature alongside a 
wide range of Jewish materials, especially the rabbinic corpus, Jewish “magical” 
artifacts, and piyyut. While Jewish texts are perhaps the most obvious places to begin, 
                                                          
426 For a programmatic discussion on the study of Hekhalot Literature as a literary corpus, see: P. Schäfer, 
“Tradition and Redaction in Hekhalot Literature,” in Hekhalot-Studien (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988). 
Also, see: M. Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 108-14. For a stronger form of her argument that we should read apocalyptic or 
“ascent” literature as literature, rather than evidence for “practices of ascent,” see: M. Himmelfarb, “The 
Practice of Ascent in the Ancient Mediterranean World,” in Death, Ecstasy, and Other Worldly Journeys 
(eds. J.J. Collins and M. Fishbane; Albany, State University of New York Press), 123-37. 
427 E. Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish Mysticism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 119-124. S. Sanders, From Adapa to Enoch: Scribal Culture 
and Religious Vision in Judea and Babylon (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 204-5.  
428 Boustan, “Emergence of Pseudonymous Attribution.” 
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such materials do not “solve” the “mystery” of Hekhalot literature. In other words, the 
materials that the scholarly community acknowledges as relevant comparanda ought to be 
broadened to include a wider set of lens and texts. In this vein, I suggest that new avenues 
of research may open up if we juxtapose Hekhalot literature alongside those communities 
examined in the previous chapter who were both roughly proximate and contemporary to 
the rabbinized Jews responsible for the Hekhalot corpus. In this sense, I echo Annette 
Yoshiko Reed’s call to expand the range of comparanda used for the study of Hekhalot 
literature to include not only Neoplatonic sources but a wider range of “Christian” 
materials.429 Building on her insight regarding late antique Syria as a particularly fruitful 
region for further contextualization, I demonstrate that a lateral cross-sectional view of 
Hekhalot literature demonstrates that some materials in the Hekhalot literature resonate 
strongly with shifts in the conceptualization of prognosis discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
                                                          
429 A.Y. Reed, “Rethinking (Jewish-)Christian Evidence for Jewish Mysticism” in Hekhalot Literature in 
Context, 349-77. For Syriac comparanda, see: A. Becker, “Polishing the Mirror: Some Thoughts on Syriac 
Sources and Early Judaism,” in Envisioning Judaism: Studies in Honor of Peter Schäfer on the Occasion of 
his Seventieth Birthday (vol. 2; eds. R.S. Boustan, K. Herrmann, R. Leicht, A.Y. Reed, and G. Veltri; Mohr 
Siebeck, 2013), 897-915. In part, both Reed and Becker respond to the rather narrow range of comparanda 
that scholars have used to contextualize Hekhalot literature. Whereas a focus on Jewish comparanda – be 
they piyyut or magical artifacts – have drawn attention to how Hekhalot literature’s overlaps with these 
domains, the comparison with other comparanda has been somewhat lacking. The study of Christian 
comparanda, for example, is limited to depictions of Jesus in the New Testament and a systematic 
comparison with Islamic-era materials remains wanting. The purpose of this chapter aims at precisely this 
broader contextualization by highlighting how a common environment shaped diverse notions of “divine 
knowledge” among various communities, including those Jews responsible for the Hekhalot corpus. 
Furthermore, though I am in full agreement of Becker’s argument that one should pay attention to Syriac 
literature in its own literary and historical trajectory, at the same time, his argument also demonstrates the 
limits of using Syriac materials as comparanda when one organizes it under the “sign of the Merkavah.” Of 
course, the “merkava/merkavta” is found throughout Syriac literature, even in the “earliest” Syriac 
hymnbook known as the Odes of Solomon. Nevertheless, it is not the appearance of the merkavta in the 
Odes, for example, that may be useful for contextualizing Hekhalot literature, but the fact that the Odes 
uses liturgy to literarily demonstrate and perhaps, even naturalize, ascent and glorification of God.  
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From Torah to Torah: Angelic Contemplation and Torah in the Sar Torah Tradition  
 
In this section, I provide a literary reading of the Sar Torah – the Prince of Torah – 
macroform [§§281-306],430 which is usually appended to Hekhalot Rabbati.431 I argue 
that this macroform’s rhetorical fashioning of a distinct “epistemological” domain that is 
both different from rabbinic conceptions of Torah and identified as a divine “measure” of 
Torah [מידות התורה] parallels a similar shift in definitions of prognosis from discursively-
produced prior knowledge of future events to the divine sense of prognosis that I traced 
out in the previous chapter.432 My argument that this macroform’s bifurcation of “Torah” 
and the “divine measures of Torah” is a rhetorical and literary strategy is inspired by 
Bhabha’s discussion of “Third Space.”433 By reading the Sar Torah macroform as a text 
designed to persuade its reader about the value of the Sar Torah “magical” praxis, I make 
no claim to know what Torah “actually” was within rabbinic institutions, only that the 
Sar Torah macroform seeks to distinguish itself from it by allying itself with a 
contemporaneous and proximate notions of divine revelation. Ultimately, I argue that in 
                                                          
430 For more on this Sar Torah macroform, see: P. Schäfer, Hekhalot Studien, 269-72. J. Dan, “The 
Theophany of the Prince of the Torah” (Heb.), Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Folklore 13-14 (1992), 127-58, 
139-41; E.E. Urbach, “The Traditions on Merkavah Mysticism in the Tannaitic Period, (Heb.), in Studies in 
Mysticism and Religion (eds. E.E. Urbach, R.J. Weblowsky, and Ch. Wirzubski; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967), 
1-28; M. Vidas, Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 
169-80; D. Halperin, Faces of the Chariot: Early Jewish Responses to Ezekiel’s Vision (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1988), 464-66; Swartz, Scholastic Magic, 221-22.  
431 For an introduction to the Hekhalot Rabbati macroform, see: Ra‘anan Boustan, From Martyr to Mystic: 
Rabbinic Martyrology and the Making of Merkavah Mysticism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 36-47; P. 
Schäfer, “Zum Problem der redaktionellen Identität von Hekhalot Rabbati,” in Hekhalot-Studien, 63-74; 
James R. Davila, Hekhalot Literature in Translation: Major Texts of Merkavah Mysticism (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 37-48.  
432 Epistemology is not, of course, a universal category. It is a tool for me to focus on one aspect of this 
chapter. As I argue in this chapter, when talking about Sar Torah traditions, epistemology and corporeality 
cannot be separated in so far as the body is both the site and instrument of what we would call knowledge-
acquisition and transmission.  
433 H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2008), 52-56, 303-37. 
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the process of creating Sar Torah traditions, whose ultimate goal is to render “Torah” 
immediately accessible and comprehensible to late antique Jews, not only was “Torah” 
literarily and conceptually reconceived in ways that distanced itself from rabbinic 
conceptions of Torah but the discourse around human comprehension also shifted to 
accommodate the possibility for humans to comprehend in a divine, or perhaps better, 
“angelic” mode of contemplation. In order to make this set of interrelated arguments, I 
follow the general narratival arch of the macroform itself and highlight those passages 
that are crucial for my argument, occasionally drawing from non-Hekhalot texts. 
   The Sar Torah macroform is appended to Hekhalot Rabbati and can be divided 
into four major sections: §§281-298 might be best described as an extended historiola 
introducing and marketing the praxis of Sar Torah; §§299-303 contains the Sar Torah 
praxis, which details what one must do in order to compel the Prince of Torah to descend; 
§§304-305 is an extended postscript, also designed to market the power of the praxis; 
§306 supplies two additional prayers one must say before they recite the Sar Torah 
praxis. These prayers are in the form of Qedushah hymns, which are found throughout 
the Hekhalot corpus but most densely in the Hekhalot Rabbati macroform. Each of these 
sections were likely composed in different times and places and were only later joined 
together to form a coherent whole. This makes it difficult to speak of a unitary “author” 
or mystical “experience” behind the text. My argument here will mostly focus on the 
historiola and the Sar Torah praxis. 
The historiola narrative can be sketched out easily enough. The scene takes place 
in Jerusalem in the moments before the Jews set out to build the Second Temple. As it 
turns out, God had ordered the Jews to not only build the Temple, but to also study Torah 
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while they do it. The Jews complain that they can only do one onerous task at a time. God 
agrees with his children that these tasks are too heavy for the Jews and promises to give 
them the Secret of the Torah, which will allow them to learn the Torah instantaneously 
“without labor or toil.” This will presumably allow the Jews to go ahead with the task of 
building the Temple. Upon hearing God’s promise, the angels object, claiming that God’s 
glory and praise depends on the Jews constantly forgetting and relearning the Torah. God 
overrules their objection and appears to the Jews in the Jerusalem in the still unbuilt 
Temple and gives them the Secret of the Torah. Zerubbabel b. Shealtiel, the governor of 
the province, then stands up and mediates the Secret of the Torah by “interpreting the 
meaning of the angelic names.”  
 
Human Corporeality and Angelic Comprehension 
 
The Sar Torah’s differentiation between the mere presence of the Torah and its divine 
aspects can be detected by attending to how it distinguishes between human practices of 
handling Torah and “angelic” modes of comprehending of Torah. The Sar Torah alludes 
to this bifurcation already in the opening passage.   
 
R. Ishmael said: Thus said R. Akiva in the name of R. Eliezer: From the day that the Torah was 
given to Israel until the latter House was built, the Torah was given but its majesty, worth, glory, 
weightiness, greatness, ornamentation, awe, dread, fear, wealth, loftiness, pomp, sweat, strength, 
power, rulership, and its might were not given until the latter House was built and the Shekhinah 
did not dwell in it (§281). 
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אמ'ר ישמעאל כך אמ' ר' עקיבא משום ר' אליעזר הגדול מיו' שניתנה תורה לישראל ועד שנבנה בית האחרון תורה ניתנה  
אבל הדרה ויקרה כבודה וגדולתה ותפארתה אימתה פחדתה יראתה עושרה וגאותה וגואנה זיעתה וזיותה עוזה ועזוזה ממשלתה 
 וגבורתה לא ניתנה עד נבנה הבית האחרון ולא שרת בו שכינה434
 
This passage telescopes to two pivotal moments in Jewish history, the Sinai event and the 
return of the Jews from the Babylonian captivity, in order to make the controversial claim 
that the latter moment was far more important than the former or any time in between.435 
This is explicitly confirmed by a passage in the conclusion of the narrative, which quotes 
the words of Haggai, “At that moment, He said, ‘The Glory of this latter House shall be 
greater than that of the former one’ (Hag. 2:9). For in the former sanctuary, I was not 
bound to my children except by this voice…”436 Whereas God could only communicate 
with the Jews through his voice in the era that began at Sinai to these moments prior to 
the building of the Second Temple, the Secret of the Torah ushers in a new epoch of 
Jewish history, one characterized by God’s full presence, his Shekhinah, inhabiting the 
Temple among his children. Yet what does it mean that God gave a powerless, 
unadorned, and impotent Torah to the Jews through Moses on Sinai?437 This passage 
rhetorically and radically distinguishes between “mere” Torah, which, as we will see, is 
what the rabbis possess, and its true worth, which is what the narrative seeks to market to 
                                                          
434 B238. Major differences in manuscripts will be noted in the footnotes.  
435 As already noted by Schäfer in Hekhalot-Studien, 271.  
436 The Hebrew word for voice [קול] may be evoking something of the idea of the “heavenly voice,” the bat 
qol [בת קול], a disembodied voice of God found throughout rabbinic literature and which is perhaps most 
famously known as a form of vitiated form of prophecy. If God is implying in this passage that he spoke to 
the “classical prophets” through a bat qol, then it complicates the idea of the cessation of “prophecy.” 
Rather, “prophecy” itself would have to be reclassified as an inferior form of communication. For more on 
the bat qol, see: L.S. Cook, On the Question of the ‘Cessation of Prophecy’ in Ancient Judaism (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 149-72. 
437 The text already assumes a rabbinic conception of two Torot, that is, both the written and the oral Torah. 
Swartz, Scholastic Magic, 102 n. 145.   
 237   
 
its audience. Words like “majesty,” “wealth,” “glory,” and so on make up the regular 
panoply of terms that Hekhalot literature uses to describe heavenly beings and objects.438  
The narrative goes on to describe the Jews’ complaint against God. They 
complain that they are overworked since they must both engage in Torah and build the 
Temple. Here, I suggest that we discard notions of some abstract sense of “intellectual 
weariness” or “intellectual labor,” which are ultimately rooted in Greek notions of the 
separation of the intellect and the body. Rather, the Jews’ complaint only make sense if 
we understand the study of Torah as physically wearying and laborious, indeed, as 
toilsome as building an entire Temple. This will be important when we investigate the 
angel’s protest later in the narrative. Thus, the Jews say, 
 
You have cast many troubles upon us. Which one shall we grasp? Which shall we abandon? For 
you have put upon us great toil and great burden. You said to us, “Build a House! Although you 
are building, be busy with Torah. [§282] 
 
אמרת לנו בית א'ע'פ שאתם  גדול זו נעזוב השלכת עלינו טורח גדול ומשוי זו נתפוס אי הרבה צרות הפלתה עלינו אי
 בונים עיסקו בתורה...439 
 
The intersection between physical toil and engaging in Torah comes through better in the 
Hebrew. The study of the Torah is something to be “grasped” comes from the root ש\תפס , 
which carries it with a sense of both the physical act of taking hold and intellectual 
comprehension. The Jews also call God’s tasks for them a great “toil” and a “burden,” a 
                                                          
438 Swartz suggests that these descriptions allude to the praxis itself, though I am more inclined to read 
them as the result of the praxis. See Swartz, Scholastic Magic, 102. 
439 D436. 
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word that carries a sense of physical weightiness. These points hint at something that will 
be demonstrated later in the narrative, namely, that the human body is as much an 
instrument for human comprehension as it is an instrument for heavy labor. Both are 
“hard labor.” 
God ultimately acquiesces to his children’s complaint and promises to give them 
the “Secret of the Torah” which will allow them to learn Torah effortlessly. In fact, God 
goes on an extended monologue detailing what (he thinks) the Jews want. He says,  
 
I know what you seek and my heart has recognized what you desire: much Torah is what you seek 
and a multitude of talmud and a great many traditions, to inquire about halakha what you wish for, 
and a multitude of ribbui440 is what you desire, to increase testimony in mountains upon 
mountains, to raise up hills upon hills of sagacity, to increase talmud in the courtyards,441 and 
pilpul in the streets, to multiply halakha like the sand of the sea, and ribbui like the dust of the 
inhabited earth,442 to establish yeshivot in the gates of the tents, to expound in them the forbidden 
and permitted, to declare impure in them that which is impure, and to declare pure in them that 
which is pure, to declare the ritually fit that which is fit and the unfit that which is unfit, to 
recognize in them types of blood and to instruct the menstruant on what they should do, to tie 
crowns on your heads and the wreath of kings on the heads of your children, to compel kings to 
bow to you, and to compel nobles to prostrate before you, to spread your name on every shore, and 
your renown in their cities, to enlighten your faces with the radiance of the day, between your eyes 
like the planet Venus. If you merit this seal to make use of my crown, no ignorant person shall be 
found in the world and there shall not be a fool or simpleton among you (§§287-288). 
 
                                                          
440 M40, O1531, D436 have “Secrets.” V228, “Rabbi.” B238, “Rabbanim.” N8128, “Rabbotim.” 
441 Reading here “in the courtyards” from M40, O1531, N8128, D436, V228, and B238, instead of “with 
difficulties” in M22.  
442 B238 “Rabbanim,” V228 “Rabbi,” M40, N8128, and D436 “Rabbis,” O1531 “Secrets.”  
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כ'ו אני יודע מה אתם מבקשים ולבי הכיר מה אתם מתאוים תורה מרובה אתם מבקשים והמון תלמוד ורוב שמעות לשאול  
הלכה אתם מצפים ולהמון ריבוי אתם מחמדים להרבות תעודה הרים הרים להעלות תושייה גבעות גבעות להגדיל תלמוד בקושיות 
רות תבל. להשיב ישיבות בשערים אהלים לפרש להם איסור והיתר לטמא בהם ופלפול ברחבות להרבות הלכה כחול הים וריבוי כעפ
את הטמא ולטהר בהם את הטהור להכשיר בהם את הכשר ולפסול בהם את הפסול להכיר בהם את הדמים ולנידות מה יעשו לקשור 
יכם להפקיע שמכם כל כופה כתרים בראשיכם ועטרת מלכים כראש בניכם לכוף מלכים להשתחות לכם להזקיק רוזנים להשתטח לפנ
וזכרכם בכרכיהם  להאיר פניכם כזריחת יום ובין עיניכם ככוכב שחרית אם תזכו לחותם זה להשתמש בכתר שלי עם הארץ לא 
 ימצא בעולם וככב וכסיל וטפש לא יהיה בכם...443
 
This passage is filled with references to post-Talmudic rabbinic institutions and practices: 
Torah, Talmud, traditions, halakha, legal dialectic (pilpul), midrashic methods of 
category inclusion (ribbui), yeshivot, ritual purity, the forbidden and the permitted, and so 
on. In contrast to Dan who reads this passage as the jealous outpouring of Jews who 
desired material things as recompense for the study of Torah,444 or Urbach, who sees in 
this text a moment of self-critique against the materialistic desires of the rabbis,445 or 
Vidas, who sees this list as what God wants the Jews to abandon,446 I read it within the 
genre of a historiola: it is designed to “sell” the Sar Torah praxis and is therefore a part of 
God’s marketing ploy. This long parade of a list is not primarily meant to convey a sense 
of what the Jews actually desire or reject – though they may very well desire or reject 
such things – but to communicate how much sheer work and toil will be required of the 
Jews if they hope to acquire these things through their own paltry means of human 
comprehension. God thus uses the language of superabundance, e.g., “heaps,” “hills upon 
hills,” “multitude,” “mountains upon mountains,” “dust of the inhabited earth,” and 
                                                          
443 M22. 
444 Dan, “Theophany,” 140-41. 
445 Urbach, “Traditions,” 23-24. 
446 Vidas, Tradition, 173. 
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dangles in front of the Jews their wildest dreams, e.g., “to compel kings,” “tie crowns,” 
and so on, in order to demonstrate the sheer impossibility of these things. He is setting up 
the Sar Torah praxis as the perfect answer to this problem.  
Yet, as Vidas has pointed out, this is only one list.447 In fact, there is another list. 
The passage goes on to say,  
 
You are happy but my attendants are sad. For this mystery is one of the mysteries that goes forth 
from within my storehouse. The sound of your academies are like fatted calves of the stall. You no 
longer learn with labor nor with toil, but rather by the name of this seal and by the invocation of 
the awesome crown. The amazed one is amazed by you. Many die from groaning over you and 
their soul departs upon hearing of your glory. Riches and wealth grow mighty upon you, the great 
ones of the world cling to you. The family that you marry into, pedigree surrounds it from all 
sides. The one blessed by you is blessed, and the one praised by you is praised. You are called 
ones who make the many righteous (Dan 12:3), they call you those who make beings meritorious. 
The proclamation of new moons goes forth from you, and the intercalation of years from the 
prudence of your wisdom. By your hands the patriarchs are anointed and by your mouth the 
fathers of the law court stand. You establish the Exilarchs, the judges of the cities act on your 
authority. The reform of the world issues from you and there is none who opposes it… (§§289-
291).448 
 
אתם שמחים ומשרתי עציבים שרז זה אחד מן הרזים יוצא מיבית גנזאי קול ישיבות שלכם בו כעגלי מרבק לא בעמל ולא 
רבים מתים באנחתם ויוצא נשמתם על שמע כבודכם ביגיעה אלא בשם חותם זה ובזכרון כתר נורא וחדווה דווה עליכם 
יה ככל עושר וממון מתגבר עליכם גדולי עולם מודבקים בכם משפחה שאתם נושים ממנה סובבת אותה וחסות ויחזק
משתבח בכם משתבח מצדיקי הרבים אתם נקראין מזכי ביריות קוראין אתכם קביעות צדדיה המברך בכם המבורך וה
                                                          
447 Vidas, Tradition, 171-74. 
448 M22. 
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ל פיכם אבות בית דין עומדין ראשי כמתכם על ידיכם נשיאים משתמשחין עשנים מעורמת ח חדשים מכם תצא ועיבור
 גליות אתם מעמדין שופטי עיירות מרשות שלכם תקנת עולם מכם תצא ואין מי חולק עליה... 
 
God’s claim that his attendants are sad is part of his ploy: he wants to demonstrate how 
lucky the Jews are that God is giving them something that even the angels hold dear. For 
his part, Vidas does not see a direct relationship between the two lists. Instead, he sees 
the first list as what “the author abandons” and the second list as what he “embraces.”449 
Regarding the first list, Vidas argues that it is in fact a parody of specifically post-
Talmudic Babylonian pedagogic ethos, one that was dominated by the study of 
Talmud.450 As for the second list, Vidas argues that it “includes mostly general, non-
academic kinds of prominence,” and, as a result, sees this list as radically discontinuous 
with the first. Of course, he acknowledges that yeshivot and other rabbinic institutions do, 
in fact, appear in the second list, though he downplays them.451 I am skeptical that the 
model of “abandonment” and “embracing” captures the relationship between these two 
lists. Instead, I suggest that we align the two lists according to the binary introduced in 
the beginning of Sar Torah macroform; whereas the first list, which is heavily associated 
with the rabbinic practices of learning, are aligned with the mere “presence” of the Torah, 
the second list is aligned with the power of Torah that God will soon give to the Jews. 
Therefore, it is not that the Jews seek the wrong things in the first list, but they did not 
ask God for enough things. God wants the Jews to know that once they merit the “name 
                                                          
449 Vidas, Tradition, 173.  
450 Vidas, Tradition, 173, and M. Vidas, “Hekhalot Literature, the Babylonian Academies, and the 
tanna’im,” in Hekhalot Literature in Context, 141-76; Urbach, “Traditions,” 23-24; Dan, “Theophany,” 
140-41; Swartz, Scholastic Magic, 221-22.   
451 Vidas, Tradition, 173.  
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of the seal and the invocation of the crown,” they will not only be masters of rabbinic and 
political institutions, but also wield royal power, compel princes, establish courts, send 
out legal reforms that affect the world, and so on.   
When God promises that he will relinquish the Secret of the Torah, (he says) that 
the angels object. Again, we should be mindful that this is God is ventriloquizing what he 
thinks the angels will say. As such, this is part and parcel of his ploy to market the 
indescribable value of the Sar Torah praxis. According to God, the angels argue that if 
God gives the “secret of prudence” to the Jews, then the Jews will no longer feel 
compelled to worship God. Furthermore, all distinctions between the fool and the sage 
will disappear, since everyone will be able to master the Torah. At the same time, the 
God’s ventriloquization of the angels slips into a broader question regarding how angels 
contemplate and comprehend. This question is intimately tied up with the human body. 
According to God, the angels say,   
 
Do not let this mystery go forth from your storehouse, and the secret of prudence from your 
treasuries. Do not value flesh and blood like us, do not consider humans as our substitute.452 Let 
them labor at Torah according to the measure453 in which they have labored and those who come 
for generations and onward. Let them establish it with toil and with great anguish. This is your 
                                                          
452 The 10th century Karaite Salman b. Yeruhim seems to have had an alternative version of this text. In his 
version, the angels tell God to, “Loathe (man) who is flesh and blood, not exalt him like us. Do not 
compare him (garbled)… Hear our outcry, receive our admonition. Leave man to labor in the Torah, and let 
him not resemble us” [ נו געל בשר ודם ואל תתהדרו כמונו ואל תדמה אותו בשאו כאשר בשתנו תשמע צעקתינו תקב תוכחותי
 ,There are important differences between his version and the one here .[עזוב אדם יגע בתורה ולא ידמה לנו
though some sort of genetic relationship seems difficult to deny. See: M. Idel, “Tefisat HaTorah beSifrut 
haHekhalot ve-gilguleyha bekabbalah,” in Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
1981): 23-84, 23-33. Halperin, Faces, 518-22. Also: I. Davidson, The Book of the Wars of the Lord: 
Containing the Polemics of the Karaite Salmon ben Yeruhim against Saadia Gaon (New York: JTS of 
America, 1934), 125.  
453 For more on this understanding of “Measure” as it relates to Torah, see below.  
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glory, this is your ornamentation: when they forget and reassess before you, calling out with a 
whole heart, supplicating with a willing soul: May what we read remain in our hands. May what 
we have studied be established in our hearts. May our inner affections take hold of whatever our 
ears have heard. May our heart hold onto the paths of talmud which we heard from the mouth of 
the master and may they honor each other.454 But if you reveal this mystery to your sons, the lesser 
shall become equal to the great and the fool like the wise.455 [§292] 
 
רז זה אל יצא מבית גזניך וסתר ערמה מאוצרותיך אל תשים בשר ודם כמונו אל תדמה בני אדם תמורתינו ייגע בתורה 
כמדה שהם יגיעים ובאים מן הדורות ואילך יקיימו אותה בעמל גדול ובתשניק גדול זהו כבודך וזו היא תפארתך כשהן 
ים בנפש חפיצה יעמוד בידינו מה שקרינו יתקיים בלבינו משכחין חוזרים וסודרים לפניך קורין בלבב שלם לך מתחננ
יתפשו כליותינו מה ששמענו אזנינו יחזיק לבבנו נתיבות תלמוד ששמענו מפי הרב ויהיה מכבדין זה את זה אבל אם רז זה 
 אתה מגלה לבניך ישוה קטן כגדול וכסיל כחכם זו תשובת עבדיו... 
 
Schäfer has already demonstrated how this passage draws from a broader rabbinic trope 
on the rivalry between angels and human.456 Nevertheless, this passage is distinct in that 
what is at stake is the difference between human and angelic modes of contemplation. 
Before continuing, it is necessary again to expand our interpretation of the words “labor,” 
                                                          
454 Swartz suggests that this passage means may the human honor the angel, not may humans honor one 
another. Swartz, Scholastic Magic, 97 n. 134.   
455 The chief angel concludes his argument by saying that if God were to relinquish this secret to the 
humans, then “the lesser shall become equal to the great and the fool like the wise.” That is, there would no 
longer be any competition among humans because they will all be equal in terms of wisdom. In that 
respect, the humans would also come uncomfortably close to the angels. As we know in the case of Elisha 
b. Avuyah, there was a tradition that there was no “competition” among the angels [b. Hagiga 15a]. 
Hekhalot Rabbati picks up on this theme and describes the relationship between Qaspiel and Dumiel, two 
of the highest angels guarding the sixth palace, in the following manner: “His domain is the lintel of the 
right side, but Qaspiel the prince used to thrust him aside, yet he has nothing against him: no grudge and no 
hatred and no jealousy and no rivalry, but one is for my glory and the other is for my glory.” [230]  The 
highest angels, therefore, do not compete with one another in so far as they are both servants of God’s 
glory.  
456 Schäfer, Hidden and Manifest God, 49-53, 51. On rabbinic discussions on the creation and essence of 
Angels, see: idem., Rivalität Zwischen Engel und Menschen: Untersuchungen zur Rabbinischen 
Engelvorstellung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1975), 51-55. 
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“weariness,” and “great anguish” in this passage away from the way that it is usually 
understood, that is, as some abstract sense of “intellectual labor” or the “weariness of 
intellectual production.” We must see the “labor” of Torah study as actual physical labor 
without assuming a strict division between the “intellect” and the “body.” In fact, as we 
recall, the Jews’ complaint to God in the opening passages only makes sense if we 
understand the study of the Torah as a physically laborious process on par with the hard 
labor required to fashion stones to build a Temple. Once this is accepted, the angels’ 
protest makes better sense. After all, the angels cry out, “Do not value flesh and blood the 
same as us. Do not consider humans as our substitute.” The verb tedameh [תדמה] 
reinforces this point in so far as the root דמה is related to conceptions of similarity and 
comparison. Given the immediate context of this passage, the angels are protesting that 
giving humans the Secret of Torah will allow them to comprehend Torah like the angels, 
that is, without labor, toil, or the need to reassess their learning. The unspoken fear is that 
by relinquishing the secret of perfect comprehension to “flesh and blood,” they will be no 
longer merely “flesh and blood,” but by virtue of their ability to comprehend Torah in 
ways that transcend their bodily limitation, they might be transformed into something 
bordering on the angels. It is therefore no accident that the angels emphasize the 
mediation of the human body for the standard rabbinic practices of producing, 
transmitting, and storing “Torah,” as seen by the many references to the hand, “soul,” 
heart, inner affections, ear, and mouth – the corporeal, and hence, faulty, instruments by 
which a human being receives, processes, and stores Torah.  
 Furthermore, the text uses a crucial word here – “measure.” The angels say, “Let 
them labor at Torah according to the measure in which they have labored [ כמדה שהם
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 and those who come for generations and onward. Let them establish it with toil [יגיעים
and with great anguish…” As I argue below, the word “measure” operates as a way of 
assigning equivalent “value” between two heterogeneous things; in a way, it operates 
much like the word “capital” does, in so far as “capital” renders two unlike things (e.g., a 
tangible house and its “market price”) equivalent. The angels argue through a similar sort 
of logic: the human body should acquire Torah only in so far as it has labored for Torah. 
The measure therefore fixes two unlike things – “Physical Hardship” and “Torah” – and 
naturalizes a model of equivalence that God will seek to upend in the following section. 
In response, God argues that this “treasure” is in fact something that he had 
reserved for the Jews precisely for this moment in time after their exile. I do not find 
God’s response convincing at all; it sounds more like him trying to get the angels off his 
back than an attempt to answer their complaint in good faith. In fact, God ultimately 
argues that he “forgot” about this mystery until this moment. In any case, God being God, 
the angels can say no more. God’s response also intimates something of the angelic mode 
of comprehension. He says,  
 
Do not, my attendants, do not my servants, do not pester me about this matter. This mystery shall 
go forth from my storehouse and the secret of prudence from my treasures. I am revealing it 
concerning it to a beloved people, I am teaching it to a faithful seed. For them it was hidden from 
the days of old but from the days of creation it was decreed for them, yet it did not come upon my 
heart to tell it to any of these generations from the days of Moses until now. It was kept for this 
generation, to make use of it until the end of all generations, “For they have gone forth from evil 
to evil and Me they did not know” (Jer. 9:2), since their heart was dulled from the exiles, so words 
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of Torah were as hard as bronze and as iron to them. It is fitting to make use of it to bring Torah 
like water into their midst and like fat on their bones. [§293] 
 
אל משרתי אל עבדיי אל תטריחו לפני בדבר זה רז זה יצא מבית גנזיי וסתר ערמה מאוצרותי לעם אהוב אני מגלה עליו 
לזרע נאמן אני אלמד אותו להם גנוז מימות עולם ומימי בראשית להם מתוקן לעולם ולא עלת על לבי ליתנה לכל הדורות 
ש בו עד סוף כל הדורות כי מרעה אל רעה יצאו ואותי לא ידעו הללו מימות משה ועד עכשיו לדור זה היה שמור להשתמ
שנטמטם לבם מן הגליות והיו דברי תורה קשין באזניהן457 כנחשת וכברזל להן ראוי להשתמש בו להביא תורה כמים 
 בקרבם וכשמן בעצמתום...458
 
As Vidas and others have richly demonstrated, the study of the rabbinic traditions was 
often conceptualized in terms of embodiment.459 Here, God makes a series of metaphors 
that fixate on the nexus between the human body and comprehension; the heart, which is 
the primary site for what we would call “memory,” is dulled by the harshness of the exile. 
The Hebrew word here comes from the root טמטם, which carries with it a sense of 
physical, and perhaps even onomatopoetic obdurateness. The passage describes “Torah” 
as hard as bronze and iron, recalling the sense of “inert” Torah mentioned in the 
introduction of the narrative.460 In contrast, the mystery of the Torah would allow the 
Jews to imbibe Torah “like water in their midst” and have it cling to them “like fat upon 
their bones.” The human body thus continues to operate as both the means and site of 
intellectual production, and though God does not explicitly “angelify” flesh-and-blood, 
                                                          
457 Only B238 and V228 has “in their ears.” 
458 V228. 
459 Vidas, Tradition, 185-90. 
460 Vidas argues that references to “bronze and iron” ultimately parody Babylonian modes of studying 
Torah through Talmudic dialectic. See Vidas, Tradition, 185-90.  
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he makes it clear that the secret will “reactivate” the heart to allow the Jews to fully 
embody the Torah.    
Schäfer further suggests that the angels’ protest evokes a set of hymns found in 
Hekhalot Rabbati, the so-called Gedullah hymns.461 Following his suggestion, I would 
like to digress a bit to focus on these hymns to better contextualize the Sar Torah 
macroform within Hekhalot literature. The Gedullah hymns as a whole highlight the 
inimitable qualities of the yored hamerkavah, and at times suggests that the human being 
is somehow equal if not superior to the angels. Still, it presents an alternative set of 
concepts and idioms for articulating revelatory knowledge, one that focuses on ascent and 
visions over the Sar Torah’s focus on transcending the epistemological limits of the 
human body. Where they converge, however, is in their focus of revelatory knowledge 
and their attempts at fashioning an alternative “epistemological” domain apart from but 
with reference to Torah. In fact, the ability to “know” or “navigate” this “epistemological 
domain” is called “wisdom” and this “wisdom” is explicitly defined against Torah. These 
hymns begin by depicting the yordei hamerkavah as recipients of revelatory knowledge. 
They say, 
 
Greater than all is to bind oneself to him so as to make enter and to bring one into the chambers of 
the palace of the Aravot firmament so that one stands to the right side of the Throne of Glory and 
at other times to stand him opposite T‘TsSh to see whatever they do before the Throne of Glory 
and to know what will happen in the future in the world: whom they bring low, whom they raise 
up / whom they weaken, whom they make mighty / whom they impoverish, whom they make rich 
                                                          
461 Schäfer, Hidden, 51. Idem., “Origins,” 245-53.  
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/ whom they kill, whom they bring to life / whom they dispossess of an inheritance, whom they 
give an inheritance / whom they bequeath Torah, and whom they give Wisdom.462 (§§81-82) 
 
 גדולה מכולם להזקק לו ולהכניסו ולהביאו לחדרי היכל ערבות רקיע להעמידו לימין כסא הכבוד פעמים שהוא עומד נגד 
למי משפילין למי מגביהין למי ט'עצ'ש יהוה אלהי ישראל לראות מה שעושין לפני כסא הכבוד ולידע מה שעתיד להיות בעולם 
ירושה למי מנחילין לו  ומרפין למי מגבירין למי מרוששין למי מעשירין למי ממיתין למי מחיין למי נוטלין ממנו ירושה ולמי נותנין ל
 תורה ולמי נותנין לו חכמה463
 
At least according to the opening section of the Gedullah hymns, the primary goal of the 
yored hamerkavah is to acquire prior knowledge of events in the future. Furthermore, this 
passage makes it clear that God’s angels – the anonymous “they” implied in the series of 
verbs – are the primary agents of God’s will. The visionary thus gains prior knowledge of 
future events by witnessing angelic activities. This passage juxtaposes a series of 
opposites, with the first object characterized negatively and the second object positively, 
and culminates with the juxtaposition of Torah and Wisdom. Curiously, this implies that 
Wisdom is the superior opposite of Torah; indeed, whereas the angels cause humans to 
“inherit” Torah (Heb. מנחילין), most likely by means of a horizontal transmission of Torah 
from Moses to the rabbis,464 Wisdom is given (Heb. נותנין) along a vertical axis from the 
angels to human beings. This verbal difference leaves no doubt here that these two things 
cannot and should not be conflated. On the one hand, this is highly unusual for the 
Hekhalot corpus; I do not know of any other passage that so explicitly contrasts Wisdom 
                                                          
462 A related passage in Ma‘aseh Merkavah seems to riff on this idea. “R. Ishmael said: R. Akiva said to 
me, I prayed a prayer and I gazed at the Shekhinah and I saw everything they do before the throne of 
glory.” [§592] 
463 V228.  
464 m. Avot 1.1. 
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and Torah.465 On the other hand, if we follow the principle that the more difficult reading 
is more likely to be the correct one, then we should be willing to let it stand that Wisdom 
and Torah are in fact opposites of one another. More importantly, this passage parallels 
the Sar Torah macroform’s extended strategy for fashioning an alternative domain of 
“angelic” contemplation; just as the Sar Torah macroform distinguished between the 
mere presence of the Torah and its divine “power, glory, beauty,” especially in order to 
articulate an epistemological difference between human and angelic comprehension, this 
Gedullah hymn also highlights the superiority of angelic “Wisdom” over a “mere” Torah 
transmitted from human to human.  
The following Gedullah hymn can be seen as articulating what the opening 
passage means by “Wisdom.” Whereas in the first hymn the visionary acquired 
knowledge of future events by observing the angelic retinue go about their business, in 
this hymn, he himself possesses the ability to know matters beyond human ken; he 
possesses “Wisdom” not merely “Torah.” It says,  
 
Greater than all is that he who peers into every deed that mortals do, even in inner rooms, whether 
fine deeds or corrupt deeds. He knows and recognizes a thief, he knows and recognizes a man who 
commits adultery, he knows and recognizes a murderer. He knows and recognizes the one 
suspected of having contact with an impure woman. He knows and recognizes the one who 
spreads malicious gossip / Greater than all is that he recognizes all sorcerers. [§83] 
 
                                                          
465 On the identification of “Wisdom” with “Talmud” among the Amoraim, see: Vidas, Formation, 118-
132.  
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גדולה מכולם שהוא צופה בכל מעשי בני אדם שעושין אפילו בחדרי חדרים בין מעשים נאים בין מעשים מקולקלין גנב 
דע ומכיר בו נואף אדם יודע ומכיר בו רצח אדם יודע ומכיר בו נחשד על הנדה יודע ומכיר בו סיפר לשון הרע אדם יו
 יודע ומכיר בו גדולה מכולם שהוא מכיר בכל יודעי כשפים.466
 
The yored hamerkavah gains panoptic visionary insight into the nitty-gritty aspects of 
human affairs. He “peers” into people’s lives like a voyeur and “knows and recognizes” 
those who are suspected of violating some important aspect of a rabbinically-inflected 
Jewish society. The Gedullah hymns continues by describing all the terrible things that 
will happen to those who harm, slander, or press a legal charge against the yored 
hamerkavah. It concludes by describing the yored hamerkavah as completely “upright, 
ritually fit, meek, humble, sensible, chosen, and set apart…”  
 Let us return now to the Sar Torah macroform. I argued above that the angels 
protest God’s decision to relinquish the secret of the Torah because it would make the 
Jews transcend their bodily limitations and render them more like angels in their ability to 
master Torah instantaneously. The conclusion of the narrative corroborates this sense of 
angelic contemplation, albeit indirectly. Here, God appears to the Jews in Jerusalem and 
the Jews fall upon their faces in reverence. In response, God says,  
 
Why are you falling down and falling upon your faces? Get up and sit before my throne in manner 
that you sit in the yeshivah. Grasp the crown and receive the seal and learn the Order of the Book 
                                                          
466 M22. 
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of Torah:467 how you do it, how you inquire into it, how you make use of it, how they elevate the 
paths of your heart, how your hearts peer into Torah.468 [§298]  
 
למה אתם נופלין ומוטלין על פניכם עמדו ושבו לפני כסאי במדה שאתם יושבים בישיבה ותפשו כתר וקבלו חותם ללמדו 
סדר ספר התורה היאך תעשוהו היאך תדרשוהו היאך תשמשו בו היאך מעלין נתיבות לבבכם היאך צופים לבבות שלכם 
 בתורה...469 
 
No longer are the Jews to prostrate themselves before God in submission, but to sit before 
him as a student before his teacher. At God’s urging, the Jews “learn the Secret of the 
Torah.”470 It is worth mentioning that the verbal pattern diverges from the second-person 
imperfect to the active participle in the phrase “how they elevate the paths of your heart.” 
The anonymous “they” can be no one else but the angels, who “elevate the paths of your 
heart” so as to enable it to peer directly into the Torah.471 Whatever the exact meaning of 
these phrases, they nevertheless express a sort of elevated corporeal epistemology 
different from the laborious and faulty process of transmission outlined by the angels in 
their complaint against God. When placed in that context, the angelicized heart 
completely bypasses the normal means of Torah comprehension, transmission, and 
retention to peer directly into Torah in a moment of instantaneous comprehension.  
This is further corroborated by the conclusion of this section of the Sar Torah 
macroform. Here, God appears to the Jews in Jerusalem and is about to transmit the Sar 
                                                          
467 B238, “Order of the Secret of this Torah,” D436, “Secret of Torah,” M40, “Crown of Torah,” O1531, 
“Order of the Torah,” N8128, “Order of this Torah.” V228 lacks this microform.  
468 D436 and M40, ‘How your hearts weary after Torah.” N8128 lacks this statement. V228 lacks this entire 
microform. The best reading seems to come from M22 and B238. 
469 M22. 
470 There is considerable variation in the manuscripts what exactly the Jews are learning. See footnote 50 
above.   
471 There is a parallel in §565: “They placed wisdom into the heart of R. Ishmael.”  
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Torah praxis to them. In order to do so, Zerubbabel b. Shealtiel, the governor of the 
region at that time,  
 
…stood up before Him like an interpreter and elaborated the names of the Prince of the Torah, one 
by one, with his name, the name of his crown, and the name of his seal.472 [§298]  
 
מיד זרובבל בן שאלתיאל ועמד על רגליו לפניו כתרגמן והיה מפריש שמות שרי תורה אחד ואחד בשמו שום כתר ושום  
 חותם
 
Even though God tells the Jews to stand up as if they are in a rabbinic yeshivah, what 
they study could not be further from the norm. Instead of study of Torah, Mishnah, or 
Talmud, Zerubbabel “interprets” the angelic names of the Princes of Torah; this passage 
implies that Zerubbabel somehow translated these divine names, thereby mediating the 
transfer of divine names from the divine realm to the human. When we relate this 
conclusion to the introduction, we come full circle: the “power” and the “glory” of Torah 
is not simple mastery of Torah itself, or at least narrowly measured by rabbinic 
conceptions of Torah, but a sort of linguistic “epistemology” or “wisdom” modeled after 
angelic modes of comprehension.   
 
Making Torah Instantaneous: Equating Measure of Torah and Value of Torah 
 
                                                          
472 Swartz, Magic, 105; For a parallel, see §581: “R. Ishmael said, As soon as I stood on my feet and I saw 
my face illuminated from my wisdom, I began to explicate every single angel who is in every single 
palace….”    
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I have argued so far that the Sar Torah macroform raises the possibility that human 
beings could contemplate like the angels, instantaneously and without toil or labor. This 
was intimately tied with the human body as the site and instrument of comprehension. In 
this section, I turn to the other side of the same coin. If humans could “instantly know” 
Torah, then Torah too must be articulated in such a way that makes it “instantly 
knowable.” I argue here that the recurring phrase “Measures of Torah” expresses this 
understanding of Torah.473 To put it differently, the ‘value of the Torah” is made 
equivalent to its “measure” and ultimately to the entirety of the “Torah” itself; these are 
all different aspects of the same “Torah.” I contextualize this part of my argument 
through other “para-rabbinic” texts from the same time period as the Sar Torah traditions.  
In §656, R. Ishmael says that after he learned the mystery of Sandalphon from R. 
Akiva, “There was light in my heart like the light of lightning that goes from one end of 
the world to the other.”474 This wonderfully evocative phrase intimates something of the 
intensity, breadth, and immediacy with which R. Ishmael was able to comprehend Torah. 
At the same time, the understanding of “Torah” itself begins to shift into something that 
is instantaneously knowable. I argue that those responsible for the Hekhalot corpus did so 
by framing “Torah” itself as an object that can be “measured” and therefore could operate 
                                                          
473 For previous discussions on the middot within a “mystical sense,” see M. Fishbane, The Exegetical 
Imagination: On Jewish Thought and Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 67-70; 
Interestingly, as Fishbane discusses, The Fathers According to Rabbai Nathan (A, 37) records a tradition in 
the name of R. Meir. “R. Meir says: Why does the verse say, And you shall know the Lord?” To teach that 
whoever possesses all these middot knows the knowledge of God” [ מלמד שכל אדם שיש בו כל מדות הללו יודע
 Though it is not clear that these middot are hypostases of God, as Fishbane maintains, the .[דעתו של מקום
middot nevertheless serves as a way of identifying two unlike things – in this case, the “Knowledge of 
God” and the seven “qualities” of God, e.g., Wisdom, Righteousness, Justice, under a single concept. Thus, 
those who know the seven “measures of God” at the same time know the “knowledge of God.” As we will 
see, the term middah will do the same in the Hekhalot materials as well.  
474 Another parallel: R. Ishmael said: As soon as I hear this report from R. Nehuniah b. HaQanah, my 
master, I stood on my feet and I asked him all the names of the princes of wisdom. And from the request 
that I asked of him I saw light in my heart like the days of heaven [§580].  
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as “a measure for” something else. The importance of understanding Torah along these 
lines is that it articulates an emic approach to the instantaneous comprehension of Torah 
that does not rely on foreign conceptions of an “Intellect” occupying the “body.”475 We 
are not dealing with a Platonic understanding of “Intellect” but a similar idea expressed 
through the resources available to late antique “para-rabbinic” Jews. As I argue in the 
next few pages, the “measure of Torah” becomes identical in value with the entirety of 
Torah itself. By way of introducing this topic, let us look a few passages later in §§678-
679, where R. Ishmael recounts how Metatron 
 
… illuminated my heart at the Gates of the East, and my eyeballs peered into the depths and paths 
of Torah. And not a single matter that my ears heard from the mouth of my master and from the 
mouth of the disciples was ever forgotten again. And as for all the paths of Torah on which I acted 
in truth, never again did I forget them. Even if I myself had not done any Torah, this measure that 
I fixed in Israel would correspond for me as the entire Torah since they increase Torah without 
labor.”476  
 
י מעמקות ובנתיבות תורה ושוב לא נשתכח מפי דבר מכל מה ששמעתי מיד האיר לבבי בשערי המזרח וצפו גלגלי עינ
באזניי מפי ר' מפי התלמידים ובנתיבות תורה שעשיתי בהן לאמיתו שוב לא הייתי משכח אותו.477 א'ר' ישמע' אם לא 
.עשיתי תורה כלום רב לי המידה זו שקבעתי בהן בישר' כנגד כל התורה כולה כדי שירבו את התורה שלא ביגיעה  
 
                                                          
475 Just because an internal account for instantaneous contemplation can be made does not discount my 
broader argument here that the environment – as shown by shifting understandings of prognosis among a 
range of Syrian communities – for such an idea was an important factor in its emergence. History is not a 
matter of either this explanation or that explanation, but both this and that. 
476 As Swartz notes, this logic is already introduced in rabbinic literature in m.Pe’ah 1:1 and b.Qiddushin 
39b (Swartz, Scholastic, 64 n. 5)  
477 O1531. M22 lacks much of this section. V228 and M22 completely lacks §679. 
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The purpose of the last sentence is clearly to market this Sar Torah practice as something 
powerful. But how does it market its power? In contrast to our passage in §298, where the 
heart itself peers into Torah, here R. Ishmael’s supercharged eyeballs “peer into the 
depths and paths of Torah.” Torah becomes “spatialized” and suddenly has “depths” and 
“paths.” Other phrases like the “pathways of Torah” and “chambers of Torah” are 
sprinkled throughout the Hekhalot corpus.478 What these articulations have in common is 
a sense of “measure” : rooms, paths, depths, and pathways are all measurable. In other 
words, Torah itself becomes conceptualized as a “measure of something” and as 
something that is “measurable.” Therefore, it is not a coincidence that R. Ishmael calls 
the Sar Torah praxis a “measure” since this “measure of Torah” is equivalent to the 
entirety of Torah [כל התורה כולה], as the passage above explicitly states.479 Most 
importantly, the “measure of Torah” does not detract from the value of the “actual 
Torah,” but by virtue of its isomorphic relationship to the Torah, it encapsulates the 
“entirety of Torah.” In other words, the measure of Torah and the Torah itself have the 
same “value.”  
This concept may demand more explanation. Moderns distinguish between the 
measure of a book, for example, from the book itself by demarcating an arbitrary number 
(e.g. 8 by 11 inches) along an abstract “grid.” However, Masuzawa reminds us that this 
                                                          
478 Phrases like the “Chambers of Torah” [§§549, 556, 569, 678] may refer to memory practices, though 
this form of symbolic reasoning is complicated by the fact that the word “chambers” is clearly drawn from 
other domains of Hekhalot literature and not from any identifiable mnemonic practices. 
479 Whereas the classical use of the word “measure” [מידה] is relatively restricted to exegetical principles, 
e.g., binyan av and gezerah shavah, or to certain aspects of God, e.g., the “measure of mercy (of God),” by 
this time, the word carries with it significantly more semantic baggage and must be translated differently 
depending on context. For example, Davila translates “measure” as “characteristics,” “practice,” “being,” 
“consistency” (Davila, Translation, 29), and Schäfer translates it as “quality” (Schäfer, Origins, 278), or as 
“mystery” (Schäfer, Hidden, 112, 119) Though these definitions make sense within the context, they do 
little to explain how the plain meaning of the word “measure” fits within the context. 
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“grid” is not immanent feature of the book itself but a peculiar representation of it born 
from a particular moment in time and space.480 As a result, we must reimagine how late 
antique Jews thought about “measure.” For R. Ishmael, the “measure” of Torah and the 
“value” of the Torah are, in fact, identical. I suggest therefore that the ability to 
comprehend Torah in a moment of angelic comprehension went hand-in-hand with an 
understanding of Torah that is “instantaneously comprehensible.” The Sar Torah 
traditions rendered Torah “instantaneously comprehensible” by rearticulating it as 
something measurable and, therefore, the measure of something. By knowing the 
“measure of Torah,” one knew the Torah itself.  
Not surprisingly, this understanding of Torah as a “measure of” and as something 
measurable finds itself at home in certain Hekhalot traditions. Here, let us return briefly 
to a famous narrative in Hekhalot Rabbati, where one of the guardians of the sixth palace, 
Dumiel, gives R. Ishmael a pep-talk before he is allowed into the seventh palace. Dumiel 
says, 
 
Before you I testify and forewarn you twice that the descender does not descend to the chariot 
unless he has in himself these two measures: he is one who has read the Torah, Prophets, 
Writings, studies Traditions, midrash, laws, lore, and the interpretation of laws – forbidden and 
permitted action, or he is one who has confirmed every negative commandment that is written in 
the Torah and he has kept all the prohibitions of the laws and of the customs and of the 
instructions which were said to Moses from Sinai. If he says to him, to Dumiel the prince: I have 
in me these two measures, then Dumi’el the Prince binds himself to Gabriel the scribe and writes 
                                                          
480 For an in-depth discussion on the “grid” as an abstract representation rather than as an “immanent” 
measure of any given object, see: T. Masuzawa, In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origin of 
Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 23-25. 
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the papyrus for him and he hands the papyrus on the pole of the wagon of this man, and the 
papyrus says, “Such and such is the Torah of so-and-so, such and such are his deeds, and he seeks 
to enter before the throne of his Glory.” (§§234-235) 
 
והיה אומ' לו שתים לפניך אני מיעיד בה ומתראה בה אין יורד היורד למרכבה אלא מי שיש בו שתי מידות הללו מי שקרא  
תורה נביאים וכתובים ושונה משנה ומדרש הלכות ואגדות ופתרון הלכות איסור והיתר או מי שקיים כל לא בכתובי' בתורה ושמר 
כל האזהרות של חוקים ושל משפטים ולתורות שנאמרו לו למשה בסיני481 אם אמר לו לדומיאל השר יש בו אחד משתי מידות הללו 
היה דומיאל השר מחזיק482 לו לגבריאל הסופר וכותיב483 לו את הניאר והיה תולה את הניאר ביסיקרא של קורון של אותו אדם 
 לומר לך כך וכך תורתו של פלו' וכך וכך מעשיו ומבקש ליכנס לפני כסא כבודו484
 
Dumiel identifies two “measures” here: first, the complete mastery of the rabbinic corpus 
(de-rabbanan), and second, the mastery of the laws written in the Torah (de-orayyta). Yet 
Dumiel does not use the tried-and-true shorthand of “de-rabbanan” and “de-orayyta.” 
Rather, he goes completely in the opposite direction by both expanding the number of 
legal “domains,” almost to the point of absurdity, and by making finer-and-finer 
distinctions between domains of law. After all, what exactly are the differences between 
the “prohibitions of the law,” the “customs of the law,” and “forbidden actions?” When 
read as a work of rhetoric, the passage is clearly trying to highlight the difficulty of 
entering the seventh palace; by pushing to expand the number of legal domains, the text 
insinuates that it is impossible for anyone to enter. This is prime marketing strategy; the 
creator of this passage wants to demonstrate the “theurgic” power of the divine names by 
demonstrating that they are equivalent to these insurmountable “measures.” This leads us 
                                                          
481 “In Sinai” found in M22, N8128. 
482 Probably “to bind” [נזקק], as in M40, O1531, N8128, D436, V228. 
483 Kotiv or Koteiv is unique to M22.  
484 M22. 
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squarely back to the question of why Dumiel calls them “measures.” The use of the word 
“measure” is not accidental; it transforms what we would call a “domain of law” into a 
“measure of law.” These “measures” of Torah contains the value of the Torah itself. 
Neither Gabriel nor Dumiel distinguishes between the “measures of Torah” and the 
“Torah” itself when he writes: “Such-and-such is the Torah of so-and-so, such-and-such 
are his deeds…” The “measures of Torah” are identical with the value of the Torah itself. 
They do not “refer to” the Torah – as if they are separate from the Torah– but are the 
linguistic content and breadth of Torah. After all, it would make no sense to allow 
someone into the seventh palace who only possesses a “measure of Torah” if “measure” 
was merely meant to reference Torah; the measure itself must somehow encapsulate the 
value and the content of Torah. 
The idea of a Torah that is both “measurable” and “measure of something” seems 
to have migrated to other corners of the post-Talmudic Jewish literature. Though this 
discussion far exceeds the present boundaries of this chapter, it is worth briefly 
mentioning two texts that “play” with such an idea.485 It must be admitted, however, that 
neither text explicitly uses the word “measure” [מידה]. Nevertheless, their parallels with 
the Hekhalot traditions discussed above will be hopefully apparent. In the late midrashic 
text known as the Midrash Alpha Beta de-Rabbi Akiva,486 for example, in which 
“Merkavah”-like traditions are woven into the literary warp-and-woof of the text, it says, 
 
                                                          
485 This idea was sparked by a conversation with Annette Yoshiko Reed and Jillian Stinchcomb at PSCO.  
486 Also known as the Alphabet (Otiyyot) of R. Aqiva.  
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… From here you learn that understanding is greater before the Holy One, blessed be he, than the 
Torah. For even if a person reads the Torah, the Prophets, the Writings, and recites the Mishnah, 
Midrashim, Halakhot, Aggadot, Shemu’ot, Tosefot, Moshvot, Ma’amadot, Haggadot, and all the 
Orders of Creation, but does not have understanding, his Torah is equivalent to nothing, as it is 
said, “The understanding of those who understand will be hidden…” (Isa. 29). Another matter: 
Why did the Holy One create the world with the letter Bet in Genesis and conclude the Torah with 
the letter Lamed? For if you put them together, they are Bet-Lamed and when you reverse it, they 
are Lamed-Bet. The Holy One said to Israel, My sons, if you establish these two letters – Bet-
Lamed and Lamed-Bet – I will attribute to you all as if you have established the entire Torah from 
the letter Bet to Lamed.487 
 
מכאן אתה למד שגדולה בינה לפני הק''ב יותר מן התורה שאפילו אדם קור' תורה נביאי' וכתובים ושונה משנה ומדרשות  
הלכות ואגדות שמועות ותוספות מושבות ומעמדות והגדות וכל סדרי בראשית ואין בו בינה אין תורתו שוה כלום שנ' ובינת נבוניו 
הק''בה את העולם בב' בבראשי' וסיים בל' התור' כדי שכשתדבקם ביחד אינן אלא בל וכי תסתתר )ישעיה כ''ט( ד''א מפני מה ברא 
תהפוך אותם אינן אלא לב אמר להם הק''בה לישראל בני אם אתם מקיימים שני דברים הללו בל ולב אני מעלה עליכם כאלו קיימתם 
 את התורה כולה מב' ועד ל'...
 
These sections comes from a section of the Midrash Alpha Beta organized around the 
letter bet. In the first section, the midrashist argues that understanding [binah] is superior 
to sheer knowledge of “Torah.” He makes this argument by listing each domain of the 
rabbinic curriculum – that is, demonstrating the rabbinic measure of Torah. This parallels 
the strategy that Dumiel used in the passage above. The result is an accordion-like 
conception of Torah, both expandable to include a range of distinct domains and 
                                                          
487 A. Jellinik (ed.), Bet ha-Midrasch: Sammlung kleiner Midraschim und Vermischter Abhandlungen aus 
der jüdischen Literatur (vol. 3; Leipzig, 1853-77; Repr., Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1938), xiv-
xvii, 12-64. I am not aware of more recent work on this text, though it may be useful as a tool for 
rethinking the development of “Hekhalot” literature and its possible “impact” on other literary domains.  
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collapsible under a single conception of Torah. Though the word “measure” is not 
explicitly mentioned here, I think the similarities are nevertheless clear: “understanding” 
is measured against the entire “measure” of the rabbinic Torah. Yet, this text differs from 
the Hekhalot text above in one crucial aspect. Whereas R. Ishmael had said that his 
“measure” – that is, the Sar Torah praxis – should be considered as great as [רב לי... כנגד] 
the entire Torah, here, “understanding” of the Torah is measured against the rabbinic 
breadth of Torah and is found to exceed it. Therefore, in both cases, the “measure of 
Torah” itself is primarily used to measure that which is equivalent or even beyond it in 
value.  
The second section [davar aher] narrows the scope to just the Pentateuch, that is, 
the “Torah of Moses.” Here, the midrashist asks why the Torah begins with the letter Bet 
[“in the beginning”: בראשית] and ends with the letter Lamed [“in the eyes of all of Israel”:  
 God seems to be saying that the entire breadth of the Torah can be .[לעיני כל-ישראל
measured by the letters bet and lamed, the letters that bookend the Pentateuch. The value 
of this measure is found to be equivalent when measured from the front to back [bet to 
lamed] and back to front [lamed to bet].488 Similar to the passages from the Hekhalot 
literature discussed above, God says to the Jews that if they “establish” Bet-Lamed and 
Lamed-Bet, that is, the beginning and end of Torah, then he will consider them to know 
the entire Torah. Put differently, he will attribute to them the entire “value” of the Torah 
if they “establish” in their hearts just the opening and concluding letters of the Torah. 
                                                          
488 Though the Hebrew word lev [לב] means “heart,” which is often depicted as the seat of memory, it is not 
clear what bel [בל] might mean.   
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Again, the understanding seems to be that the “measure” of the Torah – bookended here 
by the letters bet and lamed – are in fact equivalent in value to the entire Torah.  
 Another example might be found in the medieval text known as the Alphabet of 
Ben Sira.489 According to this text, Ben Sira is the son of the prophet Jeremiah, and thus 
his “wisdom” carries with it a prophetic nuance. In one passage, it says: 
 
It is said about Ben Sira that he learned the Book of Leviticus in one day. The teacher said to him, 
“The order of creation were altered for you.” Ben Sira answered, “There is nothing new under the 
sun,’ for Jeremiah did likewise. Moreover, it is written, ‘And Benaiah ben Yehoiada the son of a 
living man’ (2 Sam. 23:20). Was everyone dead and only he alive? But ‘living’ must mean that he 
was alive in the study of Torah, for he learned the Book of Leviticus in one day.” It is also said 
about Ben Sira that during that year he mastered the entire Pentateuch. The second year he learned 
the Prophets, and the Writings, the Mishnah, the Talmud, the Halakhot, and the Aggadot. During 
the third year, he studied the fine points of the scribes and of the Torah. In the fourth year, the 
lighter matters and the heavier matters, verbal analogies, cycles, and Gematria. In the fifth year, he 
learned the conversation of the ministering angels, the palm trees, and the demons, as well as fox 
fables. During the sixth year, he mastered Sifra, Sifrei, Tanna de-bei Eliyahu, matters that are deep 
(sealed?) for humans. By the seventh year there was not a major or minor subject that he had not 
studied.490  
 
אמרו עליו על בן סירא שביום אחד למד ספר ויקרא ואמר רבו עליך נשתנו סדרי בראשית חזר לו והלא ירמיה למד כן 
חי בתורה שלמד ועוד שבנייהו בן יהוידע למד ספר ויקרא שנ' ובנינו בן יהוידע איש חי וכי כל עולם כולו מתים נינהו אלא שהוא 
ספר ויקרא ביום אחד אמרו עליו על בן סירא בשנתו למד כל התורה כולה שנייה למד נביאים וכתובים משנה ותלמוד הלכות ואגדות 
                                                          
489 For an English translation and short commentary, see: David Stern and Mark Jay Mirsky (eds.), 
Rabbinic Fantasies: Imaginative Narratives from Classical Hebrew Literature (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 167-202; For the Hebrew text, I rely on Eli Yassif, Sippurei Ben Sira bi-Yeme ha-
Benayim: Mahadurah Biqortit u-Firke Mehqar (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984).  
490 Yassif, Sippurei, 212-13.  
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שנה שלישית דקדוקי סופרים ודקדוקי תורה שנה רביעית קלות וחמורות גזירות שוות תקופות וגימטריות שנה חמישית שיחת 
ושיחת שדים וממשלות שועלים שנה שישית סיפרא וסיפרי ותנא דבי אליהו ודברים החתומים לבני אדם  מלאכי השרת שיחת דקלים
 שנה שביעית לא הניח דבר גדול ודבר קטן...
 
Ben Sira’s stupendous mastery of the entire rabbinic curriculum over an absurdly short 
span of seven years parallels fantasies of the same in the Sar Torah traditions, even as it 
ultimately works to parody the entire notion of “Wisdom.”491 At the same time, it 
“measures out” the full breadth of Torah by parsing out each domain of rabbinic learning 
for the purpose of fantasizing about the stupendous mastery of Torah, a strategy that we 
had seen above in both the Alphabet of Rabbi Aqiva and in the Hekhalot literature. Given 
Ben Sira’s relatively quick mastery of the entire breadth of rabbinic knowledge, it is no 
surprise that Ben Sira’s teacher suspects some miraculous deed operating behind the 
scenes. One wonders whether the creators/redactors of this passage had Sar Torah 
traditions in mind, which were certainly circulating among post-Talmudic Jews at that 
time. In fact, in an alternative version of this text, the text glosses the “great things” 
                                                          
491 King Nebuchadnezzar asks Ben Sira why people have to fart. He says that if they did not fart, they 
would not know when they had to defecate and would thus soil their clothes. For more about parody in the 
Alphabet of Ben Sira, see D. Stern, “The Alphabet of Ben Sira and the Early History of Parody in Jewish 
Literature,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel (eds. H. Najman and 
J.H. Newman; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 423-48. Stern has noted to me that Ben Sira’s mastery of the Torah and 
Rabbis fits within the text’s parody of Geonic Babylonian culture; therefore its connection to Hekhalot 
literature might not be as strong as I assume. In my defense, I would add two points: First, as mentioned 
above, a later gloss reads the “Great Things” mentioned in the text as a reference to the Ma‘seh Merkavah. 
I do not think that it is a coincidence that this gloss invokes Hekhalot literature precisely within this 
context; the later editor saw the similarities between the fantasy of rabbinic mastery embedded within 
Hekhalot literature with the same found in the Alphabet of Ben Sira and equated them. In this sense, I 
should clarify that I do not see the Alphabet of Ben Sira as a literary parallel to the Hekhalot literature nor 
as a parody of Hekhalot literature. Rather, in so far as both Hekhalot literature and the Alphabet of Ben Sira 
engage with rabbinic culture from a position that lies beyond the rabbinic fold, I do not think that it is too 
surprising that both texts craft conceptions of Torah with similar rhetorical moves for similar purposes.  
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mentioned in the last line of the passage as the Ma‘aseh Merkavah [ דבר גדול זה מעשה
  .[perhaps referring to the Hekhalot macroform known by that name [§§544-596 ,[מרכבה
This understanding of “measures of Torah” bears on my reading of the conclusion 
of the Sar Torah macroform [§§299-303]. These passages come after the narrative and 
were probably composed independently.492 The praxis itself is a combination of 
adjurations and recitations of the “midrash of the Sar Torah,” which presumably refers to 
the narratival historiola. This section concludes by marketing the power of the Sar Torah 
praxis:   
 
When he completes the twelve days of adjuration, he goes forth to all the measures of Torah that 
he seeks, be it Miqra, Mishnah, or Talmud, or to a vision of the Chariot, and he goes forth with a 
measure of purity away from grief and from great affliction.493 For the learning is in our hands, the 
intervention of the ancient ones, and the tradition of the ancients, which they wrote and set down 
for generations to come, for the humble to make use of it. And whoever is fit is answered by it and 
whoever is not fit is answered by them.  (§303)   
 
                                                          
492 Nevertheless, the very fact that they are joined together means that the redactor(s) of this particular Sar 
Torah macroform saw something in the praxis that was conceptually similar, generative, or continuous with 
the narrative. Perhaps the fact that the praxis calls for the practitioner to “fix the midrash of the Torah in 
prayer thrice daily and nightly” occasioned the generative or conceptual link between the praxis and the 
narrative. After all, one of the things that God urges the Jews to do is to “seek out” [היאך תדרשוהו: same root 
as midrash, מדרש] the Sar Torah in order to gain a vision of the Torah. Furthermore, the reference to the 
taqqanah may refer to the narrative where it says that the “Taqqanat haolam will go forth from you.” 
References to “grief and great pain” also parallel the major complaints that the Jews had against the double 
burden of Torah study and Temple-building and the reference to the “ancients” writing down the 
“teaching” and bequeathing it to future generations parallels Zerubbabel’s act of transmitting the Secret of 
Torah. 
493 The word here in Hebrew [סיגוף] carries with it a sense of ascetic practices. See Jastrow, 975.  
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שנים עשר ימי' יוצא לכל מידות תורה שמבקש אם למקרא אם למשנה אם לתלמוד או לצפיית המרכבה כי במדת  ווככלות
טוהר הוא יוצא מצער ומסיגוף גדול כי תלמוד גדול הוא בידינו תקנת ראשונים ומסורת עתיקים שכתבו והניהו לדורות 
 להשתמש בו צנועים ומי שראוי נענה בו ומי שאינו ראוי להם נענה בהם494
 
After the practitioner “adjures” the angels for twelve days, they come to “raise the 
pathways of the heart” [§298] so that he might “go forth” into every “measure of Torah” 
and with a “measure of purity.” To be clear, the practitioner does not acquire “Torah,” 
but the ability to “go out” into the measures of Torah.495 What is at stake is the mode of 
acquiring and conceptualizing Torah. Therefore, the angels who “raise the pathways of 
the heart” renders the person into someone capable of immediately comprehending 
Torah. They lead the person away from “great grief and from great afflication,” which 
refer to the “grief” and “afflication” of trying to retain Torah through the faulty 
instruments of the human body. By the same token, the term “measures of Torah” are 
separate domains of rabbinic learning and denotes them as immediately comprehensible 
domains of Torah, as I argued above. In this way, both the knower of Torah grasps at a 
form of panoptic and instantaneous mastery of Torah and the Torah itself becomes 
configured as an object that is instantaneously knowable.   
Most curious about this concluding passage, however, is the intrusion of the 
phrase “Vision of the Chariot.” It is a “measure of Torah” or not? After all, the text says 
that the person goes forth to “every” measure of the Torah, which means that what 
follows should contain everything the text considers to be a “measure of Torah.” Though 
                                                          
494 M22.  
495 I suspect that the verb to “go out” deliberately evokes the “spatialized” aspects of Torah discussed 
previously, namely, the “pathways” of Torah, the “depths” of Torah, and so on.  
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the “Merkavah” appears once in the narrative as the “Throne of Glory” (§298) and once 
in reference to the “Princes of the Merkavah” (§302), they appear only incidentally. 
Picking up on the seemingly anomalous phrase “Vision of the Chariot,” Swartz argues 
that this section represents a “late synthesis” of the Sar Torah and Merkavah traditions, 
which seems to assume that the Vision of the Chariot is in fact a measure of Torah.496 I 
think that the manuscript evidence points to an alternative reading, namely, that it is not a 
“measure of Torah” but in fact an affiliated but ultimately distinct domain of revelatory 
knowledge. After all, though all seven manuscripts in Schäfer’s Synopse consider the 
Miqra and Mishnah as measures of Torah [מידות תורה] and use the word “whether” [אם] to 
mark that they are complementary aspects of Torah, four of the seven manuscripts497 use 
the word “or” [או] instead of “whether” [אם] prior to the phrase “Vision of the Chariot.” 
As a result, the use of “whether” [אם] to include the “Vision of the Chariot” as a 
“measure of Torah” in the other three manuscripts looks suspiciously like an attempt to 
harmonize the text. I suspect that the “or” [או] in the four manuscripts implies a 
disjuncture; the “Vision of the Merkavah” is not to be considered a measure of Torah in 
the same sense as Miqra, Mishnah, or Talmud, but an affiliated domain of revelatory 
thought accessible through the same praxis. If so, this is further evidence that late antique 
Jews were theorizing a form of revelatory “epistemology” affiliated yet distinct from a 
rabbinically-inflected notions of Torah.  
  
                                                          
496 Swartz, Magic, 107. Halperin, Faces, 434; Davila writes, “In other words both the power of instant 
Torah-learning and the visionary journey to the chariot are in view, a combination that weakens scholarly 
efforts to separate the Sar Torah traditions from traditions about descent to the Chariot.” (165)  
497 D436, M22, M40, O1531. 
 266   
 
Conclusion: Method as History 
 
I have argued above that in their fashioning of an alternative “magical” model for the 
acquisition of Torah, the Sar Torah traditions articulates both a conception of Torah that 
is rhetorically distinct from rabbinic models of “laborious” comprehension and an 
alternative model of human comprehension, a sort of angelic comprehension that 
transcends epistemological limitations of the human body. This articulation of an 
instantaneously-knowable “measure of Torah” and the instantaneous knower of Torah 
can be seen against the backdrop of broader theorizations of prognosis; “Torah” becomes 
the precinct of the angelic knower, removed from rabbinic modes of corporeal knowledge 
production and transmission.  
In this concluding section, I examine one way of thinking about the relationship 
between the broader theorizations of prognosis discussed in the previous chapter, on the 
one hand, and the Sar Torah traditions, on the other. I begin with the assumption that 
these separate phenomena are “related” to one another in some manner; how they are 
related, however, is something that we cannot divine. The best that I can do is to point 
insistently to the parameters set at the beginning of this study: the fact that these 
theorizations of prognosis and angelic comprehension and the “Measures of Torah” 
happened in roughly the same place and time period is the best argument that they are 
interrelated and not simply “internalist histories” playing out along their own tidy 
temporal or spatial planes. I recognize completely that this is a tautological statement 
between “method” and “result.” We are caught in the same problem that the Iamblichus 
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and the Ps.-Clementine warns us against: the conclusions to our answers are 
predetermined by the parameters and the variables we set, and “truth” is again deferred.  
Nevertheless, I wish to briefly argue for the value of thinking about the Hekhalot 
corpus alongside a wider range of texts, even in the face of tautological reasoning. The 
goal, after all, is to find something “interesting” – to put it in J.Z. Smith’s terms – or 
aesthetically satisfying – as Ankersmit argues.498 After all, as Ankersmit reminds us, 
“truth” is not the criteria for historical investigation, but what is at stake, and the 
scholarly discussion the “truth” of my historical representation is precisely what is 
important and interesting.499 In that sense, the study of Hekhalot literature alongside a 
richer variety of texts – especially “Neoplatonic,” “magical,” and “Christian”– may help 
tell more interesting and satisfying narratives of the past, narratives whose “historical” 
plausibility will always be up for grabs. I would like to focus particularly on the usage of 
“Neoplatonic texts” and “Neoplatonism” as comparanda for the study of Hekhalot 
literature, not because they are inherently more “useful,” but because they have been so 
instrumental in modern definitions of “mysticism.” 
For the most part, scholars of Hekhalot literature following Scholem have tended 
to limit their engagement with other corpora to a rather narrow range of non-Jewish 
sources.500 Calls for broader range of comparanda, sounded by Annette Yoshiko Reed, 
                                                          
498 Smith, Drudgery Divine. F.R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002). 
499 Ankersmit, Historical, 35.  
500 The debate between Schäfer and Boyarin, for example, regarding the “Christian” influence in 3 Enoch 
around the figure of Enoch-turned-Metatron, who is called the “Little YHWH” (יהוה הקטן), may be seen as 
indicative of the state of using Christian comparanda in the field. Indeed, though both Schäfer and Boyarin 
have different views on the “Christian-ness” of the “Little YHWH,” especially the “channels” or 
“responses” through which that idea may have made their way into 3 Enoch, which as every party 
acknowledges, is a late-medieval macroform, their discussion centers regarding its relationship to 
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Adam Becker, and Steven Wasserstrom, have inspired my own thinking about the 
“location” of Hekhalot corpus vis-à-vis other corpora.501 Furthermore, thanks to the work 
of Ra‘anan Boustan in particular, we are in a better position to judge the development of 
Hekhalot literature in its medieval Byzantine and Mesopotamian contexts. It is within 
these specific contexts that a greater attention to the historical development of those ideas 
that have traditionally been framed as “philosophy” or “mysticism” might provide a 
better picture for the development of modes of articulating human and divine difference 
and similarity in the Jewish corpora.  
This is not, of course, to revive the specter of “mysticism” must less “philosophy” 
as essential categories of or distinct from “religion.” At the same time, the heuristic value 
of such obviously imperfect categories for organizing our archive of the past should also 
not be ignored. In this sense, I break from both Wolfson and Schäfer, who sees little 
value of the study of Neoplatonism for the study of Hekhalot literature. In the words of 
Wolfson, “However, as I noted above, this typology of unitive experience has its roots in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Christianity centers primarily on passages from the New Testament, especially the letters of Paul. While 
practically this long-durée focus serves as a way to anchor the debate, it does remarkably little to answer 
the question of historical representation - “Why here and why now?” In other words, whereas Boyarin sees 
a genealogical argument from ancient “binitarianism” weaving its way throughout multiple “Jewish” and 
“Christian” communities and appearing in 3 Enoch, and Schäfer sees an act of imitation, in which 3 Enoch 
“responds” to the New Testament depictions of Jesus, I posit that we should look at the development as an 
analogous development, tethered to a particular time and place, that is, the medieval Byzantine and/or 
Abbasid empire. See: P. Schäfer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009), 322-27; idem., The Jewish Jesus: How Judaism and Christianity Shaped Each Other (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012),141-49. D. Boyarin, “Beyond Judaisms: Metatron and the Divine 
Polymorphy of Ancient Judaism,” JSJ 41 (2010): 323-65; idem., “The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish 
Binitarianism and the Prologue to John ,” HTR 94.3 (2001): 243-84; idem., “Two Powers in Heaven; or, the 
Making of a Heresy,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel (eds. H. 
Najman and J. Newman; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 331-70.  
501 Reed, “Rethinking.” Becker, “Polishing the Mirror.” S.M. Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and Jew: The 
Problem of Symbiosis under Early Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 181-205. 
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Neoplatonism, which is completely irrelevant to the corpus of Hekhalot mysticism.”502 
Instead, Wolfson seeks to evoke an alternative “native” framework from which to assess 
the Jewish mysticism, highlighting instead the angelification and possible deification of 
the yored hamerkavah. I have tried to do the same in my analysis of the Sar Torah 
macroform above, though I dispute the “either/or” logic interwoven in Wolfson’s 
argument. Schäfer, though critical of Wolfson’s larger characterization of Jewish 
mysticism, nevertheless echoes Wolfson’s sentiment that Neoplatonism – or at least 
Neoplatonic focus of unitive experience with the Divine – has no place for the study of 
Hekhalot literature.503 I agree: “Neoplatonism” – or at least as it is reduced here to a 
mystical union with the One – has no place for the study of Hekhalot literature. At the 
same time, curiously enough, both seem to forget that “theurgy” – which is often used 
heuristically to describe the “magical” character of the Hekhalot corpus – itself comes 
from a specific and influential strand of Neoplatonic thought and that it is as foreign to 
the Hekhalot corpus as “Neoplatonism.” To separate “theurgy” from “Neoplatonism” is 
to make an interpretative judgment on what ‘Neoplatonism’ is and what theurgy is not, 
judgments that operate on the level of description, essence, and value.504 Indeed, by 
announcing that “Neoplatonism” has no value for the study of Hekhalot literature, the 
historical development of “Neoplatonic” thought throughout late antiquity must be passed 
over in silence, when in fact its historical development might tell us something about the 
                                                          
502 E.R. Wolfson, “Mysticism and the Poetic-Liturgical Compositions from Qumran: A Response to Bilhah 
Nitzan,” JQR 85.1-2 (1994): 185-202, 193.  
503 Schäfer, “Origins,”19.  
504 Indeed, we cannot historicize “Hekhalot” literature without historicizing its “comparanda,” in this case, 
theurgy itself. Indeed, as Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler has demonstrated, theurgy as it existed in the past was 
primarily as a discourse, one that meant different things to different people and different times, and not a 
stable set of conceptions of practices. See: I. Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity: The Invention 
of a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013).  
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intertwined late antique and medieval Christian theorizations of revelation, liturgy, and 
ascent, all of which should interest scholars of Hekhalot literature.  
At the risk of making mountains out of molehills, when pushed to its limits, the 
logic that “Neoplatonism” has no place for the study of Hekhalot literature can be 
deployed against categories of “Manichaeism” or “Jewish-Christianity” or “Christianity” 
itself, thereby foreclosing all possibilities of comparison, since all categories are 
ultimately “foreign” in so far as they masquerade as abstractions of particular elements 
and come freighted with their own problematic histories. When placed in such stark 
terms, I do not think that Schäfer or Wolfson would deny the possibility or value of 
comparative work. Yet in order for Neoplatonism to be useful, we must disambiguate and 
historicize “Neoplatonism” itself.  
By way of closing, I offer up the Ps-Dionysian corpus as an example of the 
naturalization of “Neoplatonic” thinking among Syrian Christians living in the sixth 
century and as a way of making the study of Hekhalot literature more historically 
“interesting.” This period was, perhaps not coincidentally, the “gestation period” for the 
emergence of Hekhalot literature. Ps.-Dionysius stands within a centuries-long tradition 
of Syrians thinking about the power of symbols, ascent, and the nature of divinity. To be 
crass about it, Ps.-Dionysius “Christianizes” a form of Iamblichean and Proclean 
Neoplatonism, which at this point, took Iamblichus’ understanding of symbolic theurgy 
for granted. Of course, Neoplatonic thought was beginning to spread among other Syrian 
communities as well, though selectively filtered through the needs of these 
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communities.505 In any case, the Ps.-Dionysian text known as Divine Names centers on 
the power of liturgy and prayer as a theurgic vehicle of ascent, even more than his 
forebears, Iamblichus and Proclus.506 The Divine Names assumes that the divine names of 
God are not merely spoken; they are “hymned,” and when they are properly conceived, 
the hymnist “ascends.” One cannot help but be reminded of the opening lines of Hekhalot 
Rabbati: “What are the songs that one must say in order to peer into the Vision of the 
Chariot, to descend to it in peace and to ascend to it in peace?”507 and the ensuing pages 
of Qedusha songs. This raises the possibility that liturgy played a role in smuggling in 
“foreign” Neoplatonic ideas and naturalizing them in late antique Jewish literature, a 
possibility that is bolstered by the fact that Christian and Jewish liturgy from this time 
period share a number of concerns, tropes, and literary patterns.508 Furthermore, Ps.-
Dionysius emphasizes the process of “unfolding” [ἀνεπτύξαμεν] the divine names of God 
and angels, whereby one might achieve greater intellectual insights into the nature of the 
unknowable God.509 This focus on the “Names of God” and their “unfolding” strikes me 
                                                          
505 A. Becker, Fear of God and the Beginning of Wisdom: The School of Nisibis and Christian Scholastic 
Culture in Late Antique Mesopotamia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 126-54,  
506 Ps.-Dionysius writes, “Let us stretch ourselves through prayers upward to the more lofty elevation of the 
kindly Rays of God. Imagine a great shining chain hanging downward from the heights of heaven to the 
world below. We grab hold of it with one hand and another, and we seem to be pulling it down toward us.” 
: Ἡμᾶς οὖν αὐτοὺς ταῖς εὐχαῖς ἀνατείνωμεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν θείων καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀκτίνων ὑψηλοτέραν ἀνάνευσιν, 
ὥσπερ εἰ πολυφώτου σειρᾶς ἐκ τῆς οὐρανίας ἀκρότητος ἠρτημένης, εἰς δεῦρο δὲ καθηκούσης καὶ ἀεὶ αὐτῆς 
ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσω χερσὶν ἀμοιβαίαις δραττόμενοι καθέλκειν μὲν αὐτὴν ἐδοκοῦμεν, τῷ ὄντι δὲ οὐ κατήγομεν 
ἐκείνην ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω παροῦσαν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνηγόμεθα πρὸς τὰς ὑψηλοτέρας τῶν πολυφώτων 
ἀκτίνων μαρμαρυγάς. (680C, 68). See P. Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an 
Introduction to Their Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 145.  
 .(M22 :81§) מה אילו השירות שהיה אומר מי שמבקש להסתכל בצפיית המרכבה לירד בשלו' ולעלות בשלו'? 507
508 O. Münz-Manor, “Narrating Salvation: Verbal Sacrifices in Late Antique Liturgical Poetry,” in Jews, 
Christians, and the Roman Empire: The Poetics of Power in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 154-166.  
509 “These, then, are the divine names. They are conceptual names and I have unfolded them as well as I 
can. But of course, I have fallen well short of what they actually mean. Even the angels would have to 
admit such a failure and I could scarcely speak praises as they do. Even the greatest of our theologians are 
inferior to the least of the angels… I have not kept to myself any of these hierarchical words which were 
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as remarkably similar to one theme in Hekhalot literature, that is, the “interpretation” [lit. 
“separating out” [הפרש]] of the “theurgic” names of God and his angels. As we have seen, 
when Zerubbabel receives the crown of Sar Torah, he “interprets” [הפרש] the names of 
the Prince of Torah. In another passage of Hekhalot Rabbati, R. Ishmael asks, ‘What is 
the difference/interpretation of the songs that a person sings and descends into the 
Merkavah?” [?מה הפריש שירות שאדם משורר ויורד למרכבה]. Finally, Ps.-Dionysius’ focus on 
angelic hierarchy intersects with the Hekhalot literature’s descriptions of God’s angels, if 
not broadly late antique conceptions of divine “intermediaries”510 and “spiritual 
taxonomies.”511 Together, these points form a sort of dense map of family resemblances 
that overlaps with the values and concerns of Jews responsible for the Hekhalot corpus. 
Of course, such broad strokes are more provocative than probative. Nevertheless, they at 
least open up the possibility for more “interesting” historical representations of the Sar 







                                                                                                                                                                             
handed down to me. I have passed them unchanged to you and to other sacred men, and I will continue to 
do so as long as I have the power of words and you have the power to listen.” : Ταύτας ἡμεῖς τὰς νοητὰς 
θεωνυμίας συνῃρηκότες, ὡς ἐφικτόν, ἀνεπτύξαμεν οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν τῆς ἀκριβείας ἀπολειπόμενοι, τοῦτο 
γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄγγελοι φαῖεν, οὐδὲ τῆς κατὰ ἀγγέλους αὐτῶν ὑμνῳδίας, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων γὰρ ἀποδέουσιν 
οἱ κράτιστοι τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν θεολόγων, οὔτε μὴν αὐτῶν τῶν θεολόγων οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀσκητῶν ἢ 
συνοπαδῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἡμῖν ὁμοταγῶν ἐσχάτως καὶ ὑφειμένως. See: C. Luibheid (trans.), Pseudo-
Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 130-31. 
510 S. Ronis, “Intermediary Beings in Late Antique Judaism: A History of Scholarship,” CBR 14.1 (2015): 
94-120; idem., “Corrigendum,” CBR 14.3 (2016): 407-409. Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, 47-90. 
511 Marx-Wolf, Spiritual Taxonomies.  




I set out at the beginning of this dissertation to employ time and space as the primary 
parameters for navigating the “archive” of ancient texts. In so doing, I broke with models 
of scholarly comparison that are constrained by disciplinary habits, boundaries, and/or 
implicit canons. As a way of navigating through the archive, I focused particularly on 
discursive constructions of “prophethood” and “prophecy” as they developed within the 
late antique Syrian milieu. My broader goal was to propose a historical representation of 
late antique Syria as an environment marked by a peculiar density of individuals and 
communities theorizing about divine knowledge and the possible ways of accessing that 
divine knowledge. As such, I compared and juxtaposed texts within this “late antique 
Syrian” archive that have little to do with one another from a disciplinary standpoint, yet, 
I argued, cohere together when reembedded into their shared milieu. Such a model for 
representing the past, moreover, is potentially more fruitful than asking questions that 
relate to the definition of “prophecy,” in so far as the very category of definition already 
assumes traditional metaphysical ideas like essence, value, origins, development, and 
dissipation. As noted in the introduction, such questions have typically dominated 
scholarship on “prophecy” and “prophethood.” Finally, I sought to plug my dissertation 
into a range of separate scholarly conversations, especially in the fields of Jewish 
mysticism, “Jewish Christianity,” Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism. Again, to be clear, I 
did not seek to define “prophecy” from within any particular discipline, but to use my 
idiosyncratic definition of “prophecy” as a way to cut across these disciplines.  
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 In chapter one, I looked at Baraies the Teacher’ homily in the Cologne Mani 
codex to argue that the Mesopotamian followers of Mani began to theorize 
“prophethood” as a disembedded object of discourse. These early followers of Mani were 
not talking about whether Mani was a prophet or not, but what prophethood itself meant. 
I argued that this “disembedding” of prophethood was not merely a precipitate of earlier 
“Jewish Christian” traditions, but must be seen within its local context. I made a series of 
smaller arguments to make this case. First, Baraies’ the Teacher attempted to speak to 
both factions of the early followers of Mani, not to two different “religious” 
communities. Second, what was at stake was the authority to speak for Mani in the period 
following his execution. In other words, though Baraies’ argument is about Mani’s 
relationship to the chain of “ancestral prophets,” its purpose is to position Baraies and his 
faction as the “authentic” representatives of the community. Finally, I argued that Baraies 
pulls this off successfully by demonstrating his mastery of ancient writings, thereby 
signaling that he possessed the true interpretations of the writings that Mani and the 
ancestral prophets had left behind. 
 In chapter two, I traced out the transformations of Manichaean prophethood as it 
entered into the Late Antique Syrian milieu. I looked especially at the Kephalaias and 
argued that there is not a single “master” Manichaean prophetology but multiple 
prophetologies that emerged in different local contexts. I proposed that these 
developments in Manichaean prophetology, moreover, express a uniquely Manichaean 
anxiety regarding the position of Manichaeism vis-à-vis existing Syro-Mesopotamian 
“Christian” churches. In short, prophetology emerged as a conceptual tool for 
Manichaeans to both assert their identity as Christians – that is, as members of the 
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Church of Christ – and as superior to those local Christians dotting the Syro-
Mesopotamian milieu. I contextualize these developments in early Manichaean 
prophetologies by turning to contemporaneous and proximate Syriac literature, especially 
The Laws of the Various Countries, the Syriac Acts literature, and the Didascalia 
Apostolorum.  
 In the third chapter, I turn to the discursive effects that the Manichaean 
penetration into the late antique Syrian milieu had on local Syrian communities. I argue 
that the Manichaean presence made prophethood an urgent discourse among Syrian 
“Jewish Christian” communities. Manichaean arguments about Mani’s prophethood and 
revelations, as discussed in chapter two, spurred Syrian Christians to reciprocate and 
theorize more robustly an alternative prophetological system. I look specifically at the 
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies and argue that contemporary embryological discourses 
undergird its unique prophetological system. Such discourses are marshalled to make two 
interrelated points: first, to argue that “revelatory visions” or apparitions cannot impart 
true knowledge of God, and second, to polemicize against the apostle Paul, whom it 
marks as a representative of the false prophetess. Both these points, I argue, surgically 
respond to Mani’s self-presentation as Paul redivivus.  
 Whereas the first three chapters focused on the emergence of “prophethood” as 
discourse in the late antique Syro-Mesopotamian context, the next two chapters focus on 
“prophecy” itself. In the fourth chapter, I situate the shifting meanings of prognosis 
among late antique Syrian communities. While local Syrian communities were in broad 
agreement that Greek philosophy was a poor path for gaining knowledge of the divine, 
the Neoplatonists, “Jewish Christians,” and the Manichaeans argued that it was possible 
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to attain “divine prognosis.” At the same time, Syriac-speaking Christians and rabbis 
argued that one should study only those things that God had decreed as appropriate for 
study, suggesting that they are responding negatively to theorizations of prophecy among 
the other proximate communities. In fact, I argue that the Neoplatonists, “Jewish 
Christians,” and Manichaeans began to conceptualize prognosis along converging lines, 
namely, as total panoptic knowledge that could only be possessed by those who are 
ontologically connected to the divine. The Neoplatonists and “Jewish Christians” defined 
this conception of divine prognosis against discursive means of knowledge acquisition, 
especially those aligned with Greek philosophy, and against the sort of incremental 
knowledge made available through medical and divinatory prognosis. The Manichaeans, 
in contrast, do not talk about Greek philosophy, but they argued that only the appointed 
prophet could possess divine prognosis, since he both saw the “revelations” of the divine 
and was an extension of the divine essence itself. Intriguingly, they too distinguished this 
understanding of panoptic prognosis against the sort of prognosis offered by traditional 
divinatory practices.  
 The fifth and final chapter extends the argument made in the fourth chapter to 
apply to the Sar Torah macroform. I argued that in the process of marketing the Sar 
Torah praxis to its audience, the macroform raises the possibility that humans could 
“contemplate” in the same way as the angels, that is, instantaneously without toil or 
labor. At the same time, the macroform had to articulate Torah as something that could 
be “instantaneously known.” To do so, it contrasted rabbinic models of handling and 
comprehending Torah, which it portrays as profoundly bound to human corporeality, 
against its own “measures of Torah,” which “measured” the entire content and value of 
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Torah and could be comprehended instantaneously. The Sar Torah macroform thus 
promises its practitioners/readers that it would make them more like angels in their ability 
to study Torah and rendered the true “value” of Torah into something only attainable 
through angelic contemplation. In attempting to contextualize the Sar Torah macroform, 
moreover, I argued that it should not be seen merely as a natural “outgrowth” of rabbinic 
culture nor through other Hekhalot traditions. Rather, I suggested that this shift in 
thinking about angelic contemplation and the divine measures of Torah make sense 
within the broader shifts that I had already outlined in chapter four, especially the idea 
that human and discursive modes of knowledge acquisition as profoundly incapable of 
attaining the true “value” or “measure” of the divine.  
 It is my hope that the foregoing analysis of these texts as tethered to a shared 
milieu might spur further research into the relatively underworked fields discussed in this 
dissertation. As a way forward, I suggest that some of the questions asked here might be 
pushed further into the future or pushed more firmly eastward into Mesopotamia. How 
might the prophetological systems in “Mandaeism,” for example, serve as useful 
trajectories for the types of prophetologies discussed in this chapter? Could they be 
mapped unto the prophetological models without having to rely on a “Jewish Christian” 
or “Gnostic” core? What about the early Islamic prophetologies? Such questions raise the 
hope that these fields could be integrated more fully into the field of “late antique 
religions.” 
At the same time, I think that the model for historical representation offered here 
presents a somewhat experimental yet a potentially more interesting model for scholarly 
practices of historical representation. It is more interesting, in my opinion, because the 
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boundaries of what counts as comparanda remain perpetually open. At its core, it 
dispenses with the text/context binary that so bedevils scholarly habits of situating “X” in 
its “Y” context. The “texts” under discussion become nothing more than comparanda for 
one another, echoing Derrida, “There is nothing outside context.” Or, put differently, all 
the texts studied in this dissertation compose a single late antique Syrian “text,” albeit 
one that remains written in different languages, by people with different agendas, and so 
on. This model can be applied to a wide range of fields, though I think it would be 
particularly powerful for the burgeoning fields of “Irano-Talmudica” and “Late Antique 
Law.” Ultimately, the “narrative” that I spun in this dissertation remain my best attempt 
at teasing out the historical traces within the texts, and one that and I hope that it is met 
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